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Preface
Statistics are not synonymous with reality but are, rather, a way of re-
presenting the complexity of the world in categories and figures at-
tached to such categories. This becomes immediately obvious when we
compare the ways in which comparable phenomena – such as interna-
tional migration – are statistically represented in different national con-
texts. The national statistics used to describe international migration
are based on different conceptualisations that are closely related to the
history of the respective country as well as to the particular history of
migration from and to this country. Moreover, countries have various
ways of counting their foreign citizens, foreign-born populations, im-
migrants and ethnic minorities in censuses, population registers,
aliens registers and permit databases.
That such differences, in both the concepts and techniques used to
measure migration, make any international comparison of the existing
data impossible was first pointed out more than 150 years ago. As early
as 1891, the congress of the International Statistical Institute drafted a
first uniform definition of an international migrant. Since then, several
international institutions, most prominently the International Labour
Organisation and the United Nations, have heavily invested in harmo-
nising data on international migration by organising conferences and
issuing recommendations on concepts, definitions and measurements
of this phenomenon (see Kraly & Gnanasekaran 1987; Herm 2006).
More recently, such organisations were joined in their efforts by the
European Commission. Utilising newly acquired competences, the Eur-
opean Commission proposed a regulation on migration statistics in
2005, which was adopted in a slightly adapted form in 2007, and also
invested in a European project investigating the feasibility of its imple-
mentation (see Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006). Yet, despite all
these efforts, the concepts and techniques used to measure migration
in the individual countries still differ massively.
As many of the above-described initiatives, the present publication
departs from these differences in the measurement of migration. Yet,
unlike these ameliorative initiatives, it does not aim to issue a further
set of recommendations for the standardisation of data on international
migration in Europe. Nor does it try to harmonise existing data on this
topic, as does Eurostat or the so-called SOPEMI (Système d’observation
permanente des migrations), a continuous reporting system on inter-
national migration established by the OECD (for more information on
international data collection see Herm 2006: 90-105). This volume in-
tends to look at the existing national data from a critical perspective
with a view to answering the following questions: How do the ap-
proaches to counting international migrants vary between countries?
How far are these different approaches related to the histories of mi-
gration in these countries? How far do the existing statistics mirror the
reality of migration in each of these countries? And what historical, po-
litical and legal knowledge is necessary in order to correctly interpret
the existing data in the different European countries?
The researchers who joined forces in producing this book first rea-
lised that there were no answers to these questions in the existing lit-
erature on international migration statistics when they put together a
state-of-the-art report on this topic for the EU-funded Network of Excel-
lence IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohe-
sion in Europe) or, to be more precise, for the thematic cluster dealing
with migration and its regulation, which is coordinated by Heinz Fas-
smann (see Fassmann, Kohlbacher, Reeger & Sievers 2005). In order
to fill this gap, several experts involved in this cluster wrote reports on
the statistics in their country and met to present and discuss these in
three workshops. These took place in Vienna in April 2005, Osnabrück
in September 2005 and Istanbul in March 2006. These workshops re-
sulted in common guidelines for the structure of the chapters collected
in this volume.
This background explains the higher level of coherence across contri-
butions than is often the case in comparative studies based on indivi-
dual country chapters. Each chapter starts with a short overview of the
history of migration to the respective country since the Second World
War and explains the importance of migration both in real terms and
in terms of public and political opinion. This is followed by an over-
view of stock and flow statistics, including a consideration of their im-
plementation and of the concepts and instruments used to measure
migration. In the third part, the authors provide a critical insight into
the stocks of immigrants living in their countries and the numbers of
people entering and leaving per year. In addition, they comment on
trends observed in recent literature, such as the feminisation of migra-
tion or the diversification of migrants’ origins if the statistics collated
in their countries allow this (which was not the case in Poland and Ro-
mania, where the data are highly unreliable). The final section is de-
voted to a critical outlook that emphasises the problems of existing sta-
tistical instruments and explores possible future developments. Each
chapter is supplemented by an appendix, which, apart from the most
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important publications, contains links to available datasets and ad-
dresses of statistical offices.
The selection of countries described in this volume includes exam-
ples from Western, Central, Southern and Eastern Europe and of both
post-colonial and labour migration. It contains reports on the three Eur-
opean countries that have received the largest numbers of immigrants
since the Second World War – namely France, Germany and the United
Kingdom – but also on smaller countries such as Austria and Belgium,
where the share of resident immigrants is similarly high. On the other
hand, the book examines several different sending countries, including
Turkey – one of the most important countries of origin for migration to
the European Union and an accession candidate – and Portugal. Both
countries have more recently also begun to receive immigrants. Finally,
through Switzerland, the book also looks at the concepts of measuring
migration in a non-EU country in the centre of Europe.
We divided the twelve countries described in this book into four
groups based on their histories and migration regimes:
1. post-colonial countries: Belgium, France and the UK, which re-
ceived immigrants from their (former) colonies;
2. guestworker receiving countries: Austria, Germany and Switzerland,
which actively recruited workers in Southern and South-Eastern
Europe;
3. post-communist countries: Poland, Hungary and Romania, where
emigration and more recently immigration have (re-)gained impor-
tance after the fall of the Iron Curtain; and
4. new immigrant receiving countries: Greece, Portugal and Turkey,
which used to be major sending countries of labour migrants but
have recently also become receiving countries of migration.
These groups should, however, not be understood as strict categorisa-
tions. Thus, both Belgium and France received immigrants from their
(former) colonies but also actively recruited workers in Eastern Europe
in the interwar period and in Southern Europe after the Second World
War. In fact, in Belgium this form of migration is numerically more
important, which partly explains why Belgium also shares some statis-
tical traditions with the Central European countries. On the other
hand, a large majority of the immigrants in Portugal originate from
former Portuguese colonies. As a consequence, some traits of the Por-
tuguese statistics bear close resemblances to those in the post-colonial
countries. Notwithstanding these overlaps, the four groups of countries
described above share some basic characteristics in conceptualising
and measuring international migration, which we will further discuss
in the concluding chapter of this volume.
PREFACE 19
This book is the joint effort of many researchers who came together
through the European Network of Excellence IMISCOE. The editors
would like to thank the contributors for their willingness to cooperate,
for all the work they invested, not only in their texts but also in discuss-
ing their co-contributors’ work, and for their patience during the publi-
cation process. Without them this book would not exist. Thanks are
also due to the European Commission for funding our meetings,
which were of great importance in making this joint venture a success.
We are very grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments
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Public perception always lags behind actual migration development,
and statistical surveys react even more slowly. On the one hand, this
has to do not only with the institutional sluggishness of the statistics
bureaus, but also with the persistence of their conceptual frameworks
and counting methods. What migration constitutes and how it is mea-
sured is anything but a matter of consensus, which implies that the re-
sulting data are not comparable, either across national borders or over
time. On the other hand, statistics influence the public’s perception of
the issue. The concepts and techniques used to measure migration
structure the understanding of this phenomenon and thus also influ-
ence social discourse. The perception, the measurement and the actual
phenomenon thus interact in an interesting dialectical relationship.
The following article deals with this dialectic and demonstrates how
the actual development of migration has influenced statistical surveys
and public perception. The article argues historically and tries to show
that the states’ perceptions and controls have led to divergent systems
of migration surveys, which even today characterise the situation in
Europe. Indeed, even now, the concepts and measurements of migra-
tion used in the European countries still differ massively. The Eur-
opean Union is trying to develop a common migration and integration
policy but is still far from having a standardised definition, either of
who is a migrant or of how migrants are to be counted.
2 Historical migration patterns
Migration out of, to and within Europe is nothing new. Political and re-
ligiously motivated displacement, the migration of the elite, the seaso-
nal migration of farm labourers or the migration of trades people or
students, had already existed before the nineteenth century in various
forms. A regionally oriented migration history would be full of perti-
nent examples of such events. What changed with the industrialisation
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the quantitative degree
of intra-European and intercontinental migration, as well as the aver-
age distance of migration. Geographical mobility ‘exploded’ in the nine-
teenth century and the amount of long distance migration reached pre-
viously unseen values. The German demographer Gunther Ipsen has
correctly termed this phase the ‘century of the great drift’ (Ipsen 1961).
2.1 The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
Geographical mobility in the Europe of the nineteenth century meant,
in most cases, rural to city migration and, at the same time, internal
migration. All European metropolises experienced an exorbitantly fast
growth, almost exclusively through immigration from the rural re-
gions, both in the immediate vicinity of these cities and further afield.
However, emigration overseas remained much stronger in the collec-
tive memory than this internal migration. In the Austro-Hungarian
Empire towards the end of the nineteenth century, for example, the
portion of overseas migration represented only between 15 and 20 per
cent (see Fassmann 1985). Nevertheless, the authorities compiled de-
tailed data on overseas migration and the topic was publicly discussed,
while interior migration, as an expected result of the liberation of the
serfs, and urban industrialisation were accepted without further ado.
That overseas migration was more strongly thematised was to some
extent due to the more comprehensive state statistics on this phenom-
enon. One could speak about emigration to the United States because
there were figures on these movements. In the harbours of emigration
(Hamburg, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Amsterdam, Trieste or Liverpool)
and in the admission points of the destination countries (for example,
Ellis Island in New York), immigration and emigration officers meticu-
lously logged all travellers in long lists. They included the names of
those immigrating or emigrating, as well as age, gender, occupation,
geographic and ethnic origins, in addition to distinctive features, such
as personal disabilities. However, the data were not always correct,
although they were based on personal interviews; for example, Polish-
speaking citizens of Austria-Hungary were frequently allocated to Po-
land, as a result of the fact that the information provided by the inter-
viewee was unclear and/or that the immigration officer did not know
the states and boundaries in Europe at the time.
Unlike overseas migration, national and intra-European migration
data were only indirectly collated. No one recorded the internal migrant
when he or she left his or her hometown and moved to the next city.
In fact, such a registration was technically impossible. Internal migra-
tion could only be reconstructed indirectly from the census, meaning
the information on the place of birth. The Austrian and Hungarian
censuses additionally gathered information on the place of domicile.
22 HEINZ FASSMANN
Every citizen of the empire had the ‘right of domicile’ (Heimatberechti-
gung) in one municipality. This form of local citizenship implied that
the municipality would have to take over the social care of the person
in question if necessary. The citizen could move this right to another
municipality by an application process if he or she had been living in
this municipality for a long time. Nevertheless, a comparison of the to-
tal population living in a municipality with the number of those having
right of domicile in the same municipality provided some, if not very
precise, information on the extent and the geographic dispersion of na-
tional and European internal migration (see Ladstätter 1973).
Some censuses would also collate information on emigration by ask-
ing in households if a family member was abroad and for what period
of time. However, not all censuses in Europe included this question,
for the simple reason that it did not yield any precise or verifiable re-
sults, since the census takers had no possibility of double-checking or
amending the information about the ‘missing’ persons.
Apart from the collection of data on emigration in the country of ori-
gin, the country of destination also attempted to provide data on these
emigrants. The statistical offices in Europe registered all resident for-
eign citizens and sent these registration cards back to their countries
of origin. Based on these cards, the statistical authorities calculated the
sum of their citizens living abroad. Once again, it must be stressed that
these statistics on citizens living abroad were not very precise, because
only a few countries agreed to swap registration cards; furthermore,
there were no precise data on the length of the stay abroad. Whether a
person remained abroad for a month or a year was irrelevant; this dis-
tinction was and is, however, integral to the definition of migration.
In sum, there were relatively precise data on emigration flows from
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, whereas the extent of in-
ternal migration within the European nation states and migration
across European borders could only be gathered from the stocks of the
foreign-born residing in the municipalities and countries at the times
of the censuses. The same has been true for the censuses held regu-
larly since 1790 in the US. While they count the immigrant stocks in
this destination country, by definition, they do not include any data on
return migrants or deceased immigrants. In other words, the census
data do not yield any information on the migration flows between Eur-
ope and the US. Moreover, even the rough figures from the available
flow statistics of European overseas migration show considerable dis-
crepancies. Ferenczi and Wilcox claim that roughly 50 to 55 million
people emigrated from Europe to the US and approximately another
ten million Europeans left for Argentina, Canada and Brazil between
1846 and 1924 (1929: 185). The same authors quote a figure of only
around 30 million immigrants who arrived in the US and around 13
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million who entered Canada, Brazil and Argentina between 1856 and
1924. Chermayeff, Wasserman and Shapiro (1991), in turn, provided
the figure of only around 60 million immigrants into the US for the
period between 1600 and 1924. It is obvious that, despite the consider-
ably better statistical data on overseas migration, there are still massive
discrepancies.
Taken altogether, the data gathered both in the emigration ports and
in the countries of destination only provide rough estimates on Eur-
opean overseas migration. While these are enough to ascertain tenden-
cies, they should not be confused with unequivocal and precise statis-
tics (see Chermayeff, Wasserman & Shapiro 1991). Nevertheless, they
show an ‘old immigration’ into the US which lasted until approxi-
mately 1880 and which principally originated from Ireland, Britain,
Germany and the Scandinavian states, as well as a ‘new immigration’
from Italy, Austria-Hungary and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, they il-
lustrate a change from the definitive emigration of entire families or
even towns aimed at settlement in the country of destination, to indivi-
dual migrations of men and increasingly also of women with a grow-
ing contingent of people returning to their countries of origins. These,
however, are trends rather than hard statistical facts.
The end of the nineteenth century also saw the first discussions on
how to collate internationally comparable statistics on migration at the
congress of the International Statistical Institute (ISI) held in Vienna
in 1891. However, the only result of this discussion was the rather
vague conclusion that a standardised definition and procedure was ne-
cessary. The next congress of the ISI, held in Budapest in 1901, re-
sulted in the recommendation that a distinction ought to be made be-
tween permanent and temporary migration. The Institute passed
further resolutions concerning internationally comparable migration
statistics at its various meetings in Rome (1926), Warsaw (1929) and
Madrid (1931) (see Kraly & Gnanasekaran 1987: 969).
2.2 The inter-war years: 1918-1939
The factors affecting immigration and emigration changed massively
in the inter-war years, resulting in a decrease in international migra-
tion. This decrease was caused less by the changed social acceptance or
the dismantling of businesses and institutions that facilitated and
gained from migration (the so-called ‘migration industry’), than by eco-
nomic crises and the associated changes in the legal system. The US,
Europe and, later on, Canada, as well as the South American countries,
plunged into a deep economic crisis from the middle of the 1920s,
which became even graver in the 1930s. As a consequence, the public
increasingly perceived immigration as a threat and as a form of addi-
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tional competition; this perception facilitated the introduction of a legal
framework regulating migration and limiting the number of people al-
lowed to enter the respective country in a given year. Austria and Ger-
many enacted preferential treatment of their citizens in the labour mar-
ket, while the US limited annual immigration and imposed regional
quotas. The First Quota Act of 1921 allowed an annual immigration of
350,000, the second Quota Act of 1924 only 150,000, which was just
over a quarter of the overall annual average of the period from 1856 to
1924.
Due to the increasing negative perception of migration, its statistical
collation received greater attention. The ISI endorsed a data collection
programme in 1924 which would have resulted in an internationally
uniform system. ‘The “international combined method” adopted na-
tional identity documents that would include an information sheet
with detachable carbon copies. The copies would then be submitted at
each entry point during travel’ (Kraly & Gnanasekaran 1987: 969).
At the start of the 1920s, the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) recommended that each member of the ILO should make agree-
ments with other members for the adoption of a uniform definition of
the term ‘emigrant’ and the use of a uniform method of gathering sta-
tistics on international migration. In 1924, the ILO held the Interna-
tional Conference on Emigration and Immigration in Rome, which, in
its closing document, stated the need for a standardised definition of
immigration and emigration.
The Conference recognized the need for internationally compar-
able migration statistics for statistical and social scientific pur-
poses. It went on further, however, to suggest the need for stan-
dard international migration statistics as a ‘... basis for the regu-
lation of migration by international convention and to facilitate
cooperation of the administrative authorities of different coun-
tries’. (Kraly & Gnanasekaran 1987: 969)
It is difficult to establish why this and other attempts to standardise a
definition of international migration failed. One plausible explanation
may be that the individual nation states followed separate routes with
respect to the above-mentioned relations between perception, recording
and policies of migration. Such national autonomisation began early
on and was largely resistant to attempts at standardisation. Just to cite
one example of the variety: from 1924, the French Bureau International
du Travail (BIT) and the Société Générale d’Immigration (SGI) re-
cruited large groups of workers directly in Poland and Russia. The
amount of these inflows was collated in both administrative statistics
and the census. There was, however, no noteworthy emigration out of
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France in the nineteenth century or in the inter-war years. As a conse-
quence, France has never had, and has still not developed, any instru-
ments for collating data on emigration. Austria is a totally different
case; after the First World War, immigration to the new Austria de-
creased massively while at the same time large numbers of people emi-
grated to the new independent successor states of Austria-Hungary, but
also to the US, Canada and South America. As a consequence of these
changes, the 1923 Census in Austria, unlike earlier censuses, did not
include a question on birthplace, because counting immigrants made
less and less sense. Conversely, the Interior Ministry precisely regis-
tered and counted organised overseas emigration. These examples
show that statistics are always connected to specific problems in a so-
ciety, which international recommendations can, at best, only partially
address.
In the inter-war years, a significant development was that of forced
migrations which had nothing to do with economic disparities, with so-
cial acceptance of immigration or with voluntary choice of a better life
elsewhere. The majority of the migrations after 1918 resulted from the
new order laid down in the Peace Treaties after the First World War.
The victorious Entente revised the borders in East Central Europe and
in the Balkans, thereby helping the people of this region to achieve na-
tional self-determination. However, the formation of these new nation
states at the same time created a large number of ethnic minorities,
whose emigration was organised or at least facilitated. This affected
ethnic Greeks, Turks, Hungarians, Poles and Germans. Moreover, Rus-
sians, Ukrainians and Belo-Russians were forced to emigrate as a re-
sult of the October Revolution and the subsequent civil war. Later, the
National Socialist repressions and threat of genocide forced the Eur-
opean Jewry to leave for Czechoslovakia, France, Britain and, especially,
the US. These flights and expulsions also influenced the standardised
usage of the term ‘migration’, which until then had connoted citizens
leaving their state of origin in order to settle in a different state. How-
ever, these movements were less about citizens leaving their states of
origin but about (new) states producing migrants and stateless people
who became a particularly disadvantaged group of refugees.
Forced migrations, expulsions and ethnic cleansing also left traces in
the statistics because these changes in the populations were registered
and collated. Lists were compiled in refugee camps, while countless
lists and inventories were made in concentration and work camps. The
expelled persons received identity cards or temporary documents or
were registered when they claimed financial compensation for losses
suffered in the Second World War (Lastenausgleich). Since the statistics
resulting from these administrative procedures were based on the con-
cepts of individual legal frameworks, the different data sources that de-
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scribe similar phenomena are neither exact nor comparable. Hence,
the frequently quoted numbers of expelled and persecuted persons in
the inter-war years are always estimates which are subject to political
exploitation and are, therefore, to be treated with scepticism.
2.3 The post-war years
The same holds true for the immediate post-war period. Once again,
due to the new political order, there was a considerable increase in mi-
gration, which was in no way voluntary and which was not considered
a normal form of labour migration by either the affected people or the
host countries. Flight and expulsion became symbols of the immediate
post-war years; the numbers of refugees could only be approximated.
In view of the suffering of millions of displaced persons (prisoners of
war, forced labourers and surviving concentration camp prisoners), the
expelled Germans as well as Poles, Ukrainians, Italians and Hungar-
ians who were forced to leave their homes, exact numbers were prob-
ably not decisive. In any case, precise or allegedly exact figures are of-
ten exploited by countries comparing and contrasting the suffering
they experienced.
European migration becomes more differentiated once again from
the 1950s. On the one hand, this is due to the changes in the two colo-
nial empires of France and Great Britain. After the Second World War,
France resumed the active recruitment of immigrants that it first
started in the inter-war period. For this purpose, it established the Of-
fice National d’Immigration (ONI), which signed a first recruitment
agreement with Italy in 1947. Apart from the labour migrants entering
France under these agreements, there were regular movements be-
tween France and the then still-existing colonies. Several million civil
servants, soldiers and settlers of European origin had moved to the co-
lonies held by France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal in Afri-
ca, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. Fol-
lowing the independence of these colonies, many Europeans moved
back permanently to their countries of origin. Thus, the average of
304,000 people per year immigrating into France in the first five years
of the 1960s is also a result of the Algerian War and Algeria’s subse-
quent independence. Moreover, a large number of native Algerians,
who at the time were French citizens, moved to France after the Sec-
ond World War to live and work there.
The situation was similar in the UK. However, Britain up to the
1960s not only allowed the subjects of existing colonies but also those
of former colonies to enter the country without having to undergo any
immigration controls. All of these immigrants were, at best, only selec-
tively counted in the censuses held at the time. They were not consid-
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ered immigrants or emigrants, but were regarded as internal migrants
moving within a colonial empire or the Commonwealth. As a conse-
quence, the extent of these movements can only be gathered from the
migration balance, which is obtained by comparing the total population
recorded in two consecutive censuses plus the number of births and
minus the number of deaths registered between these two census
dates.
Conversely, the German-speaking countries of central Europe also
changed both their mechanisms of counting migrants and their migra-
tion regimes after the Second World War. Austria reintroduced the cri-
terion of ‘birthplace’ into its census in 1951 in order to be able to assess
the degree of flight and expulsion. After that, however, another form of
migration began. Germany, and later Austria, started systematically to
recruit foreign workers in Southern and South-Eastern Europe in the
1960s, since the Cold War and the Iron Curtain had cut off their tradi-
tional reservoirs for labour migrants from Eastern Europe. However,
the workers coming from Italy, Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey
were not necessarily perceived as immigrants. Rather, the Austrian and
German policies at the time were guided by the idea that the labour
migrants should enter their countries for a limited period of time in or-
der to fill the labour shortages resulting from economic growth. The
motto of their policy was ‘rotation’, which implied short-term help
through foreign labour when there was demand, but also a return
home when this demand decreased. Foreign workers were supposed to
behave like spinning tops on the domestic labour market. They should
come and go, if possible alone and without families, and be very flex-
ible both occupationally and geographically. This would bring maxi-
mum benefits to German and Austrian businesses while relieving so-
ciety from fundamental questions of integration, which were inevitable
when labour forces began to settle. Neither did countries of origin or
destination regard these migrants as permanent emigrants or immi-
grants, respectively, and therefore did not count them as such.
Additional labour forces from abroad were looked upon favourably,
both publicly and politically, as they worked for lower wages and were
thus useful to domestic businesses. They could also easily fade from
the public conscience. Accommodation in makeshift lodgings, barracks
or caravans right on the construction sites made it even easier for the
public to ignore the presence of these workers. In addition, the chosen
terminology – foreign workers (Fremdarbeiter) or guestworkers (Gastar-
beiter) – signalled that they would only stay temporarily and were there-
fore not immigrants. These workers were consistently described as
temporary resident population in the Austrian census and from 1965
onwards were recorded in separate administrative statistics on ‘regis-
tered guestworkers’ rather than in the normal population registers (see
28 HEINZ FASSMANN
Lichtenberger 1984). The German government had already established
such separate statistics in 1953. However, the Central Aliens Register
(Ausländerzentralregister) not only contained information on residence
and place of work but also on violations of the law.
The phase of rapid growth in Western Europe in the 1950s and
1960s was followed by an economic slump in the 1970s, which also
brought the recruitment of foreign workers to a halt. As a result of the
oil price shock and the ensuing economic stagnation, the fight for jobs
became harder. Foreign workers came to be seen as a threat and their
presence discussed in the public arena. While the British government
introduced regulations that tried to stop immigration from their former
colonies, the German and Austrian governments introduced political
measures that aimed to make the ‘guestworkers’ leave. However, these
measures did not always produce the desired result. Although some
guestworkers did indeed return to their countries of origin, others not
only stayed, but also brought their families. In fact, the end of active re-
cruitment seems to have been a clear signal that those who wanted to
stay would have to attain permanent residence. For this reason, the to-
tal foreign population residing in Austria, Germany and Switzerland
rose much more significantly than the number of foreign citizens
working in these countries. These changes also meant that the count-
ing and collating of data on the foreign population gained increasing
importance once again. The Austrian and German governments in-
vested heavily in improving the quality of the census data in Austria
and of the microcensus, register and socio-scientific data (e.g. the so-
cio-economic panel) in Germany.
At the same time, the quality of migration statistics in all European
states improved significantly thanks to the beginning internationalisa-
tion and standardisation of the definitions of migration. Following
many years in which the nation states had designed their statistics se-
parately, a new approach became at least conceivable in regulations,
such as the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
which agreed not only on the legal position of refugees but also on a
precise definition of what constituted a political refugee. This first dis-
tinct definition of a form of international migration was soon to be fol-
lowed by others. In the late 1940s, soon after their creation, the Popula-
tion Commission and the Statistical Commission of the United Nations
addressed the issue of producing recommendations on international
migration statistics. The first set of recommendations was adopted in
1953. It centred on the definition of ‘permanent immigrants’ as non-re-
sidents (both nationals and aliens) arriving with the intention to re-
main for a period exceeding a year and of ‘permanent emigrants’ as re-
sidents (nationals and aliens) intending to remain abroad for a period
exceeding one year (see United Nations 1998). The first revision of
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these recommendations followed in 1976, the second in 1998, which is
also the most recent definition of migration recommended by the UN.
The recommendations came late, perhaps too late, which might explain
why the nation states have been slow in implementing them. In fact,
the repeated revisions aimed not only to develop the existing defini-
tions of migration and to adapt them to social discourse, but also to re-
mind the states of the necessity of their observance.
2.4 The end of European partition
With the fall of the Iron Curtain there was a significant change in the
general framework for European migration. The low and high wage
areas that had been divided by a border up to 1989/90 immediately en-
tered into a process of exchange once this border was opened. While ca-
pital moved from the high wage area into the low wage area, labour
moved in the opposite direction. Germany and Austria experienced a
rise in inflow of workers. In addition, the numbers of war refugees and
asylum seekers entering these countries rose significantly as a result of
the civil war in former Yugoslavia. In these years, the migration bal-
ance in Germany reached an all time high of over 560,000 people (see
Table 1). At the same time, the economies of the southern European
countries caught up with their northern neighbours, also as a result of
increasing European integration. While the Portugal, Spain, Italy and
Greece of the 1960s were countries of origin of labour migration, they
became destination countries at the beginning of the new century. Sur-
prisingly for many, Spain ranked in fourth place of the countries receiv-
ing the largest numbers of immigrants in Europe in 2005.
Since the turn of the century, asylum and migration politics has also
increasingly come on the European agenda. With the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam, the agendas referring to migration, previously anchored in
Table 1 Annual migration balance for the EU-25, 1960-2003
EU-25 Germany France UK Spain
1960-1964 230 163 304 60 -109.7
1965-1969 -34 221 95 -45 -30.1
1970-1974 82 171 115 -32 -32.1
1975-1979 265 15 34 -11 28.3
1980-1984 15 2 52 -34 0.8
1985-1989 382 332 50 22 -19.7
1990-1994 856 563 23 22 49.4
1995-1999 645 204 8 81 129
2000-2003 1,329 155 118 161 507
Average 1960-2003 377 205 87 18 37
Source: Eurostat; author’s calculation
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the intergovernmental ‘third pillar’, were transferred to the jurisdiction
of the European Union. Articles 61-69 of this contract obliged the Mem-
ber States to develop joint visa, asylum and immigration policies by May
2004, including regulations on the recognition of refugees, the legal po-
sition of third-country nationals and family reunification, as well as
minimum standards for asylum procedures (see Perchinig 2007). How-
ever, a joint asylum and migration policy is inconceivable without an in-
tegrated data collation system that serves as a basis for planning these
policies. That is why the European Commission has also increased its ef-
forts to convince the individual states to adopt binding standards for the
definition and measurement of migration. It published a set of recom-
mendations in 2005 that aim to harmonise the European statistics on
migration. Whether these will be more successful than their predeces-
sors remains to be seen. But, as the present study shows, the shortcom-
ings of international migration data are momentous.
3 Problems of measuring international migration
Migration to, within and out of the EU is diverse and complex. Passen-
ger lists, information provided by port authorities or records gathered
at the points of entry no longer do justice to the variety of types of mi-
gration. Moreover, the individual nation states use long-established but
very different instruments for determining population and migration
figures, which are not necessarily easy to harmonise with each other.
As long as these national statistics constitute the smallest building
blocks of comparability, the enormous efforts of the OECD to collate
and present internationally standardised statistics within the frame-
work of their SOPEMI (Système d’observation permanente des migra-
tions) are doomed to failure. Similarly problematic are the efforts of
Eurostat, which accesses and aggregates these national statistics. On its
website, Eurostat refers quite openly to this problem: ‘The complete-
ness of the tables depends largely on the availability of data from the
relevant national statistical institutes’.1
The aggregation of national statistics will remain deficient unless
these are radically reformed or Europe carries out its own surveys
(such as the Labour Force Survey). Even when the Member States have
tried to implement the definition of an international migrant recom-
mended by the UN, the definitions still ‘vary significantly between
countries, within countries over time, and between different sources of
statistical information’, as Nowok, Kupiszewska and Poulain show
clearly and impressively (2006: 214). The associated problems of mea-
suring international migration in flow and stock statistics will be illu-
strated more clearly below.
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3.1 Flow statistics
Flow statistics measure the degree of migration within a specific time
period (usually one year). They are more sensitive than stock statistics
and directly show changes in migratory patterns. For this reason, more
and more countries have begun to implement flow statistics that are
usually compiled in the course of administrative procedures (such as re-
gistrations and deregistrations at registry offices or issuance of residence
and work permits, etc.). One disadvantage of these instruments is that
they depend upon the specific legal requirements of the respective state
at a specific point in time. Consequently, the resulting statistics are not
comparable across borders or over time. Moreover, as the statistics are
by-products of an administrative procedure, they are compiled by admin-
istrative staff and not by staff trained in statistics. This can have a nega-
tive impact on the quality of the information. Usually, statistics of this
type only provide very basic information such as the total number of mi-
grants, sometimes differentiated by sex and age. However, they rarely
contain information on the occupational history, the educational back-
ground, the place of birth or the last residence of the respective person
or whether he or she has left behind a family, a piece of information that
would be essential in estimating the potential of family reunification.2
When implementing flow statistics, most European states follow, in
principle, the definition of international migration recommended by
the UN. These recommendations define a long-term migrant as ‘a per-
son who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual resi-
dence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of
destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual resi-
dence. From the perspective of the country of departure the person will
be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival the per-
son will be a long-term immigrant’ (United Nations 1998: 18). A short-
term migrant is consequently:
a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her
usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a
year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that
country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends
and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrim-
age. For purposes of international migration statistics, the coun-
try of usual residence of short-term migrants is considered to be
the country of destination during the period they spend in it.
(United Nations 1998: 18)
The first problem, which arises when this definition is implemented,
is that of defining what ‘usual residence’ is. Although the UN has
32 HEINZ FASSMANN
clearly defined what this term means (‘the geographical place where
the person usually resides’), not all European states adhere to this defi-
nition or they interpret it differently. Many countries still count their
nationals as part of the resident population at least for a few months
after they have left. Austrians are categorised as emigrants after they
have left Austria for more than three months (see the chapter on Aus-
tria in this publication), Belgians after six months (see the chapter on
Belgium in this book), the Dutch if they their stay exceeds eight
months out of the forthcoming twelve-month period and Poles and Ro-
manians are only counted as emigrants if they declare that they leave
for good (see the chapters on Poland and Romania in this book). Resi-
dents of Romania are counted towards the Romanian population if
they have a permanent registered address in Romania, even if they live
and work in another country. De facto these people are emigrants: de
jure they are not categorised as such in Romania (see Romania in this
book).
The second practical problem concerns the question of whether all
people who change their usual residence should be counted. While the
UN recommendations imply that every person settling in the country
for a specific period of time should be included in the statistics, many
European countries exclude ethnic immigration or immigration from
countries to which they have specific historical or political links. Until
1974, Portugal did not register entries from the Portuguese-speaking
African countries (Paı́ses Africanos de Lı́ngua Oficial Portuguesa, PA-
LOP), since these were not regarded as a change of place of residence
but as a special form of colonial internal migration (see the chapter on
Portugal in this book). However, when these countries became inde-
pendent, the legislation changed. From 1975, those arriving from the
PALOP who were of African origin were regarded and registered as
regular immigrants, whereas immigrants of Portuguese origin were
not counted as international migrants.
Perhaps the most prominent example of immigrants not being
counted as such can be found in Germany. The German (Spät)-Aussie-
dler (ethnic Germans who have the right to resettle to Germany) are
not categorised as ‘foreigners’ but as German citizens despite the fact
that they are the quintessential migrants. The sheer number of these
shows how significant the varying treatments are. Between 1991 and
2005 more than two million ethnic Germans settled in Germany.
The same holds true for Romanians of Hungarian origin entering
Hungary (see the chapter on Hungary in this book), Moldovans of Ro-
manian origin entering Romania (see the chapter on Romania in this
book), ethnic Greeks from the area of the former Soviet Union enter-
ing Greece (see the chapter on Greece in this book) or Bulgarians of
Turkish descent entering Turkey (see the chapter on Turkey in this
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book). That these groups are not counted as regular immigrants can be
traced back to the fact that these states are based on an ethnic concept
of the nation that includes all ethnics, irrespective of where they live.
As a consequence, these border crossings are not categorised as in-
stances of immigration of foreign nationals but as the return migration
of people who have always formed part of the nation.3
The third and crucial problem in applying the UN recommendations
for flow statistics is the duration of residence in the target country. The
UN recommendations define migration as a change of place of resi-
dence that involves a crossing of an international border and a stay of at
least one year in the new country of destination. Thus, a person has to
cover a certain distance and stay for a significant amount of time in or-
der to be called a migrant. Following the UN recommendations, statisti-
cal offices should only count a person who has entered their country as
an immigrant from the second year of his or her stay. However, if the
statistical offices rigorously stick to this suggested time frame, their
data are outdated before they are published. Therefore, some countries
(for example, the Netherlands) use the intended duration of stay and
implicitly assume that this will coincide with the actual duration of stay.
However, the arriving immigrants may only have a vague idea of how
long they will be staying or they simply cite the period of stay granted
by their visas rather than their real intentions. Other countries, such as
Austria, try to circumvent the problem of delayed statistics by counting
those who have crossed their borders as international migrants after
they have stayed for more than three months (see the chapter on Aus-
tria in this book). While this might be consistently applied within Aus-
tria, the immigration figures resulting from these guidelines will al-
ways be higher than in countries that stick to the one-year limit.
Finally, many European countries have as yet not implemented prop-
er statistics on the counterflow to immigration, that is, emigration. Re-
gistration of emigration in Europe is poor to non-existent (see the
chapters on France and Poland in this book) as has also been observed
by Nowok, Kupiszewska and Poulain: ‘Most efforts should be focused
on the registration of emigration, of both nationals and non-nationals,
by facilitating the administrative procedure and by introducing incen-
tives for both the people concerned and the local administration to reg-
ister the move’ (2006: 220). The underestimation of emigration results
in an overestimation of the migration balance. Comparisons of emigra-
tion statistics to immigration statistics in the respective destination
countries of these emigrants in a so-called double entry matrix show
how large these numerical gaps can be. In fact, these are particularly
high in the post-communist countries (see the chapters on Poland and
Romania in this book).4
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Nowok, Kupiszewska and Poulain come to the conclusion that ‘cur-
rently available data on international migration flows are still far from
being internationally comparable’ (2006: 217). Only Cyprus and the
UK currently apply the UN recommendations consistently, while Fin-
land and Sweden alone treat emigration in a different way to other
countries that have signed the Nordic Agreement. All other EU Mem-
ber States have their own exceptions, traditions and statistical instru-
ments. The THESIM Report (Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006) is a
useful source for this Babylonian confusion.
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Note: ‘TCN’ refers to third-country nationals.
Source: modified after Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006
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3.2 Stock statistics
In this unsatisfactory situation many researchers turn from flow statis-
tics to stock statistics. Census data provide an excellent basis for scienti-
fic analysis and policy development. They are detailed, accurate and pro-
vide information on a large number of topics. For all that, censuses have
the disadvantage of not being comparable on an international level.
In most EU Member States the census includes all international im-
migrants, regardless of their legal status (see Table 3). The only precon-
dition for inclusion is that the person has been living or intends to stay
in the country for at least one year. However, some Member States dif-
ferentiate between EU citizens and third-country nationals by shorten-
ing the necessary period of stay for the latter to six months (e.g.
France) or even three months (e.g. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Repub-
lic, Ireland and Hungary) (see Cantisani & Poulain 2006). The treat-
ment of asylum seekers also varies. In ten out of the 25 EU Member
States, asylum seekers are excluded from the resident population and
therefore not included in the base population of the census. In these
countries, asylum seekers are included in the census if and when they
are granted refugee status as laid down in the Geneva Convention.
Only Finland includes asylum seekers but excludes political refugees if
we believe the information gathered in the THESIM project.
All EU Member States gather information on the places of birth of
their resident population (see Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006). The
birthplace is to some extent a valid criterion for defining international
migration as it allows for the distinction of those born in the respective
country from those born abroad (usually described as the foreign-born
population). If a person was born abroad, this automatically implies
that he or she migrated at least once during his or her lifetime. How-
ever, this does not apply in those countries where the borders changed.
Thus, a large majority of the foreign-born population in Poland are
Poles born before or during the Second World War in the then Polish
territories that are now part of Ukraine, Belarus or Lithuania (see the
chapter on Poland in this book). Another disadvantage of using the
birthplace to define international migration is that it does not supply
any indication of as to when exactly the respective person migrated.
Except for the UK, all EU Member States that regularly carry out
censuses also ask their respondents for their citizenship. Citizenship is
also a useful criterion for the estimation of international migration,
since it seems reasonable to assume that a foreign citizen would have
had to cross an international border at some time. Although, like place
of birth, citizenship does not supply any information on the exact date
of this change of residence, the possible time frame is shorter, since it
is reasonable to assume that the longer the person has been living in
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Cyprus 1.10.2001 12+ Included Yes Yes
Czech
Republic
1.3.2001 12+ Included Yes Yes




Estonia 31.3.2000 12+ Included Yes Yes














Greece 18.3.2001 12+ Excluded Yes Yes
Hungary 1.2.2001 3+ Included Yes Yes
Ireland 28.4.2002 3+ Included Yes Yes
Italy 21.10.2001 3+ Included Yes Yes
Latvia 31.3.2000 12+ Included Yes Yes
Lithuania 6.4.2001 12+ Excluded Yes Yes
Luxembourg 15.2.2001 12+ Included Yes Yes
Malta 26.11.1995 12+ Excluded Yes Yes








Portugal 12.3.2001 12+ Included Yes Yes




Slovakia 26.5.2001 - Excluded Yes Yes
Slovenia 31.3.2002 12+ Included Yes Yes
Spain 1.11.2001 12+ Included Yes Yes




Switzerland 5.12.2000 12+ Included Yes Yes
Turkey 22.10.2000 - Included Yes Yes
UK 29.4.2001 6+ (12+) Included No Yes
Source: modified after Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006
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the country, the higher the probability that he or she receives the citi-
zenship of this country. However, as convincing as this proxy variable
may appear at first sight, it seems dubious when looked at in detail.
The main problem of using citizenship as a proxy variable for migra-
tion is the fact that the requirements for receiving citizenship differ
massively in the EU Member States. While some countries, such as
Belgium, only require three years of residence, others such as Austria
demand a minimum stay of ten years. Moreover, many countries facili-
tate naturalisation, for instance by shortening the required periods of
stay for EU citizens or immigrants originating from former colonies or
from other countries linked to them by history or international agree-
ments. Moreover, children born of foreign citizens are foreigners in
some countries, while they are citizens in others. Hence, the number
of foreign citizens residing in a country only partly reflects the extent
of international migration, since it is closely linked to the legal practice
of granting citizenship in the respective country.
A final disadvantage of census data is the long time lag between the
collection and the publication of the data, on the one hand, and be-
tween two consecutive censuses, on the other. Over the course of a dec-
ade, the structure and dynamics of a population can change signifi-
cantly. Moreover, certain information can already be out-of-date by the
time all the census data are available.
While France has completely redesigned its census to counter these
drawbacks, Austria and other countries have introduced sample surveys
(the so-called microcensus) that provide some information on the resi-
dent population between two complete censuses (see the chapters on
France and Austria in this book). Since the microcensus aims to report
on how the population structures change over the course of time, it
usually contains a section of standard questions, which allow compari-
sons across time, and specific questions, which vary according to the
particular issue addressed. The fixed component is, however, very lim-
ited in terms of information detail. The microcensus is nonetheless an
important data source in the field of migration research, because it
gives some indication of changes in the number of immigrants be-
tween census dates. Moreover, it can be planned and organised as an
internationally comparable survey (e.g. Labour Force Survey, Euroba-
rometer). On the downside, the official nature of the microcensus also
limits the validity of the data source. The sample only contains offi-
cially registered foreign citizens. Moreover, the interviewers have to an-
nounce their visit in advance by means of an official letter. As a conse-
quence, the microcensus underestimates the immigrant population,
collects insufficient data on illegal immigrants or those who have ar-
rived recently and is thus biased towards the long-established immi-
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grant population. This bias applies in some states also to the census
(see the chapters on Portugal and Romania in this book).
3.3 Selected examples: Germany, France and the United Kingdom
Despite the foregoing critical reflections on definitions and statistics, it
should have become clear that the importance of migration within and
to the EU has increased. In a majority of European countries immigra-
tion and emigration have a bigger impact on population size and struc-
ture than the balance of births and deaths. Since the beginning of the
1990s the inflow of asylum seekers, labour migrants and family mem-
bers has been the most important demographic event in Western Eur-
ope. Of the approximately 475 million people residing in the EU,
around 23 million hold a citizenship of a country different to their
country of residence. Approximately one-third of these originate from
another EU state, and two-thirds are from outside the EU, i.e. third-
country nationals. At 40.5 million, the number of those born abroad is
much higher than the number of those holding a foreign citizenship.
This is mostly the effect of naturalisation; 5.2 per cent of the total po-
pulation of the EU are foreign citizens, while 8.8 per cent were not
born in the country where they reside (see Table 4). This percentage is
highest in the smallest states, i.e. Luxembourg and Lichtenstein, and
clearly above average in Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Germany and Spain.
Figures from Cyprus and the Baltic States have to be handled with
care. Thus, the Baltic States count those who came as internal mi-
grants in the Soviet period as international migrants.
The most important target country in the EU – in terms of absolute
volume of immigration – is the Federal Republic of Germany with ap-
proximately 10.1 million foreign-born residents and 6.7 million foreign
residents. After the US and Russia, it is the third most popular country
for immigration worldwide. The first people who immigrated to the
then Western Zones and later FRG after the Second World War were
ethnic Germans from former German territories in Eastern Europe.
Table 4 Foreign citizens and foreign-born in the EU-27 and in Germany, France and
the UK, 2005
EU-27 Germany France UK
Resident population (in 1,000) 475,067 82,501 58,521 58,614
Resident foreign citizens (in 1,000) 22,875 6,739 3,263 2,857
In % 5.2 8.9 5.6 2.9
Resident foreign-born (in 1,000) 40,560 10,144 6,471 5,408
In % 8.8 12.3 10.7 9.1
Sources: Eurostat; Münz, Straubhaar, Vadean & Vadean 2007
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These were followed by the guestworkers, initially from Italy, Spain
and Greece, and later also from Turkey, Yugoslavia and other European
and non-European countries. Today, Germany is the most important
country of destination for immigrants from Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe.
Germany does not use place of birth but citizenship to categorise
and count its immigrant population. The figures are usually based on
the registrations in the Central Aliens Register. However, those who
naturalised or returned are not automatically deleted from the Register,
meaning that the statistics based on this data source always overesti-
mate the real number of immigrants. This was clearly seen in 2004
when the number of registered foreigners dropped from 7.3 to 6.7 mil-
lion after corrections had been carried out on the data collected in the
AZR. Conversely, German resettlers (Aussiedler) are not registered in
the AZR at all because they are not considered foreigners by law. The
AZR collects data from different sources on all foreigners who have
been residing legally in Germany for a minimum of three months
without differentiating between short-term and long-term migrants. A
census, which both provides information on the resident foreign-born
population and could be used to correct the data gathered in the AZR,
was last carried out in 1987. The only additional source of data on the
resident foreign population and the naturalised foreign-born popula-
tion is therefore the microcensus, which is only a sample survey.
Hence, the state of statistical information on the immigrant population
residing in Germany is anything but satisfactory (see the chapter on
Germany in this book).
France is the second most important country of destination for im-
migrants in Europe. Around 3.3 million people currently residing in
France are foreign citizens, while 6.5 million residents were born
abroad. This means that almost half of those born abroad hold French
citizenship, which can, on the one hand, be explained by the fact that a
large number of the immigrants originate from French colonies. On
the other hand, it has always been much easier for immigrants to re-
ceive citizenship in France than in Germany. While the immigrants re-
siding in West Germany almost exclusively originate from Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe, the immigrants residing in France have come
from the entire Mediterranean, including Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Al-
geria, Tunisia and Italy. Only a marginal number of labour migrants in
France originate from former Yugoslavia and Turkey.
Unlike in Germany, the census constitutes the main data source for
analysis of immigration to France (see the chapter on France in this
book). The last traditional and complete census was carried out in
1999. In 2004, France implemented a redesigned annual census,
which, however, only samples 14 per cent of the population. The sam-
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ple is changed every year, so that after a five-year cycle 70 per cent of
the population have been interviewed. The census not only contains in-
formation on both the country of birth and the citizenship of the resi-
dent population, but also gathers information on a vast amount of
other features such as language, education and occupation. However,
while the French stock statistics are impressive, their flow statistics are
rather poor. Since these usually draw on residence permit data admi-
nistered by the Ministry of the Interior, they only include EU citizens
and third-country nationals. France does not gather any data on the im-
migration of French citizens. Nor does it gather any information on
emigration, either of French or of foreign citizens. As mentioned
above, this lack of interest in emigration can be traced back to the long
tradition of immigration in the country. Nevertheless, France needs fig-
ures on emigration and has to estimate these in order to calculate the
migration balance and extrapolate figures on the population size.
The third most popular country for immigrants is Britain, with
roughly 2.9 million foreign citizens and 5.4 million foreign-born resi-
dents. Of the 2.9 million resident foreign citizens, roughly 60 per cent
come from African or Asian countries (particularly India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh). Immigration from Europe is, by comparison, low; Britain
never actively recruited guestworkers from Yugoslavia or Turkey. Al-
most three-quarters of all European immigrants originate from Ireland,
Britain’s socio-economic and demographic reservoir.
Britain’s system of measuring migration differs vastly from those in
Germany and France (see the chapter on the UK in this book). While
the census constitutes the main data source, the British definition of
immigration relies solely on the place of birth. Citizenship has less
meaning as a marker for immigration in the UK due to its colonial
past. Instead, the census includes a question on ‘ethnicity’, which, in
turn, would not suffice to define immigration in the central European
context. The British flow statistics are considerably poorer than in Ger-
many, where the population register is a reliable source for statistics on
geographic mobility. Since Britain does not have a population register,
the British flow statistics draw on the International Passenger Survey
(IPS). The IPS is based on interviews with 0.2 per cent of all the peo-
ple entering and leaving Britain. These interviews include a question
on the duration of the intended stay (or absence) that serves to identify
short-term and long-term immigrants and emigrants as defined by the
UN recommendations. Even if the number of interviewed people is
comparatively large, the results have to be regarded as rough estimates
of the actual immigration and emigration because of the sampling er-
ror, which is of relevance for differentiated breakdowns. Asylum see-
kers are counted in separate statistics.
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4 Outlook
In 2005, the European Commission made a proposal for the develop-
ment of harmonised European statistics on migration. It states that,
due to the development of Community policies and legislation on mi-
gration and asylum, the need for comprehensive and comparable Eur-
opean statistics on a range of migration-related issues has become a
priority. Moreover, ‘[t]he further development, implementation and
monitoring of common immigration and asylum systems implies a
need for much better statistical information than is currently available’.
The Commission is familiar with the situation and knows that the de-
velopment of comparable statistics is difficult: ‘The introduction of har-
monised Community statistics on migration and asylum will be a com-
plex procedure that must take into account the policy needs for statis-
tics, international practices and recommendations and the practicalities
of applying the definitions in each of the Member States’ (European
Commission 2005: 4).
The European Parliament finally adopted the proposal in 2007 (Reg-
ulation No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Community statistics on migration and international protection).
This Regulation provides clear definitions for important terms, includ-
ing usual residence, emigration and immigration. In addition, it de-
scribes which data the Member States have to transfer to Eurostat.
However, the regulation leaves it to the Member States to decide how
they realise the transfer of the required data, which means that the
fundamental problem has not been solved.
Nevertheless, there is no way around the harmonisation of migration
statistics; if the European Commission wants to realise the objectives
stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and detailed more clearly at
the Tampere European Council in 1999, then it has to find a unified
approach to the gathering of data on immigration. Such data are the




2 The country chapters demonstrate how important it is to have flow statistics differen-
tiated by demographic and socio-economic variables. There is a clear trend towards
feminisation of migration, a growing share of highly qualified migrants and a grow-
ing diversity regarding countries of origin.
3 A similar problem relates to how dual citizens are counted. In most cases, albeit not
always, nation states treat them as citizens of their country and do not count them as
foreign citizens.
EUROPEAN MIGRATION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND STATISTICAL PROBLEMS 43
4 In 2002, the national statistical institute in Poland (CSO) registered 17,806 Polish ci-
tizens leaving for Germany while the German population register counted 100,986
Poles entering Germany the same year (see Bijak & Koryś in this publication).
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Belgium first attracted immigrants through its industries in the then
prosperous region of Wallonia. In the nineteenth century, workers were
recruited in Flanders and neighbouring countries. During that period,
Belgium was a colonial empire exporting officers, merchants, priests
and workers. The most important among Belgium’s colonies, Congo,
was acquired by King Leopold II at the Berlin Conference in 1885 and
then transferred to the Belgian government in 1908. Between the
1880s and the 1920s, a considerable number of Belgians left to admin-
ister, explore and exploit the resources of Congo. Between 1880 and
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After the Second World War, the Belgian government began to re-
cruit foreign mine workers in Southern Europe and later in Northern
Africa, negotiating bilateral agreements with countries such as Italy,
Spain or Morocco. When Congo became independent in 1960, about
100,000 Belgian citizens living in Congo returned to Belgium. Unlike
in other European countries, these migrants did not really represent a
challenge to social cohesion.
In the late 1960s, Belgium moved slowly towards a more restrictive
immigration policy and eventually halted labour migration in 1974.
Nevertheless, Belgium continued to attract large numbers of migrants,
especially through family reunification.
The mid-1980s witnessed a new increase in immigration along with
a decrease in emigration, resulting in a higher net migration. In the
early 2000s, the migration balance (around 30,000) was comparable to
the balance of the 1960s, when migration to Belgium reached its peak.
This increase was accompanied by a diversification in the migrants’
profiles: their origin, age and sex and the factors driving their migra-
tion changed considerably throughout this period (Martiniello & Rea
2001), as will be illustrated in this chapter.
The 1990s witnessed a steep increase in the number of undocu-
mented migrants and asylum seekers. The wars in former Yugoslavia
accounted for a large part of these migrants, but a significant part
also came from Iran and republics of the former USSR. Between
1990 and 1999, about 180,000 asylum applications were lodged in
Belgium.
In 2005, Belgium’s total population reached 10,445,000 people.
Among them, 1,065,000 were born abroad (10.2 per cent), while
871,000 were of foreign nationality (8.3 per cent). Among the
1,570,000 who were of foreign nationality at their birth almost half
(700,000) had become Belgian by 2005. Therefore, the criterion of na-
tionality alone is not sufficient to allow us to analyse Belgium’s data on
immigration; one must also take into account the previous nationality
and the country of birth. Since the early 1980s, the number of foreign-
ers living in Belgium has been stable, while the number of immigrants
who have acquired Belgian nationality has sharply increased. Most of
Belgium’s immigrants are Europeans, although immigration from
Southern Europe, which used to be very significant, is now charac-
terised by a negative balance. Moroccans and Turks represent the main
communities not originating from Europe. However, migrants from
more distant countries such as China or India are also growing in
number.
The number of asylum seekers reached a peak in 2000 with 42,691
claims, though the figure has since declined considerably, now around
15,000. The foreign population is heterogeneous and its distribution
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uneven throughout the country; 30 per cent of foreigners live in Brus-
sels, though the population of Brussels only accounts for 9.5 per cent
of the whole population.
Belgium is a country still in search of its national identity, tending to
describe itself as multicultural and cosmopolitan. Being made up of
two main cultural communities, the country had a bicultural dimen-
sion from the beginning. Foreign communities are increasingly seen
as adding a new dimension to this biculturalism. In recent years, the
input of foreigners has been particularly recognised at the political le-
vel; an increasing number of politicians of foreign origin have been gi-
ven important positions and foreigners have been entitled to vote in lo-
cal elections.
Despite the fact that Belgium put an official ‘stop’ to legal immigra-
tion in 1974, it has still never ceased to be a country of immigration,
although it still seems to be rather reluctant to phrase it that way. De-
spite the official discourse and the fact that minorities are now repre-
sented on the political level, Belgium’s policy towards immigration is
still harsh, with a significant number of forced repatriations and closed
detention centres. Time and time again, undocumented migrants who
have been in the country for a while demand to be regularised and
have been involved in occupying churches and leading hunger strikes.
The population is widely sympathetic to these often dramatic situa-
tions. In addition, far-right movements and political parties are increas-
ingly vociferous, especially in Flanders where the political party Vlaams
Belang has now become a mainstream political actor.
Belgian policies toward undocumented aliens sparked much contro-
versy, in particular the aspects related to forced repatriation and intern-
ment in closed detention camps. Political debate over asylum in Bel-
gium mostly revolves around these two issues. A peak was reached in
1998 when a young Nigerian woman suffocated during her forced ex-
pulsion. This raised much public attention and the government
pledged to implement a legalisation campaign for undocumented
aliens, which took place in 2000. Detention of asylum seekers, and of
children especially, in closed detention camps is also a highly contro-
versial issue. In the early 2000s, more initiatives were taken to facili-
tate the integration of foreigners, such as the granting of the right to
vote in local elections or the setting up of a Muslim council. However,
some of these measures are still controversial, such as the introduction
of compulsory language courses for foreigners in Flanders.
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1.2 Belgian statistics on immigration
Most of Belgium’s statistics on immigration are easily accessible
through many websites and are sometimes published in different lan-
guages. However, some statistics are missing, despite their relevance
for the study of migration in and out of Belgium; for example, no data
related to ethnicity are available, since the law does not permit such
data to be collected (see Perrin, Dal & Poulain 2007).
Belgium’s official statistics are based on nationality. Neither the
place of birth nor the nationality of the parents is taken into account
in the official data. Therefore, a significant part (about 45 per cent) of
the population of foreign origin is not accounted for, despite the fact
that comprehensive data on naturalisation exist. A recent study by a
research team from the University of Louvain (Eggerickx, Bahri & Per-
rin 2006) vigorously pleaded for an adaptation of current data and
also for the lift of the ban on statistics related to filiation, which
would allow statistics on ethnicity to be produced. While the criterion
of nationality used to be considered sufficient to grasp migration pat-
terns in Belgium, reforms of naturalisation procedures since 1984
have led to a situation where the number of immigrants has been in-
creasing, while the number of foreigners has remained steady, as
pointed out by Perrin, Dal and Poulain (2007: 1). The use of addi-
tional data, including data based on the origins of the migrants, thus
became necessary in order to understand migration flows in the coun-
try, despite numerous limitations on the use of such data. For in-
stance, municipalities collect statistics on filiation, but have no obliga-
tion to communicate them to the National Register, Belgium’s main
database on population.
The main source for statistical information is the National Institute
of Statistics (Institut National de Statistique, INS). The INS produces
annual statistics based on the data contained in the National Register
as well as decennial tables based on the data provided by the national
census.
1.2.1 National Register
The main population database is the National Register, placed under
the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Since 1988, all legal resi-
dents, apart from asylum seekers waiting for a decision on their case,
have been registered in this database, kept by the municipalities and
centralised in the National Register. The National Register is made up
of two main registers: the population register and the aliens register,
also kept by the municipalities. Belgians and aliens with a settlement
permit are registered in the population register, while foreigners al-
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lowed to stay in the country are registered in the aliens register. There-
fore, the term ‘aliens register’ is misleading, since aliens holding a set-
tlement permit are registered in the population register – not in the
aliens register.
All migrants residing legally in the country are supposed to register
after one week upon arrival (residences are verified by police controls),
but only if they intend to stay for more than three months, a period
shorter than the one used by the UN to define international immigra-
tion and emigration, as pointed out by Perrin and Poulain (2006:
389). As a consequence of this definition two groups of migrants are
automatically excluded from registration: short-term migrants and irre-
gular migrants. Moreover, diplomats and civil servants of the EU and
NATO, as well as their families, are not obliged to register but can be
registered at their request. Finally, Perrin and Poulain (2006: 382)
question the coverage of EU citizens in the register, since they are far
less controlled than other foreigners.
Since 1995 and a change in the legislation on asylum, asylum see-
kers have been registered in a separate register, called the ‘waiting reg-
ister’. This change of legislation might have been prompted by the per-
ceived need to present lower figures of foreigners, since, if the asylum
seekers are accounted for separately, the proportion of foreigners
among the population declines. When granted refugee status, asylum
seekers appear in the population register, but are impossible to identi-
fy; nothing distinguishes them from other foreigners holding a settle-
ment permit. In addition, separate registers also exist for EU employ-
ees and their families, as well as for employees of other international
organisations. Since Belgium hosts the headquarters of both the EU
and NATO, this part of the population is not to be neglected. Finally,
Belgians living abroad are supposed to register with their local embassy
or consulate, which is responsible for managing ‘consular population
registers’ and is also part of the National Register. Many expatriates,
however, fail to complete this task, and the reliability of these consular
population registers is thus to be treated with scepticism.
The process of deregistration is quite similar to the process of regis-
tration, but far less reliable. Any person intending to live abroad for
more than three months has to deregister from the register of his or
her municipality, and is therefore considered an emigrant. However,
many emigrants (both Belgians and aliens) tend not to deregister upon
leaving the country. Perrin and Poulain (2006) identify diverse reasons
for this under-reporting, including the lack of incentives, the fact that
the process seems unnecessary and fastidious, as well as the fear of los-
ing some advantages and/or benefits, with the latter being particularly
common amongst foreigners, and especially refugees, who are afraid
of being denied entry when they return to the country. Any person –
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national or foreigner – who has deregistered from one municipality
and has not registered in a new one within six months is automatically
withdrawn from the population register. Belgian nationals who have
left the country but have not deregistered from their municipalities can
be deregistered if they decide to register with the diplomatic post
abroad.
The National Register includes the following variables: first name
and surname, sex, date and place of birth, address of residence, nation-
ality, refugee or stateless status, filiation,1 marital status, PIN code, pro-
fession, composition of the household, place and date of death, legal
incapacity (if the person is a minor), declaration related to the burial
type, driver’s licence, passport/ID card, social security card, pension re-
gime, declaration regarding the use of organs after death, title or status
given after a war, possibility of being designated as the president of a
polling station during elections and suspension or exclusion from the
voters’ roll.
In addition, the aliens register provides the following information:
immigration service number, country and place of origin, limitations
of the stay, work permit, professional card, return right, information
on visa, name, place of birth, address, nationality of the spouse and
every child, immigration service number of parents, spouse and chil-
dren, inclusion in voters’ roll (for EU citizens), date of recognition as a
refugee, place of registration.
Not all of these variables are used for statistical purposes – this is
the case for ethnicity, since the law forbids the establishment of statis-
tics based on filiation. Every week, the data from the National Register
are transmitted to the National Institute of Statistics and computed
into statistical tables. These tables are the main source of information
on migration, but can only include the ‘legal variables’: date of immi-
gration/emigration, nationality, municipality of residence in Belgium,
sex, date of birth, marital status and household composition.
1.2.2 Census
A general census is carried out every ten years by the INS. The last
census, conducted in October 2001, was a so-called ‘General Socio-Eco-
nomic Survey’. This census relied entirely on the National Register, as
far as the counting was concerned, and did not involve a field inquiry,
unlike previously held censuses. Instead, a questionnaire collecting
data related to education, housing, etc. was mailed to all the people re-
gistered in the National Register. The general census allows the INS to
publish comprehensive reports on some aspects of immigration, such
as housing or work.
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1.2.3 Other registers and databases
Besides the statistics published by the INS, which are based on the Na-
tional Register and on the national censuses, other reports and data-
bases exist and complement these data. They are kept by various enti-
ties and institutions.
1.2.3.1 Asylum registers
Asylum seekers are registered in a special register, called the ‘waiting
register’, which is kept by the Ministry of the Interior through various
agencies, including Fedasil, the federal agency for asylum seekers, the
Immigration Service (Office des Étrangers) and the General Commis-
sioner for Refugees and Stateless Persons (Commissariat Général aux
Réfugiés et aux Apatrides, CGRA). This register contains information
related to asylum applications, detailed on a month-by-month basis.
Since the register is neither included in the general population register
nor in the aliens register, asylum seekers are not taken into account in
the statistics on the foreign population residing in Belgium. This is a
major bias of immigration data collected in Belgium. The CGRA pro-
vides statistics on the progress of claims and the decisions made upon
them, based on the waiting register. Once an asylum seeker is granted
refugee status, he or she is incorporated into the general population
register and is not considered to be an immigrant.
Asylum seekers have to fill in a claim to be lodged at the Aliens Bu-
reau upon their arrival in Belgium. The procedure then comprises two
phases: first, the admissibility of the claim will be examined; then a de-
cision on the claim will be made (‘merits phase’) by the CGRA. The
number of claims reaching the second stage of the procedure varies
greatly from year to year.
If asylum is granted, the asylum seeker receives refugee status; if it
is denied, he or she has to leave the territory. Around 10 per cent of
the applicants are granted refugee status, but the figures vary greatly
according to the country of origin. If they refuse to leave the territory
on a voluntary basis, rejected asylum seekers can be placed in a closed
internment centre before being expelled.
1.2.3.2 Work and residence permits
Work permits are issued by the federal Ministry of Labour and Employ-
ment, but the regional ministries are responsible for the implementa-
tion of the legislation and also hold the permit data, using different
methodologies. Moreover, the previous distinction between permits
that allow migrants to enter Belgium and those allowing them to stay
was abandoned in 1988. As a consequence of both this change and the
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regionalisation of the information, the data cannot really be used for
statistical purposes.
The Immigration Service also holds a database recording many as-
pects of the migrants’ files. The database is linked to the National Reg-
ister, but includes additional information linked to the Immigration
Service, such as the residence status of the migrant, regulated by a set-
tlement permit, a residence permit or a residence document, the latter
being a temporary document issued for the period of examination of
some queries. Any foreigner wishing to stay in Belgium for more than
three months has to get authorisation from a Belgian diplomatic post
abroad.
1.2.3.3 Visas and expatriates
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues visas through Belgian diplo-
matic posts abroad. However, information on the number of visas is-
sued (and refused) is very limited and varies greatly according to the
technology available at the different posts. There is no central database
on visas.
The Belgian diplomatic posts abroad also manage the information
related to expatriates. However, many expatriates choose not to register
with the diplomatic post of their country of residence. Hence, the infor-
mation on expatriates is incomplete. There are some incentives to reg-
ister though; these include the right to participate in elections (voting
is compulsory in Belgium) and the possibility of being assisted by the
embassy or the consulate in case of a crisis in the country.
1.2.3.4 Database on the acquisition of citizenship
There is no general database dealing with the acquisition of citizen-
ship. Any acquisition of citizenship is recorded in the National Register
and there are databases relating to some specific procedures. The ac-
quisition of citizenship, which requires the expression of the will of
the person concerned, needs to be distinguished from the attribution
of citizenship, which is automatic (e.g. in the case of a child of a natur-
alised parent).
A common form of acquisition of citizenship is naturalisation, which
is granted by the Chamber of Representatives (the lower chamber of
the Parliament). Since 1984, this procedure has undergone consider-
able reform, and access to nationality is now much easier than it used
to be, resulting in a sharp increase in the number of naturalisations.
The Chamber of Representatives holds a complete database, as well as
detailed statistics, on naturalisations, while the Immigration Service
holds a database on all types of acquisition of citizenship but does not
produce any statistics based on these data. Only successful applications
are recorded in the National Register.
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1.2.3.5 Statistics produced by universities and NGOs
In addition to the official statistics, many research centres and NGOs
produce statistics on selected aspects of immigration. Among recent
studies, the most significant is undoubtedly the Charles Ullens Initia-
tive, an inter-university survey coordinated by the King Baudouin Foun-
dation. Charles Ullens was a philanthropist who commissioned a large
and comprehensive survey on immigration in Belgium, involving all
major Belgian universities. The survey is currently under way, includ-
ing quantitative and qualitative aspects.
Regarding the quantitative cluster of the project, Eggerickx, Bahri
and Perrin (2006) have already produced a preliminary report based
on the criterion of the nationality at birth rather than on current na-
tionality only. Their study allows us to distinguish between immigrants
born abroad and those born in Belgium (second-generation immi-
grants).
1.2.4 A critical view of the statistical sources
As stated above, one of the main shortcomings of Belgian statistics on
immigration is the fact that some data exist, but cannot be used for sta-
tistical purposes. This is the case for data regarding filiation and ethni-
city, since the INS is not allowed to publish statistics that include these
variables.
INS statistics are based on nationality, and therefore do not take into
account those who have acquired Belgian nationality after their birth
(in Belgium or abroad). The recent study by Eggerickx, Bahri and Per-
rin (2006), based on nationality at birth, makes a step towards a more
accurate description of immigration in Belgium.
Some data, usually highly controversial, are not available to the gen-
eral public; this holds true for information on the number of people
held in closed detention camps, for example. This lack of information
hinders the democratic debate surrounding these practices.
Furthermore, in a study conducted for the King Baudouin Founda-
tion, Lennert (2001) points out some major flaws in Belgium’s man-
agement of migration data. Some have been corrected since, but not all
of them:
1. missing information:
Information is missing on some important points such as the num-
ber of illegal migrants in the country, and information on visas is
still far from complete.
2. incomplete or unreliable information:
In particular, data on emigration are unreliable, since so many emi-
grants fail to deregister from their municipality. Though it is possi-
ble to erase them from the registers, this is only a partial correction
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of the bias. As said above, statistics based on the sole criterion of
nationality are also misleading.
3. difficult retrospective analysis:
Statistical series over longer periods of time are often inconsistent,
due to changes of methodology and presentation as well as geogra-
phical reconfigurations: some countries no longer exist, while
others have been created. Furthermore, some data from the past
have not been digitalised and thus cannot be compared with more
recent figures.
4. regionalised information:
Since Belgium is a federal state, some data such as work permit
data are directly managed by the regions, which use different meth-
odologies and presentations. As a consequence, these data cannot
be compared or aggregated.
Fortunately, statistical tables produced by NGOs and academics make
up for some of these shortcomings, but they are unable to correct all of
them, especially when the law forbids doing so.
Overall, it is widely recognised that Belgian statistics are insufficient
in addressing important social issues such as the fight against discri-
mination, and many voices are now in favour of new statistical cate-
gories, that would go beyond the sole nationality criterion and appre-
hend the origins of the population on a more ‘objective’ basis (Perrin,
Dal & Poulain 2007).
1.3 Stock of foreign population
1.3.1 Overview of the stock of foreign population
On 1 January 2005, Belgium had 10,445,852 inhabitants, 870,862 (8.3
per cent) of whom held a foreign nationality. The population of foreign
descent accounted for 15 per cent of total population (1,570,475 persons).
Among them, 699,613 were naturalised, representing 44.5 per cent of
the population of foreign origin. Half of these naturalised were born in
Belgium (332,474 – 47.5 per cent). Those born abroad represented about
two-thirds (1,064,906 – 67.8 per cent) of the population of foreign des-
cent (Eggerickx, Bahri & Poulain 2006). It is to be noted that, among the
population of foreign descent, those born in Belgium were about twice
more likely to acquire Belgian citizenship than those born abroad (65.8
per cent of those born in Belgium, 34.5 per cent of those born abroad).
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1.3.2 Size of main nationalities
Unlike other European countries, most of the foreigners living in Bel-
gium (68 per cent) come from other EU Member States, which is to
some extent due to the fact that EU citizens are less likely to naturalise,
as will be shown below. Moroccans and Turks are the main groups of
non-EU nationals. Moreover, whereas some other countries have ob-
served an increasing dispersion of origins, this does not seem to be the
case for Belgium, at least for the most important groups of immi-
grants. Over the last five years, the top ten nationalities of the foreign
population have remained the same. The smaller groups, on the other
hand, tend to diversify: recent years have witnessed waves of immigra-
tion from more distant countries of origin, such as China, Brazil, India
and so on (Table 1.1).
1.3.3 Geographical distribution of foreign population
The foreign population is unevenly distributed. Given that Belgium is
a federal country, this fact has crucial importance; though immigration
policy is decided on the federal level, many integration policies (hous-
ing, education, etc.) lie within the competence of the regions.
While Italians settled mainly in the industrial regions of Wallonia
(Hainaut and Liège), more recent waves of immigration concentrated
in Flanders. Brussels, representing 9.5 per cent of the total population,
is home to 30.7 per cent of the foreign population. Finally, EU na-
Table 1.1 Belgium’s population broken down by nationality, 2005




Italy 179,015 1.7 20.5
France 117,349 1.1 13.5
The Netherlands 104,978 1.0 12.1
Morocco 81,279 0.8 9.3
Spain 43,200 0.4 5.0
Turkey 39,885 0.4 4.6
Germany 36,324 0.4 4.2
Portugal 27,373 0.3 3.1
UK 25,982 0.3 3.0
Greece 16,588 0.2 1.9
DR Congo 13,171 0.1 1.5
US 11,476 0.1 1.3
Total EU-25 591,404 5.7 67.9
Foreign population 870,862 8.3 100.0
Total population 10,445,852 100.0 –
Source: SPF Economie – DG Statistique
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tionals tend to live in conurbations in Wallonia and Brussels, though
in the countryside in Flanders, which explains why non-EU nationals
are often more numerous than EU nationals in Flemish conurbations
(see Table 1.2).
1.3.4 Age and sex of the foreign population
Compared to the Belgian population, the population of foreign descent
represents an increasingly significant share (Eggerickx, Bahri & Pou-
lain 2006). Perrin and Poulain (2007: 16) estimated that about 2 mil-
lion people had at least one foreign parent on 1 January 2005, repre-
senting around 20 per cent of the total population. This share has stea-
dily been growing faster than the total population; between 1991 and
2005, the population of foreign descent increased by 28 per cent, while
the total population only grew by 0.9 per cent.
During the times when migrant workers were recruited, the popula-
tion of foreign origin used to be predominantly male, but this has
changed since. In 1991, there were 100 men to 100 women among the
population of foreign descent, while there were only 96 men to 100
women in 2005, a ratio comparable to that of the Belgian population.
However, this trend towards the feminisation of the foreign-born popu-
lation varies according to the country of origin: the share of women is
larger among those groups originating from Eastern Europe and the
Southern hemisphere than among those originating from other coun-
tries. That the sex ratio is balanced also holds true when we consider
the foreign nationals rather than the foreign-born, as shown in Table
1.3.
The average age of the foreign population also rose sharply between
1980 and 2004, due to the fact that immigrants tend to stay in Bel-
gium even after their retirement. As a consequence, the age gap be-









Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Brussels 978,364 9.5 718,344 7.6 260,040 30.7 142,431 25.2 117,609 41.6
Flanders 5,972,781 57.9 5,697,558 60.2 275,223 32.5 170,965 30.3 194,258 36.9
In conurbations 1,926,996 1,799,263 127,733 56,900 70,833
Outside
conurbations
4,045,785 3,898,295 147,490 114,065 33,425
Wallonia 3,358,580 32.6 3,047,089 32.2 311,471 36.8 250,776 44.5 60,695 21.5
In conurbations 999,076 864,099 134,977 101,617 33,360
Outside
conurbations
2,359,504 2,182,990 176,494 149,159 27,335
Total Belgium 10,309,725 100.0 9,462,991 100.0 846,734 100.0 564,172 100.0 282,562 100.0
Source: Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism
58 FRANÇOIS GEMENNE
tween the Belgian and the foreign population has been closing,
although the foreign population, as well as the population of foreign
origin, still tended to be younger than the Belgian population in 2004
(Table 1.4).
1.4 Net migration and migration flows
Between 1962, when the first bilateral agreements were signed, and
2004, immigration to Belgium was consistently higher than 35,000
people a year, with peaks in the 1960s, 1990s and 2000s. Over the
same period, between 20,000 and 40,000 people left Belgium an-
nually. Tighter immigration policies led to a significant immigration
decrease in the early 1980s, averaging around 35,000 people per year.
Combined with a relatively stable rate of emigration, this resulted in a
low net migration in the early 1980s, with a negative balance for the
year 1983. However, these figures do not account for illegal migration,
the level of which is impossible to verify. The 1980s also marked the
start of the easing of the naturalisation procedures, resulting in a stag-
nation of the foreign population, despite a consistent increase in net
migration from the mid-1980s.
In the 1990s, as in many European countries, immigration increased
sharply. Booming globalisation, cheaper transportation and expansion
Table 1.3 Foreign population in Belgium by sex, 2000-2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Men 465,903 445,908 438,115 439,652 442,639 445,710
Women 431,207 415,777 408,619 410,425 417,648 425,152
% 48.1 48.3 48.3 48.3 48.5 48.8
Total 897,110 861,685 846,734 850,077 860,287 870,862
Source: SPF Economie – DG Statistique; author’s calculation
Table 1.4 Age structure of foreign population in Belgium for four selected
nationalities, 2004
0-17 18-64 Over 64 Total
Nationality Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Italian 13,601 7.1 142,757 74.8 34,434 18.0 190,792 100.0
French 15,233 13.7 82,790 74.5 13,123 11.8 111,146 100.0
Turkish 9,439 20.6 33,392 72.8 3,035 6.6 45,866 100.0
Moroccan 20,786 22.9 64,392 71.0 5,464 6.0 90,642 100.0
Belgian 2,033,773 21.5 5,776,720 61.0 1,652,498 17.5 9,462,991 100.0
Source: SPF Economie – DG Statistique; author’s calculation
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of the EU are undoubtedly external factors that accounted for this in-
crease. As a consequence, net migration was consistently above 10,000
(and for foreigners above 20,000). As stated before, asylum seekers
were excluded from the general population register in 1995 and were
therefore also not included in the net migration figures after 1995.
Today’s immigration to Belgium is mostly European (EU and East-
ern Europe). As early as in the 1980s, immigrants from Europe ac-
counted for 60 per cent of the immigration to Belgium. The net migra-
tion varies greatly according to the nationality of the migrant: it is far
lower for migrants from North America, Southern Europe and Japan
than for migrants from Maghreb, Turkey, Africa and Asia.
The net migration of Belgians was consistently negative; during the
1980s, the number of Belgian emigrants exceeded the number of Bel-
gian immigrants by 10,000 every year. Belgian emigration decreased
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the net migration was still negative (over
-5,000). Moreover, these figures are underestimated, since many emi-
grants do not deregister, as was explained above.
Most Belgian emigrants are between twenty and 40 years old, and
settle in the neighbouring countries, but many go as far as Canada, the
United States, South Africa or Brazil. The exact number of Belgians liv-
ing abroad is unknown, since many do not register with a diplomatic
mission upon arrival. The official number of Belgians registered
abroad is around 300,000, though estimates from diplomatic missions
suggest that the actual number is higher.
As shown in Table 1.5, flows to and from Belgium were quite stable
throughout the 1990s, then soared from 1999 onwards. This trend
Table 1.5 Belgium’s net migration, 1992-2005
Immigration Emigration Net migration
1992 66,763 33,707 33,056
1993 63,749 34,202 29,547
1994 66,147 36,572 29,575
1995 62,950 36,044 29,906
1996 61,522 36,674 24,848
1997 58,849 39,320 19,529
1998 61,266 40,236 21,030
1999 68,466 41,307 27,159
2000 68,616 43,487 25,129
2001 77,584 42,221 35,363
2002 82,655 41,349 41,306
2003 81,913 41,897 40,016
2004 85,378 42,046 43,332
2005 90,364 43,719 46,645
Source: SPF Economie – DG Statistique
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kept getting stronger in the 2000s, with the number of entries into the
country topping 90,000 in 2005. Throughout the period, the net mi-
gration of foreigners was consistently positive, ranging from around
20,000 to around 30,000.
1.5 Asylum seekers
The claims for asylum reached a peak in 2000 and have consistently
decreased since then, partly due to far more stringent conditions for
the granting of asylum (see Figure 1.1). Most of the asylum seekers
who lodged claims in 2004 and 2005 originated from the former
USSR, the Democratic Republic of Congo, former Yugoslavia and Iraq
(Table 1.6).













































































Table 1.6 Main countries of origin of asylum claimants in Belgium, 2004-2005
Country of origin 2004 (lodged) 2005 (lodged) 2005 (granted)
Russia 1,361 1,438 1,259
DR Congo 1,471 1,272 204
Serbia & Montenegro 1,294 1,203 166
Iraq 388 903 63
Slovakia 730 773 NA
Armenia 477 706 NA
Guinea 565 643 48
Rwanda 427 565 445
Nepal 373 557 NA
Cameroon 506 530 NA
Note: NA = not available
Source: Immigration Service
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Data on the claims still awaiting a decision are not available to the gen-
eral public. The Aliens Bureau used to be notorious for its long delays
(sometimes of several years) when it came to deciding on asylum
claims, but the setbacks have been significantly reduced. Statistics on
the numbers of forced repatriations are also not published.
1.6 Naturalisations
Since 1984, naturalisation has been considered one of the main tools
for integration in Belgium. Hence, the Code of Belgian Nationality al-
lows for broad access to nationality and has been amended several
times since 1984 in order to ease the procedure for migrants willing to
acquire Belgian citizenship. These changes are reflected in the num-
bers of naturalisations (Figure 1.2); every major change in the legisla-
tion was followed by a sharp increase in the number of naturalisations.
The code is based on ius sanguinis, the attribution of nationality by filia-
tion, but also allows for ius solis, the attribution of nationality by birth
in the country.
The law of 28 June 1984 introduced the Code of Belgian Nationality.
The new code abolished the legal distinction between father and
mother, as well as between legitimate and illegitimate children by al-
lowing the transmission of nationality through the mother. The follow-
ing year, the number of naturalisations reached an all-time peak of
63,824. In 1991, access to naturalisation for children of the second and
third generations was eased by introducing a ius soli regulation. While
children of the third generation automatically acquire Belgian citizen-
ship, children of the second generation can acquire citizenship through





























































































Source: SPF Economie – DG Statistique
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a simple declaration of their parents before they reach the age of
twelve. Once again, this change was followed by a sharp increase in
the number of naturalisations. Finally in 1999, the naturalisation pro-
cedure was radically simplified by abolishing the controversial ‘integra-
tion test’ and the fees and by reducing the delays before a decision is
made. This reform again resulted in a dramatic increase in the number
of naturalisations.
Figure 1.3, which shows the countries of origin of the new Belgians,
illustrates that the willingness to obtain Belgian citizenship is highly
dependent upon the advantages resulting from this new citizenship. It
therefore comes as no surprise that fewer EU nationals are interested
in obtaining Belgian citizenship.
The number of Belgian citizens abandoning their nationality to acquire
another one remains consistently low, at around 100 per year. Belgian
legislation does not currently allow dual citizenship. Therefore, in or-
der to acquire a new citizenship, any Belgian national needs to aban-
don her/his Belgian nationality. This acts as a deterrent for many, who
are afraid of losing some advantages and benefits. However, probably
the most important reason is that most expatriates settle in a neigh-
bouring European country, which makes the acquisition of a new citi-
zenship quite useless, since they benefit, as EU citizens, from most of
the advantages and benefits of the nationals (with the exception of vot-















* Mostly originated from Africa
Source: Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism
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ing rights in national elections). At the time of writing, a change in the
legislation that would allow dual citizenship was due to be discussed in
parliament.
1.7 Conclusions
Belgian statistics on immigration could be greatly improved if they
were adapted to the development of society. Current statistics do not al-
low for the development of policies addressing discrimination and do
not reflect the major changes that have occurred in Belgian society over
the last decades. References to ethnicity or ethnic groups are not yet
widely accepted and this unease is reflected in the statistics produced.
Most of the statistics are produced by the National Institute of Statis-
tics, which can only produce statistics based on legal variables. These
statistics are based on the National Register, which has not been ser-
iously updated since 1988. Some improvements are easily feasible
using existing data (including the country of birth as criterion in addi-
tion to nationality), while others would require a change in the legisla-
tion (e.g. statistics on filiation). For now, the sole use of the nationality
criterion for statistical purposes does not take into account 45 per cent
of the population of foreign descent. A major improvement would also
be the production of more reliable data regarding visas, emigration and
Belgians living abroad.
Nevertheless, the actual figures are quite reliable, often easily avail-
able and usually match the figures of Eurostat and UNHCR. They are
centralised in the National Register and, since other data on migration
are frequently checked against the National Register, the risk of discre-
pancies is rather limited.
However, the difference between the figures and the political and
public discourse is striking. As one can see, European nationals consti-
tute around 68 per cent of the foreign population. However, when re-
ferring to foreigners, media and political discourses often refer to the
non-European nationals, despite the fact that they constitute a small
minority of the foreign population. Moroccans and Turks are easy tar-
gets of anti-immigration discourse, though they constitute only a small
minority of the foreign population. Likewise, the debate on discrimina-
tion often implies that discrimination ceases once Belgian nationality
is acquired, which is far from being the case. No doubt the democratic




1 The municipalities are not obliged to provide this information.
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Perrin, N. & M. Poulain (2006), ‘Country Report: Belgium’, in M. Poulain, N. Perrin &
A. Singleton (eds.), THESIM: Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International
Migration, 381-390. Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain.
Perrin, N., L. Dal & M. Poulain (2007), ‘Appréhender “objectivement” les origines pour
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France has received successive waves of immigrants who arrived in the
country from the second half of the nineteenth century in order to off-
set sluggish population growth. This demographic revolution, in com-
bination with the industrial revolution, created a strong demand for
new immigrant workers in France, a country of early fertility decline
and early economic prosperity. This labour demand was satisfied by
migrants from other European countries that were unable to support a
more rapidly growing population, as these sending countries did not
have enough jobs to offer their young adults.
Migration from Belgium, Italy, Poland and Spain peaked in the early
twentieth century, though it continued after the Second World War.
Foreign-born 
population in France 
by country of birth, 
1999 
(in % of total foreign) 
Source: 
INSEE







Cartography: Walter Lang, University of Vienna
During this period, migration was also influenced by a key political fac-
tor, namely the founding principles of the French nation – from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1789 to the Constitution of
1958 – which guarantee asylum to victims of persecution. France was
long perceived as a country of refuge and harboured populations flee-
ing totalitarian regimes in Russia, Nazi Germany, Italy under Mussoli-
ni, Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar and Southeast Asia, to
name but a few.
The world wars of the twentieth century also created a need for im-
migrant inflows to make up for the human losses incurred and to con-
tribute to reconstruction or, more generally, to meet the needs of indus-
try. From 1946, after freedom of movement was granted to the Alger-
ian population, a massive wave of ‘French Muslim’ workers arrived
from Algeria. Heading a colonial empire, France was better placed than
its neighbours to attract African populations after the Second World
War. Hence, French populations of immigrant origin come from a wide
range of geographical areas. The decolonisation process initiated in
1956 further increased immigration, with the return of populations of
French descent from the lost territories. The most well-known wave of
this kind was the repatriation of French settlers from Algeria in 1962-
1963, though repatriates also came from Tunisia, Morocco and a part
of sub-Saharan Africa.
With the rise in French unemployment after the oil crisis, as else-
where in Europe, new legislation introduced in 1974 made it more dif-
ficult for immigrant workers to enter the country. However, this devel-
opment coincided with the recognition of the right to family reunion,
resulting in large-scale family migration, thanks to which net migra-
tion has never fallen to zero or below. The immigrant population has
thus continued to grow at least as fast as the native population. How-
ever, the specific features of French migration trends mentioned above
are tending to disappear since many former European sending coun-
tries have now in turn become receiving countries with a positive net
balance. The key trend observed over recent years in France is a level
of fertility that remains higher than elsewhere, a fact that reduces the
importance of migration in population renewal. Only one-quarter of to-
tal population increase is due to migration, a very low proportion com-
pared with other European countries, which are generally characterised
by declining fertility and major immigration flows.
2.2 Overview of stock and flow data
Statistics on migrants in France are produced on the basis of census
data and also as a by-product of various administrative sources. Among
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these, the census has by far the longest tradition, since questions re-
lated to the numbers of foreigners have been included in all censuses
since the mid-nineteenth century. Conversely, administrative sources
are quite recent: first statistics on annual migration were published in
the 1970s but with very few details on demographic characteristics. Sta-
tistics on residence permits have been extracted since the mid-1990s,
which has led to more reliable and relevant figures on migration. Ob-
viously, as in most European countries, none of these statistical sources
take into account foreigners who enter illegally, except if they are regu-
larised after their entry, which implies that they will be counted, albeit
after a certain delay. Neither do the sources include short-term mi-
grants staying in France for less than one year (such as seasonal work-
ers or rejected asylum applicants), which is in compliance with the UN
recommendations for international migration statistics (Breem &
Thierry 2006).
France does not have a population register. As a consequence, not all
issues related to international migration are covered. There are no sta-
tistics on the inflows or outflows of French citizens. The same is true
for the outflows of foreigners. The only flow statistics available are the
entries of foreigners into France based on the numbers of first resi-
dence permits issued each year. No new data collection and no new re-
gistration processes are foreseen to redress this lack of information.
Regarding statistics on stocks, the lack of a population register also
limits the updating of the statistics for the years between successive
censuses (the last ones were in 1990 and 1999). However, in 2009,
statistics on stocks will be available on an annual basis. This continu-
ous measurement will significantly improve the estimate of annual net
migration compared to the indicator currently disseminated by the Na-
tional Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
2.2.1 Census
INSEE carries out the census. The last traditional census took place in
1999 and involved universal coverage and a simultaneous count. The
achievement of the 1999 Census illustrates the difficulty of ensuring
equal coverage from one census to the next. As a matter of fact, the po-
pulation counted at the beginning of 1999 (58,497,000) was signifi-
cantly below the expected figure previously published by the INSEE
(58,977,000) by a margin of 480,000.
As of 2004, a new method of census has been in use, although the
design of the questionnaire regarding migration issues is unchanged.
The Redesigned Census of the Population (Recensement Rénové de la
Population) is now a continuous annual census, which means that the
population is no longer counted every eight or nine years, but by an-
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nual rotation over a five-year cycle (2004-2008, 2009-2013 and so on).
It is conducted on a sample of dwellings, situated in geographical
zones selected at random and enumerated comprehensively.1 The con-
tinuous population census is a sample-based survey. However, the size
of the sample is very large compared, for instance, to the German mi-
crocensus: it is foreseen that 14 per cent of the population will be inter-
viewed each year so that around 70 per cent of the total population will
have been enumerated at the end of the first cycle. Hence, reliable esti-
mates are expected even if these more sophisticated methods are not
as transparent as was the traditional census.
The statistics presented below refer to the 1990 and 1999 censuses,
since only limited statistics based on the Redesigned Census have been
published so far. The INSEE aims to complete a full five-year cycle be-
fore disseminating results. However, preliminary results show the op-
posite of the gap observed in 1999: the new census reported 460,000
people more than the current estimate. All these unexpected discrepan-
cies between successive censuses and the lack of up to date estimates
based on a continuous population register complicate the measure-
ment of annual net migration.
Censuses cover all persons who have or wish to have their usual resi-
dence in France for a period of at least six months (including the tem-
porarily absent declared by persons present in the household at the
moment of the enumeration). In principle, this includes asylum appli-
cants and illegal immigrants. However, as these groups are difficult to
identify, they are probably underestimated in the resulting statistics.
The stock of population can be distributed by citizenship, country of
birth or by a combination of both in order to identify ‘immigrants’.
The definition is as follows: an immigrant is a person born as a for-
eigner abroad and residing in the country. This means that a person
who has acquired French nationality since arriving in France is still
counted as an immigrant. Conversely, a person born a French national
abroad is not an immigrant. That is also the case for those children
born in France and defined as foreigners because both of their parents
are foreigners. Because no information is gathered on the foreign back-
ground of people born in France indirect estimates are needed for this
purpose (Tribalat 2004). However, the census includes a question on
the country of residence at the time of the previous census. Moreover,
since the 1999 Census people born abroad have been asked to indicate
the year of their arrival in France.2 A more extensive overview of char-
acteristics of the foreign population is presented in INSEE 2005.
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2.2.2 Administrative sources
Statistical monitoring of entries of foreigners into France improved
substantially in the 1990s thanks to the use of a new data source. Be-
fore 1994 the production of aggregate immigration statistics was based
on combining data resulting from the procedures of various adminis-
trative bodies. As a consequence, the data were weak in their coverage
(for instance, nationals of the EU were not included). Since 1994, the
Institut national d’études démographiques(INED) has been producing
immigration statistics by extracting appropriate data from a centralised
computer file administered by the Ministry of the Interior which lists
residence permit issuances. These statistics are more reliable (includ-
ing the arrivals of EU nationals, who only became exempt from the le-
gal requirement to have a residence permit in 2004), fully disaggre-
gated, as far as possible, and fulfil most of the international recom-
mendations (United Nations 1998).
Indeed, the INED count differs from that provided by other French
agencies which apply a restrictive definition of immigration, thus re-
sulting in underestimation. A major example is the case of the student
category; students are not taken into account in the latter statistics be-
cause they are considered temporary migrants, although many of them
receive a residence permit for one year and have the legal right to renew
it in order to pursue their studies (Thierry 2001). Moreover, as the offi-
cial body in charge of this field, the Observatory of Statistics on Immi-
gration and Integration publishes few detailed statistics (OSII 2006).
The figures presented in this report comply with the international
recommendations for statistics on international migration, defining a
‘long-term immigrant’ as a person having his/her usual residence in
the receiving country for at least one year. By counting the first permits
issued to adult aliens for at least one year’s duration as well as adding
under-age children – who are exempt from the permit requirement –
we can determine the number of aliens authorised to reside in France.
Given the fact that first residence permits are automatically issued after
the foreigners have entered the country, statistics cover the number of
individual migrants rather than the number of cases. Of course, re-
newed residence permits are not taken into account in the total num-
ber of foreigners newly authorised to stay. In fact, this figure includes
legal entries and foreigners regularised at the date of their admission.
It excludes foreigners who are passing through, seasonal workers, asy-
lum seekers awaiting a decision and illegal aliens.3
These annual statistics are broken down according to sex, age, citi-
zenship and motive for granting a residence permit (see INED web-
site). The official ground for admission mentioned on the residence
permit is not a totally reliable indicator of the actual intention of the
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migrant. In particular, in certain restrictive contexts, the use of admin-
istrative data has shortcomings; labour migration occurs partly through
the procedure for admission on family grounds and so the number of
residence permits issued for work purposes represents only a small
part of the phenomenon (Thierry 2007).
2.3 Description of the stock of foreign population
2.3.1 Stock according to the 1999 Census
At the beginning of 1999, the French census counted a population of
58.5 million people having their usual residence in France (excluding
overseas French territories). As Table 2.1 indicates, 3.3 million of these
did not hold French citizenship (5.6 per cent) and 5.9 million were
born abroad (10 per cent). The number of French citizens (55.3 million)
may be divided into those who are French by birth (52.9 million) and
those who have acquired French citizenship after birth (2.4 million).
This latter category is numerically significant, considering that France
applies a double ius soli, which means that foreign children born in
France of a parent already born in France automatically acquire French
citizenship at birth. In France, as said before, the immigrant category
is defined as those individuals born abroad having a foreign citizenship
at birth, regardless of whether they are still foreigners or not. In 1999,
there were 4.3 million immigrants in France: 2.75 million foreign citi-
zens born abroad plus 1.56 million French citizens who acquired
French citizenship after moving to France (within the total of 3.12 mil-
lion French citizens born abroad). This number represents a share of
7.4 per cent of the total population. One immigrant out of three is no
Table 2.1 Population in France by nationality and place of birth according to the
1999 Census
Place of birth in France Place of birth abroad Total
Numbers in 1,000
Nationality French 52,140 3,120 55,260
Nationality foreign 0,510 2,750 3,260
Total 52,650 5,870 58,520
Of which:
Immigrant - 4,310 4,310
Numbers in %
Nationality French 89.1 5.3 94.4
Nationality foreign 0.9 4.7 5.6
Total 90.0 10.0 100.0
Of which:
Immigrant - 7.4 7.4
Source: Census data, INSEE
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longer a foreign citizen. No substantial increase has been observed
compared to the five previous censuses: 4.2 million in 1990, 4.1 mil-
lion in 1982, 3.9 million in 1975, 3.3 million in 1968 and 2.9 million
in 1962. Due to the growth of the inflows in recent years (see below),
preliminary data provided by the first wave of the 2004 Census show a
significant increase, equivalent to 14 per cent of the stock (+600.000).
Currently, the immigrant population (4.9 million) represents a share
of 8.1 per cent of the population (Borrel 2006).
Concerning the countries of origin of the stocks of the foreign-born
in France, the situation changed slowly between the early 1990s and
2004. Table 2.2 presents the ten major countries of birth as enumer-
ated in the three last censuses. Most immigrants living in France still
originate from Southern Europe and North Africa. In 1999, the five
main countries of birth for immigrants were Algeria, Portugal, Moroc-
co, Italy and Spain. More than half a million individuals originated
from the first three countries, more than 300,000 from either Italy or
Spain. People originating from these five countries constituted 50.4 per
cent of all foreign-born in France in 2004. In the years 1999 and 1990,
this share was a little higher, at 54.7 and 59.0 per cent, respectively.
Due to the decline of the number of migrants from South European
countries of origin and the increase of the new wave from Africa and








Country of birth Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Portugal 600,000 14.4 572,000 13.2 565,000 11.5
Italy 484,000 11.6 379,000 8.8 342,000 6.9
Spain 397,000 9.5 316,000 7.3 280,000 5.7
Portugal + Italy
+ Spain
1,481,000 35.5 1,267,000 29.3 1,187,000 24.1
Turkey 168,000 4.0 174,000 4.0 225,000 4.6
Germany 114,000 2.7 123,000 2.8 128,000 2.6
Poland 129,000 3.1 99,000 2.3 90,000 1.8
Belgium 92,000 2.2 93,000 2.2 102,000 2.1
Algeria 558,000 13.4 574,000 13.3 677,000 13.7
Morocco 457,000 11.0 523,000 12.1 619,000 12.6
Tunisia 207,000 5.0 202,000 4.7 220,000 4.5
Algeria + Morocco
+ Tunisia
1,222,000 29.3 1,299,000 30.1 1,516,000 30.8
Other African
country
273,000 6.6 393,000 9.1 570,000 11.6
Other country 687,000 16.5 872,000 20.2 1,106,000 22.5
Total 4,166,000 100.0 4,310,000 100.0 4,924,000 100.0
Source: INSEE
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Asia, the foreign population diversified. Indeed, the ranking of the top
five was different in 1990 when migrants from Portugal were more
numerous than those from Algeria. Between 1990 and 1999 the order
was reversed, with the latter being the main immigrant community in
France with 574.000 persons in 1999. The same is true for Italy and
Morocco: the former was the third biggest group in 1990, immediately
followed by migrants from Morocco. In 1999, there were more immi-
grants of Moroccan than of Italian origin. In 2004, Portugal fell to the
third position, immediately preceded by Morocco. In addition, the per-
centage of North Africans (representing 29.3 per cent of the total for-
eign-born in 1990, against 30.1 per cent in 1999 and 30.8 per cent in
2004) grew to a lesser extent than the percentage of other Africans
(6.6 per cent, 9.1 per cent and 11.6 per cent, respectively).Their num-
ber became significant in 2004 (570,000), although these were distrib-
uted through a large range of countries (mainly the French-speaking
area with Senegal and Mali being the most important).
These changes were due, on the one hand, to the ageing – which
would imply an increase in mortality – of the population that settled
after the Second World War and, on the other hand, to the new geogra-
phical distribution of the recent migration flows (as described below).
These two factors explain why the share of the Italian and Spanish
stream decreased. As a matter of fact, the populations that arrived in
France first showed the highest proportion of people over 60 (almost
60 per cent for Italian and Polish and around 50 per cent for Spanish
migrants). Moreover, a significant share of these three immigrant
groups were women, since a long time had elapsed since their first ar-
rival and family reunification had largely been completed (females out-
numbered males for the three latter countries of origin). People origi-
nating from Maghreb countries and Turkey demonstrated a very differ-
ent demographic profile, characterised by limited proportions of 60+
and females. For instance, only 23.6 per cent of migrants from Algeria
were older than 60 and 43.8 per cent of them were female. The low
percentage of old migrants from Portugal (14.6 per cent) – although
they arrived 30 years ago – can be traced back to their marked tendency
to return after having retired. Migrants from Germany and Belgium
demonstrated an age structure lying between the two extremes due to
the freedom of circulation (Table 2.3).
The census does not include questions on the reasons for migration.
However, according to a large survey linked to the 1999 Census, which
gathered more detailed information on the life course of immigrants,
61 per cent of the immigrant population arrived after the age of eigh-
teen and were already with a spouse or a partner (living in France or
abroad at the time of their entry) (Tavan 2005). The majority of the re-
spondents migrated for family reasons. Even for males, who had tradi-
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tionally left their country to find a job, this figure reached 48 per cent
(73 per cent for females). The difficulty of identifying the actual motive
for migration is further illustrated by the gap between the above survey
and a similar survey conducted in one of the sending countries. In
Morocco, 70 per cent of the candidates for migration declared that they
intended to leave for economic reasons, whereas only 12 per cent put
forward family reasons (Hamdouch & Khachani 2007). This discre-
pancy reveals that a given person may have multiple reasons for mi-
grating; thus, it is difficult to identify the real motive for migration.
The comparison of the foreign-born population from one census to
another shows a limited development compared to a larger historical
perspective which also includes the descendants of immigrants; this
larger perspective illustrates how the migration patterns have changed
over several generations. The population with a migratory background
is not directly counted in the census. It is estimated through the Study
of Family History (EHF) survey, which was conducted in 1999 and
gathered information on country of birth of parents and grandparents,
combined with information on parental linguistic practices during the
early childhood of the respondents (Tribalat 2004). According to this
study, 9.2 million persons born in France had at least one immigrant
parent (the so-called ‘second generation’) or grandparent (‘third genera-
tion’). All in all, nearly 14 million persons (23 per cent of the total po-
pulation) living in France in 1999 had a migratory background.
Table 2.4 illustrates that more than 40 per cent of the parents and
grandparents of the native population with a foreign background origi-
nated from Southern Europe, namely Italy (23.7 per cent), Spain (12.5
per cent) and Portugal (6.2 per cent), whereas only 18.5 per cent had
parents and grandparents from North Africa. Tribalat pointed out that
‘public debate in France in recent years has been prompt to equate the
Table 2.3 Age, sex and length of stay of foreign-born population in France in 1999
Country of origin % of 60 + % of female Median year of arrival
Italy 59.6 50.8 1957
Poland 58.6 65.0 1960
Spain 51.8 55.0 1961
Portugal 14.6 48.7 1970
Algeria 23.6 43.8 1972
Tunisia 23.2 42.5 1972
Morocco 11.4 45.6 1978
Germany 36.3 61.3 1979
Turkey 7.6 47.0 1981
Belgium 37.2 58.0 1981
Total 24.1 49.7 1972
Source: INSEE
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population of foreign origin with its Maghrebin component. Yet indivi-
duals of Maghrebin origin belonging to the three generations studied
here represent only around three million persons, or just 22 per cent
of the total foreign-origin population […] Among those of Maghrebin
origin, slightly more than half are immigrants or descendants of immi-
grants from Algeria’ (Tribalat 2004: 64).
However, the population with an African background is expected to
grow in the future due to the increasing inflow of the foreign-born of
this origin, combined with their higher fertility rate.
The foreign-born population residing in France was older than the
native-born due to the fact that the majority of immigrants were aged
eighteen or above when they left their country of origin. The proportion
of immigrants that was under eighteen years old amounted to 6 per
cent, whereas minors constituted 20 per cent of those born in France
(Table 2.5). Conversely, people aged over 60 were over-represented in
the immigrant category. On the other hand, the proportion of minors
among those born in France with at least a parent or a grandparent
born abroad (‘second’ and ‘third’ generation) was higher than among
natives without migratory background: every third native with foreign
origin was under eighteen years old (20 per cent in the case of natives
without foreign origin). According to Tribalat’s estimate, 60 per cent of
Table 2.4 Country of origin of French immigrant population and its offspring
in 1999




Country of birth or
parental birth
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Portugal 572,000 13.3 572,000 6.2 1,144,000 8.5
Italy 379,000 8.8 2,178,000 23.7 2,557,000 19.0
Spain 316,000 7.3 1,148,000 12.5 1,464,000 10.9
Portugal + Italy
+ Spain
1,267,000 29.4 3,898,000 42.5 5,165,000 38.3
Other EU 363,000 8.4 1,439,000 15.7 1,802,000 13.4
Turkey 174,000 4.0 148,000 1.6 322,000 2.4
Algeria 574,000 13.3 1,003,000 10.9 1,577,000 11.7
Morocco 523,000 12.1 482,000 5.3 1,005,000 7.5
Tunisia 202,000 4.7 215,000 2.3 417,000 3.1
Algeria + Morocco
+ Tunisia
1,299,000 30.1 1,700,000 18.5 2,999,000 22.2
Other African
country
393,000 9.1 286,000 3.1 679,000 5.0
Other country 812,000 18.8 1,702,000 18.6 2,514,000 18.6
Total 4,310,000 100.0 9,172,000 100.0 13,482,000 100.0
Sources: INSEE; INED
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these second- and third-generation minors had African and Turkish
backgrounds. By contrast, the parents and grandparents of those aged
60 and above usually originated from European countries; indeed, ‘the
higher the age, the higher the proportion of persons originating from
an EU country outside southern Europe. This attests in particular to
the effects of the much older Belgian immigration, of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century’ (Tribalat 2004: 68).
There were only minor differences on the basis of sex when consid-
ering the age structure of the population with a foreign origin, except
for the fact that there were, due to their lower mortality, more old wo-
men (9.5 versus 7.5 per cent). However, if we consider the foreign-born
population, there was a clear trend towards feminisation in migration
flows, especially for those originating from outside the EU. Accord-
ingly, the proportion of women aged eighteen to 39 was higher than
those among men (42.4 versus 36.2), whereas the opposite was true
for those aged 40-59 (33.6 versus 38.6). As a result of the growth in fe-
male migration and their longer life expectancy, the stock of the for-
eign-born in 2004 was balanced, with an equal number of both sexes
after a long period of predominantly male migration.
2.3.2 Naturalisations, births and deaths
The number of foreigners acquiring French citizenship per year was
frequently under the 100,000 mark until the mid-1990s (Table 2.6).
At the turn of the millennium, nearly 150,000 persons per year chan-
ged their legal status in France; this increase was confirmed in more
recent years with almost 170,000 new citizens in 2004. Foreign immi-
gration flows were more or less offset by the acquisitions of nationality,
which explains the relative stability of foreign population stocks over
Table 2.5 Native and foreign-born population in France by sex and age according to
the 1999 Census (in per cent)
Born in France Foreign-born















Under 18 24.4 33.6 21.8 32.1 6.1 7.6 6.0 8.0
18-39 31.9 37.0 29.6 36.7 31.6 36.2 34.7 42.4
40-59 25.5 22.0 24.7 21.7 38.8 38.6 34.7 33.6
60 or over 18.2 7.5 23.8 9.5 23.5 17.6 24.6 16.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: INSEE; INED
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time. In 1999, 5 per cent of the estimated total foreign population in
France were naturalised. With its ius soli tradition, France grants a sig-
nificant number of naturalisations on the basis of the period of time
spent within the country (legal requirement of at least five years). This
holds true for 51.8 per cent of the decisions in 2004 (against 34.8 per
cent in 1994). An increasing number of foreigners acquired French ci-
tizenship on the grounds of marriage with a French spouse (after two
years of marriage); this number increased from around 20,000 in
1994 to 34,000 ten years later (20.4 per cent of all decisions). Not all
of those who acquire French citizenship are immigrants. In fact, 41.9
per cent of the people who were granted citizenship in 2003 were born
in France. These are mostly children of non-national parents, who can
claim French citizenship from the age of thirteen. In 2004, the descen-
dants of migrants born in France who acquired French citizenship be-
fore the age of eighteen represented 20 per cent of all decisions. As a
consequence, the average age of those acquiring French nationality was
comparatively low (25 years), with those born in France being on aver-
age fifteen years and the partners in mixed couples being on average 31
years when they acquired French nationality. The sex ratio is balanced,
with 49.6 per cent of males being granted French nationality in 2002.
More than 60 per cent of the people who acquired nationality in
2004 were citizens of an African country (among these 50 per cent
were from North Africa). This share was equivalent to the proportion
Table 2.6 Naturalisations in France according to former citizenship and legal basis









Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
1990 64,991 34,889 53.7 15,627 24.0 23,099 35.5 22,543 34.7 11,202 17.2
1991 72,242 39,445 54.6 16,333 22.6 29,184 40.4 11,971 16.6 11,565 16.0
1992 71,601 39,346 55.0 15,601 21.8 32,094 44.8 9,090 12.7 11,273 15.7
1993 98,170 35,988 36.7 15,246 15.5 33,738 34.4 8,292 8.4 11,309 11.5
1994 126,337 44,008 34.8 19,493 15.4 44,761 35.4 9,843 7.8 13,943 11.0
1995 92,410 36,280 39.3 16,659 18.0 49,111 53.1 18,373 19.9 16,344 17.7
1996 109,823 50,730 46.2 19,127 17.4 59,722 54.4 18,063 16.4 21,363 19.5
1997 116,194 53,189 45.8 20,845 17.9 62,470 53.8 19,833 17.1 22,222 19.1
1998 123,761 51,303 41.5 22,113 17.9 59,788 48.3 16,140 13.0 20,220 16.3
1999 145,522 59,836 41.1 24,088 16.6 80,434 55.3 17,547 12.1 25,621 17.6
2000 150,025 68,750 45.8 26,056 17.4 84,179 56.1 14,948 10.0 28,042 18.7
2001 127,548 57,627 45.2 23,994 18.8 74,941 58.8 12,267 9.6 22,536 17.7
2002 128,092 56,942 44.5 26,351 20.6 76,468 59.7 11,642 9.1 22,008 17.2
2003 144,640 69,272 47.9 30,922 21.4 88,817 61.4 12,444 8.6 23,710 16.4
2004 168,826 87,497 51.8 34,440 20.4 106,501 63.1 13,470 8.0 27,500 16.3
Sources: Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Cohesion; Ministry of Justice
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of African citizens in inflow statistics. Naturalisations among EU citi-
zens have been declining, as they are no longer convinced of the advan-
tages of this procedure.
In order to get a more complete picture of the demographic signifi-
cance of the foreign population in France, we also need to consider sta-
tistics on births, deaths and marriages (Table 2.7). Between 1999 and
2004, about 52,000 foreign children (i.e. those whose parents were
both foreigners at the time of the children’s births) were born each year
(6.8 per cent of the total number of births), while annually, roughly
23,000 foreigners died over the same period of time (4.3 per cent of all
deaths). Thus, the natural balance for foreigners was clearly positive
due to the young structure of the foreign population.
While births and deaths of foreigners did not change significantly
compared to the figures for the 1990s, an increasing effect of migra-
tion is visible in the statistics on marriages, especially for those invol-
ving a French person and a foreigner.4 Between 1999 and 2003, these
specific couples accounted for 13.7 per cent of the total number of mar-
riages (16.2 per cent including marriages between two foreigners)
against 10 per cent over the previous decade. As a consequence, births
from mixed parentage including one French partner rose sharply,
accounting for 9.2 per cent of children born at the turn of the millen-
nium against 5.6 per cent previously. These children acquire French ci-
tizenship at birth, whereas those born of foreign parents may only ac-
quire it after having turned thirteen. All in all, children born from at
Table 2.7 Births, marriages and deaths relating to the foreign population in France
1990-1998 1999-2003
Births of foreign children Total 500,661 260,359
Annual average 55,629 52,072
% (/a) 7.6 6.8
Deaths of foreigners Total 188,932 114,507
Annual average 20,992 22,901
% (/b) 4.0 4.3
Marriages between foreign citizens Total 59,941 36,185
Annual average 6,660 7,237
% (/c) 2.5 2.5
Marriages between French and Total 243,652 195,710
foreign citizens Annual average 27,072 39,142
% (/c) 10.0 13.7
Births of children one of whose Total 372,455 351,075
parents is French Annual average 41,384 70,215
% (/a) 5.6 9.2
Denominator: total of (a) births, (b) deaths, (c) marriages
Source: INSEE, Statistics of civil registration
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least one foreign parent now represent 16 per cent of all births in
France. In 2005, foreign women had a fertility rate of 3.3 births per wo-
men (2.8 in 1999), which is higher than the index for French nationals
(1.8). However, foreign women contribute less than 0.1 per cent to the
total number of births. With or without immigration, fertility in France
is among the highest in Europe (see Heran & Pison 2007).
Between the last two traditional censuses in 1990 and 1999 more
than 500,000 foreign children were born and 189,000 foreigners died
(natural balance equal to 310,000). As we will see below, one million
foreigners entered France, whereas 850,000 persons acquired French
citizenship, yielding a net difference of 150,000. This means that the
number of foreigners in France should have increased by about
460,000 (excluding outflows as these are not counted). The censuses,
on the other hand, counted 3.6 million foreigners in 1990 and only 3.3
million in 1999. This would mean that around 800,000 foreigners left
France over this period of nine years if the data from the two censuses
are comparable. However, according to the statistical office the popula-
tion was probably underestimated in 1999 compared to 1990 (fewer
double counts and more omissions).
2.4 Description of flows
The only data available on migration among French people are statis-
tics from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counting those registered in
the consulates. This number increased from 821,000 in 1991 to
1,100,000 in 2002, giving an annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent. How-
ever, these data indicate a general trend rather than the exact stock of
French population living abroad, since the incentives to register are
low, especially in developed countries where there are no security con-
siderations. Nevertheless, it is estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million
French citizens live abroad (Gentil 2003). Moreover, the geographical
distribution of the registered population changed considerably over the
1990s. While the number of French citizens registered in the French-
speaking countries in Africa decreased, their registrations in other Eur-
opean and in North American countries increased. This implies that
French emigration probably rose considerably more over the 1990s
than was indicated by the official figures.
As shown in Table 2.8, immigration to France, measured solely on
the basis of the number of foreigners obtaining their first residence
permit valid for one year or more, increased almost continuously be-
tween 1997 and 2004, after declining between 1994 and 1995 when
120,000 and 106,000 foreigners, respectively, were admitted for legal
residence. This number was stabilised until 1996 (106,000). The num-
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ber admitted rose in 1997 (127,000) and especially so in 1998
(156,000). However, the end of the special regularisation programme
in 1998 was not followed by a large reduction in the number of for-
eigners entering France in 1999 (145,000 against 156,000 in 1998).
The upward trend continued in 2000 (160,000), accelerated in 2001
(183,000) and was confirmed in 2002 (206,000) and 2003 (215,000).
The peak reached as a consequence of the regularisation in 1998 was
thus exceeded as of 2000, and the number registered in 2003 was the
highest since immigration of foreign workers was officially suspended
in 1974. Immigration flows, all ages and nationalities combined, grew
at a rate of 10.5 per cent in 2000, 13.9 per cent in 2001, 12.6 per cent
in 2002 and 4.7 per cent in 2003.
Inflows of nationals originating from the European Economic Area
varied little between 1994 and 2004, accounting for approximately
43,000 people annually. The general increase in immigration flows to
France therefore resulted from that of third-country nationals. With
173,000 entrants in 2003, they represented the largest share of the to-
tal inflow (80 per cent). Their proportion of total admissions for resi-
dence grew continuously over the period under discussion, but their
number was subject to sharp variations. Between 1996 and 1997, it
rose by over 37 per cent thanks to the programme that regularised the
status of several tens of thousands of foreigners, then it fell by 9 per
cent between 1998 and 1999 when this programme ended; it rose by







Third-country nationals, of which:
Total Africa Asia* America
1994 119,563 47,697 71,866 34,748 13,123 9,797
1995 106,180 -11.2 44,423 61,757 28,610 11,177 9,216
1996 105,986 -0.2 43,258 62,728 29,343 11,447 9,352
1997 127,431 +20.2 41,306 86,125 46,615 14,972 10,256
1998 155,879 +22.3 43,033 112,846 64,884 19,668 11,255
1999 145,120 -6.9 42,791 102,329 54,006 17,759 11,499
2000 160,428 +10.5 43,282 117,146 64,181 21,001 12,776
2001 182,694 +13.9 42,552 140,142 78,753 25,234 14,083
2002 205,707 +12.6 42,744 162,963 94,317 29,027 14,682
2003 215,397 +4.7 42,085 173,312 101,658 30,346 14,958
2004 210,076 -2.5 43,217** 166,859 100,567 21,310 14,917
* Turkey is not counted as part of Asia but as part of Europe (not listed in this table).
** Includes the new ten EU Member States (in third-country category before).
Sources: Ministry of the Interior; OMI (Office des Migrations Internationales, now called
Agence Nationale d’Accueil des Étrangers et des Migrations (ANAEM)); data processed by
INED (see Thierry 2004)
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over 20 per cent between 2000 and 2001 helped by favourable eco-
nomic conditions, and rose again by nearly 6 per cent in 2003.
Nationals of African countries reinforced their position at the top of
the classification of immigration flows by geographical origin, account-
ing for 47.9 per cent of total admissions for residence in 2004 (27.7
per cent in 1996, Table 2.9). As illustrated in Table 2.9, nationals of
the North African (Maghreb) countries still accounted for two-thirds of
African immigration (66.9 per cent in 2003), far ahead of migrants
from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa formerly under French rule
(25.7 per cent). Asian (12.2 per cent in 1999, 14.1 per cent in 2003)
and American (7.9 per cent and 6.9 per cent, respectively) immigrants
were far behind. The eight main countries of origin for foreigners ad-
mitted for residence in 2003 were Algeria (33,000), Morocco (25,000),
Table 2.9 Inflow of foreign nationals to France (legal long-term immigration) for
selected years and countries of origin




47,697 43,258 43,033 43,282 42,744 42,085 40,000
UK 9,267 8,021 7,712 7,850 9,444 10,834 -
Portugal 9,124 7,522 5,899 6,530 6,601 7,791 -
Germany 9,531 8,155 8,020 7,464 6,647 5,959 -
Belgium 3,880 4,005 4,267 4,746 4,762 4,200 -
Other European
citizenship
13,519 10,954 16,289 18,630 24,278 25,712 -
New EU-10
Member States
2,276 2,251 2,899 3,313 4,242 4,426 3,217
Turkey 4,456 3,165 5,723 5,814 7,706 7,544 7,701
Maghreb 23,029 18,746 36,138 40,953 63,107 68,040 65,695
Morocco 9,267 7,669 16,243 21,507 26,177 24,948 24,014
Algeria 10,911 8,469 14,523 12,760 27,936 32,596 31,846
Tunisia 2,851 2,608 5,372 6,686 8,994 10,496 9,835
Other African
countries
11,720 10,597 28,746 23,228 31,210 33,617 34,826
Senegal 1,249 1,257 3,175 3,422 4,163 3,907 3,920
Cameroon 675 768 1,798 2,039 3,190 3,724 4,123
Côte d'Ivoire 812 958 2,020 2,187 3,009 3,594 3,913
Democratic
Rep. of Congo
1,293 785 3,620 1,369 2,426 2,650 2,935
Asia 13,123 11,447 19,668 21,001 29,027 30,346 29,310
China 1,358 1,047 5,565 5,036 8,968 8,887 8,329
Japan 2,457 2,562 2,621 3,154 3,118 3,229 3,260
America 9,797 9,352 11,255 12,776 14,682 14,958 14,917
US 4,484 4,645 4,447 4,598 4,632 4,416 4,617
Total 119,563 105,986 155,879 160,428 205,707 215,397 210,076
Sources: Ministry of the Interior; OMI; calculation by INED (for more data see www.ined.fr)
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the UK and Tunisia (both 11,000), China (9,000), Turkey and Portugal
(both 8,000) and Germany (6,000). Individuals from the eight main
emigration countries to France represented 52.1 per cent of the total
number admitted for residence in 2002, compared with 44.9 per cent
in 1999 and 51.6 per cent in 1994. The diversification in immigrant
origins that was observed in earlier years appears to have stopped.
Over the period between 1999 and 2001, the sex ratio of the immi-
grants from third countries was almost balanced, with 102 females per
100 males entering the country. This stands in stark contrast to the
mid-1990s, when the share of women coming to France was far higher.
The shift to a more balanced sex ratio in France shows that the femini-
sation of immigration is not an irreversible trend, as is often postu-
lated. However, the sex ratio differed massively between the types of
permits granted. While work permit holders were mainly men (only 45
females per 100 males among the third-country nationals), family
members were predominantly women. However, there was a clear dif-
ference between family members of foreign nationals (218 females per
100 males) and those of French nationals for whom the sex ratio was
more balanced (117 females per 100 males). This latter difference illus-
trates the new strategies to enter France developed by males in the con-
text of restricted labour immigration. Moreover, male students outnum-
ber female (90 females per 100 males).
The only French information available on the motives for migration
to France is the official grounds for admission for residence indicated
on the permit (Figure 2.1). The official number of labour migrants who
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entered the country in 2003 was similar to 1994, whereas the numbers
of foreigners who were granted permits to join their family or to pursue
studies soared. After 2000, the traditional family reunification mode
involving two foreign partners was superseded by a new type of family
migration where a foreigner joined a French partner. This rise may, on
the one hand, be related to the restrictive labour immigration policy,
which encouraged candidates to find new entry channels. On the other
hand, it may be linked to a growing ‘second generation’ in France now
at the age to get married, possibly to a partner of the same origin.
However, the official reason for the stay does not always describe the
actual intentions of the immigrants. In particular, labour migration (of-
ficially controlled) occurs partly through the procedures for admission
on family grounds, since holders of a residence permit granted for fa-
mily reasons are allowed to work without having to undergo any
further administrative procedures. The difficulties of getting a work
permit which arose when politicians tried to limit such flows due to
the high level of unemployment encouraged people to seek other
grounds for admission. Moreover, the administrative procedure for
granting the residence permit may introduce some bias into the classi-
fication. An example is the regularisation programme of 1997 and
1998, where the residence permits issued were work permits, although
the family links were considered an important pre-condition for admis-
sion. This is why the relative shares of the official grounds for immi-
gration had to be corrected to get a more realistic statistical estimation
(see Thierry 2007). According to these corrected figures, employment
was still the main reason for entering France in the period between
1999 and 2001 (38 per cent rather than 16 per cent according to the
number of work permits issued), followed by studies (27 per cent) and
family reunification (20 per cent instead of 39 per cent when all resi-
dence permits mentioning a family reason are counted).
Despite the lack of information on several types of international mi-
gration (especially outflows of foreigners and inflows of French citi-
zens), INSEE estimates annual net migration based on some assump-
tions and information provided by the census (Table 2.10). However,
these figures have to be used with caution since they have not been ad-
justed to reflect the rise in the population in 2004 and 2005 and have
been frequently modified over the last years. INSEE estimates that net
migration was roughly 100,000 people at the beginning of this millen-
nium. Compared to the natural balance, which amounted to about
250,000, net migration is thus moderate.
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2.5 Conclusion
Between the second half of the 1990s and 2003, migration flows inten-
sified in France, as testified by the doubling of the number of incom-
ing aliens between 1996 and 2003 and the unconfirmed increase in
the number of French nationals living abroad. So France is not comple-
tely turned in upon itself, as some observers would claim. It is true
that the number of foreigners or immigrants rose little during the
1990s. Nonetheless, the latest census results have sparked considerable
debate and several specialists outside the statistical office claim that im-
migrant populations were under-estimated in 1999. Indeed, the many
enumerations conducted since 2004 tend to confirm this assumption
and the statistical office has made upward adjustments to population
stocks in the light of initial results. It is also true that the figure of
215,000 incoming foreigners in 2003 was very modest in comparison
with 593,000 in Spain, 602,000 in Germany and 393,000 in Italy re-
corded for the same year. But in fact, these countries experienced the
migration revolution that took place in France some years earlier. The
new receiving countries mainly attracted labour immigrants, while the
immigration flows to France were made up of persons entering the
country to join populations who had arrived in previous waves or even
populations who were born in France though preferred to choose a
partner from their country of origin.
This difference in position in the migration cycle between France and
its neighbours explains the current debate in France over the political
will to control not so much immigration volumes but rather the charac-
teristics and the duration of stay of new immigrants. The political
Table 2.10 Annual demographic estimates for France, 1995-2005
Natural balance Net migration Adjustment
a b b c
1995 198,000 40,000 -55,000
1996 199,000 35,000 -54,000
1997 196,000 40,000 -54,000
1998 204,000 45,000 -51,000
1999 207,000 45,000 60,000 +33,000 +65,000
2000 244,000 50,000 70,000 +33,000 +63,000
2001 240,000 60,000 85,000 +33,000 +61,000
2002 227,000 65,000 95,000 +33,000 +64,000
2003 211,000 55,000 100,000 +33,000 +62,000
2004 256,000 105,000
2005 95,000
Sources: INSEE, (a) ‘Bilan démographique 2003’; (b) ‘Enquêtes annuelles du recensement’;
(c) ‘Bilan démographique 2005’
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authorities have coined the notion of ‘actively selected’ immigration in
preference to ‘passively accepted’ immigration in order to highlight the
fact that labour shortages in certain sectors (hotels and the construction
industry) cannot be effectively remedied due to a lack of legal provisions
permitting the selection of certain types of economic immigrants, while
at the same time, by virtue of respect for family life, the country wel-
comes large numbers of persons who do not necessarily wish to take up
such jobs. Based on this distinction, a new law that came into force in
July 2006 aims to control the duration of stay of incoming foreigners
by granting shorter residence permits both to workers, in order to en-
courage seasonal and highly qualified labour migration, and to family
members who, with each legislative amendment, are subject to an in-
creasingly lengthy bureaucratic process before finally obtaining a long-
term (ten-year) permit. This new migration policy is combined with the
creation of an assimilation and integration contract which obliges new
immigrants to abide by social rules and to receive linguistic or occupa-
tional training. The decision to extend their residence permit may de-
pend upon their compliance with these requirements.
Within a decade, politicians have made a U-turn with regard to im-
migration. In the early 1990s, when the number of asylum seekers
peaked in France, political refugees were commonly suspected of being
economic migrants in disguise, so measures were taken to restrict their
access to the labour market. Today, though unemployment has not fall-
en in the meantime, regrets are being expressed regarding France’s
lack of appeal for foreign workers.
Notes
1 A computerised register of addresses of dwellings existing on the territory of large
municipalities is continuously updated and records all demolitions and newly built
houses. These files differ from a register based on households in the sense that the
former does not include the numbers of people per address. Consequently, such a
sample of dwellings is not biased by the underestimation of new inhabitants as could
be the case in surveys based on a population register. It is therefore to be expected
that, statistically speaking, the migrant populations will be accurately represented.
2 However, a significant share (20 per cent) of potential respondents did not reply. It
has been shown that non-response was not correlated with particular characteristics
(see Thierry 2003).
3 Statistics on asylum seekers are not included in this report due to the uncertainty of
their length of stay in the country, although they are available in specific publications
(see OFPRA website).
4 Of course, marriages of two partners with different citizenships are not automatically
mixed, nor are marriages between French spouses non-mixed. Indicators for inter-
marriage should be measured through information on the country of birth of the
spouses’ parents. However, these data have not been updated since the large survey
on integration processes among immigrants and their descendants conducted in







– annual flows of foreign
immigration (1994-2003)
www.ined.fr
French Office for the
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Britain has never considered itself a country of immigration (Coleman
1994), and this is reflected in the absence of comprehensive data on
immigrants (Coleman 1995: 159), even though some improvements
have been made in recent years.
One of the reasons for this perception is that Britain has always been
a country of emigration: ‘Throughout its history it has exported popula-
tion, particularly to its English-speaking former colonial territories and
dominions, both those that broke away – the United States and the Re-
public of South Africa – and those that remained within the Old Com-
monwealth – Canada, Australia, and New Zealand’ (Coleman 1994:
37). Emigration was seen as an instrument with which to export unem-
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ployment and poverty and to strengthen the Commonwealth as a mul-
tinational but English-speaking power. In 1922, the Empire Settlement
Act was decreed to promote emigration. The Overseas Migration
Board, founded in 1953, served a similar purpose.
In addition, Britain is not, and never was, a country actively recruit-
ing immigrants. On the contrary, the British government was always
more concerned with limiting the immigration of certain groups. After
the Second World War, despite huge labour shortages and the need to
rebuild the country, the government, unlike many European counter-
parts, did not try to attract migrant workers.
The UK only once recruited workers on an official basis for spe-
cific economic purposes. From 1947 to 1950, 75,000 ‘European
Volunteer Workers’ were recruited to work in sanatoria, hospi-
tals, and the cotton and other industries. Initially, most were fe-
male Balts from displaced persons camps; later, Ukrainian pris-
oners of war and Germans, Austrians, and Italians of both sexes
were recruited. (Coleman 1994: 38)
Whereas Germany, Switzerland and Austria started to encourage for-
eign workers to migrate to Western Europe, labour migrants from the
former overseas colonies arrived without Britain introducing any spe-
cial policy measures. Under the 1948 British Nationality Act, citizens
of the former colonies were British subjects and were therefore allowed
to come to Britain. However, ‘people of colour’ were not very welcome
and the government soon started to try to discourage them from com-
ing. Thus, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced immi-
gration controls for Commonwealth citizens who were not born in the
UK or Ireland or did not hold a UK or Irish passport. Since the regula-
tions gave large discretion to Immigration Officers, many African and
West-Indian Commonwealth citizens were denied entry, while no bar-
riers were imposed on white applicants. This practice became law
when thousands of ethnic Indian British subjects arrived from the
newly independent Kenya, where non-citizens had been barred from
working. A Bill rushed through Parliament denied entry to this specific
group of immigrants, while the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrant Act
was designed to prevent further immigration waves of this kind by spe-
cifically subjecting those of colonial origin in newly independent coun-
tries to entry controls (Dummett 2006: 565-567).
At the same time, like many European countries, the UK was facing
a labour force shortage in the 1960s, so it started welcoming guestwor-
kers from, first, Poland and Italy, and then from what remained of the
British Empire, notably the West Indies. Thousands of migrants were
drawn to Britain, especially to the greater London area. Soon the coun-
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try had two parallel systems of immigration control: one for foreigners
and one for the citizens of the colonies and the Commonwealth. Aim-
ing to merge these two systems, the British government passed the
1971 Immigrant Act, which established a distinction between those
who could enter Britain free of control (these were called ‘patrial’ at the
time and included all those who could prove a link to the UK, such as
birth, naturalisation, marriage or at least five years ordinary residence
in the country) and those who were subject to control, including all
aliens, Commonwealth citizens and British subjects whose status de-
rived from the colonies. Ten years later, in 1981, when most of the colo-
nies had become independent, the government enacted the British Na-
tionality Act, which reduced the number of people eligible to pass on
British citizenship; this was done in order to further limit immigration
(Dummett 2006: 567-570). This relationship between nationality and
immigration is peculiar to Britain, a country that has never had a com-
prehensive immigration policy as such but attempted to limit immigra-
tion by differentiating between its subjects.
In contrast to the majority of the EU-15 countries, the UK granted
free mobility to the citizens of the states that acceded to the EU on
1 May 2004, a decision clearly linked to the economic boom in Britain
and the need for an increased workforce. In fact, Britain follows a liber-
al tradition, insofar as the government leaves the necessary adjustment
to the market. However, Bulgaria and Romania, who acceded on 1
January 2007, do not benefit from the same policy. Meanwhile, Britain
also attracted high-skilled migrants from the US, Canada, Australia
and South Africa. Moreover, after the collapse of the USSR, the country
witnessed a sharp increase in the figures of asylum seekers, contribut-
ing to an increase in immigration. Despite stringent policies recently
introduced to reduce these figures, such as the 2002 Nationality, Im-
migration and Asylum Act, the UK keeps attracting large numbers of
migrants and asylum seekers.
In 2001, the foreign-born population – enumerated in the census –
reached 4,896,600, accounting for 8.3 per cent of the overall popula-
tion. This number had doubled over the previous 50 years. Among the
foreign-born people those born in the EU represented 33.1 per cent.
The UK remains a major destination country in Europe, attracting
494,000 foreigners in 2004. Most of the immigrants living in Britain
live in London, the South East and major cities such as Birmingham
and Manchester. According to projections made by the Office for Na-
tional Statistics (2005: 14), immigration is expected to contribute 56
per cent to the increase in the UK population by 2029.
Debate over illegal immigration is particularly fierce in the UK and
opposition parties, as well as some newspapers, recently accused the
government of being unable to provide credible statistics on illegal mi-
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gration. In 2004, 56,920 aliens were deported from the UK. Though
not being part of the Schengen agreement, the UK actively participates
in European cooperation projects such as the Dublin Convention and
joint repatriation flights. Immigration is one of the main political is-
sues in the country and it was a central axis of the Conservative Party
campaign in the 2005 general election. The attacks of July 2005,
plotted by UK-born Muslims, have also raised questions about the link-
age between immigration and terrorism and Britain’s identity, though
the terrorists were born and raised in the UK. Reconsiderations of Brit-
ish identity have also led to a questioning of firmly established multi-
cultural policies in the country. Thus, the government introduced mea-
sures such as a ‘Britishness test’ for immigrants seeking naturalisation
or indefinite leave in the UK. The concept of the test, officially called
the ‘Life in the United Kingdom Test’, was laid out in the Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, but the test itself was only im-
plemented in late 2005 for naturalisation and in April 2007 for settle-
ment. Those applying for naturalisation or indefinite leave now have to
demonstrate ‘sufficient knowledge’ of life in the UK, as well as suffi-
cient knowledge of English. The test fulfils both requirements, but was
highly debated and criticised. It contains questions, not only about
everyday life, but also about British history and law.
Notwithstanding these debates on British national identity, the role
of immigrants in the economy is widely acknowledged – they are con-
sidered one of the main factors for the British economy’s dynamism,
as well as the continuous growth of its population. Britain continues to
actively seek to attract high-skilled migrants to strengthen some sectors
of its economy (e.g. IT and the health sector), while fiercely combating
illegal migration.
3.2 UK statistics on migration
The main characteristic of UK statistics on migration is the absence of
a national register. In addition, UK nationals do not carry ID cards.
Therefore, there is no central database of the British population, and
one must rely on censuses and surveys. However, other databases do
exist and are kept by various agencies. These different sources are de-
tailed below.
The main body responsible for producing data on immigration is
the Office for National Statistics (ONS). However, some data produced
by the ONS, such as the census, cover only England and Wales and are
complemented by censuses produced by the General Register Office
for Scotland (GROS) and the Northern Ireland Statistical and Research
Agency (NISRA) (Perrin & Poulain 2006: 651). Though these agencies
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use the same concepts, comparing statistics can be difficult, since data
specific to Scotland and Northern Ireland are not always included in
national statistics. The ONS includes a Migration Statistics Unit. Statis-
tics are quite transparent and easily accessible. Most statistical reports
can be downloaded from the internet free of charge.
3.2.1 National census
A national census is conducted every ten years by the Office for National
Statistics in England, the General Register Office in Scotland and the
Northern Ireland Statistical and Research Agency in Northern Ireland.
The last census was conducted in 2001 (Dorling & Thomas 2004). The
questionnaire was delivered by a field force to all usual residents (de-
fined as people who spend most of their time residing at the address),
who were then asked to return the questionnaire by post. A follow-up
was organised for non-respondents. Each household was obliged to
complete the census. The next census is planned for 27 March 2011.
Questions in the 2001 Census collected information on accommoda-
tion, household, demographic characteristics, internal and interna-
tional migration, cultural characteristics, health and provision of care,
qualifications, employment, workplace and travel to work.
Unlike in many other European countries (see Coleman 1995: 160),
British statistics based on the census do not differentiate between citi-
zens and foreigners – the census does not even include a question on
citizenship (Perrin & Poulain 2006: 651) – but between those born in
British territories and those born abroad. Therefore, these figures also
include British people born abroad, as well as naturalised citizens and
aliens. The foreign-born population is significantly different from the
foreign population, especially in the case of Britain, where many Brit-
ish citizens were born in the UK’s overseas territories.
In addition, recent British censuses, like the censuses in other immi-
gration countries such as Canada and the US also contain information
on ethnicity, which is used to describe the foreign-born population in
more detail, even though it was not collected for this purpose in the
first place. Census officials were instructed to collect information on
this topic after the introduction of the 1976 Race Relations Act, which
aimed to combat discrimination on racial grounds. The census was to
provide the necessary information to establish social indicators of dis-
crimination. However, due to objections to the categorisations foreseen
for the 1981 Census, the first census that contained a question on eth-
nicity was the 1991 Census, even though this question had already
been asked in the Labour Force Survey since 1981. The 1991 Census
differentiated between the following categories that seemed to have
been established ‘for political rather than statistical reasons’ (Coleman
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1995: 160): White, black, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese.
The census thus mixed racial and ethnic categories (Kertzer & Arel
2002: 13-14). The same holds true for the 2001 Census, where respon-
dents were asked to tick one of the following main categories: White,
mixed, Asian/Asian British, black/black British or Chinese/other ethnic
group. For each category, respondents could either select among var-
ious, more specific subcategories (e.g. Indian, Caribbean, etc.) or fill in
another category that they themselves would define. In the absence of a
centralised registration system, these data create a ‘confused picture of
populations of immigrant or foreign origin’ (Coleman 1995: 160).
During the processing, data are edited to ensure overall consistency,
extrapolated in order to compensate for non-responses and statistically
adjusted according to surveys done in a follow-up to the census cover-
age. Throughout the process, data are continuously reviewed and evalu-
ated (Dorling & Thomas 2004).
3.2.2 The International Passenger Survey (IPS)
Despite the absence of a national register, all migrants, either arriving
in or leaving the country, should be recorded. In practice, however, the
main measure of migration to and from the UK is the International
Passenger Survey (IPS). This survey is conducted by the Office for Na-
tional Statistics and consists of a sample survey of all passengers (in-
cluding transit passengers and UK residents returning home) passing
through the UK’s main ports and airports. Perrin and Poulain (2006:
653) report that 256,000 travellers were interviewed in 2001, amount-
ing to 0.2 per cent of all travellers. Travellers are first asked how long
they intend to stay or be away from the UK. If they answer that they
have been away for more than a year (or have never been to the coun-
try) and intend to stay for more than a year, they are considered mi-
grants (according to the UN guidelines), and undergo a full interview.
Likewise, UK residents who have been in the country for more than a
year and intend to leave for more than a year are considered emigrants
and also undergo a full interview. Thierry (2004: 749) reports that
about 3,000 people, out of 256,000 surveyed in 2001, were considered
migrants and therefore underwent a full interview (2,376 immigrants
and 689 emigrants). The survey collects information on migration pat-
terns, but also on financial flows and data useful to tourism policy. The
data collected are then weighted in order to come to a national esti-
mate. However, the IPS has important flaws:
– Like all surveys, the IPS is subject to a certain level of uncertainty –
the standard error was 4.1 per cent in 2001 (Perrin & Poulain
2006: 653).
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– Travellers are free to answer the survey or not. Therefore, the non-
response rate is quite high (about 20 per cent) and it affects the
survey.
– People seeking asylum at the border are not surveyed.
– People entering or leaving the country through non-monitored
routes are not surveyed.
– More importantly, travellers who conceal their intentions regarding
their stay and declare that they intend to stay less than one year
and end up staying more than one year are not taken into account
(the same holds true for emigrants). This leads to adjustments oper-
ated by the ONS – according to Thierry (2004: 750), the inflows are
inflated by about 40 per cent.
– Finally, the ONS also uses other sources to complement the IPS,
which makes it far less transparent. Though the IPS is the major
source of information for international migration, it is complemen-
ted by Home Office asylum seeker data (since asylum seekers are
not surveyed in the IPS) and estimates of migration between UK
and Ireland provided by the Irish Central Statistics Office. Further-
more, as stated above, the IPS is adjusted to account for those who
come as visitors but stay longer than first indicated (so called visitor
switchers) as well as those who enter as immigrants but leave be-
fore the end of their intended stay (so-called migrant switchers).
3.2.3 Other databases
The general database of the Home Office is called the Case Informa-
tion Database (CID). Subsets of the database include data on the acqui-
sition of UK citizenship, permanent settlement, asylum procedures
and other information related to migration; there is no specific data-
base on residence permits. Among these datasets, the two most signifi-
cant are the databases on asylum seekers and on the acquisition of UK
citizenship.
The database on asylum seekers is part of the CID and is operated
by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate at the Home Office.
Statistics on asylum are widely available and published quarterly. They
are frequently audited by the National Audit Office, being found con-
sistent with data from Eurostat and UNHCR. Besides the refugee sta-
tus that allows them to remain indefinitely in the UK, applicants can
benefit from other forms of protection: a temporary Humanitarian Pro-
tection status or a temporary Discretionary Leave Status, if it is not pos-
sible to return the person in question.
Asylum applicants need to apply at the port of entry or after entry to
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate. It should be noted that
applicants at the port of entry are not surveyed by the IPS. Decisions
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on the claims are made on a case-by-case basis by an immigration offi-
cer, based on the details given at the interview. If the claim is denied, it
is possible to appeal to an Immigration Appeal Adjudicator. However,
if the appeal is denied, it is also possible to appeal again to the Immi-
gration Appeals Tribunal, but very few applicants are allowed this last
resort of appeal, since the appeal needs to be based on a point of law.
The new Asylum and Immigration Act, implemented in April 2005,
aims at speeding up the application process and reducing the possibili-
ties of fraud and abuse of the system.
The database on asylum seekers is well maintained and it is regu-
larly updated. An exhaustive report is issued every three months, allow-
ing comparisons between different periods of the year.
The database on the acquisition of citizenship is another subset of
the CID, maintained by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, a
division of the Home Office. The British Nationality Act of 1981 recog-
nises six forms of nationality:
– British citizens, who are the majority;
– British overseas territories citizens (BOTCs), who hold citizenship
through a connection with a British overseas territory;
– British overseas citizens (BOCs), who hold citizenship through a
connection with the former British colonies;
– British Nationals (Overseas), who were residents of Hong Kong be-
fore Britain returned the territory to China in 1997;
– British subjects, who are a small group of people born in the Re-
public of Ireland before 1949 or are connected to a country that be-
came part of the Commonwealth in 1949;
– British protected persons, who are an even smaller group of people.
These were citizens of a UK protected state or territory before it at-
tained its independence.
As one can see, British legislation on nationality is rather complex, due
to the country’s links to its former territories and colonies. In the six
categories of citizenship outlined above, the first three categories being
the main ones, while the latter are dwindling.
British citizenship can be acquired by birth (for any child born in
the UK or a British overseas territory if one parent is a citizen or
settled under immigration law), descent, adoption, naturalisation or re-
gistration (for some specific categories of citizens). The data on the ac-
quisition of citizenship are published yearly.
Overall, UK statistics suffer from two major shortcomings:
– The absence of a central population register: One needs therefore to
rely on the censuses, produced every ten years, to get a comprehen-
sive picture of the stock of foreign-born population.
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– The imprecision of the International Passenger Survey (IPS): migra-
tion flows are often underestimated, since only travellers declaring
that they wish to stay for more than one year undergo a full inter-
view. People who decide to stay longer are not included in the sur-
vey; neither are people who enter through unmonitored routes. As
early as 1987, Coleman stated that the ‘IPS can only provide a crude
estimate of the general demographic import of migration flows, in-
capable for statistical reasons of any refined sub-division or analysis,
and prone to both error and bias’ (1987: 1162).
Almost twenty years later, a similar statement can once more be made.
Although some improvements have been made in recent years, includ-
ing the computerisation of the databases (Düvell & Jordan 2003: 328),
analysis of migration trends in the UK remains greatly hampered by
unsatisfactory data (Coleman 1995: 158). Furthermore, these data and
the categories they induce often remain politically driven and hardly
comparable.
3.3 Stock of foreign-born population
3.3.1 Overview of the stock of foreign-born population
According to the 2001 Census, there were 58,789,194 people living in
the UK. Among them, 4,896,600 people were born abroad. Hence, in
the 50 years between 1951, when the census counted 2.1 million people
born abroad, and 2001, the foreign-born population more than
doubled.
The share of the foreign-born population in the UK is now 8.3 per
cent, which is slightly higher than the OECD average (7.8 per cent),
but significantly below the rate of traditional immigration countries
such as the US, Canada or Australia. The diversity of the foreign-born
population is also increasing. In 1971, Europe accounted for half of the
foreign-born population (50.9 per cent); 30 years later this share had
fallen to one-third (33.1 per cent) (see Table 3.1). While North America
and Oceania contribute significant numbers to the foreign-born in the
UK, the share of Asia in particular rose sharply between 1971 and 2001
(from 600,000 to 1.4 million people, respectively representing 19.8
and 29.2 per cent of the total foreign-born population), with the most
important Asian sending countries being Pakistan, Bangladesh and In-
dia. Finally, the absolute numbers of people born in the Far East in-
creased four-fold between 1971 and 2001.
The 2001 Census showed that an increasing majority (92.1 per cent)
of the British population is ‘white’ while this is the case for just over
half (52.6 per cent) of the foreign-born population (see Table 3.2).
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Asian and Asian British people are the second-largest group, followed
by the black and black British. Other ethnic groups accounted for
around 10 per cent of the foreign-born population. If we rank the main
ethnic groups in a decreasing order, we get the same ranking for both
the total and the foreign-born populations.
Table 3.1 UK foreign-born population broken down by country of birth, 2001
Country of birth Numbers Share of the foreign-born
population (%)
Europe 1,620,000 33.1
Republic of Ireland 537,100 11.0
Other Western Europe 834,900 17.1
Eastern Europe 248,000 5.1




New Zealand 58,300 1.2




Other South Asia 89,200 1.8
Caribbean 255,000 5.2
Africa 834,100 17.0
South Africa 141,400 2.9
Kenya 129,600 2.6
Other Africa 563,100 11.5
Far East 398,200 8.1
China 52,500 1.1
Hong Kong 96,400 2.0
Other Far East 249,200 5.1
All other countries 359,900 7.3
Total 4,896,600 100.0
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2001 Census
Table 3.2 UK foreign-born population by ethnic group, 2001




White 2,575,100 52.6 92.1
Mixed 140,800 2.9 1.2
Asian or Asian British 1,229,300 25.1 4.0
Black or black British 580,500 11.9 2.0
Chinese 176,200 3.6 0.4
Other 194,700 4.0 0.4
Total 4,896,600 100.0 100.0
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2001 Census
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Most of the foreign-born population is concentrated in major conur-
bations and in the South East (see Table 3.3). London, in particular, at-
tracts a large number of migrants; in some boroughs, people born
abroad represent roughly half of the borough’s population. A large part
of the population of Oxford and Cambridge was also born abroad
(around 20 per cent) – this is due to the presence of overseas students
and faculty in these university towns.
In London, the foreign-born population tends to live north of the
Thames, which is partly due to more affordable housing and immi-
grant networks.
The foreign-born population is significantly younger than the UK-
born population: most of the people born abroad are of working age.
Females make up a greater proportion of the foreign-born population;
this contributes greatly to the feminisation of the workforce in the UK,
as illustrated in Table 3.4, which shows the age and sex distribution of
Table 3.3 Regional distribution of foreign-born population in the UK, 1991 and 2001
Region 1991 2001
Numbers %* Numbers %*
East Midlands 176,488 4.5 224,623 5.4
East of England 255,417 5.0 328,131 6.1
London 1,233,328 18.5 1,779,300 24.8
North-East 47,527 1.9 67,259 2.7
North-West 213,356 3.2 280,055 4.2
Scotland 125,071 2.5 168,142 3.3
South-East 426,314 5.7 580,417 7.2
South-West 162,744 3.5 218,348 4.4
Wales 62,374 2.2 77,312 2.7
West Midlands 270,719 5.3 342,269 6.5
Yorks & Humber 180,037 3.7 235,424 4.7
* part of total population
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2005: 136
Table 3.4 Age and sex distribution of the foreign-born and UK-born labour forces,
2001 (in per cent)
Men 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 Total 16-64
Foreign-born 3.8 13.6 20.2 11.8 49.4
UK-born 6.5 12.7 19.2 14.8 53.3
Women 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-59 Total 16-59
Foreign-born 4.9 15.4 20.8 9.5 50.6
UK-born 6.2 12.4 18.0 10.1 46.7
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2001 Census
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the labour force (males aged sixteen to 64 and females aged sixteen to
59) in 2001. Female migration is more recent than male migration,
which is mirrored in the age patterns: under 34, women are more nu-
merous, but men are more numerous over 50.
While there is obviously a trend of demographic ageing among the
migrants who arrived after the Second World War, this trend is com-
pensated by the arrival of younger migrants in recent years.
3.4 Net migration and migration flows
3.4.1 Migration flows according to the International Passenger Survey (IPS)
The information related to migration flows in the UK comes from the
International Passenger Survey (IPS), a survey permanently conducted
by the National Institute for Statistics at Britain’s main ports and air-
ports. However, as stated above, this survey does not take into account
every point of entry into the country. Neither does it cover asylum see-
kers or migrants who declare that they intend to stay for less than a
year and later extend their stay. Since 1991, adjustments and correc-
tions have been made in order to take these migrants into account and
to thus produce estimates of the Total International Migration (TIM).
Therefore, any comparison with data prior to 1991 is biased, since the
methodology has changed in the meantime. Thierry (2004: 750) states
that these adjustments can account for up to 40 per cent of the TIM
inflow figures. They can certainly account for the rise in immigration
numbers after 1991, with visitor switchers (or overstayers) outnumber-
ing the migrant switchers (those who left before their intended date of
departure).
The corrected figures from the International Passenger Survey trans-
late into an estimate of the total migration flow. However, these figures
must be regarded with caution, since they are derived from a survey
and not an actual registration process. The extrapolation also takes into
account other sources such as figures on asylum seekers from the
Home Office. Furthermore, the margin of error is significant, which af-
fects the results of the extrapolation.
Over the last decades, migration both into and out of the UK has in-
creased. The number of people leaving the country increased from
240,000 in 1975 to 350,000 in 2004. Over the same period, the num-
ber of people entering the country increased threefold from 200,000
in 1975 to about 600,000 in 2004. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
more people left than entered the country, but this trend was reversed
in 1983 and has not changed since. However, between 1994 and 2004,
the gap between the inflow and the outflow widened considerably.
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In the decade between 1994 and 2004, the UK witnessed a net inflow
of around 1.4 million people, a sharp increase from previous decades.
As shown in Table 3.5, the number of foreigners entering the country
doubled every five years between 1994 and 2004. Net migration of
British citizens was consistently negative over the decade and increased
six-fold between 1994 and 2004. Overall, net migration was consis-
tently positive over this period, but did not rise continuously; indeed,
the years 1996 and 1997, as well as 2002 and 2003, witnessed a de-
cline.
Table 3.6 details the inflow and outflow between 1994 and 2004.
The inflow of British citizens was quite stable over the decade, while
the inflow of foreigners more than doubled. Both the outflows of Brit-
ish citizens and foreigners rose slightly.
The countries of origin and destination of people emigrating from
and immigrating to the UK do not yield many surprises. Among the
British citizens leaving the country, 42 per cent moved to an EU coun-
Table 3.5 United Kingdom’s net migration, 1994-2004
Total British Foreigners
1994 77,000 -17,000 94,000
1995 75,000 -52,000 127,000
1996 54,000 -62,000 116,000
1997 47,000 -60,000 107,000
1998 139,000 -23,000 162,000
1999 163,000 -23,000 186,000
2000 163,000 -57,000 220,000
2001 172,000 -53,000 225,000
2002 153,000 -91,000 245,000
2003 151,000 -85,000 236,000
2004 223,000 -120,000 342,000
Source: Office for National Statistics 2005: 120
Table 3.6 Inflows and outflows across UK borders, 1994-2004
Total inflow British Foreigners Total outflow British Foreigners
1994 314,000 108,000 206,000 238,000 125,000 113,000
1995 312,000 84,000 228,000 237,000 136,000 101,000
1996 318,000 94,000 224,000 264,000 156,000 108,000
1997 326,000 89,000 237,000 279,000 149,000 131,000
1998 390,000 103,000 287,000 252,000 126,000 126,000
1999 454,000 116,000 337,000 291,000 139,000 152,000
2000 483,000 104,000 379,000 321,000 161,000 160,000
2001 480,000 106,000 373,000 308,000 159,000 149,000
2002 513,000 95,000 418,000 359,000 186,000 174,000
2003 513,000 106,000 407,000 362,000 191,000 171,000
2004 582,000 88,000 494,000 360,000 208,000 152,000
Source: Office for National Statistics 2005: 120
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try, while 38 per cent migrating to the UK had been previously living
in an EU country. After Europe, Australia is the most common country
of origin of those coming to Britain (15 per cent), but is far less popular
as a country of destination. It is interesting to note that 38 per cent of
British citizens migrating to the UK had been living in a Common-
wealth country, and that about the same proportion of those emigrating
left for a Commonwealth country (37 per cent).
The countries of origin and destination of foreign migrants are far
less well documented. Both in-migration and out-migration of foreign
migrants rose throughout the decade, though out-migration increased
at a significantly lower pace than in-migration. It is estimated that
much of the increase can be linked to people from countries outside
the EU and the Commonwealth, especially non-EU European countries
and the US.
The 2001 Census provides some data on the factors driving the in-
flows and outflows. It appears that economic factors are predominant;
about 20 per cent of the immigrants to the UK come to take up a
specific job, while between 25 and 36 per cent of those emigrating do
so for the same reason. The number of immigrants coming to study
increased sharply in recent years; in 2003, annual migration data
from the ONS showed that students accounted for 25 per cent of the
inflows, while they had accounted for 16 per cent only ten years ear-
lier. However, students represent less than 5 per cent of the inflow. Fi-
nally, those accompanying a partner or another person account for
about 15 per cent of both the inflows and outflows. Other reasons
driving migration include job or asylum-seeking (Office for National
Statistics 2005: 126).
These reasons might explain why younger age groups are predomi-
nant among migrants. In 2003, 84 per cent of the immigrants and 75
per cent of the emigrants were below 44. However, immigrants tend
to be younger than emigrants, as well as younger than in previous
years. Male migrants slightly outnumber female migrants among both
immigrants and emigrants, but female migrants tend to be younger
than their male counterparts. Female migrants outnumber male mi-
grants in the age group 15-24 (both for inflows and outflows), but the
trend is reversed in the older age group. However, in terms of net mi-
gration, female immigrants outnumber male immigrants in all age
groups.
3.4.2 Asylum seekers
Applications for asylum reached a peak in 2002 and then fell consider-
ably in 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 3.1), more so than in the rest of Eur-
ope. This is partly due to some measures taken between 2002 and
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2004 in order to reduce the number of asylum applications: non-sus-
pensive appeals for nationals of 24 selected countries, new detection
technology for search of freight bound to the UK from France, Belgium
and the Netherlands, restricted access to support and so on.
Only 3 per cent of claimants were granted refugee status in 2004,
which was the lowest level since 1995. Most of the claims (88 per cent)
were dismissed, while 9 per cent were granted temporary Humanitar-
ian Protection or Discretionary Leave status. Asylum removals also fell
to 14,905 (including dependants). Most of the applicants in 2004 were
Iranian, Somali, Chinese, Zimbabwean and Pakistani (see Table 3.7).
The data on applications awaiting decisions are also made public;
9,700 claims were awaiting an initial decision in 2004, which is also
the lowest figure since 1995.
















































Source: Office for National Statistics
Table 3.7 Main countries of origin of the asylum claims lodged in the UK, 1996-2004
Country of origin 1996 2000 2004
Iran 585 5,610 3,455
Somalia 1,780 5,020 2,585
China 820 4,000 2,365
Zimbabwe 130 1,010 2,065
Pakistan 1,915 3,165 1,710
Iraq 965 7,475 1,695
DR Congo 680 1,030 1,475
India 2,220 2,120 1,405
Afghanistan 675 5,555 1,395
Sudan 280 415 1,305
Source: Office for National Statistics
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3.5 Naturalisations
Statistics on naturalisation are produced by the Home Office and are
published in a yearly statistical bulletin. Data are broken down into
mode of acquisition, age, previous nationality and region of birth.1 The
number of people granted British citizenship has grown continuously
and regularly since the late 1990s, to reach 161,780 in 2005 (an in-
crease of 15 per cent over 2004). However, the number of applications
reached a peak of 217,475 in 2005, an increase of 64 per cent com-
pared to the previous year (see Figure 3.2). The main reason that can
explain this increase is the introduction on 1 November 2005 of a new
requirement to demonstrate knowledge of life in the UK in order to be
entitled to claim citizenship. This requirement is evaluated by the ‘Life
in the UK test’. The highly controversial test is administered, as well as
based on a brochure edited by, the Home Office. It lasts 45 minutes
and contains questions on the history of the UK, everyday life and so
on. In October 2005, the month prior to the implementation of the
test, the number of applications for naturalisation soared, which sug-
gests that many submitted their application early in order to avoid the
requirement. In 2004, a test of English language had already been in-
troduced as a requirement, which led to a decrease in the number of
applications that year, but also to an increase in the previous year
(2003). The new ‘Life in the UK test’ incorporates the language test.
On the other hand, the refusal rate is quite stable, around 10 per
cent (11 per cent in 2005, 9 per cent in 2004). The decision rate rose
by 18 per cent in 2005, thanks to procedural and organisational
changes, as well as improved staff productivity – this also accounts for
the rise in the number of people granted citizenship in 2005. Resi-
dence in the country is the most frequent basis for the granting of citi-




































































zenship (48 per cent of the total in 2005), while marriage to a British
citizen accounted for 21 per cent of the total and minor children for 25
per cent of the total.
As shown in Figure 3.3, the largest percentage of people granted citi-
zenship originated from Asia, with 19 per cent coming from the Indian
subcontinent. Grants to people from non-EU Europe increased signifi-
cantly. In 2005, the nationalities with the largest number of citizen-
ships granted were India (9 per cent), Pakistan (8 per cent) and Serbia
and Montenegro (6 per cent). The majority of the people granted citi-
zenship were aged between 25 and 44 (51 per cent of the total), while
children under sixteen accounted for 23 per cent.
In addition to the data presented above, the Research Development
and Statistics Directorate conducts an annual study on the ‘tendency of
overseas nationals to take up British citizenship’ using information
from the UK Labour Force Surveys. The study shows that 61 per cent
of foreign-born people having stayed in the UK for six years or more
were British citizens in 2005. It also shows that nationals from Africa
and Asia were much more likely to take up British citizenship after six
years than nationals from developed countries such as Australia, the
US or the EU Member States. It does not seem too speculative to as-
sume that the incentives to become British are higher for citizens from
developing countries. Interestingly, people born in Ireland were very
unlikely to become British citizens – only 22 per cent of those who had
lived in the UK for over twenty years were actually British.



























UK statistics on immigration are characterised by the absence of a na-
tional register. Therefore, the majority of the available data is based on
censuses and surveys. This implies some flaws and biases in the relia-
bility of the data:
– Data on the population stock are only available every ten years,
which is the time period of the national census.
– Data on migration flows are produced from a survey covering about
0.2 per cent of all travellers to the UK. The extrapolation makes the
figure quite imprecise, even when corrected and adjusted.
– The stocks and flows of illegal migrants are totally unknown.
However, UK statistics respect the relevant UN guidelines and defini-
tions and comprise data on less-documented topics such as ethnicity or
the tendency to take up British citizenship. They are also easily avail-
able, but remain driven by political rather than statistical reasons,
which include the need to control non-European immigration.
Foreign-born residents constitute 8.1 per cent of the total population.
This population is increasingly diversified, with Europe representing a
declining share of it, and also more female in recent years. Net migra-
tion has been positive throughout the last decade, with Britain attract-
ing about half a million foreigners in 2004, a number that has more
than doubled in the last decade. Among these foreigners, more than
100,000 are now granted British citizenship every year.
The UK has therefore experienced a major shift in its migration pat-
terns over the last decade: from a country of emigration, it became a
country of massive immigration. This tendency is likely to continue,
but statistics on migration flows have so far been unable to catch up
with this shift and adapt to the changing migration landscape.
Note
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In its eventful history, Austria has been both a sending and receiving
country of migration. In the past, these movements were often linked to
the changing borders of the country. This no longer holds true for the
more recent history of Austrian migration. Since the 1950s, two groups
of migrants have been of particular importance: 1) refugees from the
communist countries and 2) labour migrants and their families. Due to
its neutrality during the Cold War, Austria received three major waves of
refugees, namely from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968
and from Poland in 1981. However, for most of these, Austria was only
















Cartography: Walter Lang, University of Vienna
At the beginning of the 1960s, Austria was confronted with an ur-
gent need for additional labour and started to recruit workers in Spain
(1962; this contract remained unimportant in quantitative terms), Tur-
key (1964) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1966).
This so-called ‘guestworker immigration’ to Austria can be divided into
four phases; the first phase was the recruitment phase that lasted up to
1973. While Austria only attracted a few hundred labour migrants in
the first years after the recruitment agreements had been signed, the
numbers of entries went up to around 35,000 per year at the peak of
the recruitment phase. After the collapse of growth following the first
oil crisis in 1973, the immigration of guestworkers declined sharply.
This was exacerbated by the Austrian government decreeing a morator-
ium on recruitment. Moreover, the government tried to encourage for-
eign workers to return home by offering them financial incentives.
Both of these policies were rather ‘successful’ in the sense that Austria
was able to keep unemployment from rising or at least to delay its rise.
Labour migration from Turkey and Yugoslavia began to increase again
with a renewed phase of economic growth in the mid-1980s. At the
same time, the political changes in the communist countries led to a
growing number of people from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
seeking political asylum in Austria, since they could not know at the
time that these changes would be lasting and irreversible. For the same
reason, the countries receiving these asylum seekers continued to grant
them refugee status. Finally, an economic slump in the early 1990s led
the Austrian government to markedly restrict immigration to Austria
by introducing stricter requirements for asylum and by setting upper
limits (quotas) for the recruitment of new workers and the number of
dependants allowed to join them. This resulted in a stabilisation of the
proportion of foreign nationals in the population as a whole (Fassmann
& Reeger 2001).
The term ‘guestworker’ demonstrates perfectly how labour immigra-
tion was perceived and treated by politicians and the wider society. In-
itially, nobody considered either the social consequences of recruitment
or the possibility that these immigrants might stay longer or even for
good. This attitude also left its mark on the 1971 Census, which
counted guestworkers, whose spouses and children were still abroad,
as commuters on a non-daily basis rather than as resident population.
This distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ still prevails in the minds of
both policymakers and the public.
Although the successor states of former Yugoslavia and Turkey are
still important countries of origin of new immigration, two other flows
have been growing significantly in recent years: on the one hand, Aus-
tria has become a turntable of East-West-migration since the fall of the
Iron Curtain; on the other hand, the number of people coming from
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other EU countries has been growing at a steady rate since Austria’s ac-
cession to the EU in 1995. Altogether, the share of foreign citizens
amounted to almost 9 per cent in 2001 when the last census was held.
If we also consider naturalised foreign-born people, every seventh per-
son residing in Austria had a migratory background in 2001.
4.2 Overview of the most important stock and flow data
sources
In the case of Austria, three main data sources concerning population –
and, as a subgroup, international migrants – are going to be discussed
in depth, namely:
– the census, which covers the stock of population,
– the population register recently introduced on the municipal level,
which is kept up to date continuously and can be used to describe
both stocks and flows, and,
– statistics on naturalisations, births and deaths since these have an
impact on the stock of the (migrant) population.
Other statistical sources, such as the register of asylum seekers or the
registers kept at different ministries that do not cover the whole group
of international migrants, will be mentioned when relevant.
4.2.1 Census
The history of the census in Austria goes back to 1869 when the Habs-
burg monarchy carried out the first ‘modern’ census, using a common
basic principle for the whole of their empire, which, of course, covered
a much larger area than Austria today. Further censuses followed in
1890, 1900, 1910, 1923, 1934 and 1939. Since 1951, the census has
been conducted regularly in the first year of each decade. Hence, the
last census was carried out in May 2001 (see also for the following Sta-
tistics Austria 2005). This was also the last census based on interviews.
The authorities responsible for the data collection in 2001 were the
municipalities. Depending on their size, they could chose between two
possible procedures to fulfil this duty; while the larger municipalities
usually set up a field force that delivered and collected the forms and
provided help and information if necessary, the smaller ones preferred
to install counting bureaus and to ask their inhabitants to fill in the
forms there. Every household was obliged to fill in forms for every
household member and the municipalities had to check whether all
the forms were returned. They also had to make sure that all the ques-
tions had been answered and had to contact the households for further
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information if necessary. Once these controls were completed, the
forms were sent to the central statistical office, Statistics Austria (Statis-
tik Austria).
The census is not a mere counting exercise. The results also influ-
ence important administrative and political issues. These include the
distribution of the collected taxes to the provinces and municipalities
(based on the numbers of both Austrian and foreign inhabitants) and
the allocation of parliamentary seats to electoral districts (based on the
numbers of Austrian inhabitants entitled to vote). Hence, the census
has a strong political component. As the number of main residents de-
termines the share of state budget to be given to the respective pro-
vince or municipality, there are manifold examples of communes with
a large number of secondary homes that appeal to their inhabitants to
fill in the form for them and thereby to declare that the respective com-
mune is their main place of residence.
The Austrian census covers all persons who on the day of counting
had their main residence in Austria, with main residence being defined
as the centre of life and relationships. This implies that migration-re-
lated phenomena that do not aim at settlement in Austria, such as
transnational mobility or seasonal migration, are by definition not cov-
ered by the census.
While earlier censuses solely drew on the housing register, the 2001
Census combined this data source with the population register so that
the interviewers worked from a list of inhabitants per building or flat.
Deviations from this list were only accepted in extraordinary cases. Or,
to put it differently, the 2001 Census only contains those who were in-
cluded in the adjusted population register. Hence, the data source does
not cover foreigners not registered and thus present in Austria on an
undocumented basis.
Nor does the census provide any information on the length of stay
in Austria or the date of naturalisation, two variables that would be very
helpful in measuring the progress or failure of social integration in dif-
ferent fields. Nevertheless, the 2001 Census provides more information
with regard to this particular field of research than earlier censuses
since it reintroduced the question regarding the place of birth that was
last posed in 1961. This allows migration researchers to include natura-
lised immigrants in their studies on the performance of immigrants in
different social fields.
Besides basic demographic features (sex, age, marital status, place of
birth, citizenship), the census includes a large variety of information
on the individual level, such as colloquial language, denomination,
education and occupational status, which can hardly be found in any
other data source. It is an excellent source for various kinds of users,
but it has two main, time-dependent, disadvantages: the long time
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span between the censuses and the long ‘waiting period’ until the data
are processed and available for the public, researchers and politicians.
As mentioned above, the 2001 Census marks the end of classic po-
pulation counting in Austria via direct interrogation. The new law reg-
ulating the census procedure that entered into force in 2006 created
the legal basis for using exclusively register-based censuses in the
future. The reasons for abandoning the old model are manifold: cen-
suses were very expensive; there was growing resistance to them
among the population; the intervals between censuses were too long;
and the delay between the inquiry and the publication of the results
was enormous. The first register-based census will be carried out in
2011 (Kytir 2006). This change from the traditional to a register-based
census will make comparisons between censuses more or less impossi-
ble or at least difficult.
4.2.2 Population register
The size of the Austrian population had been estimated annually be-
tween one census and the next up to 1996, when Austria introduced
migration statistics based on the Registration Act of 1991. These statis-
tics draw on a system of continuously reporting on the changes of
main residences at the level of the communes (about 2,359 municipali-
ties); that is, they cover both internal and international migration. Up
to 2001, each municipality held a population register and directly for-
warded the data to Statistics Austria. However, the municipality calcula-
tions for the federal states and Austria differed considerably from the
results of the population projection based on the census (Lebhart 2005:
2). As a consequence, the data collection procedure was modified.
Based on the data of the 2001 Census, a Central Registration System
(ZMR) was established within the Ministry of the Interior. Since then,
the ZMR has been responsible for sending the registration data to the
Central Statistical Office. At the same time, Statistics Austria intro-
duced a new system for population statistics, including migration sta-
tistics (POPREG), which ensures uniform data processing (Lebhart &
Marik 2005: 396). Moreover, it allows for the checking of the numbers
for the stock of population at any time and for all spatial levels for Aus-
tria. Unfortunately, there is still a long delay between the gathering
and the publication of the data; the results for the year 2002 were pub-
lished in July 2005.
Every person who changes his or her main residence within Austria or
who enters or leaves Austria is obliged to register within three days.1 The
authority responsible for (de)registration is the ‘registration service’ at
the municipality; in Vienna, changes of main residence are registered
on the city district level by the registration service at the local authority
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(Magistratisches Bezirksamt). New inhabitants can register in person
or by post (email or fax are not accepted). They can also be registered
by a trusted third person. Documents required are the completed regis-
tration form, an identity card stating nationality (passport [obligatory
for foreign nationals] or driving licence) and birth certificate. Homeless
persons can register by stating that they have no official dwelling or by
providing the registration service with a contact address. The registra-
tion form contains, inter alia, the following information: name, aca-
demic degree, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, current and pre-
vious (or future) address of main residence (Gisser 2000: 3).
Before March 2002, the police was in charge of registration. That
this was a barrier and in some cases a good reason for avoiding regis-
tration if possible, can be deduced from a marked increase in registra-
tions, especially by foreign nationals, in 2002. Some of these were
most probably not new immigrants but people who had been residing
in Austria for a longer period of time without registering.
The population register has not yet been linked to other registers, as
there are no common codes in use. But there are concrete plans to link
the ZMR to the Social Security database and other non-administrative
registers in order to prepare and carry out the register-based census in
2011 (Bilger & Kraler 2006).
If we use the population register as a source of information on inter-
national migration, we have to take into account that the register per
se excludes the following groups of persons: diplomats, tourists, seaso-
nal workers and commuters. Asylum seekers in federal care have been
registered since the end of 2004.
Generally speaking, the Austrian population register follows the UN
definitions for short-term (91 to 365 days) and long-term (over 365
days) migrants. Foreign nationals who stay less than 90 days are not
counted as migrants (Kytir, Lebhart & Neustädter 2005: 207). People
leaving the country for a longer period of time are advised to deregister.
However, many persons leaving Austria do not deregister as it is not
obligatory, there are no incentives and they do not want to lose their of-
ficial status in the country. As a consequence, the number of registered
emigrants is usually lower than the number of actual emigrants, which
implies that the statistical migration balance is usually higher than the
real migration balance.
4.2.3 Statistics on naturalisations, births and deaths
The statistical coverage of naturalisations, births and deaths is rather
straightforward, as every case is reported in the same way. These events
are continuously collated and influence the calculated stock of (foreign)
population.
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Austrian naturalisation statistics include data on acquisitions of na-
tionality by 1) grant or extension of grant (the usual, and numerically
by far the most important, mode of acquiring nationality, after birth, in
Austria), 2) declaration (a special procedure for family members of uni-
versity professors) and 3) notification (a special procedure for Holo-
caust survivors). In other words, the statistics exclude all automatic ac-
quisitions of Austrian nationality after birth and thus the following
groups of persons: 1) foundlings and stateless children, 2) children
born out of wedlock to a foreign mother and an Austrian father who
can acquire Austrian nationality by legitimisation and 3) university pro-
fessors who automatically acquire Austrian nationality upon taking of-
fice in Austria (Çınar & Waldrauch 2006: 42). While the Minister of
the Interior is in charge of nationality law, the provincial governments
implement the law and therefore also gather the data on naturalisa-
tions. The data are processed at the Central Statistical Office. The list
of variables includes date of birth, date of naturalisation, sex, place of
birth, former citizenship, marital status and the reason for naturalisa-
tion (see Section 4.3.2).
Statistics on natural population change, i.e. births and deaths, are
held by the registrar of civil status. These statistics are a complete in-
ventory count and are highly reliable and exact. However, the data do
not cover marriages, births or deaths of Austrian residents outside Aus-
tria and per se exclude irregular migrants. Furthermore, death statistics
do not provide any information on the place of birth or a possible
change of citizenship. Hence, computed mortality rates and life expec-
tancy figures for the immigrant population are biased, as they only ever
cover legally resident foreign citizens.
4.3 Description of the stock of foreign population
4.3.1 Stock according to the 2001 Census
In 2001, the Austrian census counted 8,032,926 people resident in
Austria. Those holding double citizenship (55,066) were counted as
Austrian nationals. As Table 4.1 indicates, 710,926 people resident in
Austria did not hold Austrian citizenship (8.9 per cent) and more than
one million people living in Austria were born abroad (12.5 per cent).
All in all, the number of persons with a direct migratory background
amounts to 1,119,414, or 14 per cent of total population, which means
that every seventh person recorded in the census either immigrated to
Austria or is the child of an immigrant (this excludes children of natur-
alised immigrants). The combination of the variables nationality and
place of birth allows for the identification of four different population
groups (see Table 4.1):2
AUSTRIA 117
1. both variables ‘Austria’: 86 per cent of total population,
2. both variables ‘foreign’: 7.4 per cent of total population, foreign citi-
zens who where born abroad,
3. Austrian nationals with a place of birth abroad: 5 per cent of total
population, mostly naturalised immigrants but also ethnic Aus-
trians born abroad,
4. foreign nationals born in Austria: 1.4 per cent, usually children or
grandchildren of immigrants.
As in the early 1990s, the majority of the foreigners living in Austria in
2001 originated from former Yugoslavia and Turkey, the two main
guestworker sending countries. They represented 61.1 per cent of all for-
eign nationals in Austria in 1991 and 63.2 per cent in 2001; thus, their
share rose slightly. The fastest-growing group(s) of foreign nationals in
Austria were those coming from former Yugoslavia (+63 per cent), lar-
gely due to the war in this region at the time and the resulting arrival of
refugees in Austria. The size of the Turkish national group, by contrast,
remained relatively stable between the two Censuses (+7.3 per cent).
Although the share of EU nationals among all foreign residents re-
mained stable in the decade under consideration (14.8 and 14.9 per
cent), this group also grew remarkably (+38.8 per cent). This marked
rise can most probably be explained by Austria’s accession to the EU in
1995, which opened the Austrian labour market to other EU nationals.
If we go by the two fastest-growing groups of immigrants between
1991 and 2001, i.e. nationals from former Yugoslavia and from the
other EU Member States (see Table 4.2), Austria seems to counter the
hypothesis of a growing diversification of origins that has recently been
observed in other European countries. However, the number of immi-
grants from other or unknown countries also increased markedly in
this period. A more detailed analysis of this group reveals that Asian
and African immigration gained in importance, albeit not significantly.
Table 4.1 Population in Austria by nationality and place of birth according to the
2001 Census
Place of birth in Austria Place of birth abroad Total
Nationality Austria 6,913,512 408,488 7,322,000
Nationality foreign 116,015 594,911 710,926
Total 7,029,527 1,003,399 8,032,926
As % of total
Nationality Austria 86.1 5.1 91.1
Nationality foreign 1.4 7.4 8.9
Total 87.5 12.5 100.0

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Apart from a diversification of origins, recent studies also observed a
feminisation of international migration. Austria confirms this trend.
Between the Censuses of 1991 and 2001, the share of women in the to-
tal foreign population increased from 43 to 47 per cent. Moreover, the
share of women rose for almost all major sending countries (see Table
4.3). Initially dominated by males, the stock of immigrants from the
most important labour-sending countries (former Yugoslavia and Tur-
key) was made up of equal numbers of men and women at the begin-
ning of the new millennium. These figures imply that family reunifica-
tion was almost completed for these countries. In comparison, the
share of women was still much lower for African countries but never-
theless grew significantly between 1991 and 2001 (the share of Egyp-
tian women, for example, rose from 14.5 to 36 per cent). On the other
hand, more than half of the Germans, Romanians, Americans, Indians
and Filipinos living in Austria in 2001 were female. The most striking
of these are certainly the Filipinos, where the share of women still lay
at 60 per cent in 2001, despite the fact that it had fallen by 6 percen-
tage points since 1991. This can be explained by the fact that immigra-
tion from the Philippines was initially predominantly female, with
most of these women being recruited as nurses in the 1970s.
Finally, the census reveals that foreign nationals (except from the
EU-14) residing in Austria are much younger than the Austrian na-
tionals: whereas every fifth immigrant is under fifteen years old, the re-
Table 4.3 Foreign nationals from selected countries by sex in Austria, 1991 and 2001
1991 2001
Total Women % women Total Women % women
Europe 466,885 203,301 43.5 642,676 305,460 47.5
Former Yugoslavia 197,886 85,333 43.1 322,261 151,589 47.0
Turkey 118,579 47,789 40.3 127,226 55,998 44.0
Germany 57,310 30,062 52.5 72,218 37,483 51.9
Romania 18,536 7,093 38.3 17,470 9,031 51.7
Poland 18,321 7,343 40.1 21,841 9,872 45.2
Africa 8,515 1,787 21.0 14,223 4,856 34.1
Egypt 4,509 652 14.5 4,721 1,698 36.0
Asia 25,805 11,567 44.8 35,271 16,637 47.2
Iran 5,687 2,347 41.3 5,926 2,509 42.3
The Philippines 2,883 1,924 66.7 3,368 2,045 60.7
India 3,043 1,152 37.9 4,879 1,681 34.5
China 3,357 1,560 46.5 4,567 2,235 48.9
America 9,516 5,301 55.7 12,313 7,074 57.5
US 5,770 3,038 52.7 6,108 3,168 51.9
Australia 738 369 50.0 1,026 505 49.2
Stateless, unknown 6,231 2,204 35.4 5,417 2,005 37.0
Total 517,690 224,529 43.4 710,926 336,537 47.3
Source: Statistics Austria; author’s compilation
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spective share amounts to about 15 per cent among Austrians. On the
other hand, every tenth Austrian woman is older than 75 years, while
this age group is almost non-existent among immigrants, since many
of those, who came to Austria in the 1960s and 1970s either tend to re-
turn to the country of origin after having reached retirement age or
have naturalised by then. Moreover, recent inflows do not include large
numbers of elderly people.
As already mentioned, the new population register allows us to ana-
lyse both stocks and flows of immigrants in Austria. As for the stocks,
Table 4.4 compares the results of the 2001 Census to the stocks as re-
gistered in the population register in 2005.
The Table illustrates that the population of Austria grew by about
175,000 people between the last census and 2005, mostly due to immi-
gration. It was mainly migrants from the EU-14 and their descendants
who contributed to this development. The number of Austrian na-
tionals, by contrast, remained relatively stable, albeit less due to natural
population change than to the high number of naturalisations (around
30,000 per year).
4.3.2 Births, deaths and naturalisations
Births and deaths form part of natural population change. Concerning
foreign nationals, the number of deaths has been astonishingly con-
stant over the last 35 years, with the annual number remaining consis-
tently below 2,000. There are two reasons for this stability: 1) the ma-
jority of the labour migrants still return to their country of origin after
Table 4.4 Austrian and foreign nationals by sex in 2001 (census) and 2005
(population register)
2001 census 2005 register 2001 = 100
Total % Total %
Austrian nationals Male 3,514,800 48.0 3,577,095 48.2 101.6
Female 3,807,200 52.0 3,840,820 51.8 100.8
Total 7,322,000 100.0 7,417,915 100.0 101.2
EU-14 Male 52,506 49.5 69,257 50.3 126.0
Female 53,667 50.5 68,406 49.7 122.6
Total 106,173 100.0 137,663 100.0 124.3
Other foreigners Male 321,883 53.2 339,944 52.2 103.0
Female 282,870 46.8 311,002 47.8 106.9
Total 604,753 100.0 650,946 100.0 104.8
Total 8,032,926 8,206,524
Source: Statistics Austria; author’s compilation
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having reached retirement age and 2) the longer a migrant has stayed
in Austria, the higher the probability that he or she has acquired Aus-
trian citizenship and will not die as a foreign national in Austria.3 For
these reasons, there seems to be much more variation in the number
of births than in the number of deaths (see Figure 4.1).
After a first peak at the beginning of the 1970s, the number of births
declined due to remigration initiated by the economic crisis in the
wake of the first oil price crisis and settled at slightly more than 6,000
births per year between 1976 and 1982. Only in the second half of the
1980s did the number of births rise again, reaching a peak with almost
13,000 births in 1992. Since then, the number of births has decreased
and is currently stagnating, mostly due to a slight adjustment of the re-
productive behaviour of foreign women to that of Austrians.4
According to the data provided by Statistics Austria, the number of
naturalisations surged steeply in 1999, when it first passed 20,000.
This trend continued over the following years, with 44,694 foreigners
receiving Austrian citizenship in 2003, when 5.8 per cent of all foreign
citizens officially residing in Austria at the time were naturalised.
About one-third of the new Austrian nationals were granted citizenship
on the basis of ten years residence in Austria, and almost 50 per cent
were naturalised on the basis of their spouse or parent having received
citizenship (Çınar & Waldrauch 2006).
Of the more than 356,000 people who naturalised between 1991 and
2006, 69.1 per cent used to be citizens of Turkey or former Yugoslavia
and its successor states. About 30 per cent of the 356,000 new Austrians










































Source: Statistics Austria; author’s compilation
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were born in Austria. This might explain why the large majority of those
naturalising is comparatively young: almost 60 per cent are under 30,
with one-third being younger than fifteen, while only 1 per cent is older
than 60. In 2003, just as many men as women acquired Austrian citi-
zenship. Before that, the share of men was slightly lower than that of
women.
4.4 Description of flows
The migration flows between the early 1990s and 2006 can be divided
into three distinct phases that have different characteristics and (statis-
tical) backgrounds. After immigration had boomed in the wake of the
fall of the Iron Curtain and due to the war in Yugoslavia, it stagnated
in the second half of this decade, as a result of Austria introducing an-
nual quota for new immigration in 1993. During this period, net im-
migration was very low, with stable inflows and outflows of both Aus-
trians and foreign nationals. This stagnation phase ended just before
the beginning of the new millennium, due to a pronounced inflow
from the EU and some preferred third countries. While net immigra-
tion remained just below 20,000 between 1999 and 2001, with around
70,000 foreigners entering and 48,000 leaving the country every year,
the migration balance rose considerably between 2002 and 2004,
when it amounted to 50,582. Since then immigration has been declin-












1993 5,780 2,686 672 14,131 2.2 48.1 28.0
1994 5,621 3,377 904 15,275 2.3 47.8 27.0
1995 4,529 3,201 872 14,366 2.1 47.4 27.2
1996 3,118 7,492 691 15,627 2.3 46.7 32.7
1997 3,659 5,064 1,096 15,792 2.3 47.0 29.0
1998 4,142 5,664 1,500 17,786 2.6 48.0 28.7
1999 6,728 10,324 1,635 24,678 3.6 49.4 33.2
2000 7,557 6,720 2,682 24,320 3.5 49.6 30.1
2001 10,737 10,046 2,813 31,731 4.4 50.5 30.4
2002 13,990 12,623 1,774 36,011 4.7 50.8 30.9
2003 21,574 13,665 2,096 44,694 5.8 50.0 30.6
2004 19,045 13,004 1,373 41,645 5.4 50.2 28.0
2005 17,037 9,545 1,128 34,876 4.4 50.3 28.7
2006 12,133 7,549 981 25,746 3.1 48.9 29.9
Note: The table does not include naturalisations of people residing abroad (200 to 700
cases per year).
Source: Statistics Austria; author’s compilation
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ing again mostly due to new political restrictions that came into force
at the beginning of 2006.
However, a critical look at the numbers reveals that this increasing to-
tal between 2002 and 2004 was not necessarily simply due to rising
immigration but also to changes in the registration system. Firstly, as
mentioned above, the police was in charge of registrations before
2002, when the municipalities took over this responsibility. So the
growing inflows at the time might to some extent be explained by the
fact that people who had avoided registration with the police felt more
comfortable registering with the municipality. Unfortunately, it is im-
possible to estimate the amount of these belated registrations. Sec-
ondly, asylum seekers have been included in the population register
since spring 2004, which increases the numbers of entries by about
10,000 to 15,000 (Kytir 2005: 788).
If we analyse the countries of origin of the inflows in 2006, we
might be surprised to find that a large share of the immigrants (15.4
per cent) were Austrian nationals, and 16.1 per cent were Germans,
with the rest of the ‘old’ EU-15 Member States accounting for only 7.1
per cent and thus playing a rather marginal role. Immigration from
the so-called guestworker countries still amounted to almost one fifth
of the total inflows, with former Yugoslavia accounting for 14 per cent
and Turkey for 5 per cent. If we compare these numbers to the out-
flows in the same year, the share of Austrians leaving Austria seems to

























































Source: Statistics Austria; author’s compilation
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be disproportionately high (28 per cent), while 14 per cent of the peo-
ple leaving Austria were nationals of countries that used be part of Yu-
goslavia, 4 per cent were Turks.
Table 4.6 offers a different perspective on official Austrian migration
statistics. Of more than 100 countries under consideration, only nine
made up for almost 70 per cent of the total migration balance in
2006. The clear majority of these were from Germany, the only coun-
try in the list representing the ‘old’ EU-15, immediately followed by Po-
land that has always had strong migratory ties with Austria. However,
the list of the top nine sending countries also includes one country of
origin that seems to have gained in importance more recently, the Rus-
sian Federation. So, the data based on the population register seem to
point towards two parallel trends: a continuation of immigration from
traditional sending countries, on the one hand, and a slight tendency
towards a diversification of origins, on the other.
Neither the population register nor the census provides any informa-
tion on the reasons for immigration to Austria, the purpose or legal ba-
sis of the intended stay or its probable length. While this information
can be found in the Asylum and Foreigners Statistics held by the Min-
istry of the Interior (see Table 4.7), this source only includes foreign
nationals who are subject to permit requirements under the Aliens
Law; that is, it excludes citizens of the European Economic Area, Swiss
citizens and recognised refugees (Bilger & Kraler 2006: 567-569).
The BMI data on inflows provide some additional information on re-
cent international migration to Austria. In almost all the years between
1999 and 2004, short-term permits accounted for more than half of
all the permits issued. Their number almost doubled in this period,
with the majority of these being granted to seasonal workers. This can
Table 4.6 International inflows and outflows in Austria in 2006 by nationalities
with a balance of more than 1,000
Inflow Outflow Balance % of balance
Foreigners total 85,384 52,904 32,480 100.0
Germany 16,223 7,147 9,076 27.9
Poland 6,035 2,899 3,136 9.7
Serbia & Montenegro 7,423 5,162 2,261 7.0
Turkey 4,897 2,948 1,949 6.0
Russian Federation 2,438 871 1,567 4.8
Slovakia 3,669 2,285 1,384 4.3
Hungary 3,734 2,401 1,333 4.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3,235 2,080 1,155 3.6
Romania 4,757 3,656 1,101 3.4
Rest 32,973 23,455 9,518 29.3
Source: Statistics Austria, Migration Statistics 2006; author’s compilation
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be explained by the fact that for many people short-term stays have be-
come the only legal way to enter Austria for work purposes since the
government severely restricted labour migration in the mid-1990s. The
other category of permits that gained in importance between 1999 and
2004 were those residence permits that cannot be subjected to a quota,
with a large majority of these being permits granted on the grounds of
family migration. More than 20,000 residence permits were issued for
this reason, both in 2003 and 2004. Finally, the number of asylum ap-
plications also increased markedly, but only up to 2002, when more
than 39,000 asylum applications were filed in Austria. In the two fol-
lowing years the number of asylum applications fell significantly. This
corresponds to an international decrease in numbers of asylum seekers
due to both an amelioration of the situation in some countries of origin
and the new restrictions introduced in many industrial countries that
kept migrants from applying for asylum.
The inflows as registered in the population register are considerably
higher than the numbers of permits issued to, and asylum applications
filed by, third-country nationals. This is mainly due to the fact that the
population register also includes those entries that are exempt from
permits. Moreover, the different ways of acquiring and counting the
data make any comparison between the two datasets difficult.
Table 4.8 provides a synopsis of all the factors influencing the devel-
opment of the foreign population in Austria: births and deaths (birth
balance), immigration and emigration (migration balance) and natura-
lisations between 1994 and 2004.
In the mid-1990s, the migration balance of foreigners was relatively
low (around 10,000 per year). This changed markedly after the turn of
the millennium. The birth balance fell steadily from 10,744 in 1994 to
7,247 in 2004, while the number of naturalisations increased consider-
ably from around 15,000 to 44,694 in 2003. In spite of these high
Table 4.7 Residence permits issued and asylum applications in Austria, 1999-2004












1999 5,278 13,383 - 15,268 - 20,129 33,949
2000 5,275 10,938 9,361 19,610 9,071 18,284 35,823
2001 7,776 15,699 13,637 33,602 17,269 30,127 57,077
2002 6,596 20,570 18,054 38,801 19,767 39,354 65,967
2003 8,027 26,537 22,701 35,045 17,384 32,359 69,969
2004 5,138 26,697 23,308 32,209 15,718 24,634 64,044
Source: Statistics Austria 2006 on the basis of POPREG (total inflow); Ministry of the Interior
(BMI), Asylum and Foreigners Statistics
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numbers of naturalisations and the diminishing birth balance, the
number of foreign citizens resident in Austria grew steadily between
1994 and 2004. This was due to new immigration, a fact that is highly
surprising if we consider how succeeding governments since the early
1990s have tried to restrict new immigration.
4.5 Conclusion: Statistics and reality in the Austrian context
Austrian migration policy aims at integrating immigrants already pre-
sent in the country, on the one hand, and at strictly limiting new immi-
gration from third countries, on the other. De jure Austria does still not
define itself as a country of immigration; de facto it has been a country
of immigration for decades. This paradoxical situation is also reflected
in the statistics. New immigration has constantly increased, despite the
restrictions introduced since the 1990s. Moreover, the number of tem-
porary residents not counted as immigrants, such as visitors, tourists,
foreign students, and in particular seasonal workers, also increased
considerably. In keeping with its self-perception, Austria still applies
ius sanguinis, which means that children of foreign citizens born in
Austria are automatically foreign citizens.5 While this is irrelevant for
migration flows, it influences the stock of foreign population and its re-
flection in statistics that count persons who have spent their whole life
in Austria as foreigners.












1994 669,453 673,792 8,678 10,744 19,107 -15,275
1995 677,061 680,330 6,538 10,321 9,439 -14,366
1996 681,709 683,089 2,759 10,200 9,991 -15,627
1997 683,394 683,700 611 9,263 10,000 -15,792
1998 686,481 689,261 5,561 8,983 14,300 -17,786
1999 693,955 698,649 9,388 8,966 29,403 -24,678
2000 701,768 704,887 6,238 8,971 23,248 -24,320
2001 718,259 731,631 26,744 8,196 45,372 -31,731 4,907
2002 743,255 755,124 23,493 8,179 53,790 -36,011 -2,465
2003 759,576 765,303 10,179 7,256 51,099 -44,694 -3,482
2004 776,147 788,609 23,306 7,247 60,621 -41,645 -2,917
Sources: Kytir 2005: 778; 1994-2001: population extrapolation; 2002-2004: POPREG; statistical
adjustments: 2001: differences between the census and POPREG that cannot be explained
demographically, 2002-2004: difference between birth balance from the birth register and
POPREG and inconsistencies in the register
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For 40 years up until the 2001 Census, Austrian migration-related
statistics only used citizenship to describe the resident immigrant po-
pulation. As a consequence, there was no information on naturalised
immigrants, since they could not be identified in any statistical source.
This is more than a subtle hint that policymakers were not really inter-
ested in these new Austrian citizens, their social situation and housing
or their performance on the labour market. Though naturalisations nu-
merically play an important role in Austria, only little could be found
out about the sometimes rather successful stories of ‘new Austrians’
from other statistical sources like the microcensus. The main focus of
policymakers’ considerations and intentions were foreign citizens, who
are – at least at the beginning of their stay – often marginalised and
not well integrated. As soon as these foreigners acquired Austrian citi-
zenship, nobody seemed to be interested in them anymore.
As in most other European countries, the main data sources for in-
ternational migration to Austria fail to capture the wide variety of
movements. This is mainly due to the fact that migration is still per-
ceived as a one-time irreversible event with a clear point of departure
and destination. However, as mentioned above, temporary migration
has been gaining in importance, as people do not always want to, or
are not always allowed to, settle down in the country of destination.
These forms of migration are a priori excluded, as statistical tools are
not flexible enough to cover them. Moreover, there are no statistics on
transnational mobility, as statistics per se concentrate on national con-
texts. As to data on the integration of migrants, the situation has
slightly improved, as the 2001 Census contained a question on the
place of birth. This means that naturalised immigrants can now be in-
cluded in studies discussing basic factors of integration, such as hous-
ing and the socio-economic situation of the person in question.
Although the new population register is a valuable source for inflows
and outflows, it lacks important information on the professional back-
ground, education or legal status of the migrants. Quantitative studies
on migration are therefore more or less limited to the place of origin
and basic demographic features. A more detailed insight into interna-
tional migration might be possible when the population register is
linked to other sources. However, this will probably not happen before
2011, the year of the next census and the first one that is not based on
interviews. Whether the register-based census will be as reliable a
source remains to be seen.
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Notes
1 This also concerns tourists who have to fill in a form in their hotel. However, this
information is not included in the population register. A change of a secondary resi-
dence to a main residence has to be registered within one month.
2 A group of people that cannot be identified by this method are children born in
Austria of naturalised immigrants.
3 An analysis of the number of deaths by religion shows that the number of Muslims
who died in Austria increased almost fivefold between 1977 (121) and 2004 (545).
4 For Austrian women, the fertility rate dropped from 1.45 in 1985 to 1.31 in 2005.
While the decline was similar for all foreign women (2.14 in 1985 and 2.00 in 2005),
it was more marked for Turkish women (3.61 in 1985 and 2.86 in 2005).
5 The most recent changes in the Austrian Citizenship Law that came into force in
2006 could be interpreted as a move towards ius soli, as they entitle foreign citizens
born in Austria to citizenship after six years. However, the children still have to fulfil
the general naturalisation requirements that were increased by the same law (see
Çınar & Waldrauch 2006: 53).
Statistical sources
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– employed and unemployed
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www.ams.at
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– asylum
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The first years after the Second World War were characterised by large-
scale immigration to Germany. These immigrants were, in the main,
German refugees (Vertriebene) from the eastern parts of the former
‘German Reich’, from Eastern European countries and from the Soviet
Union. According to the 1950 Census, when the forced resettlements
came to an end, 7.9 million refugees and expellees were resident in
the Federal Republic of Germany and 3.6 million in the German De-
mocratic Republic. In the same period (1945-1950), about ten million
people (forced labourers, prisoners of war and concentration camp
prisoners) left Germany and returned to their countries of origin. Be-
tween 1950 and 1961, the year of the construction of the Berlin Wall,
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about 2.6 million Germans moved from East to West Germany (see
Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann & Zwintz 2005: 204-205; Herbert 2001:
192ff.; Bade & Oltmer 2004: 52ff.).
In 1955, a period of labour migration began. Between 1955 and 1968,
the German government signed recruitment agreements with Italy
(1955), Spain and Greece (both 1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963),
Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). However, be-
tween 1955 and 1961, the number of foreigners living in Germany rose
by only about 200,000. After 1961, steady economic growth and the
GDR’s decision to close its borders to the West, which cut off the flow of
workers from East Germany, led to increasing labour shortages.
In total, about 14 million workers (‘guestworkers’) from the recruit-
ment countries entered Germany between 1955 and 1973 in order to
take up temporary employment there. The majority of these recruited
workers returned to their countries of origin before 1973 when the Ger-
man government declared a halt to recruitment in response to the oil
shortage and subsequent economic slowdown. In this year about 2.7
million workers were in Germany. For many of these, the ban may
have been an incentive to settle in Germany, as the new legal regula-
tions prevented them from re-entering Germany after a temporary re-
turn to their country of origin (see Cyrus 2005: 9; Bauer, Dietz, Zim-
mermann & Zwintz 2005: 206-207).
In the recruitment period from 1955 to 1973, the foreign population
in Germany increased from half a million (0.9 per cent of total popula-
tion) to almost four million (6.4 per cent of total population). Net mi-
gration rose almost annually and reached its peak in 1970 at
+542,000. Only in the recession year of 1967, was a negative net mi-
gration (of about 200,000) registered.
Until the late 1960s, most foreign workers were nationals from Italy,
Spain or Greece. Later, workers from Yugoslavia and, particularly, Tur-
key predominated. In 1968, Turkish nationals made up 10.7 per cent
of the foreign population in Germany, with Yugoslavians constituting
8.8 per cent; by 1973, Turkish citizens accounted for 23 per cent of for-
eigners living in Germany, while Yugoslavians made up 17.7 per cent.1
The period between the cessation of recruitment and the end of the
1980s was primarily characterised by migration through family reunifi-
cation. From 1973 to 1979 the number of foreigners residing in Ger-
many remained stable. Overall, until 1988, the number of foreigners
rose quite slowly, from 4 million to 4.6 million.
The political changes in Central and East Europe (i.e. the fall of the
Iron Curtain) at the end of the 1980s triggered a new period of migra-
tion to Germany. The number of foreigners moving to Germany in-
creased significantly, exceeding the number of those leaving. A large
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proportion of these incoming migrants were asylum seekers and ethnic
Germans (Aussiedler).
In spite of rising and diversifying migration inflows, it was not be-
fore 1998, when the new government coalition of the Social Demo-
crats and the Green Party took office, that the country’s traditional de-
fensive self-definition, according to which Germany was not a country
of immigration, was abandoned. The following years saw numerous
amendments and reforms in migration and foreign resident policy
and legislation. This paradigmatic shift was initiated by the 1999 re-
form of the German Nationality Law, followed by the appointment of
an Independent Commission on Migration in summer 2000, and the
passing of the so-called Green Card Regulations in August 2000,
which broadened access of non-German specialists to the labour mar-
ket in Germany. Finally, in 2004, the German parliament passed the
new Immigration Act, based on a compromise between the govern-
ment and the opposition. The new law, which came into force on 1
January 2005, contains, amongst other provisions, regulations on the
entry and residence of foreigners (and ethnic German migrants) and
aims at simplifying the existing set of migration regulations. Thus,
the new law reduces the types of residence permits from five to two:
the (temporary) residence permit and the (permanent) settlement per-
mit. Moreover, a much-discussed element of the law enables highly
skilled third-country nationals to immigrate to and settle in Germany.
This amendment has been interpreted as an important shift in Ger-
man migration policy since it loosens the restriction on recruitment.
Furthermore, the Immigration Act contains, for the first time, regula-
tions on the integration of migrants at a national level. For example,
under the new law new residents are generally obliged to participate
in integration courses.
5.2 Overview of stock and flow data
Official German statistics differentiate between Germans and foreign-
ers rather than between those born in Germany and those born abroad.
As a consequence, these statistics underestimate the proportion of peo-
ple who have a migratory background, as they do not include natura-
lised citizens or ethnic German migrants (Spätaussiedler), both of
whom are incorporated into the statistics as Germans. Addressing this
problem, the government passed a new law on the microcensus (Mik-
rozensusgesetz 2005), which came into force on 1 January 2005. This
new regulation facilitates the identification of citizens who have a mi-
gratory background (naturalised Germans and ethnic German mi-
grants) in the microcensus and thus improves the measurement of mi-
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grants’ integration. The first results of the new microcensus were pub-
lished in June 2006.
In recent years, not only social scientists but also politicians have
come to realise that the sole registration of the nationality in the offi-
cial statistics is insufficient for measuring integration. This holds parti-
cularly true for the field of education, where the discussion on how to
adequately measure the educational attainment of students with differ-
ent migratory backgrounds was further intensified by the results of the
PISA study (see Herwatz-Emden 2005: 9; Konsortium Bildungsberich-
terstattung 2006: 139). In 2007, the Conference of the Ministers of
Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz – KMK) decided to introduce the
criterion of ‘migratory background’ into the official statistics on stu-
dents/pupils by way of the ‘language spoken at home’.2 First results
should be available for the school year 2008/2009.
The statistics on child and youth welfare (Kinder- und Jugendhilfesta-
tistik) have registered the migratory background of children in child
care facilities (kindergartens) since 2006. They use the criteria ‘country
of origin of at least one parent’ and ‘prevalent language spoken in the
family’.
5.2.1 Data on the stocks of foreigners
5.2.1.1 Central Register of Foreigners (AZR)
The most relevant source concerning data on the foreign population in
Germany is the Central Register of Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister).
The AZR, as it is known, collects data on all foreigners who legally re-
side in Germany for a minimum of three months.3 These data stem
from public authorities, mainly from the more than 600 local foreign-
ers authorities (Ausländerbehörden),4 but also from German embassies,
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration
und Flüchtlinge; responsible for the asylum procedures) or the Federal
Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz), amongst others. The Register pro-
vides information on foreigners broken down by sex, age, citizenship,
residence status and duration of stay. It includes asylum seekers and
refugees.
One problem of the AZR is that foreigners who have left the country
or have naturalised may still be included in the files because they for-
got to deregister or have not yet been deregistered by the foreigners
authorities. At the beginning of 2005, the Central Register on Foreign-
ers completed a process of revision and correction. As a consequence
of this process, the number of foreigners residing in Germany de-
creased from 7.3 million at the end of 2003 to 6.7 million at the end of
2004.
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Since 2006, the AZR has been recording new characteristics, includ-
ing the purpose of the stay (according to the regulations of the new Im-
migration Act). First results will be published in 2007.
The AZR data on foreigners are lower than the ones reported in po-
pulation updates (Bevölkerungsfortschreibung), which registered 7.3 mil-
lion foreign nationals in 2005. One reason for this difference is that
the AZR includes only those foreigners who take up ‘non-transitory’ re-
sidence in Germany (see Federal Statistical Office 2006a: 6; Bilger &
Kraler 2006: 421).
5.2.1.2 Census
Another reason for the above-mentioned difference is that the popula-
tion updates are estimates based on the results of the 1987 Census.
Due to strong, principled opposition to the last census as well as the
high costs involved, there has been no full census since. However, the
Federal Statistical Office has announced that it will carry out a register-
based census in 2010/11.5 The necessary data will be drawn from differ-
ent registers, such as the municipal population register or the registers
of the labour and tax offices (see Bilger & Kraler 2006: 420).
5.2.1.3 Microcensus
In June 2006, the Federal Statistical Office (2006b) published the first
results of the new microcensus. This is the first statistical source that
allows for the identification of citizens with a migrant background. The
2005 microcensus differentiated between the following groups:
1. Foreign nationals
1.1 Immigrated foreign nationals (first generation)
1.2 Foreign nationals born in Germany (second and third
generation)
2. German nationals with migrant background
2.1 Immigrated German nationals of migrant background
(ethnic German migrants, immigrated foreigners natura-
lised in Germany)
2.2 German nationals of migrant background born in Ger-
many (naturalised persons, children of ethnic German
migrants, children of naturalised persons, children of
parents with foreign nationality who receive German na-
tionality by birth (ius soli), children with one parent of
migrant background)
The results show that about 19 per cent of the population in Germany,
or 15.3 million people, are of a migrant background. 7.3 million of
these hold a foreign nationality, 8.0 million the German nationality.
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5.2.2 Flow data
One of the main sources concerning migration flows is the Federal Sta-
tistical Office’s data on arrivals and departures, which have been pub-
lished since the 1950s and are based on the records of local registration
authorities. Under German law, residents are required to fill in an offi-
cial registration form at their local registration office every time they
change residence, both nationally and across German borders.6 These
registration forms are processed by the Statistical Offices of the federal
states (Länder) and subsequently compiled into national statistics by
the Federal Statistical Office.
The Federal Registration Framework Act allows the federal states to ex-
empt foreigners from the obligation to register if their stay is only tem-
porary. In Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Hol-
stein and Northrhine-Westfalia foreigners are exempted from the obliga-
tion to register if their stay does not exceed two months. In Baden-
Württemberg and Saxony the period is one month. The different provi-
sions of the federal states lead to a non-uniform registration of migrants.
However, the federalism reform involves a transfer of the legislative
authority for the registration of the population to the federal government
with a view to guaranteeing a standardised registration procedure. More-
over, there are long-term plans to introduce a central population register.
The above regulations imply that the official statistics on arrivals and
departures are not based on migrants as such (persons), but on the
number of relocations across Germany’s national borders (cases). This
detracts from the quality of these statistics, as every person relocating
across German borders more than once within a twelve month period
will be registered repeatedly in these statistics (once per relocation).
Thus, the number of recorded migrations will always be somewhat
higher than the number of actual migrants for that year. Moreover, the
official statistics do not provide any information on the duration of mi-
grants’ residence in Germany. This sets German statistics apart from
other countries’ migration statistics, where migrants’ (intended) dura-
tion of stay is an essential criterion for defining migration. Thus, be-
sides permanent immigration, the migration statistics in Germany also
include, for example, temporary (short-term) stays of seasonal workers,
exchange students and guest scientists.
The official statistics tend to underestimate the migration outflows,
as not all foreign nationals notify local authorities when leaving Ger-
many. Some of the departing migrants simply forget to deregister;
others intentionally neglect to do so in order to secure their legal resi-
dence status in Germany. Consequently, the official arrival and depar-
ture statistics tend to underestimate the scope of migration outflows
and return migration.
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Another shortcoming of the official arrivals and departures statistics
is the fact that they do not differentiate between different types of mi-
gration. On account of that, it is impossible to determine, for example,
whether Polish nationals enter Germany as ethnic German immigrants
(Spätaussiedler), or seasonal and contract workers. Chances are that eth-
nic German immigrants will settle down in Germany permanently,
whereas seasonal workers will have to return to their home countries
after three months at the latest. If information on the type of migration
were available, it would be easier to provide the necessary facilities and
specific integration programmes for the respective groups of migrants.
As the official arrivals and departures statistics only cover those who
register or deregister with local authorities, they usually exclude people
entering or leaving the country illegally, as these try to avoid any con-
tact with the authorities. Hence the migration statistics underestimate
the inflow of migrants.
Since 2006, the AZR can be used as an additional source of informa-
tion on inflows and outflows of foreign nationals. In July 2006, for the
first time, the Federal Statistical Office published information on immi-
gration and emigration on the basis of the AZR (see Section 5.4.1).
In addition to the general data available from the Federal Statistical
Office, the following federal offices collect information on individual
groups of migrants:
– Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migra-
tion und Flüchtlinge): statistics on asylum seekers, refugees and
Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union;
– Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit): data on la-
bour migration (work permits for contract workers, seasonal work-
ers, IT experts);
– Federal Administration Office (Bundesverwaltungsamt): statistics
on ethnic German migrants/ repatriates (Spätaussiedler).
5.3 Description of the stock of foreign population
At the end of 2005 about 6.8 million people living in Germany held a
foreign nationality. This amounts to a share of 8.2 per cent of the total
population (c.f. Table 5.1).
The majority of the foreigners in Germany are nationals of the for-
mer recruitment states, most of them of Turkey (26.1 per cent of all
foreign nationals), Italy (8.0 per cent), the successor states of former
Yugoslavia (14.3 per cent), especially Serbia and Montenegro (7.3 per
cent) and Greece (4.6 per cent). In addition, a significant number of
nationals of Middle and East European countries live in Germany,
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especially from Poland (4.8 per cent), Russia (2.8 per cent) and the Uk-
raine (1.9 per cent; for more information, see Table 5.2).
About a quarter of the foreigners (i.e. 1.654 million people) originate
from one of the old Member States of the European Union; about a
third of these are Italians. 7.1 per cent are nationals of the new Mem-
ber States (482,864), and about two-thirds of these are Polish. The
number of nationals from the new EU Member States increased by 9.8
per cent between 2004 and 2005.
62 per cent of all non-Germans have been living in Germany for
more than ten years, 33.9 per cent even for more than twenty years.
With regard to non-German employees and their families from former
recruiting states this rate is even higher: 77.4 per cent of the Turks,
81.9 per cent of the Greeks, 82.3 per cent of the Italians and 78.3 per
cent of the Spanish people have been living in Germany for ten years
or longer. The average duration of stay is 16.8 years.
Among the 6.756 million non-Germans, 1.385 million (about 21 per
cent) were born in Germany; among the non-German minors the pro-
portion of people who were born in Germany is more than two-thirds
(70 per cent).
The age structure of the foreign population differs significantly from
that of the German population (cf. Table 5.3). Foreign nationals are
characterised by a high percentage of younger and middle-aged people
(between six and 39 years). In 2005, 39.0 per cent of the Germans be-
Table 5.1 Total population and foreign population in Germany, 1991-2005
Year Total population* Foreign population* % of
foreign nationals
1991 80,274,600 5,882,267 7.3
1992 80,974,600 6,495,792 8.0
1993 81,338,100 6,878,117 8.5
1994 81,538,600 6,990,510 8.6
1995 81,817,500 7,173,866 8.8
1996 82,012,200 7,314,046 8.9
1997 82,057,400 7,365,833 9.0
1998 82,037,000 7,319,593 8.9
1999 82,163,500 7,343,591 8.9
2000 82,259,500 7,296,817 8.9
2001 82,440,400 7,318,628 8.9
2002 82,536,700 7,335,592 8.9
2003 82,531,700 7,334,765 8.9
2004** 82,501,000 6,717,115 8.1
2005** 82,438,000 6,755,811 8.2
* as of 31 December
** The figures for the years 2004 and 2005 are not comparable to previous years. The
reduction in the number of foreigners results mainly from a revision of the AZR.
Source: Federal Statistical Office
138 STEFAN RÜHL
longed to this age group, compared to 58.6 per cent of the foreign na-
tionals. However, 5.5 per cent of the Germans were younger than six
years, whereas this is true for only 3.3 per cent of the foreigners; this
can to some extent be explained by the fact that nearly half of the chil-
dren born of foreign parents after the change of the nationality code in
2000 acquired German citizenship by birth. As for the age group ‘65
and older’, 20.4 per cent of the Germans are older than 64, compared
to 6.7 per cent of the foreign population.
Table 5.2 Foreign population in Germany by nationality, 31 December 2005
Country of nationality Total Male Female Female in %
Turkey 1,764,041 937,581 826,460 46.9
Italy 540,810 319,136 221,674 41.0
Serbia & Montenegro* 493,915 262,163 231,752 46.9
Poland 326,596 152,653 173,943 53.3
Greece 309,794 168,705 141,089 45.5
Croatia 228,926 112,616 116,310 50.8
Russia 185,931 75,744 110,187 59.3
Austria 174,812 92,877 81,935 46.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina 156,872 81,098 75,774 48.3
Ukraine 130,674 51,919 78,755 60.3
The Netherlands 118,556 64,691 53,865 45.4
Portugal 115,606 62,955 52,651 45.5
Spain 107,778 54,116 53,662 49.8
France 102,244 47,016 55,228 54.0
US 97,864 56,031 41,833 42.7
UK 96,245 58,140 38,105 39.6
Vietnam 83,446 41,740 41,706 50.0
Iraq 75,927 48,605 27,322 36.0
China 73,767 39,157 34,610 46.9
Romania 73,043 30,210 42,833 58.6
Morocco 71,639 41,974 29,665 41.4
Macedonia 62,093 33,509 28,584 46.0
Iran 61,792 34,894 26,898 43.5
Kazakhstan 59,370 27,270 32,100 54.1
Afghanistan 55,111 29,353 25,758 46.7
Thailand 51,108 7,245 43,863 85.8
Hungary 49,472 28,276 21,196 42.8
India 40,099 26,506 13,593 33.9
Lebanon 40,060 23,215 16,845 42.0
Bulgaria 39,153 16,986 22,167 56.6
Sri Lanka 33,219 16,728 16,491 49.6
Pakistan 30,034 18,099 11,935 39.7
Syria 28,154 16,097 12,057 42.8
Slovenia 21,195 10,588 10,607 50.0
Total 6,755,811 3,493,799 3,262,012 48.3
* The figures for Serbia and Montenegro include persons holding the nationality of former
Yugoslavia who cannot be assigned to one of the successor states.
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Central Register for Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister)
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As mentioned above, the statistics on foreigners residing in Germany
only capture part of the picture of immigration to Germany as they ex-
clude, amongst others, naturalised Germans who constitute a consider-
able share of those having a migrant background in Germany. The nat-
uralisation figures presented in Table 5.4 show that the number of mi-
grants who naturalised increased steadily between 1995 and 2000. A
major share of these new Germans was of Turkish origin, which can
partly be explained by the fact that the Turkish government introduced
a privileged non-citizen status, the so-called pink card, which grants
Turkish emigrants, who have to renounce their Turkish nationality in
order to acquire the nationality of their country of residence, a number
of special rights, such as the right to acquire property in Turkey (Kadir-
beyoglu 2007: 297-299). A new nationality law, which came into force
in 2000, facilitated the access to German citizenship. As a conse-
quence, naturalisation figures reached an all-time high the same year.
This was, on the one hand, due to the fact that a large number of cases,
which had accumulated over the years, could be decided more quickly
than was the case under the previous law (Hailbronner 2006: 232). On
the other hand, an interim regulation, which only came into force in
2000, allowed children up to the age of ten to acquire German citizen-
ship based on the new ius soli regulation if they fulfilled the require-
ments of the new law at the time of their birth. These cases were
counted as naturalisations (about 20,000 in 2000). Between 2000 and
2005, the number of naturalisations fell continuously (see Table 5.4).
In 2005, 117,241 foreigners obtained German citizenship.
Since the introduction of ius soli elements in 2000, about 40,000
children born in Germany of foreign nationals have annually acquired
German nationality by birth in addition to the nationality of their
parents.7 Between 2000 and 2005, 231,263 ius-soli children were born
in Germany.
Table 5.3 German and foreign population by age groups, 31 December 2005
Age groups Germans Foreigners
Total % Total %
Under 6 4,103,769 5.5 205,885 3.0
6-17 9,178,660 12.2 955,634 14.1
18-24 5,988,321 8.0 717,197 10.5
25-39 14,141,080 18.8 2,299,515 34.0
40-59 22,039,962 29.3 1,826,156 27.0
60-64 4,360,961 5.8 299,154 4.4
65 and older 15,336,093 20.4 452,270 6.7
Total 75,148,846 100.0 6,755,811 100.0

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4 Description of flows
5.4.1 Migration to and from Germany
Over the last decade of the twentieth century, migration flows to and
from Germany were influenced by several factors. One important fac-
tor was the fall of the Iron Curtain, which allowed migration outflows
from the former eastern European bloc. As for Germany, this has led
to an increase in the migration inflows of ethnic German immigrants
(Aussiedler) and asylum applicants from Eastern Europe, particularly in
the first half of the 1990s. Secondly, the civil wars in former Yugoslavia
resulted in considerable migration of war and civil-war refugees
throughout the 1990s. Thirdly, labour migration from neighbouring
states, particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, increased. With Po-
land, a kind of ‘commuter migration’ has developed, i.e. Polish na-
tionals enter Germany for a limited period of time in order to seek
temporary work (mainly as seasonal and contract workers).
In the period between 1991 and 2004, nearly 13.8 million people
were registered as having entered Germany. However, a large number
of arrivals often coincides with an increased number of departures.
During the same period, almost 9.8 million residents deregistered in
Germany in order to settle down in another country. In 2004, nearly
780,000 arrivals and about 698,000 departures were registered, re-
sulting in a net migration figure for all German and non-German resi-
dents of +82,543 (net migration for foreigners: +55,217). This was the
lowest net migration since 1998 (see Table 5.5). In 2005, about
707,000 people were registered as having come to Germany, the lowest
figure since 1987. Moreover, for the first time, the net migration of
Germans was negative (-16,764).
Inflows and outflows on the basis of the AZR were published for the
first time in June 2006. Because the AZR registers 1) persons rather
than cases and 2) only those foreigners who stay in Germany for more
than three months, the inflows and outflows are significantly lower
than the figures based on the registered arrivals and departures. In
2005, according to the AZR, 401,000 foreigners immigrated to Ger-
many, 323,000 of these for the first time, while 290,000 people left
Germany.8
If we look at the nationality of those entering and leaving the coun-
try, it becomes obvious that the majority of the migrants are European
(see Table 5.6; these figures are based on the Federal Statistical Office’s
statistics on arrivals and departures). In 2005, Polish nationals formed
the largest group of immigrants (21 per cent). 18 per cent of all immi-
grants were Germans, who constituted the largest group until 2004.
This group comprises ethnic German immigrants (Spätaussiedler) as
well as a considerable number of other German nationals returning
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Table 5.5 Migration inflows and outflows across German national borders,
1991-2005
Year Inflows Outflows Net migration
Total Of which
foreigners
% Total Of which
foreigners
% Total Of which
foreigners
1991 1,198,978 925,345 77.2 596,455 497,540 83.4 +602,523 +427,805
1992 1,502,198 1,211,348 80.6 720,127 614,956 85.4 +782,071 +596,392
1993 1,277,408 989,847 77.5 815,312 710,659 87.2 +462,096 +279,188
1994 1,082,553 777,516 71.8 767,555 629,275 82.0 +314,998 +148,241
1995 1,096,048 792,701 72.3 698,113 567,441 81.3 +397,935 +225,260
1996 959,691 707,954 73.8 677,494 559,064 82.5 +282,197 +148,890
1997 840,633 615,298 73.2 746,969 637,066 85.3 +93,664 -21,768
1998 802,456 605,500 75.5 755,358 638,955 84.6 +47,098 -33,455
1999 874,023 673,873 77.1 672,048 555,638 82.7 +201,975 +118,235
2000 841,158 649,249 77.2 674,038 562,794 83.5 +167,120 +86,455
2001 879,217 685,259 77.9 606,494 496,987 81.9 +272,723 +188,272
2002 842,543 658,341 78.1 623,255 505,572 81.1 +219,288 +152,769
2003 768,975 601,759 78.3 626,330 499,063 79.7 +142,645 +102,696
2004 780,175 602,182 77.2 697,632 546,965 78.4 +82,543 +55,217
2005 707,352 579,301 81.9 628,399 483,584 77.0 +78,953 +95,717
Source: Federal Statistical Office
Table 5.6 Migration inflows and outflows across German national borders by
nationality, 2004-2005
Country of nationality Inflows Outflows Net migration
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Poland 125,042 147,716 96,345 98,190 +28,697 +49,526
Germany 177,993 128,051 150,667 144,815 +27,326 -16,764
Turkey 42,644 36,019 38,005 34,466 +4,639 +1,553
Romania 23,545 23,274 20,275 20,606 +3,270 +2,668
Russia 28,464 23,078 14,078 12,899 +14,386 +10,179
Hungary 17,411 18,574 16,490 15,669 +921 +2,905
Italy 19,550 18,349 35,056 27,118 -15,506 -8,769
Serbia & Montenegro 21,691 17,514 28,345 20,461 -6,654 -2,947
US 15,292 15,228 14,926 14,409 +366 +819
France 12,488 12,260 13,646 10,354 -1,158 +1,906
China 13,067 12,034 12,793 10,468 +274 +1,566
Slovak Republic 11,633 11,806 10,284 9,088 +1,349 +2,718
Ukraine 15,000 10,881 6,357 5,656 +8,643 +5,225
The Netherlands 9,140 10,088 6,230 5,479 +2,910 +4,609
Croatia 10,513 9,260 12,379 11,294 -1,866 -2,034
Bulgaria 11,586 9,057 10,299 9,129 +1,287 -72
Greece 10,205 8,975 20,340 16,391 -10,135 -7,416
Austria 8,998 8,647 9,458 7,639 -460 +1,008
Czech Republic 8,947 8,459 8,302 6,254 +645 +2,205
India 9,125 8,364 7,302 7,095 +1,823 +1,269
Source: Federal Statistical Office
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from abroad. More than 5 per cent were Turks, while Romanians and
Russians each comprised about 3 per cent. Germans constituted the
largest group of nationals leaving Germany in 2005, followed by na-
tionals of Poland, Turkey, Italy and Romania.
Women have a smaller share – compared to men – in both migra-
tion inflows and outflows. The percentage of females has remained
fairly stable over the last two decades, continuing to be slightly higher
for migration inflows (approximately 40 per cent) than for migration
outflows (approximately 37 per cent) (see Table 5.7).
Persons migrating to Germany are, on average, younger than the re-
sident population, but this is also true for those leaving Germany (see
Figure 5.1). Thus, the effect immigration has on rejuvenating the age
structure of German society is partly diminished by migration out-
flows.
5.4.2 Types of migration
The almost 700,000 migrants who enter Germany each year fall into
certain classifiable groups (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
2006; Table 5.8).
The most important group is that of labour migrants, who account
for more than half of the annual inflow. Labour migrants from Middle
and Eastern European countries have been given an opportunity to take
Table 5.7 Migration inflows and outflows in Germany by sex, 1990-2005
Year Inflows Outflows
Male Female % of
females
Total Male Female % of
females
Total
1990 695,231 561,019 44.7 1,256,250 327,796 246,582 42.9 574,378
1991 696,279 486,648 41.1 1,182,927 364,116 218,124 37.5 582,240
1992 911,771 577,678 38.8 1,489,449 450,544 250,880 35.8 701,424
1993 771,018 496,986 39.2 1,268,004 543,675 253,184 31.8 796,859
1994 631,596 438,441 41.0 1,070,037 483,819 256,707 34.7 740,526
1995 651,809 444,239 40.5 1,096,048 454,260 243,853 34.9 698,113
1996 571,876 387,815 40.4 959,691 442,324 235,170 34.7 677,494
1997 496,540 344,093 40.9 840,633 477,595 269,374 36.1 746,969
1998 473,145 329,311 41.0 802,456 470,639 284,719 37.7 755,358
1999 504,974 369,049 42.2 874,023 423,940 248,108 36.9 672,048
2000 487,839 353,319 42.0 841,158 426,798 247,240 36.7 674,038
2001 507,483 371,734 42.3 879,217 383,889 222,605 36.7 606,494
2002 481,085 361,458 42.9 842,543 390,764 232,491 37.3 623,255
2003 439,988 328,987 42.8 768,975 392,541 233,789 37.3 626,330
2004 455,601 324,574 41.6 780,175 436,362 261,270 37.5 697,632
2005 411,024 296,917 42.0 707,352 390,266 238,133 37.9 628,399
Source: Federal Statistical Office
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up (temporary) employment in Germany. The majority of these labour
migrants work as seasonal or contract workers. In 2005, the official
number of non-German seasonal workers amounted to 330,000 and of
non-German contract workers to 22,000. The main country of origin
is Poland. About 80 per cent of all work permits were granted to Polish
nationals. In addition, the introduction of the so-called Green-Card reg-
ulations has opened up a new channel for migration inflows of IT ex-
perts. Up to the end of December 2004, a total of 17,931 work and resi-
dence permits (so-called ‘Green Cards’) were granted to non-German
IT specialists, most of them being nationals of India, Romania and
Russia.
The second largest inflow is EU internal migration, which can in-
clude labour migration but also all other types of migration (retirement
migration, family reunification, etc.). The number of EU nationals ori-
ginating from the old Member States fell steadily from 176,000 in
1995 to 89,000 in 2005. In 2005, net migration between Germany
and the old EU Member States was negative (-10,000). Conversely, net
migration between Germany and the ten new EU Member States was
positive (+61,000).
The third most important reason for migration is family reunifica-
tion. The visa statistics of the Foreign Ministry record all the cases
where German embassies abroad have granted permission for a spouse
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or a child to migrate to Germany. These statistics recorded an increase
in migration inflows of family members, from approximately 55,000 in
1996 to approximately 85,000 in 2002, and a decline in the following
years. In 2005, the number of successful applications submitted to
German embassies was 53,000. Turkey is the main country of origin;
27 per cent of all visas for the purpose of family reunification were
granted at a German embassy in Turkey.
The next most important group are ethnic German immigrants/re-
patriates (Spätaussiedler). The inflows of ethnic Germans reached their
peak in 1990 (379,073). Subsequently, they steadily decreased, with
just 35,522 persons immigrating in 2005, the lowest figure since 1984.
Since 1990, people from territories within the former Soviet Union
have constituted the largest group. About 99 per cent of all Spätaussie-
dler originated from these territories in 2004. The main countries of
origin were the Russian Federation (21,113 people in 2005) and
Kazakhstan (11,206 people in 2005).
In the public domain the quantitative importance of the asylum see-
kers is often overestimated. The number of asylum seekers and refu-
gees entering Germany annually is significantly lower than that of eth-
nic German immigrants/repatriates (Spätaussiedler) or family members.
Between 1990 and the end of 2004, more than 2.2 million people ap-
plied for political asylum in Germany. After the peak in 1992, applica-
tion figures decreased almost continuously. In 2005, a total of 28,914
people submitted a petition for political asylum (2004: 35,607), the
lowest level since 1983. In 2005, the main country of origin of asylum
seekers was Serbia and Montenegro, followed by Turkey, Iraq and Rus-
sia. However, between 2000 and 2005, the majority of applicants origi-
nated from Asian countries (Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, China and some of
the successor states of the former Soviet Union).
A group that gained increasing importance was that of foreign
students: from the winter semester 1993/94 to the winter semester
2003/04, the number of first-semester students that entered Germany
for the purpose of studying at a German university or college (Bildungs-
ausländer9) more than doubled, from slightly less than 20,000 to about
42,000. The largest group of ‘Bildungsausländer’ starting a university
course at a German university or college in 2003 was Chinese (6,676
students), followed by students from Poland (4,028), France (3,427),
Russia (2,650) and Spain (2,698). Since the end of the 1990s, the
number of foreign students, especially from China, the middle and
eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Po-
land and the Czech Republic) and India has risen significantly.
Finally Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union have to be
mentioned. All in all, a total of about 200,000 Jewish emigrants from
the successor states of the former Soviet Union10 entered Germany
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between 1990 and 2005. In 2005, 5,968 Jewish migrants came to
Germany.
5.5 Critical outlook
The main sources for data on migration are the statistics on arrivals
and departures based on registration and deregistration of cross-border
movement. However, due to some deficiencies, these statistics do not
adequately reflect ongoing migration: 1) they do not report the sustain-
ability and the purpose of immigration; 2) they record cases rather
than the number of migrating persons; and 3) the obligation to register
differs between the individual federal states.
Nevertheless, there have been some improvements in stock and flow
statistics. Since 2006 the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR) can ad-
ditionally be used to get information on inflows and outflows of for-
eign nationals. The AZR collects data on all foreign nationals that leg-
ally reside in Germany for a minimum of three months. With the com-
ing into force of the new migration law, new characteristics have been
introduced into the AZR, especially the purpose of the stay (according
to the regulations of the new Immigration Act). The remaining gaps
have to be filled by new procedures of statistical registration and the
harmonisation of migration data on an international level.
Notes
1 Also during the 1970s the GDR began to recruit foreign workers on the basis of bilat-
eral agreements with other socialist countries (Vietnam, Mozambique and Cuba). In
1989, about 93,000 contract workers were living in the GDR (see Bade & Oltmer
2004: 92ff.).
2 See Sekretariat der ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland, ‘Workshop zur “Datengewinnungsstrategie für die Bil-
dungsstatistik” am 13.02.07 in Berlin’. www.kmk.org.
3 This excludes persons entering Germany for a short visit, such as tourists, business
travellers or seasonal workers. According to German law, foreigners are persons who
do not hold German nationality (including those who are stateless) or who are not
Germans according to Article 116 (1) of the Basic Law. Persons with multiple citizen-
ship, who are nationals both of Germany and an additional country, are registered
statistically as German citizens.
4 The foreigners authorities are mainly responsible for the discharging of tasks con-
cerning the residence of third-country nationals (issuing, termination and renewal of
residence permits).
5 Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), ‘Intensive preparation of the reg-
ister-based census starting’, press release, 29 August 2006. www.destatis.de.
6 Under federal and state registration law, all inhabitants of Germany are required to
notify local authorities if they change residence. However, foreign military personnel
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stationed in Germany and diplomatic and consular staff, and their families, are not
required to register and therefore form no part of official arrivals and departures sta-
tistics. Authorities record the following data when a person is registered or deregis-
tered: last and future place of residence, sex, marital status, participation in gainful
employment, date of birth and nationality. Those holding another citizenship apart
from the German one are registered as German citizens.
7 These children have to opt for one nationality after coming of age.
8 Inflows include foreigners immigrating to Germany and foreign children born in
Germany during the reference year. In 2005, about 30,000 children with foreign na-
tionality were born in Germany. Outflows include cases of unknown destination, and
persons registered as dead or ‘no longer resident’.
9 It is important to distinguish between two groups of non-German students: one
group comprises so-called Bildungsinländer, i.e. foreign nationals who have graduated
from German schools; most of these were born in Germany and should therefore
not be categorised as migrants. The other group consists of so-called Bildungsauslän-
der, i.e. foreign nationals with non-German university entry qualifications who enter
Germany for the purpose of studying at a German university or college.
10 Based on a decision of the German Chancellor and the sixteen state governors on
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6.1 Introduction
In the nineteenth century, Switzerland was a poor, rural country. Emi-
gration was common and some examples of this are well known. The
so-called Swabian children (Schwabenkinder) – the children of poor
mountain farmers – were sent to rich farmers and households in Ba-
varia or Württemberg in spring and returned with presents and money
in autumn. Young Swiss men earned their livelihood by serving as sol-
diers in the armies of various countries. The ‘Swiss Guard’ protecting
the Pope in Rome stands as a reminder of the poverty prevailing at that
time.
With the late industrialisation at the end of the nineteenth century















Cartography: Walter Lang, University of Vienna
Switzerland became one of the first European countries to experience
immigration in sizeable numbers. Even though a high proportion of for-
eigners resided in the country at the beginning of the twentieth century,
it was not until the 1930s that migration became a major social issue.
After the Second World War, migration flows increased and soon stir-
red public and political debate. Rotation of the labour force (‘guestwor-
ker system’) ensured that immigration was temporary and prevented
immigrant groups from settling permanently in the country. However,
this rotation policy rapidly showed its limits, especially with regard to
the subsequent integration of the migrant population. As a result, the
limitation of migration has been the object of a succession of referenda
since the 1960s. The place occupied by these topics in public and poli-
tical opinion may be measured by the high percentage of the popula-
tion taking part in these referenda on migration and asylum laws.
Swiss data use the criterion of citizenship to describe immigration.
Although this is only a rough indicator of the size of migrant commu-
nities, the share of foreigners confirms that migration is of enormous
importance for Switzerland. In 2006, with 1.55 million foreigners – or
20.7 per cent of its resident population – on the national territory, Swit-
zerland has one of the highest proportion of foreigners in Europe (i.e.
residents with foreign citizenship), significantly ahead of Germany
(8.9 per cent in 2001), Austria (9.4 per cent), France (5.6 per cent) and
Italy (2.2 per cent). Within Europe, only Luxembourg (37 per cent) has
a higher percentage of foreigners. Switzerland is genuinely a country
of immigration, in part because of a significant inflow of migrants, no-
tably in the 1990s, as is shown by the fact that 23 per cent of the popu-
lation were foreign-born.
However, until quite recently, Switzerland was reluctant to acknowl-
edge the need for an integration policy at all levels of governance. The
adoption of an article on integration, added to the federal Foreign Na-
tionals Act in 1998, can be considered the turning point in this respect.
According to the new law adopted in September 2006,1 the federal
authorities aim to tie the presence of foreigners to the needs of the la-
bour market, placing it ‘in the interest of demographic and social de-
velopment’2 rather than fighting against Ueberfremdung (‘excessive for-
eign presence’) as stated in the 1931 law which was in force until 31 De-
cember 2007. The new bill aims at securing financial support for
integration efforts made by migrants and local receiving communities.
This change was brought about not only by the profound transforma-
tion of the international context, Switzerland’s rapprochement with the
European Union under the freedom of circulation guaranteed by the
bilateral agreements, but also by the unprecedented rise in unemploy-
ment in Switzerland. Integration policies are new at federal level, hav-
ing traditionally been carried out mainly at cantonal level, since, in the
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Swiss federal system, cantons are in charge of education, health and
housing. The new integration policy is primarily aimed at newcomers
(Niederberger 2005; Mahnig & Piguet 2003).
There is no automatic access to the polity for foreigners; naturalisa-
tion occurs on a voluntary basis and requires explicit political approval,
resulting in a quite restrictive practice, on the whole (Achermann &
Gass 2003). The mode of integration can therefore be described as wel-
fare state inclusion without the rights of citizenship.
6.2 Institutions, definitions and statistical sources
In 1970, the federal government set up the Central Register of Foreign-
ers as an instrument designed to monitor the influx of foreign workers.
This records all resident foreign nationals and delivers the bulk of in-
formation on this topic. Moreover, the increase in the number of ques-
tions regarding citizenship, origin and/or naturalisation in surveys and
censuses clearly indicates the need for more data on this part of the po-
pulation. Recently, surveys such as the Migrant Health Monitoring Sur-
vey have been specifically directed at the foreign population, clearly
showing the importance of data collection on this issue.
6.2.1 Institutions
The principal institution involved in data collection is the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office (SFSO), which is responsible for the production and
dissemination of statistics at the national level. Other federal offices,
such as the Swiss Federal Office for Migration (FOM) and the Federal
Social Insurance Office provide some additional statistical information.
There is substantial coordination between offices involved in the pro-
cess of data collection, especially with regard to administrative data.
Moreover, the offices collaborate in data publication in order to avoid
differences.
SFSO tries to provide harmonised registers if possible (for instance,
the Register of Foreigners and the Register of Asylum Seekers are har-
monised and the variables included are coded in the same way). How-
ever, in most cases, different data sets cannot be directly linked (due to
the absence of a Personal Identification Number or PIN). Recently, at-
tempts have been made to link databases by probabilistic linkage meth-
ods, but results are not yet available at the time of writing. The overall
integration of administrative data on asylum seekers and foreigners –
through the Central Migration Information System – had been in pre-
paration for several years before the former Federal Office for Refugees
and the Office for Immigration and Integration were merged to form
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the Federal Office for Migration in January 2005. The information sys-
tem became operational in 2008.
The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) is generally responsible
for data collection at a national level (including sampling, collection,
validation and diffusion). Some regional offices (at the cantonal level)
may provide help in the collection of data, for example with the cen-
suses, but this is not systematic. At the local level, institutions such as
hospitals, schools or universities are involved in the production of sta-
tistics, under the direction of the SFSO.
There is no centralised Population Register in Switzerland (but hun-
dreds of local registers); however, two central registers of foreigners or-
ganised at a national level do exist, since immigration falls under the
direct competence of the Confederation. Data are collected by regional
offices (for example regional police administrations) and centralised by
the Swiss Federal Office for Migration. International inflows and out-
flows, as well as naturalisations, deaths and births, are declared and re-
corded in the registers of foreigners. The quality of declaration is high
for inflows (as declaration is necessary in order to obtain a permit) as
well as for outflows (emigration has to be declared in order to gain ac-
cess to the benefits of the occupational provident insurance, known as
the ‘second pillar’).
6.2.2 Concepts and definitions
In most cases, the variable ‘citizenship’ is included in registers and sur-
veys and it comprises an exhaustive list of nationalities. In some cases,
the place of birth and the age at arrival (or the date of arrival) are also
included. In the case of administrative registers, the status of residence
(residence permit) is often included, but not always. The only register
including information on ethnicity is the Register of Asylum Seekers.
The country of birth is only included in the censuses, which list every
authorised foreigner living in Switzerland (asylum seekers and diplo-
mats included). The last census, carried out in 2000, was organised by
post and internet, which means that every household had to send back
the completed form or fill in a form. For this reason, the non-response
rate was higher than in 1990 and before (especially for some questions
such as religion).
Information on the naturalisation status is also available in some sta-
tistics (Labour Force Survey 1991-1995, Census 2000).
Since these statistics do not contain a PIN, it is difficult to link cen-
suses, registers and surveys. Therefore, statistics are generally com-
puted on the basis of one data file.
The coding of citizenship and place of birth is harmonised according
to the SFSO nomenclature.
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6.2.3 Availability of data
The register of foreigners refers to the period 1974 and thereafter
(1981 and thereafter for computerised data). The register of asylum see-
kers covers the period from 1994 to the present. There is a strong rela-
tionship between data availability and the volume of migration flows.
In fact, both registers reflect the awareness of migration issues on the
part of the federal and cantonal administrations.
The register of foreigners includes the structure of the foreign popu-
lation (according to citizenship, age, sex, place of birth, etc.) as well as
changes of place and status (immigration, emigration and naturalisa-
tion). Besides data on asylum requests, the register of asylum seekers
includes the same information, apart from naturalisation. Both regis-
ters are updated by administrative offices in all Swiss regions and are
centralised in the Federal administration. Every foreigner with a resi-
dent permit is automatically registered. Vital statistics (births, deaths,
marriages, divorces, etc.) also provide data on events occurring in Swit-
zerland. This makes it possible to describe the demographic trends in
every migrant group defined by citizenship.
The census is another major basis for statistics on foreigners. Orga-
nised once every decade, it provides information on the socio-economic
situation of inhabitants according to their citizenship and/or place of
birth. Censuses – and the last one especially – carried out in 2000, are
based on the principle of ‘economic population’, which means that peo-
ple are recorded where they spend most of their time. All foreigners
holding a permit are covered in the census, including diplomats. The
recent decision to abolish the census and to partially replace it by regu-
lar (administrative) register and sample surveys has generated consid-
erable discussion among researchers and within the administration.
Recent debates on migration have also led to a wide range of initia-
tives from the statistical offices to provide data on the participation of
foreigners in the labour force (since 2003) or on the health status of
migrants (2005). Other statistical activities are planned in the domains
of security, criminality and social insurance.
Data sources on the foreign population in Switzerland are consid-
ered particularly rich and informative. From a statistical point of view,
and because of the very existence of the Register of Foreigners, this po-
pulation is more precisely described than the Swiss population. How-
ever, especially in the field of integration, some topics are only poorly
covered by the statistical system. For instance, little information is
available on the family structure of foreigners (except through the cen-
suses), income and housing.
Since Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, the sta-
tistical system is rather different from that of other European coun-
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tries. In particular, European Surveys (Eurobarometers, household pa-
nels, etc.) are not systematically carried out in Switzerland. However,
with the signing of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the
European Union, Switzerland will progressively adapt its standards to
those of Europe.
6.2.4 Categories of foreigners
As mentioned above, in Switzerland, as in other German-speaking
countries, citizenship is the main criterion used to define foreign popu-
lations. Other criteria, such as parental origin or place of birth, are not
systematically included in the data sources. For this reason, naturalised
foreigners are generally considered together with the Swiss in statistics
and cannot be studied as a group.
Available statistics generally distinguish between different categories
of foreigners according to the permit they hold. In principle, we can
therefore easily distinguish between asylum seekers, long-term mi-
grants, short-term migrants and international officials with their fa-
milies. Only refugees are difficult to identify, as they enter the category
of migrants with annual or permanent permits once they are granted
refugee or any other residence status.
It is rather difficult to identify foreign groups according to the rea-
son for migration (family reunification, labour migration, etc.), because
the specific immigration data only provide information on the legal
flow.
During the 1980s and 1990s, illegal migration developed in Switzer-
land and became a crucial subject on the political agenda. Rough esti-
mates suggest that between 100,000 to 200,000 undocumented for-
eigners live – and work – in Switzerland, but up to now no official data
are available.
6.2.5 Quality of data
Though there may be exceptions, the quality of data in Switzerland is
generally considered to be high. This is true, in particular, of data from
the civil register, survey data and census data (which display a good le-
vel of coverage).
As far as administrative data are concerned, the quality depends on
the source, the subject and the quality of the work performed by agen-
cies and boards responsible for data collection and computerisation.
Data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the foreign population
and on migration may be considered exhaustive and of rather good
quality. A survey of the sources (foreigner registers, census, etc.) shows
that there is consistency between different sources as regards the data
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about the number of foreigners due to the fact that, under the federal-
ist system, the administrative procedure is comprehensive and precise
in Switzerland. For other areas, statistics do not converge. For instance,
data concerning the professional activities of migrants are not always
reliable and there are discrepancies between sources for indicators
such as activity rates or unemployment rates.
Another problem frequently mentioned by researchers concerns the
sample surveys. These are not representative as far as the foreign popu-
lation is concerned because of the difficulty of reaching foreigners who
do not speak one of the country’s four official languages or who live in
collective accommodation. It is also difficult to break down survey data
into individual nationalities, because the numbers are too small to be
significant. On the other hand, groups of nationalities (Swiss as against
foreigners of different nationalities) are too heterogeneous to be mean-
ingful. However, some improvement has been observed during the last
decade regarding surveys: the Labour Force Survey, for instance, over-
sampled the number of foreigners to be included in the survey and or-
ganised interviews in foreign languages.
6.2.6 Accessibility of micro-data to researchers
According to the Law on Data Protection, the SFSO has access to all
administrative data for statistical purposes. The dissemination of such
data among researchers is allowed for statistical use only. In practice,
Swiss researchers have access to most databases, made anonymous,
after signing a contract of data protection. They have no access to iden-
tification variables (such as name, surname and address).
The collection of data from public or administrative sources or the
gathering of personal data on a voluntary basis may be carried out by
the SFSO according to the Swiss Statistics Act. The law allows the of-
fice to use administrative data for statistical purposes, in collaboration
with other administrative offices or cantons. However, the harmonisa-
tion of administrative data and its integration into the statistical system
is rather difficult, not least because of the division of competences be-
tween local communities, cantons and the federal government in the
Swiss administration system.
6.2.7 Statistics and reality
Statistics reflect policy. People are grouped into categories which derive
from the way social phenomena are understood, as well as the way
these are politically and administratively regulated. So, for instance,
early statistical data on immigrants concerned the labour force exclu-
sively, and the permit was one of the crucial variables; this was a conse-
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quence of the rotation policy pursued by the authorities. Later, the
whole foreign population was taken into account, with the mostly used
variable being Swiss – as opposed to foreign – nationality.
Today the criterion of nationality is paramount. Often, statistics pre-
sent data on the foreign population using special geographical cate-
gories, namely macro-regional areas (EU vs. other, non-EU European
countries and other continents). This has to be seen in the light of the
dual recruitment system introduced in 1998, which differentiates EU
nationals, who enjoy free movement, from citizens with other geopoliti-
cal origins whose entry is subject to strict high-qualification conditions.
However, the nationality criterion no longer suffices to provide a
proper description of the migration phenomenon and, in particular, of
the dynamics of integration. That is particularly true for two domains:
foreigners born in Switzerland and naturalised foreigners.
The relevance of the first problem becomes obvious when we com-
pare the criteria of nationality and place of birth (not included in stan-
dard statistical presentation of immigration) in the 2000 Census, the
most up-to-date information on the migrant population available in
Switzerland (Table 6.1). This comparison reveals that one Swiss citizen
in eight was born and grew up abroad, while 22.6 per cent of the for-
eigners were born in Switzerland, which means that they are not mi-
grants in the true sense of the word, but belong to the second and third
generation, who, because of the restrictive ius sanguinis-inspired natura-
lisation policy, remain foreigners even though they were born in the
country (Fibbi & Wanner 2004). If data on birthplace are not included,
those born in the country and those who recently arrived are discussed
under the same heading on the basis of their common nationality; this
methodological deadlock may prompt explanations of social dynamics
based on essentialised concepts of (unchanging) culture and identity,
overshadowing underlying social and individual dynamics. For this rea-
son, the place of birth should be taken into account when monitoring
integration processes.
The criterion of current citizenship is so dominant that naturalised
persons cannot easily be singled out for statistical purposes. The 2000
Census revealed that 26 per cent of the people who were foreigners at
Table 6.1 Resident population in Switzerland by nationality and place of birth,
2000
Nationality/place of birth Born in Switzerland (%) Born abroad (%) N
Swiss 88.2 11.8 5,792,461
Foreigners 22.6 77.4 1,495,549
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2000 Census
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birth became Swiss during their lifetime. Some 520,000 Swiss citizens
were foreigners at birth; this means that one Swiss in ten was natura-
lised during his/her lifetime. Since naturalised young people are high-
er than average performers in school, neglecting this population leads
to an over-pessimistic assessment of integration processes and success.
6.3 Dynamics and structures of the foreign population
6.3.1 The dynamics of the foreign population
The proportion of foreigners in the population has risen steadily since
1950, when only 5.9 per cent of the residents did not have Swiss nation-
ality. By 1970, that number was 15.9 per cent and, by the end of 2002,
this figure stood at 21.6 per cent. Within Europe, only Luxembourg, at
37 per cent, has a higher percentage of foreigners. As Table 6.2 indi-
cates, the number of foreigners decreased at the end of the 1970s after
the oil crisis but increased again without interruption after 1980.
Right after the Second World War, female labour immigration ex-
ceeded male immigration in number for both demographic (impact of
the war on male population) and economic reasons (e.g. demand for
female labour in the textile industry), until the gender balance finally
reversed. In 1990, male labour immigrants were roughly twice as nu-
merous as female immigrants. This trend was partially compensated
by movements resulting from family reunification, which became
more marked after 1980.
As elsewhere, births play a significant role in the foreign popula-
tion’s increase. This is largely due to the long history of migration in
Switzerland and the presence of families in the country. As a result,
natural increase is positive among foreigners (in contrast to the Swiss),
Table 6.2 Number of foreigners in Switzerland, 1970-2004
Year Total Men Women Sex ratio (%)
1970 1,001,887 538,456 463,431 116.2
1975 1,032,610 553,245 479,365 115.4
1980 913,497 496,893 416,604 119.3
1985 960,674 531,471 429,203 123.8
1990 1,127,109 629,980 497,129 126.7
1995 1,363,590 738,228 625,362 118.0
2000 1,424,370 757,119 667,251 113.5
2001 1,447,553 767,988 679,565 113.0
2002 1,476,966 782,085 694,881 112.5
2003 1,500,907 792,954 707,953 112.0
2004 1,524,663 804,753 719,910 111.8
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, resident population, excluding asylum seekers and
diplomats
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but tends to diminish because of parental naturalisation. Acquisition
of citizenship clearly slows down the increase of the foreign popula-
tion (Table 6.3).
6.3.2 Socio-economic position
Few data exist regarding the socio-economic position of migrants and
only rough descriptions of trends can be undertaken. Since the end of
the Second World War, the Swiss economy and its labour force have
clearly depended on foreign labour. By the end of the War, immigration
flows increased to meet the labour shortage in the construction in-
dustry. After 1960, many of the permanent immigrants and seasonal
workers were poorly qualified and/or supplied labour-intensive
branches and regions suffering from (seasonal) labour shortage. This
was likewise the case of the second wave of immigration (1985-1992).
In 2000, immigrants composed 25 per cent of the total workforce,
50 per cent of hotel and catering industry workers and 33 per cent of
those in construction. A feature of migration at the beginning of this
century is an increase in the proportion of highly skilled migrants from
Germany, France and Italy.
6.3.3 Geographical origin
The distribution of the foreign population according to citizenship (see
Table 6.4) shows the increase in migrants from former Yugoslavia, Tur-
key and non-European countries. Between 1970 and 2000, the number
Table 6.3 Components of foreign population development, 1998-2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Population
1 January
1,375,158 1,383,645 1,406,630 1,412,937 1,447,553 1,476,966 1,500,907
Births 21,075 21,679 21,573 18,544 19,158 19,417 19,402
Deaths 4,152 4,261 4,338 4,263 4,250 4,492 4,401
Natural
increase
16,923 17,418 17,235 14,281 14,908 14,925 15,001
Immigrations 72,202 83,677 84,200 99,746 105,014 98,812 100,834
Emigrations 64,017 62,780 59,302 56,477 53,517 51,046 52,950
Migratory
balance
8,185 20,897 24,898 43,269 51,497 47,766 47,884
Naturalisation 21,277 20,363 28,700 27,583 36,515 35,424 35,685
Population
31 December
1,383,645 1,406,630 1,424,370 1,447,553 1,476,966 1,500,907 1,524,663
Sources: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, civil registration (births and deaths) and foreigners
registers (migration flows and naturalisation), resident population, excluding asylum seekers
and diplomats
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of Italian and Spanish migrants decreased as the number of Yugoslavs,
Turks and Portuguese increased greatly. Sri Lanka, India and China are
the main Asian countries of origin, with most Sri Lankans seeking asy-
lum and Indians and Chinese mostly students. The decrease in the
number of Italians can be put down to the Oil Crisis (1975) and ex-
plained by the fact that most Italians at that time were holders of an-
nual authorisations. Such authorisations are not renewed when busi-
nesses are not able to provide work for foreigners. As far as Spanish
migration is concerned, inflows reached a maximum during the 1980s
and were followed by an outflow of the first generation of migrants.
For both countries, naturalisation did not play a major role in the de-
crease in the numbers of foreigners. Due to labour shortage and the
difficulty of finding workers in traditional immigrant countries (espe-
cially Italy), other migration flows (especially from Portugal, Turkey
and former Yugoslavia) occurred after the 1980s. In 2000, about
15,500 highly skilled migrants coming from outside the EU/EFTA and
North America were living in Switzerland. Of those, 6,700 came from
Eastern Europe, 4,000 from Asia, 2,400 from Africa and 2,400 from
Latin America. Such trends have led to a rapid diversification of origins.
Other studies describing recent migration trends observed a femini-
sation of flows to Switzerland (especially among African migrants) – a
phenomenon also noted in other countries and related both to the de-
velopment of migration opportunities for more qualified women and
to family reunification – and an increase in the average level of qualifi-
Table 6.4 Foreign Population in Switzerland by citizenship, 1970-2000
1970 1990 2000
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Total number of foreigners 1,080,076 100.0 1,245,432 100.0 1,495,549 100.0
Germany 118,289 11.0 86,197 6.9 112,348 7.5
Austria 44,734 4.1 30,172 2.4 29,849 2.0
France 55,841 5.2 52,715 4.2 62,727 4.2
Italy 583,850 54.1 383,204 30.8 322,203 21.5
Spain 121,239 11.2 124,127 10.0 84,559 5.7
Portugal 3,632 0.3 110,312 8.9 142,415 9.5
Former Yugoslavia 24,971 2.3 172,777 13.9 362,403 24.2
Turkey 12,215 1.1 81,655 6.6 83,312 5.6
Other European countries 56,993 5.3 83,721 6.7 99,279 6.6
Africa 5,121 0.5 24,768 2.0 49,873 3.3
North and South America 18,425 1.7 30,357 2.4 51,124 3.4
Asia 8,327 0.8 62,937 5.1 92,145 6.2
Oceania 1,063 0.1 1,763 0.1 2,994 0.2
Unknown 25,376 2.3 727 0.1 318 0.0
Sources: Wanner 2004; Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 1970, 1990 and 2000 Censuses
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cation of migrant groups, such as Italians and Spaniards, which tradi-
tionally presented a low level of skills (Wanner 2004).
6.3.4 Demographic structure
At the end of 2000, the bulk of the foreign population (men and wo-
men) were of working age (see Figure 6.1). The age structure of this
Figure 6.1 Swiss population by place of birth and age, 2000
Foreigners at birth
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population is shaped like a fir tree, with a large number of children
and working-age adults. The proportion of migrants over age 50 is
clearly smaller than among the Swiss.
Although there are more men in the foreign population, the number
of women entering Switzerland has been increasing since 2000, as a
consequence of the aforementioned tendency towards feminisation. As
a result, the ratio of foreign men to foreign women is levelling out,
with men being in the majority, as Table 6.2 indicates.
As Figure 6.2 shows, the amount of new entries for residence (black
line) and entries of seasonal workers (grey line) since 1949 has fluctu-
ated strongly over the years.
6.4 Migration policy
Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it has partially
joined the liberalised European labour market. In June 2002, the Bilat-
eral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland
and the EU Member States came into force.
This agreement means that EU citizens with a work contract, regard-
less of their skills or qualifications, can live and work in Switzerland
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under a quota system that provides 15,000 first-time long-term resi-
dence permits and 115,500 short-term residence permits per year.
In July 2004, individual admission controls on pay and working con-
ditions for EU nationals were abolished and replaced by measures in-
tended to prevent wage dumping as the latter could damage the inter-
ests of workers who live in Switzerland. In return, Swiss citizens will
not need special permission to live and work in any of the 27 EU Mem-
ber States. Between 2008 and 2009, the EU or Switzerland can decide
to discontinue this arrangement, but if neither side wants to dissolve
the agreement, it will remain in force.
As a result of the agreement, Switzerland has seen the number of
immigrants coming from EU countries jump from 34,000 in 1997 to
49,800 in 2003, an increase of 46 per cent (also see Table 6.4 in Sec-
tion 6.3.3). Most of these EU nationals are from Germany and Portugal,
with EU labour migrants most active in finance, trade-related and ser-
vice industries. In 2005, Switzerland became the first country of desti-
nation for German emigrants, with the United States being the second.
The agreement has also helped increase the number of EU nationals
who work in Switzerland and live in a neighbouring country, especially
in two economic centres, Geneva and Basel. At the same time that
Switzerland made it easier for EU nationals to enter the country, the
policies pertaining to third-country nationals became more restrictive.
Employers who want to hire a foreign employee have to apply for
authorisation at the canton’s labour market office, which can issue a
work permit if the federal authority considers the economy needs the
applicant’s qualifications.
A permit may only be issued if the wage and employment conditions
meet standards and if no qualified domestic or EU worker willing to
work under those conditions can be found. Work permits are granted
only to executives, specialists and other highly qualified workers from
outside the EU/European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The permit is
initially valid for one year and can be renewed every year indefinitely;
after ten years the person may receive permanent residence.
The number of first-time year-round renewable residence permits,
which includes working rights, is limited to 4,000, while the number
of non-renewable one-year residence permits may not exceed 5,000.
Any change of job or profession, as well as a move to another canton,
requires approval from the cantonal labour market authority.
Under the current law, it is difficult for a foreigner to come to Swit-
zerland and start a business or be self-employed. This situation could
change if the federal government passes a new Aliens Law.
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6.5 Conclusions
Statistics available in Switzerland provide a fairly good idea of the mi-
grant population in the country and of its main socio-demographic and
economic characteristics. It is often said that, statistically speaking,
Switzerland’s administration is able to provide more information on
the foreign than on the native population.
Considering some important recent developments, the type of statis-
tics which are available tend to obscure major structural changes in de-
mographic and social dynamics. Sticking to the sole criterion of nation-
ality implies maintaining the fiction of a monolithic understanding of
the nation, while at the same time reinforcing the impression of an un-
bridgeable dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the nationals and the
foreigners.
However, a large amount of work still needs to be done before these
statistics on migrants and foreigners in Switzerland can become a real
tool for monitoring the integration of the foreign population, rather
than just being a rigid administrative information system focussed on
the size and the main characteristics of the ‘non-Swiss’ population.
One of the major challenges for the next decade, in the context of the
diversification of migration flows, will be to mount a longitudinal sta-
tistical tool which aims to understand integration processes. The set-
ting up of a PIN number for all inhabitants (in the context of the social
security system) would probably help in the development of such tools.
Another challenge is linked to undocumented migration and its mea-
surement. Until recently, administrative offices in charge of statistics
clearly ignored the fact that illegal migration is a reality in Switzerland
as well as in most industrialised countries. As global economic changes
and the reinforcement of restrictive migration laws are likely to contri-
bute to perpetuating and most probably increasing irregular migration,
this aspect cannot be ignored. An effort is therefore needed to find
ways of measuring not only legal migration, but also ‘real’ migration.
Notes
1 It came into force on 1 January 2008.
2 Federal Law on Foreigners, chapter 2. art. 3, para. 3: ‘Bei der Zulassung von Ausländer-
innen und Ausländern wird der demografischen, der sozialen und der gesellschaft-




Swiss Federal Statistical Office – population register
– census
www.bfs.admin.ch
Swiss Federal Office for Migration – immigration
– naturalisations
www.bfm.admin.ch
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs – unemployment www.seco.admin.ch
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Ágnes Hárs and Endre Sik
7.1 Introduction
A general survey of the recent history and current situation of migra-
tion in Hungary has to include the country’s rapidly changing location
in the world system of migration. At the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Hungary was a country of emigration, sending millions of poor
young males (mostly from the fringes of the Monarchy) to the United
States.1 During and after the First and especially the Second World
War large-scale forced resettlement movements took place.2 Moreover,
Hungary lost a substantial part of territories with an ethnically mixed
population after the First World War. As a result, an ethnically highly
homogeneous population was created, very receptive to nationalist or
even irredentist ideologies.
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Over the following four decades communism turned Hungary into
a closed country, with very restricted and state-controlled inward and
outward migration. Between 1949 and 1989, there was practically no
immigration into Hungary, except for two politically motivated waves,
when Greek and Chilean communists were given asylum in the early
1950s and 1970s. However, the Hungarian border was much more
permeable with respect to emigration. After the lost revolution in
1956, about 200,000 people left the country. Moreover, there was
continuous emigration from Hungary between 1956 and 1989; it is
estimated that at least another 200,000 people left the country in this
period.
In 1988/89, with the ever-growing number of people arriving from
the neighbouring countries, a quasi-refugee regime emerged in Hun-
gary. The term ‘quasi’ refers to the fact that Hungary signed the 1951
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees only in late
1989. Hence, no asylum seeker could be formally granted refugee sta-
tus, although the constitution contained the concept of asylum. How-
ever, both the media and politicians called the migrants ‘refugees’,
which can only be explained by the political context; the overwhelming
majority of these ‘quasi-refugees’ in the period were ethnic Hungarians
fleeing from the still communist Romania.3 This sudden and unex-
pected large inflow of migrants (mostly from Romania) was followed
by a considerable outflow of the same people who returned home or
left for a third country.
Hungary’s accession to the European Union has not brought dra-
matic changes in the migration trends of the country. Although the
number of labour immigrants has been increasing over the past few
years, it is still very low compared to the total number of the workforce.
On the other hand, the number of asylum seekers decreased from more
than 11,000 in 1999 to about 1,600 in 2004 and 2005 and only slightly
increased again in 2006 to 2,117 (UNHCR 2007a,b). Thus, the expecta-
tions (and in some cases fears) that the numbers of asylum seekers
would surge with Hungary’s accession to the EU were not confirmed.
7.2 The most important data sources4
To explain the merits and limitations of the existing official migration
statistics in Hungary, we start by introducing the available statistical
sources and publications, the basic definitions used by them and their
advantages and shortcomings. This brief and descriptive introduction
is followed by a more detailed description of the stock and flow data.
The authority responsible for producing accurate statistical data and
publications on international migration, foreign population stocks and
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asylum seekers in Hungary is the Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, HCSO). To fulfil this task the HCSO
mainly draws on administrative data sources, such as the population
register, aliens police data or work permit data.5 Among these, the ad-
ministrative sources held by the Ministry of the Interior, i.e. the Central
Aliens Register (Központi Idegenrendészeti Nyilvántartás, CAR) and
the Central Population Register (A polgárok személyi adatainak és lak-
cı́mének nyilvántartása, CPR), are the most important (for further in-
formation, see Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 below). Twice a year the Minis-
try of the Interior transfers data to the HCSO in electronic form. Based
on these data, the HCSO publishes statistics on the immigration and
emigration of Hungarian citizens and foreigners, on resident foreign-
ers and on naturalisations.6 The HCSO also issues separate statistics
on asylum procedures; these are produced by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Office of the Ministry of the Interior (BM-BÁH) based on data
gathered in the Asylum Information System (Menekültügyi informa-
cios rendszer). Besides these administrative sources, the HCSO uses
officially collected survey type statistical data, namely the census (see
Section 7.2.1 below) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS), for statistics
on international migration, albeit to a lesser extent. For, rich as they
are, these data sources either do not cover the foreign population at all
or do so only poorly. Thus, the census did not include data on citizen-
ship between 1960 and 1990. Moreover, the LFS, carried out by the
HCSO since 1992, only covers a limited share of the immigrants.
Apart from the HCSO, some governmental institutions that collect
administrative data on migration produce and publish statistical compi-
lations both in hard copy and online. The Central Office of the Minis-
try of the Interior uses the population register to publish statistics on
emigration, immigration and return migration of Hungarian citizens
as well as on naturalisations and Hungarians born abroad. The Depart-
ment of Aliens Policing of the Immigration and Nationality Office of
the Ministry of the Interior (BM-BÁH) publishes, based on the CAR,
data on foreign citizens residing in Hungary and the numbers of for-
eign citizens entering or leaving the country. The Department of Refu-
gee Affairs of the Immigration and Nationality Office of the Ministry
of the Interior (BM-BÁH) publishes data on refugees. Finally, the Na-
tional Employment Service, operating under the auspices of the Minis-
try of Labour and Social Affairs, collects more detailed data on labour
migration when issuing work permits. General data on labour mi-
grants are included in the Aliens Police statistics, as those intending to
work in Hungary have to apply for a residence permit.
Hungarian migration statistics are based on the concept of citizen-
ship.7 The basis of identifying citizenship is registration with the Min-
istry of the Interior (HCSO 2003). In the case of foreign citizens immi-
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grating or emigrating from countries with changing borders – the So-
viet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – the Central Statistical Of-
fice decides on the likely citizenship (in the successor states). As such,
the classification is made according to the (last) permanent residence
or, for lack of that data, according to the place of birth of the people
concerned. The basis of the registration at the National Police Head-
quarters of the Ministry of the Interior is the passport of the foreigner.
If this document does not include the latest foreign place of residence,
people who were still registered as Soviets, Yugoslavs or Czechoslovaks
in the data file were classified as belonging to the new states according
to their place of birth. However in the case of foreign citizens residing
in Hungary, the citizenship was not changed, if the foreign person ar-
rived in Hungary before the foundation of the successor states and had
been staying in the country since then.
International migration means ‘leaving the country of the usual resi-
dence for a shorter or longer permanent period, the aim of which is to
establish residence in another country in order to settle down or to
have an income there. In the majority of the cases this also involves ac-
quiring the citizenship of the chosen country sooner or later’ (HCSO
2003: 33). Shorter official, business or tourist trips or a longer stay for
study purposes cannot be considered as migration. However, if the pur-
pose of staying in Hungary is to earn an income, this is a case of im-
migration even if the immigrant is likely to return to his or her home-
land sooner or later. The distinction made between long-term and
short-term migrants regards the period of migration. A long-term mi-
grant is a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her
usual residence for a period of at least twelve months so that the coun-
try of destination effectively becomes his or her country of residence. A
short-term migrant is a person who moves to another country for a per-
iod of less than twelve months to earn an income. Since the distinction
between temporary and permanent residence permits was abolished on
1 January 2002, the permit data gathered in Hungary no longer allow
us to distinguish between these two categories.
In 2001, the understanding of the term ‘resident population’ as used
in Hungarian statistics changed considerably. As will be explained in
more detail below, this change meant that more detailed statistics are
now available, both on foreign citizens residing in Hungary and on the
inflows and outflows of foreign citizens. The 2001 Census was the first
to include information on foreign citizens residing in Hungary. Depart-
ing from the figures gathered in the 2001 Census, the HCSO provides
population updates for the inter-census years based on the CPR for
Hungarian citizens and administrative data, i.e. the amount of resi-
dence and immigration permits, for foreign citizens.
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7.2.1 Census
For more than a century, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office has
carried out a census every ten years. However, the population included
in the census differed markedly. Up to 1960, the census counted those
persons who were present in the respective administrative unit on the
day of the census, while the censuses carried out between 1970 and
1990 counted registered residents, regardless of whether they were
present or absent on the day of the census. Under the communist re-
gime, this system of counting the population was, on the one hand,
quite an accurate means of representing the population residing in the
Hungarian territory, since both immigration and emigration were
strongly controlled. On the other hand, there was no particular political
interest in more information about the marginal number of immi-
grants residing in the country, let alone about the number of Hungar-
ians who left the country without deregistering. However, both the mi-
gratory reality and the political interests changed after the fall of the
Iron Curtain. In particular, international organisations were interested
in comparable data on international migration. In response to this
need, the 2001 Census counted the actual resident population, i.e.
those who actually lived and could be contacted at a specific address re-
gardless of whether they were registered there or not.8 As a conse-
quence of this new understanding of the population, the 2001 Census
is the first to provide detailed information on foreign citizens residing
in Hungary for more than three months. This source includes details
such as citizenship, place of birth, sex, age, actual and permanent ad-
dress, education and occupation (HCSO 2006a: 80-81). Hence, the
only disadvantage of this source is that there are no comparable data
for earlier years.
7.2.2 Central Population Register (CPR)
The Central Population Register holds information on the registered
resident population, which is defined as including: Hungarian citizens
having permanent residence in Hungary; Hungarian citizens having
permanent residence abroad who requested registration; foreigners
holding permanent residence permits (including refugees); and EEA ci-
tizens holding residence permits (abolished with Hungary’s accession
to the EU). Data on foreigners are gathered in the Central Aliens Reg-
ister (CAR), which is linked to the CPR. However, the CAR also con-
tains data on temporary migration, which is not fed into the CPR (Ku-
piszewska & Nowok 2006: 529-530).
Citizens and holders of a permanent residence permit leaving the
country for more than 90 days should inform their municipality of this
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fact. Those leaving temporarily stay in the register but their place of
temporary residence abroad is added to the data; however, there is no
information on the place of destination for those leaving for good. Re-
turning residents have to notify their municipality within three days if
they have no permanent address in Hungary. However, since there are
no incentives for deregistration, emigration is usually underreported.
Moreover, immigrations and emigrations of temporary residents are
not covered at all (Kupiszewska & Nowok 2006: 530).
7.2.3 Central Aliens Register (CAR)
The Central Aliens Register (CAR) includes information on all foreign-
ers who applied for or hold a visa, a temporary residence permit or a
permanent residence permit, plus data on the children accompanying
these people. The data include the date of application, the date of entry
into the country, the type of permit granted or not and the date the re-
spective permit was issued. Due to the administrative character of the
data, those whose permits had expired were not necessarily removed
from the database. This was corrected in 2001. As a consequence, the
number of legally resident foreigners in Hungary dropped by more than
40,000 people between 2000 and 2001 (see Kupiszewska & Nowok
2006: 531, 536).
The HCSO uses the CAR to produce statistics on both the stocks
and flows of foreigners. The stock figures include ‘foreigners as at 1st
January with valid residence permits, permanent residence permits
(settlement or immigration permits) and EGT residence permits (for
EEA citizens)’ (Kupiszewska & Nowok 2006: 536). The flow statistics
include the number of temporary and permanent residence permits is-
sued per year.
7.2.4 Work permit data
Although labour immigrants are included in the CAR, this source does
not provide detailed information on foreigners employed in Hungary.
Therefore, the HCSO uses work permit data to give a deeper insight
into labour migration to Hungary. Work permit data include informa-
tion on the sex and citizenship of the employee, industrial branches
and region of employment.
In the wake of Hungary’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, work
permit regulations were changed. Labour migrants from the EU Mem-
ber States no longer need a work permit (except in cases of reciprocity
with those countries that still impose work permit requirements on
Hungarian citizens). However, those EU citizens who are no longer in-
cluded in the work permit register still need a green card. Hence, a re-
174 ÁGNES HÁRS AND ENDRE SIK
liable overview of labour immigration to Hungary will have to summar-
ise work permits, green cards and the obligatory registration of the citi-
zens of the new Member States working in Hungary.
7.3 The stock of foreign citizens in Hungary and the inflows
and outflows
In the following section, we will first present the official statistical data
on migrants in Hungary and then, in the final section, we will look at
non-official sources. The most reliable stock data can be derived from
the 2001 Census. The stock and flow data, based on various adminis-
trative sources described in Section 7.2, are less reliable and limited in
information. However, these are much fresher and provide information
on successive years.
Foreign citizens resident in Hungary constituted around 1 per cent
of the total population in 2001 (see Table 7.1). Due to the fact that there
are more women than men in the total Hungarian population, the
share of men holding a foreign citizenship in the total Hungarian male
population is slightly higher than that of women, although the number
of women holding a foreign citizenship outnumbers that of men. Be-
tween 2001 and 2006, the share of those holding a foreign citizenship
in the total population slightly increased. The proportion of men and
women is still balanced.
The two data sources provide similar information on the geographic
origins of the foreigners resident in Hungary (see Table 7.2). The over-
whelming majority of foreign citizens originate from Europe, with an
increasing proportion coming from Romania and other neighbouring
countries. Besides Europeans, immigrants of Asian origin, mostly Chi-
nese and to a lesser extent Vietnamese, constitute considerable immi-
grant populations.
The 2001 Census provides us with the most comprehensive informa-
tion on foreign citizens resident in Hungary, including dual nationals,
a large majority of whom are returnees who display different character-
istics to other migrants.9 While only 1 per cent of the total population
in Hungary are foreign or dual citizens, the proportion of the foreign-
born population is considerably higher, at 2.7 per cent of the total po-
pulation. The share of women is higher among the foreign-born while
lower among foreign citizens, perhaps because of the unbalanced mar-
riage market, i.e. females are over-represented both among those com-
ing from the East and moving to the West (see Table 7.3).
Table 7.4 provides a more detailed picture of the population by citi-
zenship and place of birth. While only 2 per cent of the Hungarian citi-
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Table 7.2 Stock of foreign citizens in Hungary by country of citizenship in per cent
of total foreigners, 2001 and 2005
Census 2001 Foreign population 2001* Foreign population 2005*
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
Total
foreigners
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
European origin 83.1 79.6 86.4 84.7 81.5 87.8 84.5 82.5 86.6
Of which:
Romanian 36.3 34.4 38.2 37.8 37.5 38.0 42.9 42.4 43.3
Ukrainian 9.5 7.8 11.2 8.1 7.3 11.7 9.9 9.4 6.2
Yugoslav 9.3 10.3 8.3 11.5 13.0 10.1 7.8 8.6 7.1
Slovak 4.1 2.9 5.2 1.4 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.0 2.7
German 7.1 6.7 7.4 6.8 5.2 8.3 6.8 6.0 7.6
Russian 2.6 1.8 3.3 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.4 2.2
Polish 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.1 1.6 2.6 1.5 1.1 1.9




5.6 6.2 5.0 7.0 8.0 6.0 7.6 8.3 6.8
African origin 1.5 2.4 0.7 1.1 1.9 0.4 1.2 1.8 0.5
US + Australia 5.1 5.9 4.4 2.7 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.1
* Data refer to 1 January.
Sources: 2001 Census; HCSO 2006b; authors’ calculations
Table 7.3 Share of foreign and dual citizens and foreign-born population in
Hungary, 2001 (in per cent)
Total Men Women
Share of foreign citizens 0.91 0.94 0.89
Share of dual citizens 0.17 0.19 0.16
Share foreign & dual citizens 1.09 1.12 1.05
Share of foreign-born population 2.7 2.5 2.9
Total population 10,198,300 4,850,600 5,347,600
Source: 2001 Census
Table 7.4 Breakdown of population in Hungary by place of birth and residency in
2001 (in per cent)
Resident in
Hungary




Citizenship Born abroad Born in Hungary
Foreign citizens 74.5 16.3 0.4 8.8 100.0
Dual citizens 54.8 3.0 2.8 39.4 100.0
Foreign & dual
citizens
71.4 14.2 0.7 13.7 100.0
Hungarian citizens 2.0 0.0 0.0 97.9 100.0
Total population 2.7 0.2 0.0 97.1 100.0
Source: 2001 Census; authors’ calculations
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per cent of the dual citizens were born in Hungary. Almost three quar-
ters of the foreign citizens but only about half of the dual citizens were
born abroad. Thus, these two groups differ significantly, which is partly
a result of the historical border shifts mentioned earlier.
Data from the 2001 Census show that approximately 8 per cent of
the national ethnic groups in Hungary are foreign-born, i.e. they are
first-generation migrants. The share of the foreign-born was largest
among Rusins (54 per cent), Ukrainians (50 per cent), Romanians (49
per cent) and Poles and Bulgarians (both 42 per cent) (Tóth & Vékás
2004).
As Table 7.5 shows, compared to the native population, the foreign
and dual citizens are:
– comprised of fewer females;
– more in the range of working age (20-59 years old);
– more highly educated.
Within this group those with dual citizenship are even less frequently
female, with more being teenagers or elderly, and being significantly
more educated.
Based on the permit data included in the CAR, the HCSO provides
statistics on the stocks of foreigners resident in the country (see Figure
7.1). These include all those holding valid residence permits, perma-
nent resident permits and, up to 2004, permits for EEA citizens. As
mentioned above, this administrative source is somewhat less reliable
than HCSO data. In fact, administrative adjustments carried out in
2001 showed that 40,000 people still included in the CAR no longer
held a valid permit. As a consequence, the number of foreigners legally
residing in the country fell to a level that was lower than in 1993 but
has since increased again to the level reached before the correction.
The HCSO also publishes data on the inflows and outflows of for-
eign citizens (see Figure 7.2). The inflow of immigrants (calculated on
Table 7.5 Socio-demographic characteristics of Hungarian citizens compared to those
of the foreign and dual citizens residing in Hungary in 2000 (in per cent)
Natives Foreign and
dual citizens
Within foreign and dual citizens
Foreign citizens Dual citizens
Gender: female 52.4 50.8 51.3 48.4
Age: under 19 23.2 21.2 20.0 27.6
20-29 15.6 24.0 26.0 13.1
30-59 40.7 43.0 43.6 39.9
Above 60 20.5 11.8 10.4 19.4
Education: secondary 38.0 57.3 56.0 65.1
Higher 12.5 25.3 24.2 31.4
Source: 2001 Census
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the number of temporary and permanent residence permits issued per
year) increased sharply between 1987 and 1991. Subsequently, the
number of foreign citizens entering the country legally remained more
or less stable up to the turn of the century, when it grew again. The
number of emigrants followed the same trend between 1985 and 1991,
albeit on a much lower level, and has since remained stable. This
means that most of the immigrants remained in the country, while a
smaller number returned home or moved on to a third country. Taken
as a whole, Figure 7.2 illustrates that Hungary is an immigration coun-
try. At the beginning of the 1990s, the migration surplus was large, de-




















































































Sources: HCSO 2003, HCSO 2006b (rounded figures)
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spite the fact that a large number of foreigners emigrated. Subse-
quently, both immigration and emigration of foreigners are stable. Fi-
nally, at the turn of the century, Hungary becomes a full-scale immi-
gration country – at least in official statistics, notwithstanding the
known shortcomings of emigration data.
Of course, statistics based on permit data exclude, per se, all kinds of
illegal migration (for further information on this phenomenon in Hun-
gary, see Section 7.6). Moreover, it does not include the quasi-refugees
who arrived in Hungary in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These are
included in Figure 7.3. This graph that extends our view beyond permit
data and at the same time breaks down immigration into four major
types in order to provide a more realistic insight into immigration to
Hungary (see Figure 7.3).
The first immigrants coming to Hungary in the transition period
were quasi-refugees, here categorised as ‘other’, who were neither recog-
nised as refugees nor defined as immigrants. Having entered the coun-
try in various ways, they either managed to regularise their status and to
become legal immigrants or residents in the following years or they left
again for a third country. The first wave of quasi-refugees, with a peak
of ‘other forms’ of immigration, was followed by a brief ‘immigration
permit’ period, later overtaken by that of ‘residence permits’. The num-
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Sources: HCSO 2001: Table 1.8.1 and 1.8.2; HCSO 2003: Table 1.12
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ber of work permits issued is closely linked to immigration trends,
which is hardly surprising since those intending to work usually need
an immigration or residence permit (excluding border commuters; see
Section 7.5). Particularly during the transition period, many of the qua-
si-refugees applied for work permits in order to legalise their status in
the country. This high interest in work permits decreased in the mid-
1990s when the number of naturalisations surged. More than 20,000
foreign citizens, most of them originating from Romania, were (re-)nat-
uralised in 1992 and more than 11,000, again mostly from Romania, in
1993. With the adoption of stricter naturalisation requirements, this
number fell again (see Kovács & Tóth 2007: 150-151).
What this figure tells us, however, is not so much that immigration
is changing but that the statistical regimes are changing, following the
changes in the legal regulation of migration. For example, both the
high number and the disappearance of the ‘other’ types of immigration
were linked to the developing migration regulation and the way statis-
tics caught up with these.
As far as emigration is concerned, foreigners (mostly those coming
from Romania and former Yugoslavia) emigrated in large numbers
shortly after their arrival between 1988 and 1992, while Hungarian
emigration was relatively more pronounced before the change of the
system (see Figure 7.4). The annual number of refugees was changing
rapidly, which is partly ‘normal’ (since it reflects the unpredictable
changes in the worldwide political landscape and the way these are
‘translated’ into the mental maps of the refugee population, i.e. their
Figure 7.4 Emigration of foreign citizens and Hungarians, return migration of































































































Source: HCSO 2001, 2003, 2006b
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views of the world as a space of migration) and partly a by-product of
the changes in the Hungarian regulation (Hungary abolished the terri-
torial restriction of the Geneva convention in 1998 and has since also
accepted non-European refugees) and how these are reflected in migra-
tion statistics. The number of returnees has always been rather low, ex-
cept for a short period around the mid-1990s.
7.4 Characteristics of recent inflows and outflows
Contrary to what we expected on the basis of standard migration litera-
ture, we did not find any sign of a sharply growing feminisation or a
geographical dispersion of migration to contemporary Hungary. Figure
7.5 shows the changing proportions of female migrants in various mi-
grant groups in contemporary Hungary.
Figure 7.5 shows that the proportion of females is more or less con-
stant among almost all types of migrants entering or leaving Hungary.
Only among Hungarian emigrants did the proportion of women signif-
icantly increase, indicating a growing ‘export’ of Hungarian females,
especially between 2001 and 2005.
The average age of male and female immigrants has not changed at
all. There was, however some change in some smaller immigrant and
emigrant groups (see Figure 7.6).
While both male and female emigrants were, on average, about 30
to 35 years when they left the country, this figure surged to 45 years in
Figure 7.5 Shares of females among those entering and leaving Hungary, 1990-
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the mid-1990s. The average age of male and female refugees rapidly
oscillates up to 2000 and has constantly risen ever since. In most
years, male refugees were older than their female counterparts, which
can most likely be explained by the fact that they arrived as families.
As mentioned above, the countries of origin of those entering Hun-
gary have not become more diversified in recent years. On the contrary,
in 2003 the overwhelming majority (85 per cent) of the stock of for-
eigners residing in Hungary for more than a year was of European ori-
gin, mostly from neighbouring countries with large Hungarian minori-
ties (see Table 7.6).
While the share of men and women is more or less balanced among
the total immigrant population, this proportion differs significantly for
the regions of origin. While immigration from Asia (namely China),
former Yugoslavia and the miscellaneous countries is predominantly
male, more women than men come to Hungary from the EU.
The immigrant stock on the labour market can best be characterised
by the number of work permits issued (see Figure 7.7).10 The
overwhelming majority (85 per cent) of the foreign labour is of European
origin, mostly from Romania, Ukraine and, increasingly, from Slovakia.
Labour immigrants mainly originate from the countries bordering
Hungary. Their proportion steadily increased from 65 per cent of the
total in 1996 to 76 per cent in 2000 and finally to 86 per cent in
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2004. In fact, the increasing number of work permits (plus green
cards and registrations) is due to the growing labour immigration from
these countries. The share of Slovak workers increased considerably
over the last decade (see Table 7.7). It should be noted that work permit
holders who commute on a daily basis are not considered immigrants
(see the immigrant population by citizenship in Table 7.2). Neverthe-
less, they are included in the immigrant labour statistics.
Table 7.6 Immigrants in Hungary by sending country/region and sex,
1 January 2004 (in per cent)
Share of immigrants
by sending region
Share of immigrants by







Former Yugoslavia 11 47
Ukraine 12 54
Asia 11 100 44
Of which:
China 46 45
All others 4 38
Total 100 51
Source: HCSO 2004








































































Sources: 1990-2003: work permit statistics; 2004-2006: work permits, green cards and regis-
trations (all data for 31 December)
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Table 7.8 shows that the countries of origin of the foreign citizens
entering Hungary and of those naturalising in Hungary largely re-
mained the same between 1994 and 2005. In fact, if there is any
change in the geographical origin at all, it is the opposite of dispersion,
i.e. increasing concentration.
In sum, since the share of females among the migrants increased only
slightly, we conclude that the feminisation of migration is not a major
Table 7.7 Geographic concentration of immigrant labour stock by sending countries,
1996-2006
Immigrant labour
Share of total Share of 4 neighbouring
1996 2000 2004 2006 1996 2000 2004 2006
Romania 70 65 62 53
Former Soviet Union 18 19 16 14
Former Yugoslavia 8 5 2 3
Slovakia 4 11 21 30
4 main neighbouring sum 65 76 86 86 100 100 100 100
EU-15* 0 7 3 4
Asia (China & Vietnam) 4 8 2 2
Others 32 9 9 8
Total 100 100 100 100
18,763 35,014 66,132 64,626
* EU-15 data are not necessarily included following the EU enlargement due to the
regulation of the registration.
Sources: 1990-2003: work permit statistics; 2004-2006: work permits, green cards and regis-
trations (all data for 31 December)
Table 7.8 Proportion of Romanian, Slovakian, Ukrainian (Russian) and Former
Yugoslavian citizens among immigrants, work permit holders and those
who naturalised in Hungary, 1994-2005
From Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine (Russia) and Former Yugoslavia (%)
Immigration Work permits Naturalisations
1994 62 68 80
1995 57 73 82
1996 50 65 85
1997 50 71 84
1998 59 65 85
1999 70 74 89
2000 70 76 85
2001 73 82 92
2002 74 70 93
2003 68 71 85
2004 78 72 89
2005 63 76 89
Sources: HCSO 2003, 2006b
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trend in contemporary Hungary. Neither is geographical dispersion:
the countries of origin of those entering Hungary have largely re-
mained the same since the early 1990s. This is very likely the result of
the large quasi-diasporic migration region bordering Hungary and the
strong diaspora politics of Hungary (Sik 2000; Sik & Tóth 2003). The
only observable change is that migrants tend to be older than ten years
ago, which might be interpreted as a sign of the maturation of the mi-
gration process.
7.5 A critical but positive outlook
In the previous brief analysis we implied that migration statistics are
unavoidably distorted by two opposing influences:
– the historical, political and cultural characteristics of the country
where they were produced, and
– the internationalised trends (or fashions) of statistical data produc-
tion.
This unavoidable double bias can be very lucidly illustrated by analys-
ing Hungarian migration statistics. As to the country-specific bias, we
saw characteristics of the Hungarian migration statistics (such as the
special returnee statistics or a very detailed analysis of naturalisation),
which might be rather unique and are likely to be the result of Hungar-
ian diaspora politics. As to the bias due to internationalisation, we de-
monstrated that the harmonisation of migration statistics towards the
UNHCR and the EU resulted in changes that hardly allow for a reliable
time-series analysis.
More importantly, however, there are reasons why we assume that
there is an unavoidable and increasing general inability of any official
migration statistics to give a comprehensive and reliable picture of the
current migration processes.
First of all, some of the newly expanding forms of migration cannot,
due to their very nature, be properly covered by standard migration sta-
tistics. Examples are the following:
– the increasing spread of transnational commuters (au pairs, seaso-
nal agricultural workers, Hungarian doctors working in UK hospi-
tals over the weekends);
– the spreading of international small entrepreneurs (Portes, Haller &
Guarnizo 2001);
– the internationalisation of the informal economy (growing informal
remittances, trafficking).
In the case of Hungary the (temporary) spread of certain special forms
of migration has further increased the general level of bias between the
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reality and the statistical depiction of migration processes. This is due
partly to Hungary being in the middle of the (former) buffer zone
(Wallace 1996), and partly to a long history of ‘migrating borders’.
The first of these characteristics implies special migration patterns,
such as suitcase trade (Czakó & Sik 1999; Sik & Wallace 1999) and
‘Comecon marketplaces’ (Sik 1999) and an elaborated system of open-
air daily labour markets (Sik 2002).
The second explains Hungary’s strong diaspora migration policy,
which also influences statistics. This policy addresses the large Hun-
garian diaspora just on the other side of the Hungarian borders, which
has been described as a quasi-diaspora (it was created not by emigra-
tion but by the repeated redrawing of the borders). As a consequence,
the term ‘foreign-born’ population has a distorted meaning in Hungary.
Among the elderly, a substantial proportion of the ‘foreign-born’ were
born in former Hungarian territory that later became ‘foreign’ in the
statistics (Juhász 1997).
If all the aforementioned claims are correct, the future of official mi-
gration statistics is in a perilous state. However, we foresee the supple-
mentation of the existing and unavoidably deteriorating official data by
alternative sources registering migration flows. These sources would be
a useful addition to the existing statistics and provide us with a better
overview of contemporary migration flows. Such alternative sources of
information could be very different from border statistics (Futo & Jandl
2005), the analysis of tourist flows and so on.
To illustrate that limited but still useful additional and alternative
data sets can contribute to answering relevant questions about migra-
tion, the following section will serve to introduce a method we devel-
oped at TÁRKI (Social Research Inc.). This method uses municipalities
as the unit of analysis of certain (in our view increasingly important)
migration processes which are, per se, not included in any standard
migration statistics.
7.6 An additional and alternative method of measuring
migration: The Local Government Monitoring and
Database Project (LGMDP)
TÁRKI started the first phase of Local Government Monitoring and Da-
tabase Project in 1995. Since then, there have been twelve waves cover-
ing the following migration related topics:
1995 informal economy, foreign labour, xenophobia, suitcase
trade;
1996 informal economy, foreign labour, xenophobia, suitcase
trade;
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1997 informal economy, foreign labour, xenophobia, suitcase
trade;
1998 local labour market, foreign labour, suitcase trade;
2000/2001 refugee integration;
2002 informal economy, migrants on the local labour market
and migration from the municipality, suitcase trade,
tourism;
2005 informal economy, foreign labour, suitcase trade.
The LGMDP covers all Hungarian municipalities (No. app. 3100). The
basic characteristics of the survey technique are as follows:
– a self-administered questionnaire (max. eight pages, simple struc-
ture);
– non-response is corrected by weighting; weights are derived from
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) Settlement Data-
base;
– longitudinal panel (all waves are assembled into a cumulative data-
base).
The response rate of the single-phase survey (sending questionnaires
to the municipalities only in one wave) is about 25-30 per cent, while it
is about 50 per cent of the two-phase survey (two postal questionnaires
or a postal wave and a phone wave).11
The main advantages of the survey technique are:
– As the database is based on annual surveys that are being built con-
tinuously, it will provide longitudinal data, which enable users to
make projections for the future.
– It allows a quick and up-to-date analysis (the time required for ana-
lysing a survey is about three months).
– LGMDP surveys provide additional information (e.g. ethnic compo-
sition, commuting migrant workers, open-air marketplaces) that
other existing databases do not contain.
– The data cover parts of the migrant population which cannot be
reached by normal statistical methods (illegal migrants, commuting
workers, shuttle traders) as well as some aspects of the migration
process which are too specific to be properly analysed by macro-sta-
tistical methods (such as integration, foreign investors on local level,
wages on the local labour market, spread of open-air markets, etc.).
The following two subsections serve to summarise some results of
these surveys (for further details, see Sik 1998, 1999).
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7.6.1 Spatial distribution of informal markets and foreign traders
In 1997, every seventh municipality had at least one informal market.
‘Large informal markets’ (with at least ten traders regularly present)
existed in 12 per cent of the municipalities. On average, these informal
markets were open three days a week for six hours throughout the year
and were made up of 92 traders. While foreign traders were present in
the majority of these informal markets, their number was higher than
the national average in Southern Transdanubia, the Great Northern Plain
and some towns. Among these foreigners, ethnic Russians and Roma-
nians constituted the largest groups in 1995, followed by Poles, ethnic
Hungarians living across Hungary’s borders and Chinese. This changed
in 1997, when traders of Romanian ethnicity predominated, with the sec-
ond and third places being taken by Chinese and Russians, while the
numbers of Polish traders, Hungarian traders from beyond the country’s
borders and traders from former Yugoslavia were negligible. The follow-
ing regional deviations from the national trend were observed:
– For both years, ethnic Chinese traders were to be found mostly in
towns. Their proportions decreased along with settlement size;
– For 1997, traders from former Yugoslavia were overrepresented in
informal markets in towns, while Romanians and Hungarians from
beyond the borders were more likely to be found in informal village
markets.
Table 7.9 Spread and intensity of migrants in Hungary by region and settlement
















Hungary* 60 0.7 50 0.4 42 0.3
Northwest region 58 0.5 45 0.3 39 0.3
Southwest region 52 0.8 48 0.5 37 0.4
Central Hungarian
region
88 1.0 65 0.5 58 0.5
Northern Hungarian
region
53 0.4 40 0.2 29 0.1
Northeast region 69 0.6 59 0.4 53 0.4
Southeast region 76 0.8 70 0.5 62 0.5
City 81 0.4 72 0.4 72 0.4
Big village 87 0.7 74 0.4 70 0.4
Mid-size village 73 0.6 66 0.4 52 0.3
Small village 46 0.7 35 0.4 29 0.3
* except Budapest
Source: TÁRKI settlement database 1998
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7.6.2 The proportion and spatial distribution of migrants in Hungary
Between 1995 and 1998, the proportion of settlements with migrants12
(spread) and the proportion of migrants in the population (intensity)
decreased in all regions and settlement groups except for the cities,
where the share of the migrants remained the same.
The proportion of settlements with migrants and the proportion of
migrants in the population were higher in those sub-regions13 that bor-
der on Romania, where a comparatively large number of migrants live
in a few big cities. The proportion of migrants in the population is also
above average in the Austrian and Ukrainian border sub-regions.
Notes
1 The two classic books (in Hungarian) that offer a historical and/or anthropological
overview are Puskás (1982) and Fejős (1992).
2 This was due to the Holocaust and the expulsion of approximately 200,000 ethnic
Germans whose homes were filled with ethnic Hungarians expelled from Czechoslo-
vakia.
3 This remained unchanged for the following seven to eight years. In 1990, 96 per
cent of the ‘refugees’ were from Romania. Subsequently, the number of asylum see-
kers from former Yugoslavia increased due to the war in this region. Their propor-
tion among all asylum seekers lay between 77 and 91 per cent in the period from
1992 to 1997.
4 The following section draws on Kupiszewska and Nowok (2006).
5 Due to the fact that most of the data are based on administrative sources, the defini-
tions and numbers are somewhat sensitive to the regulations on immigration, resi-
dence and naturalisation that were changed in 2002, in 2004 with Hungary joining
the EU, and in 2007 in response to the EU directive on free movement of third-coun-
try nationals. The present paper avoids discussions of these regulations but refers to
them where necessary.
6 Data on the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship are included in both the CPR and
the CAR. The HCSO links these sources and harmonises the data.
Table 7.10 The intensity and spread of migrants in the border sub-regions of Hun-
gary in 1998 (in per cent)
Border sub-regions
Austrian Former Yugoslavian Romanian Ukrainian Slovakian Hungary*
Migrants/local
active population
1.1 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.5 0.7
Settlements with
foreigners
45 41 66 43 31 42
* except Budapest
Source: TÁRKI Settlement database 1998
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7 The census and the CAR also contain data on the place of birth of the resident popu-
lation but these are not of good quality in the CAR (Kupiszewska & Nowok 2006:
536). Moreover, birth in a foreign country does not necessarily mean that the respec-
tive person migrated but may instead be traced back to a change of the Hungarian
border.
8 In addition, the 2001 Census covered the registered resident population in compli-
ance with the needs of the regular national statistical reporting system (i.e. vital sta-
tistics). All published statistics are based on the concept of the actual resident popula-
tion (HCSO 2006a: 80-81).
9 Hungarian citizens were asked for a possible second citizenship in the 2001 Census,
while foreign citizens could only state one citizenship.
10 Following Hungary’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, EU citizens are no longer
included in the work permit register. Consequently, the figure summarises the num-
bers of work permits, green cards for EU-15 citizens and obligatory registrations of
the citizens of the new Member States working in Hungary.
11 Similar surveys were carried out in Romania and Poland in 2000-2001 and in Roma-
nia and Slovakia in 2003, using almost identical questionnaires. The response rate
was 28 per cent in Poland (fall 2000), and 57 per cent in Romania (spring 2001).
12 The term ‘migrants’ includes refugees, permanent residents, legal and illegal (i.e. un-
declared and/or unregistered) workers and naturalised Hungarians. Naturalised Hun-
garians were included in this discussion since they show similar characteristics as
the other immigrant groups.
13 Regional statistics splits Hungary into about one hundred sub-regions. Sub-regions
are cities and their agglomeration within the borders of a county. We defined border
sub-regions simply as those of which their border is also the border of Hungary. The
naming of the border sub-region refers to the country with which a common border
is shared. In some cases a sub-region has common borders with more than one
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Czakó Á. & E. Sik (1999), ‘Characteristics and Origins of the Comecon Open-air Market
in Hungary’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (4): 715-737.
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Tóth (eds.), From improvisation toward awareness? Contemporary migration politics in
Hungary, 17-31. Budapest: MTA PTI.
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Jakub Bijak and Izabela Koryś
8.1 Introduction
Poland is a perfect example of a country whose data on international
migration have the typical shortcomings widely discussed in the litera-
ture (e.g. Bilsborrow, Hugo, Oberai & Zlotnik 1997; Eurostat 1997;
Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006). Not only are migration flows se-
verely underreported, but, additionally, the definitions in use do not
comply with the international standards determined by the United Na-
tions (1998). Moreover, information on irregular migration to Poland
is generally limited to border guard statistics on apprehensions (cf.
Futo & Jandl 2005; Kępińska 2005). All of these shortcomings have
profound consequences for many areas of socio-economic life since re-
liable statistics on international migration and the resident population
are crucial for many aspects of public policy planning.
8.2 Historical and political background of Polish migration data
8.2.1 Historical background up to 1989
Official Polish data on migration stocks and flows should in general be
handled with great care, since their analysis may lead to inaccurate
conclusions and spurious findings if the analysts neglect to consider
both their implicit shortcomings and the historical and social contexts
of current and previous migration flows. It should be noted that the
shortcomings and inefficiencies in the current Polish system of collect-
ing and reporting data on international migration can, for the most
part, be traced back to the communist political regime (1945-1989).
For centuries, out-migration (both politically and economically moti-
vated) was the major direction of population flows in Poland. The sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century and the whole nineteenth century
were dominated by the emigration of political refugees from the terri-
tory then occupied by the three neighbouring empires. At the turn of
the twentieth century, the mass economic outflow started. In the years
1871 to 1913 almost 3.5 million people emigrated (which is roughly
equivalent to 14 per cent of the average population of Poland at the
time). Another 2.1 million emigrants left Poland in the inter-war period
(1918-1939; cf. Morawska 1989).
Over a hundred years of substantial outflows firmly established Pol-
ish migration networks abroad, which in turn contributed to maintain-
ing the high volume of Polish emigration. As a consequence, the Pol-
ish state institutionalised emigration. Largely inspired by the Italian
legislation on emigration introduced at the beginning of the twentieth
century, Poland developed state agendas dedicated to migration man-
agement and the protection of Polish emigrants in their countries of
residence. Although regarded as a substantial loss of human capital in
the inter-war period, emigration was also seen as an important means
of reducing demographic and economic pressure in the overpopulated
rural regions of Poland (Jarzyna 1933). If the public and political opi-
nions on international migration issues are to be judged by the rich-
ness of data and variables reported in official migration statistics, the
policymakers in inter-war Poland seemed to have been much more
concerned with international population movements than their con-
temporary counterparts (CSO 1930-1939; MCL 1938).
Under the communist regime the international migration of Polish
citizens became a highly politicised issue. Driven by ideological con-
cerns, the communist government imposed restrictive exit rules, allow-
ing emigration mostly on ethnic grounds or for the purpose of family
reunification. However, the political attempts to suppress the outflows
proved to be rather futile in the long run. The on-going erosion of com-
munist political power was clearly correlated with the gradual liberali-
sation of international movement restrictions (Stola 2001). This pro-
cess was significantly accelerated when the migrants’ remittances be-
came an important source of foreign currency for the socialist
economy. As a result, the dominant attitude towards international mo-
bility gradually changed, which is reflected in the official statistics of
international flows published in the Statistical Yearbooks. Initially
sparse and parsimonious, these data were extended and enriched over
the years.
Up to the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 and the ensu-
ing socio-economic transformations, the majority of the people leaving
and coming to Poland had been Polish citizens. Besides, emigration
was usually long-lasting, if not permanent, due to both the difficulties
encountered when applying for a permit to leave (especially to the Wes-
tern countries) and the potential repressions upon return, in the case
of overstaying the period spent abroad. Hence, the system of registra-
tion and reporting of international migration flows developed after the
Second World War might have been relatively accurate in the commu-
nist era but became outdated and seriously inefficient, when both the
socio-political context and international mobility patterns changed.
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8.2.2 Recent patterns of international migration in Poland
The political liberalisation and economic transformation that com-
menced in the 1990s attracted to Poland the first wave of actual
(mostly temporary) immigrants, transforming Poland from a typical
country of emigration into a sending-receiving country. The incoming
immigrants consisted mainly of: (a) small entrepreneurs who filled eco-
nomic niches on the newly-opened market (for example, Vietnamese
traders selling cheap textiles and running oriental fast-food restaurants,
cf. Koryś 2004); (b) petty traders from the former Soviet republics who
were subsequently absorbed by the emerging secondary labour market
in Poland (cf. Stola 1997); as well as (c) highly skilled professionals
from Western countries who greatly contributed to the institutional
modernisation in Poland and to the transfer of knowledge (Iglicka
2000). An important feature of these movements was their ‘provi-
sional’ and temporary character. A large majority of these migrants, in-
cluding the highly skilled, circulated between Poland and their home
countries on the basis of tourist visas, doing their business without the
required permits. An unprecedented phenomenon was also the first ap-
pearance of asylum seekers in Poland in 1992 (Kicinger 2005).
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, regular migration to
Poland has become more significant. Petty traders and small entrepre-
neurs have gradually been pushed out of the market. Circular migra-
tion from the neighbouring post-Soviet countries has been limited by
the introduction of visa requirements. At the same time, a certain
number of the formerly irregular migrants have been and are being
regularised as there has been and still is a continuous demand for mi-
grant labour, especially in the areas of domestic services, agriculture
and construction (Koryś 2005).
8.2.3 Limitations of the Polish statistics on international migration
Although the patterns of migration in Poland have changed signifi-
cantly since the end of the communist era, the system of registering in-
ternational population flows has not. Conceptualised several decades
ago under different socio-political circumstances, the system now
seems archaic and outdated. For example, due to the prevailing defini-
tions, it still predominantly focuses on capturing return migration in-
stead of the immigration of foreigners to Poland.2
This problem is further exacerbated by the legal regulation of immi-
gration in Poland. Some foreigners are not recorded as immigrants in
the official Polish statistics, as the Central Statistical Office (CSO) cate-
gorises as immigrants only those who hold a so-called settlement permit.
According to the enacted regulations (Act on Aliens of 2003), settle-
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ment permits are granted to those foreign citizens who have lived in
Poland for at least three years on the basis of a residence permit, for at
least five years as refugees or who hold an appropriate visa. Moreover,
the applicants must demonstrate the ‘existence of durable family bonds
or economic ties with the Republic of Poland’ and supply proof of ‘ac-
commodation and economic means’ (in other words, they must prove
that they have a regular income and secured lodging).3 Rejected appli-
cants who remain in Poland are registered as ‘temporary immigrants
from abroad staying for a period of more than two months’, even if
their actual stay lasts for years.4
Notwithstanding these problems, there are several sources of accu-
rate data on foreigners coming to and residing in Poland. The Office
for Repatriation and Aliens (Urząd ds. Repatriacji i Cudzoziemców,
URiC) provides registers of the so-called fixed-term and permanent set-
tlement permits. The Central Statistical Office supplies the best avail-
able information on temporary migrants and the migrant stock based
on the census, while the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy produces
statistics based on the numbers of work permits issued (we will further
elaborate on these issues in the next section of this chapter).
Of course, statistics are also affected by changes in the legal regula-
tions that apply to foreigners, including the harmonisation of these
regulations with EU legislation. As a side-effect of these changes, some
migration-related data are not comparable across time. In particular,
sudden drops or increases in the figures might exclusively be due to
changes in definitions. This holds true for the number of work permits
issued to EU citizens, a number which dropped after Poland’s acces-
sion to the EU in 2004.
Finally, an adequate interpretation of the official statistics requires
historical background knowledge on border changes and ethnic move-
ments in the twentieth century. Such information is crucial for a prop-
er understanding of the data on the Polish population broken down by
citizenship and by country of birth, as well as of statistics on the stocks
of foreigners in some regions. For example, persons with dual Polish-
German citizenship happen to be registered as foreigners in the Opols-
kie voivodship. On the basis of empirical data, we will discuss some of
these problems in more detail in the following section.
8.3 Migration artefact: What do the Polish data reveal?
8.3.1 General remarks
Problems with quality, completeness and comparability of international
migration data can have various causes, including different definitions
used in particular countries, as well as incomplete reporting, especially
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of emigration, for legal, technical, organisational or other reasons (Bils-
borrow et al. 1997). These problems are still very serious in a majority
of the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, de-
spite the visible efforts of the national statistical institutes to improve
the quality of the data (Eurostat 1997; Nowok 2005). Poland is by no
means an exception to this rule.
The United Nations recommendations propose the definition of a
long-term migrant as ‘a person who moves to a country other than that
of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months),
so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new
country of usual residence’ (United Nations 1998: 18). Consistently,
the UN definition of the ‘resident population’ includes all those who
have actually resided in the respective country for a period of at least
twelve months. However, in official Polish statistics the respective defi-
nitions are based on the concept of ‘permanent residence’ instead of
‘usual residence’ (see Section 8.3.2).
There are typically two major types of bias related to the registration
of regular migration. The first concerns the underreporting of migra-
tory events, especially of out-migration, given the definitions and regula-
tions in use in a particular country. In practice, this type of bias can be
corrected after a population census, by means of the retrospective ad-
justment of data on population stocks and flows. This is usually done
by the national statistical institutes, i.e. in Poland by the Central Statis-
tical Office. The Polish data on stocks are systematically corrected ex-
post on the basis of census results, but the past net migration figures
are not. Instead, a separate category for the statistical adjustment of
this error can be created in the population balance equation, in order
to account for the census-based corrections.5
However, even if the registration were complete, the resulting data
would still be biased due to differences between the definitions used in
a given country and those recommended by the United Nations
(1998). The size of this difference can be estimated on the basis of aux-
iliary data, such as surveys complementing the population census. In
practice, this kind of additional information is usually only available
for population stocks.
8.3.2 Migration flows
The official data of the Central Statistical Office on international migra-
tion flows include only those migrants who enter or leave Poland per-
manently. In practice, this means that only those who declare that they
intend to come or go for good are counted as international migrants.
Hence, the Polish statistics do not define migrants based on their
length of stay, which automatically implies that they do not adhere to
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the one-year threshold used in the 1998 United Nations recommenda-
tions. In fact, no data on flows that use a specified time criterion are
systematically collected in Poland (Nowok & Kupiszewska 2005: 17).
Such information is available only periodically, from surveys and, more
recently, from population censuses. The official information on migra-
tion flows is collected via statistical forms which have to be filled in
upon (de-)registration of residence at the municipal office. Data from
the computerised central population register (PESEL) are not used for
statistics on population movements (Nowok & Kupiszewska 2005: 7).
Therefore, to avoid confusion, we only use the terms ‘register’, ‘regis-
tration’, etc., to refer to the municipal population registers gathering
data through statistical forms – and not to the PESEL database.
Apart from data on permanent migration, there is also some infor-
mation available on ‘temporary migrants’, i.e. people changing resi-
dence for more than two months. The differentiation between perma-
nent and temporary migration in Poland is a legacy of the communist
system of population registration. Despite the fact that temporary resi-
dence may last for many years, its changes are not reflected in the offi-
cial migration statistics (Nowok & Kupiszewska 2005: 19). A detailed
description of the migration data collection process in Poland can be
found in the Polish country report for the project ‘THESIM – Towards
Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration’ (Kupis-
zewska, Nowok & Kupiszewski 2006).
The Polish ‘permanent residence’ concept is one of the narrowest
possible definitions used in the measurement of international migra-
tion. On the other end of the scale, there are countries such as Ger-
many, one of the most important migration countries in Europe, where
foreigners have to register with the local authorities and are conse-
quently recorded as migrants within one week.6 In the case of migra-
tion between Germany and Poland, one of the major directions of po-
pulation flows in Europe in the 1990s, this results in serious discre-
pancies between the data reported by these countries, which in both
cases contain a certain amount of ‘demographic fiction’ (Kędelski
1990).
With respect to deficient reporting, it has to be noted that the regis-
tration of migrants is usually (but not always) more complete in the re-
ceiving countries than in the sending countries. Migrants have more
incentives to register at their destinations than to deregister in their
countries of origin (Kupiszewski 2002: 106). A useful tool for analys-
ing the discrepancies between these data sources is a double-entry ma-
trix of migration that juxtaposes the data of sending and receiving
countries (cf. Poulain 1999; Kupiszewska & Nowok 2005). Tables 8.1
and 8.2 show the respective double-entry vectors for emigration from
and immigration to Poland in 2002. The tables include data on eigh-
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teen major countries of destination and origin, respectively sorted by
their importance for migration exchange with Poland according to the
official Polish statistics. It is worth noting that the Polish data on mi-
gration only include information on the migrants’ countries of origin
and destination. The National Statistical Institute does not publish data
broken down by citizenship (Nowok 2005).
Based on the observation that migrants are more likely to register at
their destination than to deregister at origin, Table 8.1 provides a rough
estimate of the overall number of people who left Poland in 2002. This
estimate includes only those fourteen countries for which both types of
data are available; in other words, it excludes France, the UK, Australia
and Greece. There are two reasons for including the German data in
the analysis despite the clear conflict of definitions. Firstly, Germany
was a key migration partner country of Poland at the turn of the
twenty-first century. Secondly, despite the differences in definitions,
the discrepancy between the Polish and German statistics with respect
to reporting migration from Poland to Germany is very similar to dis-
crepancies observed for the other countries.
Even working under very rough assumptions, a simple statistical
analysis shows that the eighteen most significant receiving countries
registered about 141,900 emigrants from Poland in 2002, with the 95
Table 8.1 Data on emigration from Poland by main countries of destination, 2002
Sending country data Receiving country data S/R ratio Source of
Poland: CSO (1) Respective NSIs (2) (1)/(2) in % data for (2)
1. Germany 17,806 100,968 17.6 Eurostat: NC
2. US 2,676 13,304 20.1 NSI website
3. Canada 1,016 1,076 94.4 NSI website
4. Austria 525 2,514 20.9 NSI website
5. France 339 NA NA -
6. Italy 302 3,384 8.9 CoE (2004)
7. The Netherlands 290 2,275 12.7 CoE (2004)
8. UK 254 NA NA -
9. Australia 187 NA NA -
10. Sweden 174 1,186 14.7 Eurostat: NC
11. Spain 166 3,869 4.3 Eurostat: NC
12. Belgium 119 2,427 4.9 NSI website*
13. Denmark 95 962 9.9 Eurostat: NC
14. Switzerland 88 700 12.6 Eurostat: NC*
15. Greece 75 NA NA -
16. Norway 47 702 6.7 Eurostat: NC
17. Czech Republic 38 1,679 2.3 Eurostat: NC
18. Luxembourg 23 97 23.7 Eurostat: NC*
Total 24,532 141,900 17.3 -
Notes: S/R ratio refers to the number of emigrants registered in Poland as leaving for a spe-
cific destination divided by the number of immigrants from Poland recorded in the statis-
tics of that destination country (terminology after Kupiszewska & Nowok 2005: 5); CoE =
Council of Europe; NA = not available; NC = NewCronos; NSI = National Statistical Insti-
tute; * = flows of Polish citizens.
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per cent credible interval ranging from 140,300 to 143,600. Hence, it
can be concluded that the registration systems of the destination coun-
tries recorded on average almost six times more immigrants from Po-
land than the Polish statistics.
Such an estimation is not possible for immigration to Poland, as we
cannot safely assume that the Polish data cover more immigrants than
the statistics of the sending countries, given the permanent residence
concept in use in Poland. In fact, the Polish statistics usually capture
fewer immigrants than the data of the respective source countries. This
holds true for migration not only from Germany, in the case of which
the Polish statistics captured barely 3 per cent of the total number of
emigrants registered in Germany, but also from other countries of
Western and Central Europe (Table 8.2). The only exceptions are the
non-EU post-Soviet countries. The Polish statistics record more immi-
grants from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine than are re-
gistered as emigrants leaving for Poland in these countries.
Nevertheless, it seems that in most cases, apart from population
flows to and from Germany, underreporting of emigration is a much
more serious problem for Polish statistics than underestimated immi-
Table 8.2 Data on immigration to Poland by main countries of origin, 2002
Receiving country data Sending country data R/S ratio Source of
Poland: CSO (1) Respective NSIs (2) (1)/(2) in % data for (2)
1. Germany 2,335 78,739 3.0 Eurostat: NC
2. Ukraine 350 137 255.5 CoE (2004)
3. Italy 251 459 54.7 NSI website
4. France 247 NA NA -
5. Canada 230 NA NA -
6. Kazakhstan 221 NA NA -
7. UK 208 NA NA -
8. Austria 156 1,538 10.1 NSI website
9. Belarus 130 81 160.5 CoE (2004)
10. Russian
Federation
86 80 107.5 CoE (2004)
11. The Netherlands 83 492 16.9 Eurostat: NC
12. Sweden 70 190 36.8 Eurostat: NC
13. Spain 63 99 63.6 NSI website
14. Belgium 61 411 14.8 NSI website*
15. Greece 60 NA NA -
16. Armenia 50 NA NA -
17. Switzerland 41 277 14.8 Eurostat: NC*
18. Lithuania 40 89 44.9 CoE (2004)
Total 6,587 NA NA -
R/S ratio = the number of immigrants from a specific country of origin registered in Poland
divided by the number of emigrants leaving for Poland recorded in the statistics of the
respective sending country (terminology after Kupiszewska & Nowok 2005: 5), CoE =
Council of Europe; NA = not available; NC = NewCronos; NSI = National Statistical
Institute; * = flows of Polish citizens
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gration. This has a direct impact on net migration figures and thus
also on population estimates made in the periods between the cen-
suses. Both of these usually underestimate population loss due to mi-
gration, which also means that all relative figures based on these num-
bers are incorrect. These problems concern not only demographic
rates, as shown in Sakson (2002), but also key economic measures per
capita, such as the GDP and so on.
Sakson (2002) made an attempt to assess the size of migration un-
derreporting in Poland in the 1980s, i.e. under the communist regime.
Her estimate departed from the official population of Poland as
counted in the 1988 Census, which totalled 37,878,600 people. This
number was already corrected by the CSO, which means that it ex-
cludes about 50,000 permanent emigrants who had left Poland with-
out deregistering since the previous census carried out in 1981. How-
ever, this statistical adjustment was most certainly seriously underesti-
mated, mainly for political reasons, since emigration was officially
restricted under the communist regime (Okólski 1994; Sakson 2002:
53-54). On the basis of computerised registration of border crossings,
previously not used in population statistics, Sakson (2002) estimated
that 590,700 ‘invisible’ emigrants (1.6 per cent of the census popula-
tion) had moved abroad illegally for at least one year between 1981 and
1989.7 The region with the highest share of ‘invisible’ emigrants in the
1988 Census population was the former Opolskie voivodship (5.3 per
cent, corresponding to 53,900 people).
A similar analysis can also be performed for the period between 6
December 1988 and 21 May 2002, i.e. between the dates of the two
most recent population censuses. A first way of correcting the results
of the 2002 Census is to compare the register-based and the census-
based estimates of the permanent population of Poland on 1 January
2002. This comparison shows that 390,300 people emigrated between
1989 and 2002 ‘without saying good-bye to the population register’.8
In Table 8.3, we distributed this difference of –390,300 people over
the years 1988 to 2002 proportionally to the size of net migration from
Poland registered in Germany. No correction has been made for 1993,
as the responsible German authority adjusted the Polish migrant stock
by -23,000 persons for that year. In Table 8.3, the latter adjustment
was distributed equally over the period 1988-1992. Figure 8.1 illus-
trates the difference between the official and the corrected population
and net migration numbers as recalculated in Table 8.3. That the offi-
cial and corrected numbers are the same for 2002 is due to the fact
that these figures were already adjusted by the CSO.
The simple analysis presented suggests that the difference between
registered and corrected net migration (and thus also population size)
was most pronounced in the transition period between 1989 and
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1990. According to this simplistic correction, the more realistic net mi-
gration rate in 1989 reached about -5.6 per 1,000 inhabitants of Po-
land, instead of the officially reported -0.7 per 1,000.
8.3.3 Population stocks
As has been shown, data on population flows can be corrected on the
basis of the census. However, the Polish data on population stocks con-
front us with a second problem that results from non-compliance with
the UN definitions of long-term migrants and thus of usual residents.
Table 8.3 Official and corrected net migration and population in Poland, 1988-2002
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net migrationa
Official –96.6 –27.6 –12.6 –14.2 –10.0 –14.1 –19.0 –18.2 –12.8 –11.8 –13.3 –14.0 –19.7 –16.7 –17.9
Corrected –105.2 –210.4 –93.0 –28.0 –26.2 –14.1* –29.7 –31.8 –20.2 –15.7 –20.1 –26.4 –33.3 –31.4 –23.1
Populationb
Official 37.8 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.4 38.5 38.5 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.7 38.7 38.6 38.6 38.2
Corrected 37.8 37.9 37.9 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.2 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.2 38.2
Net migration ratec
Official –2.6 –0.7 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 –0.5
Corrected –2.8 –5.6 –2.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.4* –0.8 –0.8 –0.5 –0.4 –0.5 –0.7 –0.9 –0.8 –0.6
a thousand persons; b mid-year, million persons; c per 1,000 mid-year population;
* not corrected (no 1993 German data)
Sources: Eurostat – NewCronos; Council of Europe 2004: Table 8 for Poland; CSO; authors’
calculations
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The extent of this problem can again be assessed on the basis of the
2002 Census. In 2002, the CSO for the first time decided to count not
only the permanent population, as required by law, but also the usual
resident population, as recommended by the UN in 1998. For this pur-
pose, the CSO used the following definitions (CSO 2003a: 15-16;
authors’ translation):
‘Permanent population (permanent residents): The category includes
permanent residents (usually persons registered for permanent resi-
dence), who:
– were present in the period of time when the census was carried
out;
– were absent during the census, irrespective of the place of stay and
the length of absence.’
‘Residents (resident population) – a new category of population – include:
– permanent residents, except for those who have left their place of
residence for at least twelve months, regardless of their place of stay
(in Poland or abroad);
– temporary residents from Poland or abroad (foreigners) who have
resided in their new place of residence for at least twelve months.’
According to the 2002 Census, Poland had a permanent population of
38,230,100 people, while the resident population lay at 37,620,100, i.e.
610,000 people less. Interestingly, this number has not risen very
much since the 1988 Census, when, according to Sakson (2002), it to-
talled 590,700 people. This may indicate that on balance the stocks of
non-deregistered Poles living abroad may to some extent still attest to
the legacy of the communist period, especially of the 1980s. Despite
the availability of this information, the CSO calculates the majority of
its statistics for permanent residents, overestimating the real popula-
tion size of Poland by more than 600,000 people. A territorial distri-
bution of the net emigration recorded in the 2002 Census is presented
in Figure 8.2.
The 2002 Census also contains information on 85,500 people, who
arrived or returned from abroad between 1989 and 2002. Out of these,
69,700 were Polish citizens and 15,800 were foreigners, stateless indi-
viduals or persons of unknown citizenship (CSO 2003b: 92). The mi-
gration survey, conducted at the same time as the census, yielded simi-
lar results. The survey found 83,100 immigrants, of whom 67,300
were return migrants, i.e. permanent residents who had left the coun-
try for a year or longer; a further 15,700 were newcomers, i.e. perma-
nent residents abroad, staying in Poland for over twelve months (CSO
2003b: 350). Clearly, these figures are strongly interrelated; immigrants
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with Polish citizenship are most likely return migrants, while foreign
citizens are typically newcomers.
All migration-related data published by the CSO (2003b) on the ba-
sis of the census are broken down into many categories: by sex, age,
voivodship, type of municipality (urban or rural), citizenship, country
of previous residence, country of current residence, year of arrival, year
of departure, reasons for migration, marital status, level of education,
occupation (for survey data), etc. Regrettably, despite the availability of
this fairly detailed census-based information, no efforts have as yet
been made to recalculate the official data on population flows and
stocks from the years preceding the census.
The above-described differences in definitions also impact on the
Polish data on population stocks broken down by citizenship and by
country of birth (Tables 8.4 and 8.5). On the one hand, the data pub-
lished by the CSO include only the permanent population. Hence, they
do not cover those foreigners who do not hold a permanent residence
permit but are de facto residents and should therefore be included in
the population stocks of Poland. On the other hand, 444,900 (91.6 per
cent) out of the 485,600 foreign citizens in Poland have both a foreign,
Figure 8.2 Net long-term emigration (for twelve months or more) from Poland as
reported in the 2002 Census
Sources: CSO 2003b: Tables 14 and 38; authors’ calculations
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most frequently German, and Polish citizenship and, in most cases,
are not immigrants.
The country of birth does also not yield any information on the
number of immigrants residing in Poland, as it refers to present rather
than to historical borders (CSO 2003b: 29). This means that a large
majority of the foreign-born population in Poland are Poles born before
or during the Second World War in the then Polish territories that are
now part of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.
8.3.4 Residence permits, asylum, naturalisations and illegal migration
As explained in Section 8.2.3, the migration statistics published by the
CSO only include those foreigners who have been granted a settlement
Table 8.4 Permanent population in Poland by citizenship and country of birth,
2002
Citizenship Number In % Country of birth Number In %
Total 38,230,080 100.0 Total 38,230,080 100.0
Only Polish 37,084,821 97.0 Poland 36,871,281 96.4
Foreign (incl. dual) 485,591 1.3 Abroad 775,282 2.0
By number of citizenships: Of which:
Dual Polish/foreign 444,930 1.2 Ukraine 309,131 0.8
Only foreign/stateless 40,661 0.1 Belarus 104,463 0.3
By citizenship: Germany 101,633 0.3
German (incl. dual) 287,510 0.8 Lithuania 79,769 0.2
Of which: Russia 54,226 0.1
Polish and German 279,639 0.7 France 34,634 0.1
Only German 7,871 <0.1 US 9,004 <0.1
US (incl. dual) 31,391 0.1 Czech Republic 6,200 <0.1
Canadian (incl. dual) 14,756 <0.1 Austria 4,312 <0.1
French (incl. dual) 8,070 <0.1 Italy 4,292 <0.1
Ukrainian (incl. dual) 6,361 <0.1 Unknown country 18,390 <0.1
Unknown 659,668 1.7 Unknown 583,517 1.5
Source: CSO 2003a: Tables 26 & 30
Table 8.5 Permanent population in Poland by citizenship and country of birth,
2002
Country of Birth Citizenship
Polish (incl. dual) Foreign (incl. stateless) Unknown Total
Poland 36,765,038 10,135 96,108 36,871,281
Abroad 741,880 29,748 3,654 775,282
Unknown 22,833 778 559,906 583,517
Total 37,529,751 40,661 659,668 38,230,080
Source: CSO 2003a: Table 32
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permit and are therefore registered as permanent residents in their
municipality. The only data that supply information on the actual num-
ber of regular foreign newcomers and residents are permits data gath-
ered by the Office for Repatriations and Aliens. Table 8.6 shows the
number of permits issued, broken down into main categories, and the
number of asylum applications lodged between 1995 and 2004.
Any interpretation of the figures presented in Table 8.6 should take
into account the following background information. While temporary
residence permits have to be renewed annually, which implies that the
numbers reflect the stock of temporary residents commencing or
prolonging their residence in Poland in a given year, settlement per-
mits are only issued once, thus relating to flows of migrants. Upon
being granted the settlement permit, the foreigner ‘vanishes’ from the
statistics unless he or she registers in a municipality. Though the stock
of newly admitted regular migrants is known from the registers of






















1995 5,202 11,363 3,067 - - 843
1996 5,313 13,668 2,841 - - 3,211
1997 5,443 17,498 3,973 - - 3,531
1998 5,541 20,759 1,657 4,893 - 3,423
1999 6,025 20,618 551 16,810 - 3,061
2000 6,563 19,662 857 15,037 - 4,662
2001 7,380 19,793 690 20,787 - 4,529
2002 7,608 24,643 607 29,636 - 5,170
2003 8,106 19,831 1,735 28,579 72 6,909
2004 8,829 13,179 4,366 25,427 1,097 8,079
Of the 2004 figures, the most significant countries of citizenship:
Ukraine 1,965 2,743 1,658 8,520 36 72
Belarus 1,211 1,025 389 2,008 18 52
Vietnam 196 1,063 368 1,875 62 16
Armenia 60 268 235 1,793 45 18
Russia 388 584 446 1,605 761 7,183
India 156 430 40 641 7 151
US 623 527 61 898 - -
Germany 254 982 63 (1,419)* 409 (303)* - -
France 53 658 25 (999)* 330 (156)* - -
UK 36 319 16 (601)* 212 (135)* - -
* The figures in brackets are the numbers of residence permits issued to EU citizens and
their families in 2004.
Sources: CSO 2004, 2005; Office for Repatriation and Aliens
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temporary residence permits, the stock of settled foreigners is un-
known, and can be estimated only on the basis of the population
census.
The data on work permits, issued originally by the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Policy, can be problematic due to differences in length
of the permits issued. While some of them are valid for two years,
others expire after two months. It is unclear whether these discrepan-
cies are taken into account in the data. The data on students, provided
by the Ministry of National Education, reflect stocks as of 30 Septem-
ber of a particular year and are thus incomparable with other sources,
which reflect either the mid-year or end-year population.
The data on work and temporary residence permits provided by the
Office for Repatriation and Aliens seem to imply that the number of
immigrants from the EU steadily declined in the period under discus-
sion. However, the opposite is true. EU citizens prolonging their stay
in Poland acquired different permits reported in separate statistics
(numbers in brackets in Table 8.6). As a consequence, they ‘disap-
peared’ from the joint statistics of the Office for Repatriation and
Aliens. This is an example of how the adjustments of the legislation to
EU regulations led to structural breaks in the series of international
migration data.
The official figures on naturalisation are also not comparable over
time, albeit for a different reason. While the figures for the years 1992
to 2001 only cover acquisitions of nationality by conferment, the num-
bers for 2002 to 2004 additionally include acquisitions of nationality
through acknowledgment and marriage procedures.9 This explains
why the number of naturalisations increases markedly in 2002 (see
Table 8.7). Moreover, many so-called acquisitions of nationality, espe-
cially by Israelis or Germans, are actually restorations of the Polish citi-
zenship to those who were illegally deprived of their citizenship by the
communist authorities, as well as to their descendants.10
An overview of Polish data sources on illegal migration is provided
in the ICMPD yearbook, which also supplies selected statistics for
2003 and 2004 (Futo & Jandl 2005). The majority of numbers origi-
nate from the database of the Border Guard of the Republic of Poland,
including migration-related border apprehensions (5,800 cases in
Table 8.7 Total number of Polish citizenship acquisitions, 1992-2004
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Acquisitions 1,522 834 751 1,036 679 555 871 1,000 975 766 1,186 1,634 1,937
1991-2001: acquisitions of Polish citizenship in the conferment procedure
2002-2004: acquisitions of Polish citizenship in the conferment, acknowledgement and mar-
riage procedures
Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens (after Kępińska 2005: Tables 35 and 36)
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2004), persons rejected at the borders (66,000 in 2004) and deporta-
tions (6,200 cases in 2004) (Futo & Jandl 2005: 163-166). Some infor-
mation on illegal migration can also be drawn from the statistics on
border crossings that recorded 98.3 million entries and 97.7 million ex-
its in 2004. The difference, a net total of 600,000 cases, is most likely
due to a combination of many factors, including under-recording of
outflows at the frontiers, regular long-term immigration and, last but
not least, people who entered Poland legally and overstayed their visa.
Though interesting in themselves, the above data sources do not
supply any information on either the volume of illegal population flows
from and to Poland or the stocks of irregular immigrants residing in
the country at a given time. In fact, figures for irregular migration
flows and stocks are scarce and usually based on expert judgement
rather than on statistical information. For example, Iglicka (2003) esti-
mated that a maximum of half a million irregular migrants (most of
them unregistered seasonal workers or petty traders) repeatedly en-
tered Poland each year in the late 1990s. About 100,000 of these were
from the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Iglicka’s estimate shows that the cases known to the Polish authori-
ties, i.e. the persons apprehended or deported, only represent a small
fraction of all irregular migrants in Poland. However, this problem is not
specific to Poland. All European countries have difficulties in recording
irregular migration due to the very nature of this phenomenon.
8.3.5 Origins, gender and motives of migration
Despite their obvious shortcomings, the Polish official statistics are the
only source that can be used to describe recent tendencies and changes
in immigration patterns and thus to answer the question as to whether
Poland confirms the hypotheses of a feminisation and a growing diver-
sification of origins, as observed in recent studies on international mi-
gration. Table 8.8 shows selected data on registered immigration to
Poland in the years 1997 to 2004 by the main regions of origin. In ad-
dition, the Table includes information on the share of women in the
migrant population for the period 2002 to 2004.
The figures highlight a clear disproportion between the genders. The
majority of migrants from all continents, except for Europe, are men,
since men are usually the ‘pioneers’ of a migration chain. The only ex-
ception to this rule is the inflow from the adjacent former Soviet re-
publics, where the large share of women coming to Poland responds to
the increasing demand for female migrants in the domestic services
such as housekeeping, child-minding and elderly care.
The figures do not allow for the formulation of any clear statements
regarding a diversification of origins, mainly due to the shortcomings
210 JAKUB BIJAK AND IZABELA KORYŚ
described above. The numbers predominantly include return migrants
from Europe and the United States, repatriates and those who hold set-
tlement permits. In other words, the vast majority of actual newcomers
to Poland is not included in these figures, as immediately becomes ob-
vious when we compare these with Table 8.6.
As noted in the THESIM country report for Poland (Kupiszewska,
Nowok & Kupiszewski 2006: 580, 587), the Office for Repatriation and
Aliens (URiC) also gathers data on the reasons for migration (work, fa-
mily reunification, studying, participation in professional training pro-
grammes, etc.). Unfortunately, as the system can register several mo-
tives for a single person and does not distinguish between primary and
other reasons, the disaggregated data are not made available to the
public. For this reason it is not possible to determine on the basis of
the official statistics whether migration in Poland is becoming increas-
ingly selective.
8.4 Conclusions and recommendations
The official Polish data on international migration should be handled
very carefully. Any analysis of these data should take into account both
their evolution and their historical and social contexts. The system of
registering international population flows has not yet been adjusted to
the changing patterns of migration in Poland. It still predominantly
captures return migrants instead of the actual foreign newcomers to
Poland. At the same time, changes in the legal regulations, in particu-
lar the harmonisation with EU legislation, may render some migra-
tion-related figures incomparable across time.
Table 8.8 Inflow of immigrants to Poland by region of origin and by sex, 1997-2004
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Females as
% of the total
2002-2004
Total 8,426 8,916 7,525 7,331 6,625 6,587 7,048 9,495 47.5
Origin of immigrants, in %
Europe * 63 63 65 66 69 67 64 69 51.1
EU-24 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 47 44.0
EU-15 NA NA NA NA NA 54 50 45 45.2
Former USSR NA NA NA NA NA 14 16 24 62.0
Africa 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 32.8
America 20 20 25 22 20 21 23 19 46.0
Asia 12 14 6 9 7 8 10 9 41.6
Oceania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 45.7
* including Turkey and Cyprus; NA = not available
Sources: CSO, demography database, demographic yearbooks (various years)
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The information about population flows from and to Poland is
biased by under-registration and by the fact that the definitions in use
differ from the internationally accepted UN standards, as established
in 1998. The same applies to the population stocks that, despite the ad-
justment made after the 2002 Census, are still artificially inflated by
over 600,000 people who left Poland without having been deregis-
tered. There are some regions where underreporting of emigration is
particularly serious. This holds true for the Opolskie voivodship, for ex-
ample, where there is a high proportion of ethnic Germans, many of
whom hold dual Polish-German citizenship.
As a consequence of underrecorded emigration, the official popula-
tion of Poland is overestimated by 1.6 per cent, which in turn means
that relative demographic and economic measures, such as birth and
death rates and GDP per capita, are underestimated on average by the
same magnitude. As has been shown by Sakson (2002), estimation er-
rors of age- and region-specific rates can even exceed 20 per cent. In
the case of international migration rates, the underestimation of migra-
tion and the overestimation of the population lead to seriously under-
estimated relative indicators of population flows. Hence, the Polish mi-
gration statistics seem to construct a social and political reality that
does not properly reflect the facts.
In general, the international migration flows in Poland, as seen
through the official figures published by the Central Statistical Office,
are more a statistical artefact than reality. With respect to irregular mi-
gration, the available statistics cover only the cases that are known to
the authorities: apprehensions, deportations, refusals of entry, etc.
Clearly, this is just the tip of the iceberg. However, this problem is not
specific to Poland but is characteristic of all data related to irregular
phenomena, including migration.
On the whole, it seems to be of the utmost importance that the tools
used to measure migration flows in Poland are adapted to international
standards. A more accurate measurement of migration stocks and flows
would allow both for the correction of demographic and economic mea-
sures and the assessment of the socio-demographic consequences of
any migration policy. Hopefully, the rapidly increasing international
mobility of Polish citizens as well as the continuous inflow of foreign-
ers will lead to a substantial reform of the Polish system of collecting
international migration data.
212 JAKUB BIJAK AND IZABELA KORYŚ
Notes
1 This chapter partially draws on background information (Kupiszewska & Nowok
2005; Nowok & Kupiszewska 2005; Nowok 2005) gathered during the EU-funded
project THESIM – Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migra-
tion (Poulain, Perrin & Singleton 2006). The authors are obliged to Dorota Kupis-
zewska, Beata Nowok and Marek Kupiszewski from the Central European Forum for
Migration and Population Research, who were responsible for the Polish case study
in the THESIM project (Kupiszewska, Nowok & Kupiszewski 2006). In addition, Ja-
kub Bijak gratefully acknowledges the Annual Stipend for Young Scientists of the
Foundation for Polish Science (FNP), while Izabela Koryś remains greatly indebted
to the Foundation for Population, Migration and Enviroment (BMU-PME) in Zurich.
The material presented in this chapter reflects the state of affairs prior to the 2004
enlargement of the European Union. The hardly measurable emigration from Poland
following the EU accession only magnified the statistical inadequacies mentioned in
the study. However, the size of the problem – though definitely worth a separate in-
vestigation – will become fully apparent only after the next population census, sched-
uled for 2011.
2 The Central Statistical Office does not differentiate between native and foreign immi-
grants but focuses on the previous country of residence. Furthermore, while natives
can immediately register when they enter the country, foreigners have to comply with
several regulations before they are allowed to register, which in turn delays their
being recorded in the immigration statistics.
3 Art. 65 of the Act on Aliens of 13 June 2003 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland
No. 128, 2003, Item 1175).
4 According to the Office for Repatriation and Aliens, 80 per cent of the 3,589 applica-
tions for settlement filed in 2005 were accepted, while 457 applications were rejected
and 258 discontinued. Similar proportions can be observed for the previous years.
5 Cf. Council of Europe (2004: Table 8 for Poland). The adjustment can also be calcu-
lated directly on the basis of statistical or demographic yearbooks provided by the
CSO, by comparing the respective figures including the post-census corrections with
those excluding such adjustments.
6 The German Federal Registration Framework Act allows the federal states to exempt
foreigners from the obligation to register if their stay is only temporary (see Rühl in
this publication).
7 Sakson’s estimate conforms to the 1998 UN definition.
8 Sentence attributed to Harri Cruijsen, a Dutch demographer and expert in popula-
tion projections.
9 ‘Acknowledgement can be considered as an entitlement-based procedure of acquisi-
tion, [whereby] a stateless person or a person whose nationality is unknown can be
granted Polish nationality,’ while conferment is ‘the most discretionary procedure
[which] can be considered as a “fast track” for granting nationality’ (Kępińska 2005:
31). The latter can be used for sporting, artistic and scientific purposes or other
achievements.
10 Detailed comments on the data on permits, asylum and acquisitions and losses of ci-
tizenship can be found in the Polish country report for the THESIM project (Kupis-
zewska, Nowok & Kupiszewski 2006: 587-588). The SOPEMI report for Poland pro-
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Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu [People on the Swing.
Migration between the Peripheries of Poland and the West]. Warsaw: Scholar.
United Nations (1998), Recommendations on statistics of international migration. Revision 1.




Ancuţa Daniela Tompea and Sebastian Năstuţă
9.1 Introduction
Romania has predominantly been a country of emigration. The first
major wave of emigrants left the country at the turn of the twentieth
century. Between 1890 and 1924, about 170,000 Romanians left for
overseas destinations (predominantly for the United States, Canada
and Brazil), mainly for economic reasons. However, a large number of
these emigrants returned to Romania (Potot 2003: 89-90). Those who
left or were forced to leave the country in the course of the twentieth
century were largely members of three ethnic minorities, namely Ger-
mans, Jews and, to a lesser extent, Hungarians. Of these, only a small
proportion of the Jews immigrated specifically to Romania in order to
escape from pogroms in Russia in the late nineteenth century (Magocsi
1993: 107). The large majority of these three minority groups, who to-
gether accounted for 18 per cent of the total population in Romania in
the interwar period, ended up in this country when the borders were
revised during and after the First World War. In this period, Romania
(re-)acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania from Hungary, Bu-
kovina from Austria and South Dobruja from Bulgaria. While the eth-
nic Hungarians were mainly located in Transylvania, the ethnic Ger-
mans, as they came to be known after the First World War, descended
from several groups of immigrants who had settled in different parts
of these newly acquired Romanian territories between the twelfth and
the nineteenth century (for details, see Magocsi 1993: 104-107). Simi-
larly, the ethnic Jews were widely spread in Romania at the time, with
significant shares living in the traditional Romanian territory of Molda-
via and in Bessarabia, but also in Transylvania and in Bukovina. How-
ever, the large proportions of ethnic Jews in these two latter areas can
also be traced back to the fact that the 1920 Romanian census was the
first to register Jews as a separate nationality. Moreover, nationality was
not determined on the grounds of the language used on a daily basis
as in earlier Hungarian censuses, which for this reason registered
many Germans and Jews as Hungarians; rather, the respondents were
asked to indicate their nationality by birth. These changes in counting
led, on the one hand, to the intended increase in Romanians in the
contested area of Transylvania (Arel 2002: 102, 117; Illyés 1981: 20;
Kocsis 2007: 46). On the other hand, both the Jewish and German
minorities became much stronger.
Of the ethnic Jews and Germans, who, according to the censuses
conducted in 1920 and 1930, constituted about 4 per cent each of the
total Romanian population in the interwar period, almost none were
left in 2002, albeit for different reasons. Most of the Jews who were
not deported or killed due to Romania’s alliance with Germany left Ro-
mania immediately after the Second World War or, to be more precise,
after the foundation of Israel. A substantial share of the Germans, on
the other hand, were either relocated to newly acquired German terri-
tories when Romania became an ally of Germany, fled or were de-
ported after 1944 when Romania changed sides and joined the Allied
Forces (Turliuc 2003: 130; Magocsi 1993: 166-167).1 The exodus of both
groups continued in the communist period, although international mi-
gration was strictly controlled in Romania under the communist re-
gime. Those intending to leave, even if only for short periods of time,
had to apply for official permission. Yet, despite these strict controls,
the numbers of people who emigrated permanently were not insignifi-
cant. Of these, relatively high proportions were members of the three
largest ethnic minorities in Romania.2 This can largely be explained by
the fact that the emigration of ethnic Germans and Jews was respec-
tively supported by Germany and Israel. Both countries paid the Roma-
nian government lump sums for each individual who was allowed to
leave Romania for good.
Probably for this same reason, the Romanian emigration statistics
are surprisingly accurate for the communist period. Statistics on immi-
gration, by contrast, have only been available since 1991. However,
neither the official flow statistics nor the official stock statistics capture
international migration from and to contemporary Romania, mainly
due to the fact that migration patterns have changed massively since
the fall of the Iron Curtain. In particular, circular migration, especially
since the abolition of the Schengen visa requirement, as well as illegal
forms of migration, have become far more significant. At the same
time, immigration, particularly from Moldova, has continuously grown.
Nevertheless, up to 2006 the statistics on migration flows to and from
contemporary Romania published by the National Institute of Statistics
only captured those who settled permanently in Romania or abroad. Si-
milarly, the stocks of foreign citizens residing in the country were se-
verely underrecorded in the 2002 Census. While statistics from desti-
nation countries of Romanian outflows provide more information on
emigration from Romania, residence and work permit data give more
of an insight into immigration to Romania. Nevertheless, some of the
movements from and to this country remain statistically invisible, as
218 ANCUŢA DANIELA TOMPEA AND SEBASTIAN NĂSTUŢĂ
they are difficult to capture with the existing statistical instruments;
this is due to their frequently temporary and sometimes illegal nature
(Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 7-8).
9.2 Overview of the most important stock and flow data
sources
The authority responsible for the production of statistics on interna-
tional migration in Romania is the National Institute of Statistics (In-
stitutul National de Statistica, NIS). Their main data sources are:
– the census which covers the stock of the population and
– the population register.
However, as the following will show, these statistical reports only cover
a tiny fraction of the actual immigration to, and emigration from, Ro-
mania.
Additional data can be obtained from the Authority for Foreign Per-
sons, which holds a database on registered foreign citizens, the Minis-
try of Interior and Administration Reform, which publishes statistics
based on residence permit data, the General Inspectorate of the Border
Police, which holds data on the numbers of people not allowed to enter
or leave the country, and the National Office for Refugees, which gath-
ers data on the numbers of asylum claims filed in Romania. Since July
2006, all of these figures have to be reported directly to the NIS. It re-
mains to be seen whether this will improve the availability and the
quality of the data on international migration in Romania.
9.2.1 Census
The first Romanian census was held in 1859-1860, i.e. in the very year
of the union of the Romanian principalities. Consequently, counting
the inhabitants of the new-born nation seems to have been one of the
main political priorities at the time. Nine further censuses have fol-
lowed, with the last two carried out in 1992 and 2002. However, the
results of the two most recent censuses are not comparable, as they
use different definitions of population. In 2002, the population of Ro-
mania was determined according to the 2000 UNO EEC recommenda-
tions for Population and Housing that draw on the 1998 UN recom-
mendations for the definition of international migration. This had ma-
jor implications for who was counted and not counted as part of the
population in 2002 as opposed to 1992. While in 1992 Romanian citi-
zens with legal residence in Romania were counted towards the Roma-
nian population irrespective of whether they had lived abroad for years,
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the 2002 Census excluded those Romanian citizens who had left the
country for more than a year on the day of counting, even if they still
had legal residence in Romania.3 At the same time, the 2002 Census
for the first time counted foreign citizens and stateless persons who
had been living in Romania uninterruptedly for more than a year on
the day of the census, while the 1992 Census only included those for-
eign citizens who had established legal residence in Romania, i.e. who
had entered their Romanian address into their identification cards
(National Institute of Statistics 2005).
This conceptual change could have provided rich data on the foreign
population residing in Romania at the time since the census includes
questions on sex, age, marital status, place of residence, place of birth,
citizenship, ethnicity (based on the person’s declaration), religion, edu-
cation and occupation. However, as will be explained in detail below, it
seems that the foreign population was severely underrecorded in the
2002 Census.
9.2.2 Population register4
The data for the Romanian population register are held by the Evi-
dence of Population Department of the Ministry of the Interior and Ad-
ministrative Reform. Up to July 2006, the data were gathered by the
police, who reported every registered change of residence to the county
departments of the National Institute of Statistics. These, in turn,
transferred the data to their central department, which used these to
produce statistics on population flows and stocks.
The main shortcoming of the Romanian statistical registration un-
til 2005 was the lack of a centralised computer system. In 2005, the
personnel of the local department of the NIS in Iaşi still used paper
registrations. This changed massively in July 2006 when a centra-
lised computer system was introduced. All the information on for-
eigners can now be reported directly to the Central Office of NIS
through this system.
In principle, every movement of a person both within Romania and
across borders should be registered by the Evidence of Population Of-
fice. A person leaving his or her usual residence temporarily in order
to visit another country or to work there should inform the police of
this temporary change of address. However, as in many other coun-
tries, there are no incentives for deregistration, which implies that emi-
gration is usually underrecorded (see Section 9.3 for more informa-
tion). Legal temporary and permanent immigrants are registered by
the Border Police. Moreover, they should inform the local police of
their arrival and obtain the relevant permit. However, there are still no
internal guidelines for the registration of foreigners. The only existing
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guidelines for the registration of the population were published in
1993 and relate to births, deaths and marriages.
9.3 Statistics on emigration flows
Considering that emigration statistics are usually rather unreliable, the
statistics on emigration from Romania during the communist period
were surprisingly accurate. This becomes obvious if we look at one of
the major emigration flows during this period, the emigration of ethnic
Germans to Germany. A comparison of the numbers of ethnic Ger-
mans deregistered in Romania and of those registered as arriving from
Romania in Germany between 1975 and 1988 shows that the Roma-
nian emigration statistics covered more than 80 per cent of this emi-
grant group (see Table 9.1). As mentioned above, this was mainly due
to the strict controls on emigration in Romania. Moreover, since the
German government paid a lump sum for each German emigrant al-
lowed to leave, there clearly was an interest in correct emigration fig-
ures, at least for this particular group. These preconditions were no
longer valid after the fall of the regime. As a consequence, the reliabil-
ity of the Romanian emigration statistics deteriorated dramatically after
1988 (also see Table 9.2).
Table 9.1 Ethnic German emigrants registered in Romania and ethnic German










1975 4,292 5,077 84.5
1976 3,200 3,766 85.0
1977 9,809 10,989 89.3
1978 10,993 12,120 90.7
1979 8,617 9,663 89.2
1980 13,608 15,767 86.3
1981 9,948 12,031 82.7
1982 10,954 12,972 84.4
1983 13,441 15,501 86.7
1984 14,425 16,553 87.1
1985 12,809 14,924 85.8
1986 11,034 13,130 84.0
1987 11,369 13,994 81.2
1988 10,738 12,902 83.2
1989 14,598 23,387 62.4
1975-1989 159,835 192,776 82.9
Sources: National Institute of Statistics 2006; Federal Administration Office Germany 2006;
authors’ calculations
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Nevertheless, the statistics on the numbers of ethnic Germans leaving
the country after 1988 were still comparatively accurate. In the early
1990s, Germany also became a major destination country for other Ro-
manian citizens. Between 1990 and 1993, about 330,000 Romanian ci-
tizens registered in Germany (see Table 9.2). Although these figures
might include double counts, since the German flow statistics register
cases rather than persons, it is nevertheless not an exaggeration to state
that far fewer of the non-ethnic German Romanians deregistered upon
leaving Romania, most probably since they were not guaranteed resi-
dence, let alone citizenship, at their destination. In fact, the large ma-
jority of the entrants applied for asylum but were rejected.5 As a conse-
quence, large numbers of Romanians left Germany again, especially
between 1992 and 1994. While the migration balance was positive be-
tween 1990 and 1992 (1990: 61,203, 1991: 30,884 and 1992: 57,564),
it was negative for the three following years (1993: -20,549, 1994: -
13,538 and 1995: -744).6 Subsequently, both immigration and emigra-
tion of Romanian citizens to and from Germany remained stable (be-
tween 14,000 and 24,000 immigrants and 13,000 to 20,000 emi-
Table 9.2 Emigration to Germany registered in Romania and immigration from























1990 66,121 60,072 6,049 111,150 78,068 189,218 54.0 7.7 34.9
1991 20,001 15,567 4,434 32,178 61,670 93,848 48.4 7.2 21.3
1992 13,813 8,852 4,961 16,146 110,096 126,242 54.8 4.5 10.9
1993 6,874 5,945 929 5,811 81,760 87,571 102.3 1.1 7.8
1994 6,880 4,065 2,815 6,615 31,449 38,064 61.5 9.0 18.1
1995 9,010 2,906 6,104 6,519 24,845 31,364 44.6 24.6 28.7
1996 6,467 2,315 4,152 4,284 16,986 21,270 54.0 24.4 30.4
1997 5,807 1,273 4,534 1,777 14,144 15,921 71.6 32.1 36.5
1998 3,899 775 3,124 1,005 16,987 17,992 77.1 18.4 21.7
1999 2,370 390 1,980 855 18,814 19,669 45.6 10.5 12.0
2000 2,216 374 1,842 547 24,202 24,749 68.4 7.6 9.0
2001 854 143 711 380 20,142 20,522 37.6 3.5 4.2
2002 1,305 67 1,238 256 23,953 24,209 26.2 5.2 5.4
2003 1,938 20 1,918 137 23,780 23,917 14.6 8.1 8.1
2004 2,707 36 2,671 76 23,545 23,621 47.4 11.3 11.5
Total 150,262 102,800 47,462 187,736 570,441 758,177 54.8 8.3 19.8
* Ethnic German immigrants are usually counted as Germans in German inflow statistics,
so the figures for incoming Romanians should, generally speaking, not include ethnic
Germans.
Sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics 2006; German Federal Administration
Office 2006 (ethnic German immigrants); German Federal Statistical Office (Romanian
nationals); authors’ calculations
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grants per year, yielding a migration balance of about 300 to 7,500).
These figures confirm that migration from Romania to Germany be-
came a circular movement originating mostly from Southern Transyl-
vania, Banat and Western Oltenia (Sandu 2005: 558, 562). However,
circular migration movements were also observed for ethnic Germans
who interspersed periods of work in Germany with periods of living
back in Romania. Moreover, many ethnic Germans came back as inves-
tors or representatives of German companies; permanent relocation to
Romania with the family is the exception (Michalon 2004).
That temporary emigration from Romania has become more signifi-
cant was also confirmed in the 2002 Census. If we go by the figures
only, the population of Romania decreased by more than 1 million peo-
ple between 1992 and 2002 (from 22,810,035 to 21,680,974). Only
330,000 of this population loss can be explained by natural decrease. If
we add the recorded inflows of about 70,000, the population loss due
to emigration was at least 900,000 or 4.2 per cent of the 2002 popula-
tion (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 8). However, since the 1992 Census
counted all registered Romanian residents irrespective of whether they
were present on the day of the census, we do not know how many of
the 900,000 actually left the country between 1992 and 2002. What
we do know is that about 310,000 people officially left the country be-
tween 1992 and 2001. Another 360,000 were registered as having left
the country temporarily (i.e. for more than six months) on the day of
the census (Sandu, Radu, Constantinescu & Ciobanu 2004: 1). This
leaves us with 230,000 people not accounted for in these statistical
sources.
Other important countries of destination for temporary migration
from Romania are Italy and, particularly, Spain. As Table 9.3 shows, the
Romanian data only capture a fracture of actual emigration to Italy be-
tween 1995 and 2003. However, Spain is even more striking a case in
point since this country does not feature among the ten most important
emigration countries despite the fact that, according to Eurostat figures,
more than 370,000 Romanian citizens were registered as having entered
Spain between 1992 and 2005. More than 90 per cent of these arrived
after 2002 when Romanians no longer required a visa for entering the
Schengen area for a period of no more than 90 days. In 2005, Spain re-
corded about 190,000 legal Romanian residents (Viruela Martı́nez
2006) and Italy 249,000. Altogether, about 500,000 Romanians were
legally resident in Southern Europe in 2005 (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 9).
Two other important countries of destination for migration from Ro-
mania are Hungary and former Yugoslavia. However, as Sandu (2005:
560) points out, the flows to these countries are even more difficult to
measure since they include trips for work or trade as well as commut-
ing or small traffic.
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Of course, none of these figures cover those Romanians who enter
these countries of destination illegally or, more importantly since
2002, those who enter as tourists and work illegally. Viruela Martı́nez
(2006) shows that between 2002 and 2004 only about 27 per cent of
the Romanians residing in the country (317,366 on 1 January 2004 ac-
cording to the National Statistical Institute in Spain) held a residence
permit (about 83,000 on 31 December 2003 according to the Spanish
Ministry of Labour). However, this percentage probably changed mas-
sively in 2005 when the number of residence permits held by Roma-
nians more than doubled due to a legalisation process. Although there
are no comparable figures for other Schengen countries, we may as-
sume that working tourists also entered these countries. The Roma-
nian border police registered an increase of border crossings by 1.4 mil-
lion between 2002 and 2004. Over the same period the number of exit
refusals increased by 1.3 million to 1.7 million in 2004. Yet, despite
these increased state controls, there were complaints from Schengen
and EU states about the high number of Romanians overstaying their
tourist visa (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 10).
All of the above proves that temporary and circular migration have
surged while permanent emigration, especially to Hungary and Ger-
many, has become far less significant in recent years. Almost 100,000
people left Romania permanently in 1990. This figure was already
halved in 1991 with 45,000 people leaving the country for good. Since
then the number of permanent emigrants has fallen almost continu-
ously with minor increases in the mid-1990s. Only the numbers of
those leaving for Canada, the US and Italy have remained relatively
stable after 1995, albeit on a very low level of about 1,000 to 3,000 for
each of these destinations per year (see Table 9.4). Nevertheless, this is
the only kind of emigration registered in official Romanian statistics.
Table 9.3 Emigrants leaving for Italy registered in Romania and immigration of




citizens registered in Italy
% covered
in Romania
1995 2,195 2,321 94.6
1996 1,640 6,701 24.5
1998 1,877 6,818 27.5
1999 1,415 10,651 13.3
2000 2,142 19,332 11.1
2002 1,317 17,541 7.5
2003 1,993 74,463 2.7
Total 12,579 137,827 9.1
Note: Eurostat does not have figures for Italy before 1995; the figures for 1997 and 2001
are missing in the database.
Sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics 2006; Eurostat; authors’ calculations
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9.4 Immigration
The National Institute for Statistics did not publish any data on immi-
gration to Romania before 1991. The 1992 Census recorded about
3,000 foreign citizens permanently residing in the country (as ex-
plained in Section 9.2.1, the 1992 Census only counted permanent re-
sidents). If we go by figures alone, the number of foreigners increased
9.4 fold between the 1992 Census and the 2002 Census, which re-
corded 27,910 foreign citizens, with 12.8 per cent of these originating
from the Republic of Moldova, 8.5 from Italy, 8.4 from Turkey, 7.0
from China, 6.3 from Germany and 6.0 from Greece (Constantin, Va-
sile, Preda & Nicolescu 2004: 63). However, as explained above, the
2002 Census was based on a different concept of population. This in-
cluded foreign citizens and stateless persons who had been living in
Romania uninterruptedly for more than a year on the day of the cen-
sus. Hence, the numbers also increased due to this change in measure-
ment. At the same time, the census most probably vastly underre-
corded the foreign citizens residing in the country. This becomes im-
mediately obvious if we compare the census data with permit data and
the numbers of foreigners registered by the Authority for Foreign Per-
sons. About 68,000 foreigners held either a permanent (1,400) or a
temporary (66,500) permit in Romania in 2002 (OECD 2005). In the
same year, 70,857 foreigners (17,336 of whom were EU citizens) were
registered by the Authority for Foreign Persons (Baldwin-Edwards
2007: 26).
Table 9.4 Permanent emigration from Romania by country of destination, 1990-2005
Total Austria Canada France Israel Italy Germany US Hungary Others
1990 96,929 3,459 1,894 1,626 1,227 1,130 66,121 4,924 10,635 3,730
1991 44,160 4,630 1,661 1,512 519 1,396 20,001 5,770 4,427 3,208
1992 31,152 3,282 1,591 1,235 463 528 13,813 2,100 4,726 2,288
1993 18,446 1,296 1,926 937 324 645 6,874 1,245 3,674 1,010
1994 17,146 1,256 1,523 787 417 1,580 6,880 1,078 1,779 1,363
1995 25,675 2,276 2,286 1,438 316 2,195 9,010 2,292 2,509 2,504
1996 21,526 915 2,123 2,181 418 1,640 6,467 3,181 1,485 2,367
1997 19,945 1,551 2,331 1,143 554 1,706 5,807 2,861 1,244 1,841
1998 17,536 941 1,945 846 563 1,877 3,899 2,868 1,306 2,640
1999 12,594 468 1,626 696 326 1,415 2,370 2,386 774 2,097
2000 14,753 270 2,518 809 433 2,142 2,216 2,723 881 2,200
2001 9,921 167 2,483 463 279 1,486 854 1,876 680 1,398
2002 8,154 293 1,437 233 106 1,317 1,305 1,356 903 1,044
2003 10,673 338 1,444 338 164 1,993 1,938 2,012 984 1,315
2004 13,982 491 1,445 436 85 2,603 2,707 2,049 1,553 1,470
2005 10,938 421 1,220 343 64 2,731 2,196 1,679 1,013 1,050
Total 373,530 22,054 29,453 15,023 6,258 26,384 152,458 40,400 38,573 31,525
In % 100 6.2 8.1 4.2 1.8 6.0 42.9 1.3 10.7 8.7
Source: National Institute for Statistics 2006; authors’ calculations
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However, the number of those holding temporary residence permits
has considerably decreased since that date, while the number of those
holding permanent residence permits has been increasing steadily, al-
beit not to such an extent that this could explain the decrease in tem-
porary permits (see Table 9.5).7 53,606 foreign citizens held either a
temporary or a permanent residence permit in 2006. 21.3 per cent of
these originated from Moldova, 11.8 per cent from Turkey, 9.3 per cent
from China and 6.7 per cent from Italy. However, while the first three
groups had increased since 2005, the number of Italians holding per-
mits had decreased by 11 per cent. 20,4 per cent of the temporary resi-
dents are students, with the large majority of these coming from Mol-
dova; 17.7 per cent were granted temporary residence on the grounds
of family reunification, again with a majority of these coming from
Moldova; and 17.3 per cent of the temporary residents came to Roma-
nia to work there, mainly from China, Italy and Turkey. While half of
the Chinese and Italian temporary residents are workers, more than
40 per cent of the Moldovans are students (Ministry of Interior and
Administration Reform 2007: 37-39).
The number of asylum seekers entering Romania is very low. The
number of claims filed reached a peak with about 2,400 in 2004 and
has been decreasing ever since, with 594 claims filed in 2005. The
most significant countries of origin were Iraq, Bangladesh and China
(UNHCR 2007: 473).
Due to its very nature, there is no way of measuring the numbers of
immigrants entering or working in Romania illegally. Estimates of the
stocks based on the numbers of expulsions and the numbers of per-
sons detected in Romania and at the borders decreased from 20,000
in 2000 to 12,000 in 2002. The number of those caught entering the
country illegally is usually much lower than the numbers of those
caught leaving the country illegally. Of the 3,600 people arrested in
2002, about 2,540 (both foreign and Romanian) were trying to leave
the country (OECD 2005: 260). These numbers of apprehensions at
Table 9.5 Number of foreigners holding permanent and temporary residence
permits in Romania, 1999-2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Permanent residence
permits
1,300 1,200 1,100 1,400 NA 2,314 3,595 5,429
Temporary residence
permits
61,900 69,500 66,500 66,500 NA 44,448 45,890 48,177
Total 63,200 70,700 67,700 67,900 NA 46,762 49,485 53,606
Note: NA = not available
Sources: OECD 2005; Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform 2006, 2007
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the borders decreased considerably to about 1,000 in 2006. 380 of
these tried to enter the country illegally. The numbers of refusals of en-
try have also declined, from about 80,000 in 2002 and 2003 to about
50,000 in 2005 and 2006, with more than 50 per cent of those re-
fused entry coming from Moldova. (Ministry of Interior and Adminis-
tration Reform 2007: 34-35). As Baldwin-Edwards pointed out, these re-
fusals will most probably impact on illegal short-term and circular mi-
gration (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 26).
None of the above immigrants are included in the flow statistics
published by the National Institute for Statistics as these only contain
data on those immigrants whose address in Romania has been regis-
tered in their ID cards and in their evidence files (see Figure 9.1). As
pointed out by Constantin et al. (2004), these are mainly repatriates
and ethnic Romanians, with a large majority coming from Moldova
(66 per cent of the total registered permanent residents between 1994
and 2005).8 Other important countries of origin are the United States,
Ukraine and Germany. More than 80 per cent of these immigrants are
under 50 years of age, with the majority being between 26 and 40. 46
per cent of those who have arrived between 1991 and 2005 were fe-
male, so the gender ratio is more or less balanced (National Institute
for Statistics 2006).
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9.5 Conclusions
The statistics on international migration published by the National In-
stitute for Statistics only cover a tiny fraction of the actual movements
to and from Romania. This is mainly due to the fact that the system of
measuring migration has only changed slightly since the end of the
communist period in 1989. The main interest of current statistical re-
porting seems to be the documentation of the stocks of Romanian citi-
zens, of the permanent emigration of Romanians and of repatriations
as well as of the permanent immigration of ethnic Romanians. Tem-
porary movements, which have increased massively since the change
of the political system, have generally been ignored. The only exception
to this rule was the 2002 Census, which tried to measure the actual
population rather than the registered permanent population. Unfortu-
nately, it vastly under-recorded the foreign citizens residing in the
country.
Most of the technical shortcomings in Romanian statistics were
eliminated in 2006 when the NIS introduced a centralised computer
system. However, the central problem remains to be solved and it is ne-
cessary to redefine the concept of international migration underlying
these statistics if these are to depict a more accurate picture of interna-
tional migration to and from Romania.
Notes
1 Romania lost Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and southern Dobruja after the Second
World War. However, the Germans living in these areas had been resettled to newly
acquired German territories during the war, while a majority of the Jews had died in
the Holocaust.
2 According to the census conducted in 1977, 88.1 per cent of total population were
ethnic Romanians, 7.9 per cent were ethnic Hungarians, 1.7 per cent were ethnic
Germans, and 0.1 per cent were ethnic Jews. However, out of the 17,810 people who
legally emigrated in 1977, 26.8 per cent were ethnic Romanians, 55.1 per cent were
ethnic Germans, 8 per cent were ethnic Hungarians, and 7.9 per cent were ethnic
Jews. Of the people who left Romania legally between 1975 and 1989, 44.1 per cent
were ethnic Germans, 12.8 per cent were ethnic Hungarians, and 5.4 per cent were
ethnic Jews.
3 Legal residence is established on the basis of the address registered in the respective
person’s identification card. For children under fourteen lacking an identification
card, the census registered the address of the parent(s) or the person(s) taking care of
them.
4 The following information is based on an interview with an expert from the Iaşi
county department of the NIS, 10 July 2007.
5 Between 1992 and 1996, 265,136 Romanian citizens entered Germany. Over the
same period, 194,726 people originating from Romania filed an asylum application
in Germany (UNHCR 2002: 119). Since then, the numbers of asylum seekers origi-
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nating from Romania have decreased massively, not only in Germany. Figures lay at
about 10,000 between 1996 and 2000 and decreased to 2,700 in 2005, with the
most important countries of destination for these flows being Ireland, Belgium, Italy,
Greece and France (UNHCR 2007: 473).
6 A similar pattern can be observed for the migration of Romanians to Hungary; the
numbers of immigrants from Romania increased massively in the early 1990s but a
majority of these either returned to Romania or moved on to a third destination in
the years to follow (see Hárs & Sik in this publication).
7 Foreign citizens residing in Romania can apply for permanent residence after a peri-
od of temporary legal residence of at least six years (this requirement is reduced to
three years for those married to Romanian citizens).








Ministry of Interior and
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2005. www.mai.gov.ro/documente.
ROMANIA 229
Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform (2007), Imigraţia şi azilul ı̂n România
2006. www.mai.gov.ro/documente.
National Institute of Statistics (2006), Romanian Demographic Yearbook. Bucharest: NIS.
National Statistical Institute (2005), Census of Population and Dwellings, 18 March 2002,
Volume V – Population, Households, Dwellings. Bucharest: NSI. www.insse.ro.
OECD (2005), Trends in International Migration. Geneva: OECD.
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Part 4
New immigrant receiving countries

10 Greece
Martin Baldwin-Edwards with Katerina Apostolatou
10.1 Introduction
In all countries, official state data, such as the census, constitute insti-
tutions of power, through which the state ‘imagines’ its dominion – the
nature of the human beings it rules, the geography of its domain and
the legitimacy of its ancestry (Anderson 1991: 163-164). Since the late
nineteenth century, Greece has been preoccupied with homogenising
its population with respect to ‘ethnicity’ (although religion was actually
the principal criterion) and with managing extraordinarily large popula-
tion movements (in excess of two million in the period 1919-1926)
with respect to neighbouring countries of the former Ottoman Empire
(Pentzopoulos 1962). A popular perception was systematically created
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222); the continued exodus of various minorities also served to rein-
force that perception.1 The management of statistical evidence, for the
political purpose of showing that the residents of Greece were actually
Greeks, was paramount (Michailidis 1998) and had clear parallels in
neighbouring Balkan states. Thus, with the same Ottoman population
datasets (1900, 1905) for the geographical region of Macedonia (most
of which was transferred to Greece in 1913 after the Balkan Wars), Bul-
garian, Serb, Greek and Turkish authors were each able to ‘prove’ sta-
tistically that ‘the majority of the population was theirs’ (Kertzer & Arel
2001: 21). This tendency toward political constructivism with respect to
data has not been lost in the region, although arguably it has become
more sophisticated.2
Emigration of Greeks, which had been significant at around
420,000 in the first quarter of the century, was the dominant form of
migration from 1945 to 1974. It began with refugee flight during the
1946-1949 civil war, but no data at all were recorded until 1955 (Fakio-
las & King 1996: 172). Greek ‘guestworker’ (Gastarbeiter) migrations to
Belgium began in 1953 and led to a recruitment agreement with Bel-
gium in 1957, with Germany in 1960 and subsequently with Switzer-
land, the Netherlands and Sweden (Vermeulen 2008). Gross emigra-
tion is estimated at 1.4 million for the period 1945-1974, with about
half going to Germany; some 25 per cent subsequently returned. Offi-
cial figures on return commence only in 1968, peak in 1975 and the re-
cords end – as for emigration data – in 1977 (Fakiolas & King 1996:
172-174). It can be concluded that Greek data on migrations of Greeks
were heavily reliant upon estimates, inconclusive concerning return
and repeat migrations and, overall, reflected an apparent lack of inter-
est in the matter by the state.
According to Nikolinakos (1973), mass emigration of Greeks in the
1950s and 1960s had left certain sectors of the Greek labour market
short of workers, and Africans were employed as private servants, hotel
workers and dockyard labourers alongside Turks in industry. By the
end of 1972, according to the Labour Secretary of the military govern-
ment, the number of foreign workers in Greece amounted to 15,000-
20,000, mostly Africans (Fakiolas & King 1996: 176). In the 1970s,
the first non-European refugees started to arrive – some 3,000 from
Lebanon, in 1976 – to be followed later by small numbers of Vietna-
mese boatpeople, and in the 1980s by asylum seekers and refugees
from across the Middle East (Papantoniou, Papantoniou-Frangouli &
Kalavanou 1996: 41). After 1985, large numbers of Poles and other
Eastern Europeans arrived. Greece at that time refused to allow recog-
nised refugees and asylum seekers the right to work, and they were
temporarily housed in refugee camps and rented hotel rooms awaiting
relocation to another country; however, the international climate for re-
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fugee relocation worsened, and the typical length of stay of the refu-
gees increased from six to nine months to as much as five years (Pa-
pantoniou et al. 1996: 42). Most of the asylum seekers and refugees
worked in the large Greek informal economy, and played an important
role in attracting yet more immigrants from Eastern Europe and the
Middle East.
By 1986, the number of legal immigrants was estimated as 92,440,
and by 1990 as 173,436 (Fakiolas & King 1996: 176); however, detailed
residence permit data suggest a rather lower figure of around 60,000
for 1990 (see Section 10.3.1 below). To these official data should be
added the illegal and semi-legal3 residents, estimated at 100,000 for
1990 (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a). Thus, the immigrant population by
1991 was of the order of 2-3 per cent of total population, although prob-
ably constituted a higher proportion of the labour force.
It was not until 1991 that the Greek state or society showed any real
interest in immigration policy, with the challenge to Greek border in-
tegrity by Albanians who were leaving the collapsed socialist regime of
Enver Hoxha. A few tens of thousands crossed the mountainous border
with Greece and provoked a near-hysterical reaction in the mass media,
with the rapid construction of a ‘dangerous Albanian’ stereotype (Kary-
dis 1992). Hastily, a new immigration law was approved, to replace the
outdated 1929 Law. The 1991 Law makes clear in its Preamble, the un-
derlying rationale: ‘Suddenly, Greece started to be flooded with aliens,
who, entering, staying and working illegally, create enormous social
problems for the state, while they inevitably try to solve their own pro-
blems by engaging in criminality (drugs, robberies, thefts, etc.)’ (Min-
utes of the Parliament, Session 10 October 1991; cited in Karydis
1998).
Thus, the main justification for a repressive law was the allegation
of criminality, with the mass media playing a central role in the shap-
ing of public opinion, particularly with regard to Albanians. The new
law made no practical provision for legal immigration, but instituted
several new mechanisms of expulsion and deportation as well as imple-
menting major parts of the Schengen Agreement (Baldwin-Edwards
1997; Baldwin-Edwards & Fakiolas 1998). Over the period, 1991-2001,
the Greek police typically expelled without legal process around
150,000-250,000 persons per year, of whom 75-80 per cent were Alba-
nian (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b: 4).
Since the 1970s, small numbers of ethnic Greeks had been arriving
from the Soviet Union; however, according to survey data, large inflows
began in 1989 and peaked in 1993. Various laws were enacted to facili-
tate the arrival in Greece of ‘repatriates’ from the USSR, along with easy
naturalisation: yet no reliable records of their arrival in Greece or of
their receipt of Greek citizenship have apparently been kept. Ethnic
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Greeks from Albania, on the other hand, were not accorded any real pri-
vileges over the 1990s, were not described as ‘repatriates’ and statisti-
cally were indistinguishable from illegal migrants (Baldwin-Edwards
2004a: 3). Since 2002, a Special Identity Card for Homogeneis has
been issued to Albanian nationals claiming Greek ethnicity: the number
of such permits awarded was concealed on the grounds of ‘national se-
curity’ by the Ministry of Public Order until summer 2006, when the
Minister confirmed to a Parliamentary Committee that the previously-
leaked figure of 200,0004 was correct (Athens News, 4 August 2006).
Public opinion on immigration in Greece has been very much influ-
enced by the mass media, especially in the early 1990s when it was fo-
cused on the ‘dangerous Albanian’ stereotype; the media coverage has
improved since about 2000, although the damage has been done
(Baldwin-Edwards 2004c: 58-59). Consistently, comparative European
opinion polls, such as Eurobarometer, show Greeks as the most xeno-
phobic and intolerant in the EU-15 – at least, when answering theoreti-
cal questions on racial attitudes. Greek opinion polls reveal more com-
plex patterns, with Greeks tending to blame immigrants for high(ish)
Greek unemployment, but frequently ranking illegal immigration as
one of the least pressing socio-political problems in Greece, ranking it
in tenth position out of twelve choices (Baldwin-Edwards & Safilios-
Rothschild 1999: 214-215). Thus, it is not surprising that Greek citizens
make a clear distinction between common xenophobic beliefs and
more positive personal experiences, with few real complaints about im-
migration in everyday life. Immigration has yet to emerge as a signifi-
cant political issue, despite its salience over the last fifteen years.
10.2 Overview of stock and flow statistics
In the early 1990s, despite the very large number (hundreds of thou-
sands annually) of Albanians involved in illegal migration and subse-
quent (illegal) expulsions by the Greek state, along with the rapidly-
growing xenophobia sponsored by the mass media, there was no shift
in state policy on the collection of statistical data. This was primarily, it
seems, because both the Greek state and society believed that the im-
migration of Albanians (and others) was a temporary phenomenon
and of little real interest to the country. The official position until the
mid-1990s was that ‘Greece is not a country of immigration’ (Glytsos
1995: 168). After several years of highly restrictive policy and typically
circa 30,000 valid work permits and 80,000-90,000 residence per-
mits, by 1994 government estimates of the stock of illegal migrants
had reached 500,000-600,000 (Baldwin-Edwards & Fakiolas 1998:
188-191). It was not until Greece’s first legalisation programme of
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1997, with 372,000 applicants for a six-month ‘White Card’, that any
hard data emerged.5 A subsequent legalisation programme for one to
three year ‘Green Cards’ yielded only 228,000 applicants and the lack
of adequate immigration statistics resulted in increasing criticism from
European quarters.
By the time of the decennial population census in 2001 there was
some considerable political pressure on Greece to attempt to record its
total immigrant population. The 1991 Census, conducted in the nor-
mal Greek bureaucratic style, had captured a picture of mainly legal
immigrants: the 2001 Census was approached differently. The National
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) set out to convince immigrant or-
ganisations and the illegal immigrant population generally, that its re-
cords – although state-owned – were sacrosanct and unavailable to po-
lice, immigration or tax authorities. The NSSG mounted sophisticated
advertising campaigns to this end and also engaged in direct dialogue
with major immigrant groups.6 The result was that some 762,000
non-Greeks were recorded in the 2001 Census – around 7 per cent of
total population – and it was generally considered to be a remarkable
success in the recording of illegal immigrants. However, it should be
noted that this census, like all Greek censuses since 1951, had no ‘sen-
sitive’ questions pertaining to mother tongue, religion, ethnicity or
multiple nationality.
The latest stage in the evolution of immigration data in Greece has
its foundation in the 2001 Immigration Law (2910/2001). This trans-
ferred the responsibility for immigration issues away from the Ministry
of Public Order (although leaving it with legal competence for border
controls, ethnic Greeks, asylum seekers and EU nationals) and to the
Ministry of the Interior. In particular, it established a semi-autonomous
research body – the Migration Policy Institute – attached to the Minis-
try, with the mandate to conduct or commission research and to pro-
vide policy advice. This institute, under its new political leadership in
2004, awarded a series of research contracts to universities and exter-
nal authorities. The first was a study of immigration statistical data in
Greece in order to advise the Ministry of the current state of affairs, as
well as to make recommendations for improvement in the collection
and compilation of such data – the latter, particularly, in order to con-
form to the new EU regulation on migration data. This study was con-
ducted by the current author and is available on the web (Baldwin-Ed-
wards 2004a). Eight of its nine recommendations have now been im-
plemented, and Greek immigration statistics are slowly converging
onto a more typical European pattern of data-collection and presenta-
tion. The 2005 Immigration Law (3386/2005) continued the moderni-
sation of immigration data collection, although with few specific struc-
tural changes.7
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The principal sources of data on migration are:
– the decennial census (NSSG),
– the quarterly Labour Force Survey (NSSG),
– the register of residence permits for third-country nationals (Inter-
ior Ministry),
– the register of asylum applications and decisions (Ministry of Public
Order).
The residence permit data allow for the analysis of reasons for the
awarding of residence permits – employment, self-employment, family
reunification, etc. – and the nationality (but not country of origin) of
permit holders. There is no information available on education and
skill levels from this dataset, although this information is now begin-
ning to be collected in order to compensate for the lack of data collec-
tion by the Labour Ministry. The 2001 Census is the only published
source of data on education and skills, although the last few years of
the Labour Force Survey are in theory able to provide this.8 Data on
asylum seekers are provided by the Ministry of Public Order and
UNHCR, but there are no reliable data on existing stocks of recognised
refugees.
In principle, there are also registers for the permits given to Alba-
nian ethnic Greeks (Ministry of Public Order) and for CIS ethnic
Greeks not awarded citizenship (Ministry of the Interior); however,
neither of these institutions has ever produced relevant data. There are
no published data on persons leaving and entering the country –
although these are checked and apparently recorded – and there are
only poor quality data on the reasons for the granting of Schengen vi-
sas, and no information on long-term national visas. There are limited
records on the awarding of Greek nationality to foreigners, but no cen-
tral data collection on the local awards to ethnic Greeks from Pontos
(by far the larger): there are, therefore, no proper data on naturalisa-
tions. The records of births and deaths of foreigners are kept manually
at over 1,000 municipalities and until late 2006 were not collated cen-
trally; these data are reproduced for the first time, below.
The 1991 Law defined foreign nationals as all those without Greek
or EU nationality (Art. 1), whilst regulating the residence and employ-
ment rights of ‘repatriated Greeks’ in a separate provision of the Law
(Art. 17). The 2005 Immigration Law repeats this definition (Art. 1),
but makes no special provision for ethnic Greeks (other than permit-
ting those whose claims of Greek ethnicity had been rejected to apply
for legalisation); other legislation exists – see 10.3.2.1 below – which op-
erates apparently independently of immigration law.
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10.3 Empirical observations of stocks and flows
10.3.1 Trends in stocks
The limited historical evidence strongly suggests that in the post-war
period Greece has always had a presence of undocumented immi-
grants, owing to the inability of the state to enact and enforce coherent
legislation in many areas of state activity. Thus, starting from 1990,
there was already a large stock of undocumented migrants who do not
appear in official data. Table 10.1 uses the latest reliable data to provide
a brief summary of information on known immigrants, by geographi-
cal origin, 1990-2006.
In terms of legally present immigrants, the data are fairly unambigu-
ous; the 1990 data are a reasonable approximation of legal third-coun-
try nationals minus most EU nationals (who, in Greece, were generally
refused permits at that time so they remained as undocumented), privi-
leged aliens of Greek ethnicity (Cypriots, Greek-Americans, Greek Pon-
tians, etc.) and recognised refugees. (Most of these latter three categories
appear in the 1991 Census and explain the difference in numbers.) The
2001 Census data capture a substantial number of – although by no
means all – undocumented immigrants, totalling 762,000 (including












Total 57,113 167,276 371,641 762,191 586,474
Eastern Africa 793 1,334 1,575 2,118 1,547
Middle Africa 35 222 142 530 296
Northern Africa 5,393 5,220 7,283 9,026 12,110
Southern Africa 155 564 37 1,085 235
Western Africa 547 503 2,329 2,941 2,391
Americas 6,063 20,872 527 27,347 3,931
Eastern Asia 759 661 363 1,513 2,453
South-Central Asia 3,697 4,481 21,813 28,584 35,091
South-Eastern Asia 4,733 4,002 5,530 7,185 7,257
Western Asia 6,823 33,556 17,228 71,271 29,178
Eastern Europe 12,471 27,968 68,564 108,693 116,588
Northern Europe 5,696 13,803 112 18,151 208
Southern Europe 2,829 27,185 244,403 450,271 374,798
Western Europe 5,487 17,569 30 23,621 22
Oceania 520 6,505 34 9,065 310
Albanian homogeneis 200,000
EU-25 estimate 70,000
Total including estimates 856,415
* valid permits as of 15 January 2006
Sources: Permit, legalisation applications and census data; authors’ compilation
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EU nationals). There is a significant difference in the management of
the two censuses, which makes data comparison near impossible. The
1991 Census massively under-recorded illegal immigrants and provides
a picture of a small number (60,000-80,000) of legal third-country na-
tionals, along with ethnic Greeks and EU nationals. The 2001 Census,
as noted above, adopted a very different strategy. It also appears likely
that ethnic Greeks, with or without Greek nationality, were recorded as
Greek citizens.
With regard to the 2006 data, the changed stock of third-country na-
tionals with permits since 1990 is of the order of 500,000; to this fig-
ure, should be added the number of ethnic Greek Albanian permits
(estimated at 200,000). Therefore, the change in stocks of documented
third-country nationals over the period 1990-2006 is from circa
60,000 to 780,000. By geographical region, the biggest increases are
in immigration from Southern Europe (Albanians), from Eastern Eur-
ope (Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Russians and Moldovans),
from Western Asia (Georgians, Armenians, Syrians and Iraqis) and
from South-Central Asia (Pakistanis, Indians and Bangladeshi).
Using various state data sources, along with averaged estimates of il-
legal stocks, the IMEPO advisory report (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a) con-
structs a complex synthetic picture of the annual changes in migrant
stocks. This is reproduced in Figure 10.1. Several points should be
made concerning this diagram. First, official permit data until recently
excluded children, who are therefore included as an estimated category
in their own right. Secondly, the practice of issuing special permits to
ethnic Greeks from Albania was started in 2001/02, and these are of
such magnitude (over 200,000) that they are factored in. Thirdly, the
practice of issuing very short-term permits has led to rapid movement
into and out of legality: this appears quite graphically after the first le-
galisation in 1997, where the lower application figures for the succes-
sor ‘Green Card’ placed some 150,000 immediately back into illegal
status. Awards of ‘Green Cards’ were very slow and, generally, with a
validity of only one or two years (theoretically they could be awarded
for one to three years and five years); subsequent renewal application
rates were very poor and, of those applying, only 50 per cent were
granted. The graph also shows the 2001 legalisation applications and
the greater success of the Interior Ministry (which assumed control of
permits and legalisations after 2001) in maintaining immigrants in le-
gal statuses.
What Figure 10.1 shows most dramatically however, is the very high
inflows of undocumented migrants – including, in reality, ethnic
Greeks who later benefited from either the awarding of nationality or
homogeneis permits. Removal of these from the data is difficult, as
these naturalisations have not been properly recorded; equally, re-
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migration of immigrants is not known and, in the case of some nation-
alities (such as Polish), may be quite high.
Table 10.1 clearly shows the predominance of immigrants from
Southern Europe – almost entirely from Albania – along with Albanian
homogeneis and immigrants from Eastern Europe. No single dataset
adequately depicts immigrant stocks, since there are so many different
immigration regimes and limited data collection, but it is possible to
utilise the 2001 Census and the latest permit data. These are shown,
for major nationalities, in Table 10.2.
Although Albanians are the predominant nationality, at 58 per cent in
the census and 63 per cent in the permit data, the census data predate
the award of 200,000 homogeneis permits to Albanians. It is also prob-
able that some Albanians, especially those with three-year homogeneis
permits, have engaged in ‘circular migration’, but without data on exit
and entry this can only be a matter of speculation. However, the num-
ber of valid permits (of both types) awarded to Albanians is probably
500,000-550,000, taking their proportion of total immigrant stocks, in-
cluding EU nationals and ethnic Greeks, up to around 66 per cent.
Bulgarians have had an increased presence since the 2001 Census,
although some of these permits are for seasonal work. Georgians are less
visible in the permit data because many will have taken Greek nationality
Figure 10.1 Evolution of legal and undocumented non-EU immigrant stock
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or homogeneis permits; the likelihood is that their actual number will be
considerably above the 2001 figure. Romanians show an increase in
the permit data, and Ukrainians have shown a large increase since the
2001 Census. Pakistanis also show a significant increase in the 2006
data, while EU-25 and US nationals are almost invisible in all data
other than the census, making it difficult to assess changes in stocks.
Only since late 2006 have data been collated for births and deaths of
foreign nationals within Greece. Table 10.3 shows the unpublished data
for 2005. Immigrant births (as defined by maternal nationality, which
might overstate the extent) constituted some 16.5 per cent of all births
in 2005. Of these alien births, the majority (60.3 per cent) were to Al-
banian women and over 70 per cent were to women from four neigh-
bouring countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. Thus,
the birth rates are in proportion to immigrant population group sizes.
This is slightly surprising, as the more youthful immigrant population
has an aggregate birth rate which is apparently similar to the very low
birth rate of Greeks. The reason doubtless lies in the very great extent
of migrant workers rather than migrant families; there are no calcu-
lated data available at this time on the proportion of family units in the
total immigrant population.
Data for deaths by nationality also reflect the age structure of im-
migrant populations and, to a lesser extent, the period when they
first migrated to Greece. Total immigrant deaths constituted only 1.5
per cent of deaths in Greece in 2005, with the Albanian proportion
at 15 per cent of immigrant deaths – well below their recorded
presence. Table 10.4 shows major nationalities; it can be seen that
Table 10.2 Principal nationalities of foreigners residing in Greece, 2001 and 2006
Census 2001 Residence permits 2006
Abs. % Abs. %
Albania 438,036 57.5 Albania 368,625 62.8
Bulgaria 35,104 4.6 Bulgaria 46,114 7.9
Georgia 22,875 3.0 Romania 26,462 4.5
Romania 21,994 2.9 Ukraine 20,283 3.5
US 18,140 2.4 Pakistan 15,478 2.6
Russia 17,535 2.3 Georgia 13,496 2.3
Cyprus 17,426 2.3 India 10,697 1.8
Ukraine 13,616 1.8 Egypt 10,629 1.8
UK 13,196 1.7 Rep. of Moldova 10,561 1.8
Poland 12,831 1.7 Russia 10,084 1.7
Germany 11,806 1.5 Others 54,132 9.2
Pakistan 11,130 1.5
Others 128,502 16.9
Sources: 2001 Census; Ministry of the Interior, residence permit data 2006
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EU countries are high on the list (reflecting the retirement migration
pattern), along with Turkish nationals. These latter are probably peo-
ple left over from the period of population exchanges between
Greece and Turkey (Baldwin-Edwards 2006), who had not changed
their citizenship.
There are data on two out of the three methods of naturalisation, but
these are highly incomplete and misleading, as well as being very small
in number. For a detailed investigation of naturalisation and citizen-
ship data, see the study authored by Harald Waldrauch (2006).
10.3.2 Flow data
Legal immigration flows are very small in the case of Greece, where the
typical mode of entry is either illegal border-crossing (from Albania),
tourist over-staying and illegal working (Eastern Europeans, amongst
others) or student entry and illegal working (Africans). There are no
data available at all on the emigration of Greeks or the re-migration of
immigrants.
10.3.2.1 Legal inflows
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Table 10.4 Deaths of foreign

















Total for Greece 103,468
Source: NSSG private communication
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Asylum seekers
The trend in inflows is shown in Table 10.5, although it should be
noted that the recognition rate is currently around 1 per cent – the low-
est in the EU. To some extent, Greece continues its older practice of
leaving rejected asylum seekers as illegal immigrants, to work in the
large informal economy: rejected asylum seekers and those formerly
with refugee status were specifically targeted in the 2005 legalisation,
attached to the 2005 Immigration Law.
The principal nationalities are Middle Eastern and Asian, as might be
expected. Table 10.6 gives the major nationalities for 2005. At this
time, Greece seems to suffer to some extent from the ‘false asylum see-
ker’ problem, although this had not always been true in the past. How-
ever, even the higher number for 2005 is insignificant in comparison.
Table 10.5 Total number of first asylum applications in Greece, 1997-2005
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number 4,376 2,953 1,528 3,083 5,499 5,664 8,178 4,469 9,050
Source: Kanellopoulos & Gregou 2006: 25
Table 10.6 First asylum applications in
Greece by principal national-
ities, 2005
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Ethnic Greeks
Of much greater significance are the inflows of ethnic Greek immi-
grants who were rapidly given Greek nationality (as ‘repatriated’9 and
‘returning’10 ethnic Greeks) or other documentation. These inflows
were not recorded centrally, nor was the awarding of Greek nationality
to them. Furthermore, many ethnic Greeks from Kazhakstan and
Ukraine did not wish to acquire Greek nationality, as they would lose
their former nationality; the 2000 Law (see Note 10) created a Homo-
geneis Card, quite different from the Special Homogeneis Card for Al-
banians, in order to grant some of the privileges of Greek nationality.
The number of such cards is not known.
There is only one source of data on inflows of ethnic Greeks from
Pontos – a survey carried out in the period 1997-2000.11 Table 10.7
shows inflows by year in the period 1987-2000, and the proportion
that entered in conformity with the 1993 Law. According to the survey,
some 155,000 entered Greece over the period 1989-2000, more or less
coinciding with the mass immigration of Albanians and others after
1991. Indeed, the peak years of immigration of Pontian Greeks were
1990-1993, over which four-year period some 80,000 arrived. It can be
seen that, starting in 1994, some 45 per cent (going up to 95 per cent
in 2000) entered with a normal tourist visa; it was this spontaneous
‘non-legal’ entry which led to the change in the citizenship law in
2000. There is no information on the number of those who may have
Table 10.7 Immigration of ‘repatriated’
Greeks, 1987-2000


















Source: Emmanouilidi 2003: Table 7
Table 10.8 Main countries of origin
of ‘repatriated’ Greeks
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entered since 2000; any who did so, would have been eligible for rapid
granting of Greek nationality or a Homogeneis Card.
Table 10.8 shows the principal countries of origin of ‘repatriated’
Greeks. The vast majority come from Georgia and have presumably ta-
ken Greek nationality. However, of the 31,000 or more from Kazakh-
stan and the 5,000 from Ukraine (there are probably many more who
have arrived since 2000), a large proportion is thought not to have ta-
ken Greek nationality but the Homogeneis Card instead.
Ethnic Greeks from Albania were not given such privileged treat-
ment. For political reasons, the Greek state preferred that they remain
as Albanian nationals with strong links in Albania; by informal bilat-
eral agreement with Albania,12 the Greek state until 2007 did not nor-
mally award Greek nationality to Albanians. From 2001 they were eligi-
ble for a Special Identity Card of three years’ duration, of which alleg-
edly some 200,000 were awarded. A government Decision13 of 2005,
with a legal base of Article 17 of the 1991 Immigration Law, grants Al-
banian homogeneis a ten-year standard residence permit along with a
Special Homogeneis Identity Card. Curiously, this Decision extends
also to Albanian nationals who have resided in Greece before 199014
and possess an expired ‘foreign identity document’.
Seasonal workers
Greece has few seasonal labour recruitment agreements and uses them
very little. The three principal bilateral agreements are with Bulgaria,
Albania and Egypt. No data have been published, but residence permit
data for the IMEPO study showed that about 1,000 Egyptians, 8,000
Bulgarians and 7,000 Albanians had taken such permits over the peri-
od July 2003 to September 2004.
10.3.2.2 Illegal inflows
These are impossible to measure, as in all countries, but interception
data can sometimes be used to make extrapolated estimates. Table 10.9
gives unpublished data from the relevant ministry, along with our own
interpolated data for actual border apprehensions.
Disregarding the mass illegal expulsions carried out in the 1990s
and 2000-2001, there is no clear interpretation possible of what has
been going on since 2002. In 2005, some 75 per cent of apprehended
illegal aliens and some 85 per cent of removed aliens were Albanian,
with Bulgarian and Romanian trailing at about 3 per cent each in both
categories (Kanellopoulos & Gregou 2006: 27-28). Thus, it seems that
the previous decade’s pattern of male Albanian illegal border crossing
continues to a great extent; women and children, however, are thought
to arrive by more legal means (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b). There is no
obvious ratio of interception to successful crossings that can be used,
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without original research being undertaken. Furthermore, there is real
doubt about the accuracy of these data anyway, as the Ministry of Pub-
lic Order does not supply figures for actual border apprehensions and
subsequent response (refoulement, asylum procedure, etc.).
10.3.3 Analysis of trends and patterns
10.3.3.1 Skill levels
The only available information on skill levels of immigrants consists of
the data on level of education from the 2001 Census; therefore, no
comparison can be made over time. Table 10.10 gives summary data
for the nineteen major nationalities, along with a comparison for the
Greek adult population. Overall, the data show immigrants as not
being significantly different in educational profile from the Greek po-
pulation, with the exception of a greater number of illiterate15 persons
(9 per cent compared with the Greek 4 per cent) and a much lower
proportion of immigrants who failed to complete high school (34 per
cent compared with the Greek 44 per cent). By individual nationality,
there are striking differences.
The US and the UK have a very high proportion with postgraduate
university education, while Ukraine, Cyprus, the UK, Germany, Russia,
Table 10.9 Border apprehensions and expulsions/deportations from Greece,
2000-2006
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Caught at border1 NA NA 29,019 22,136 15,182 26,919
Caught at sea1 NA NA 3,286 2,636 3,112 3,116
Total border apprehensions2 259,403 219,598 32,305 24,772 18,294 30,035
Administrative expulsion decisions 22,227 15,988 25,925 26,259 26,693 36,316
Judicial expulsion decisions 5,715 4,746 3,673 3,283 3,086 4,333
Total expulsion decisions 27,942 20,734 29,598 29,542 29,779 40,649
Of which:
Male 20,379 16,204 24,802 23,430 25,093 35,369
Female 7,563 4,530 4,796 6,112 4,686 5,280
Expulsions not carried out 3,711 7,492 17,848 14,616 14,059 19,411
Total expulsions carried out 24,231 13,242 11,750 14,926 15,720 21,238
Note: NA = not available
1 Prior to 2002, undocumented immigrants were removed from Greek territory without
legal process. In 2001, the Greek Ombudsman ruled that the Ministry of Public Order had
exceeded its authority and such removals were contrary to the Greek Constitution and
international law.
2 Data on border apprehensions are not provided by the Ministry, but are subsumed within
other data on apprehensions of illegal immigrants on Greek territory, and those for whom
legal process is required. There is some doubt about the validity of the calculated figures
given here, which may understate the extent of actual border apprehensions.
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Egypt, Armenia, Georgia and the US, with first degrees. These nation-
alities are significantly more skilled than the Greek population. A simi-
lar, but less pronounced, pattern can be observed with higher voca-
tional training.
A second group of nationalities can be identified, which has a high
proportion of people who completed lyceum education: these are Ro-
mania, Cyprus and Poland (around 50 per cent compared with the
Greek 27 per cent).
The third group of nationalities consists of those contributing large
proportions of people who failed to progress beyond primary school (in-
cluding those classed as illiterate). Greece itself is in this class, with 44
per cent of the population falling within the classification. Bangladesh,
Pakistan, India and Iraq have just over 50 per cent with this educational
level; slightly below Greek levels are Turkey, Syria, Albania and Australia.
Thus, it seems reasonable to talk about a polarisation of economic
migration, with the US and the UK providing highly educated workers
and the other countries in the first category also providing university
educated workers. The medium-skilled category consists of Romanians,
Cypriots and Polish – although it is likely that many of the Polish are
actually skilled craftsmen. The unskilled category has many similarities
with the Greek population and is numerically dominated by Albanians,
though it also includes significant numbers of factory workers from
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India.
10.3.3.2 Gender dispersion
The IMEPO study compared the major nationalities’ gender balance
using the 2001 Census and total residence permit data (Baldwin-Edwards
2004a: 10). Whilst noting the gender imbalance of most immigrant
groups in the census, it also noted a worsening of the gender imbalance
after 2001. Several nationalities showed an increase in males (Syria,
Egypt, Romania, Albania) and some nationalities with a female bias
showed an increase in females (the Philippines, Ukraine and Russia).
Figure 10.2 shows gender balance by region of origin, according to
the 2006 residence permit data. For Southern Europe (Albania) there
is a predominance of males; for Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Moldova) a predominance of females; South-Central Asia (Pakistan, In-
dia, Bangladesh) is predominantly male; and Western Asia looks ba-
lanced but actually consists of males from Syria and females from
Georgia and Armenia.
There is no obvious pattern of feminisation of the immigration;
rather, the pattern is one of increasing polarisation by gendered nation-
ality. These trends appear to confirm segmentation of the Greek labour
market by both gender and nationality, along with the primacy attached
to work in acquiring legal residence.
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10.3.3.3 Migration type
Since there are no data on migration flows, the majority of which are
illegal, the only data on migration type are derived from stock data.
Figure 10.3 provides summary data from the IMEPO study, which is
the only source of information on the type of residence permit; the
data are supplemented by UNHCR data on refugee and asylum seeker
stocks as well as the large figure for Albanian homogeneis permits.
There are no other data available, so no comparison can be made con-
cerning trends.
The data given below do not actually constitute stock data, as they
are total permits issued over a fifteen-month period. They do give some
indication of immigration flows by type, however. They show that the
most important category consists of dependent employment, followed
by ethnic Greeks from Albania. Two much smaller categories of self-
employment and family reunification follow, with the remaining cate-
gories more or less negligible. Unlike the case in Northern European
countries, refugees and asylum seekers are insignificant in number.
Table 10.11 gives data on permit types for the major nationalities in
Greece, by gender, for 2003-2004. These show the importance of de-
pendent employment for legal residence in Greece, with the exception
Figure 10.2 Gender ratios of immigrants with residence permits in Greece by

































Source: Ministry of the Interior, residence permit database; authors’ calculations
250 MARTIN BALDWIN-EDWARDS WITH KATERINA APOSTOLATOU
of the Albanian homogeneis permits. Also apparent is the gender asym-
metry, with male Albanians dominating the numbers (except with the
Albanian homogeneis permits, for which there are no data) and women
predominating in the case of Ukraine and Bulgaria.
10.3.3.4 Trends in dispersion by geographical origin
The trends by broad geographical region of origin for the period 1990-
2006 are shown in Table 10.1, above. In particular, the inflow of Alba-
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Family member of EU national
Spouses of homogeneis (2)
Long-term permits
Victims of trafficking
Sources: Baldwin-Edwards 2004a; UNHCR
Table 10.11 Permit types for major nationalities by gender, 2003-2004
Albanian Bulgarian Romanian Ukrainian
Totals M F M F M F M F
Dependent employment 465,848 255,442 43,087 18,880 27,584 13,228 7,402 3,054 12,225
Albanian homogeneis (estimate) 200,000 NA NA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Self-employed 82,952 46,212 5,160 1,285 3,398 3,635 1,087 780 3,109
Family reunification 81,216 19,599 46,964 1,487 2,702 450 1,240 361 1,038
Spouses of EU nationals 18,751 633 2,510 117 1,942 101 1,222 102 1,597
Seasonal 16,324 6,180 986 4,101 3,857 9 4 0 1
Refugees + asylum seekers 12,864 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Widows or children reaching 18 4,794 2,068 1,677 188 172 33 42 31 56
Study 4,646 336 491 175 298 157 154 60 120
Others (10 minor categories) 3,593 284 184 108 105 87 70 21 34
Company Executives 2,225 5 3 33 32 14 6 84 22
Parents of Greeks 1,420 28 129 7 133 5 114 3 161
Family members of EU nationals 606 42 78 39 87 12 28 22 57
Spouses of homogeneis 523 4 16 0 1 3 4 28 40
Long-term permits 419 0 0 23 33 0 1 0 1
Victims of trafficking 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Note: NA = not available
Sources: Ministry of the Interior; UNHCR; authors’ compilation
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nians over this period has been massive and they now constitute some
66 per cent of known immigrants in Greece. This unusual predomi-
nance of one nationality tends to overshadow some other trends, which
are noteworthy. First, there have been smaller but parallel trends in in-
creased immigration from other countries in the region – namely Bul-
garia, Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova – over the period
2002-2006. Secondly, there seem to have been continuous inflows of
ethnic Greeks from Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
other former Soviet satellite states; these inflows are of unknown mag-
nitude and the awards of Greek nationality and homogeneis permits are
not collated or published. Thirdly, there have been increased inflows of
male guestworkers from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, along with
smaller inflows of other Asian nationalities.
Insofar as dispersion is concerned, this seems to have increased,
even though the majority of immigrants are from relatively few coun-
tries. Thus, Greece has experienced the simultaneous concentration of
regional nationalities alongside the increased presence of previously
unknown immigrant groups. By 2001, Greece had an immigrant pre-
sence from almost every country in the world, other than some small
islands; there is even a small presence from most of the Pacific islands.
Table 10.12 Number of countries with immigrant presence in Greece, by region of
origin, 1990/1991 and 2001
Continent Region 1990/1991* 2001

















* 1991 Census data have some omissions and errors, particularly concerning smaller
national groups, so these have been supplemented with 1990 residence permit data.
Sources: Ministry of Public Order, 1990 residence permits; 1991 Census; 2001 Census
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Table 10.12 shows the changed presence of immigrants from countries
by region, 1990/91 to 2001.
10.3.3.5 Age profiles
Information on the age profiles of immigrants are still only available
from the 2001 Census; theoretically, these data are recorded for resi-
dence permits, but in practice the Ministry is unable to extract them as
actual data.
Figure 10.4 shows age distributions for the top five nationalities (ac-
cording to the census), along with those for Greeks. All nationalities –
even the US – have higher proportions of working age people than the
native population; in particular, in the age bracket twenty to 34 Roma-
nians are strikingly present, with two-thirds of their number in this
range. High proportions also exist in the case of Albanians, especially in
the under-30 range, and of Bulgarians and Georgians. The latter two na-
tionalities are also present in high proportions in the older age brackets
of 40-55, reflecting the presence in Greece of many older women, often
engaged in housekeeping and elderly care, from Bulgaria and Georgia.
The importance of Albanian and, to a lesser extent, Georgian chil-
dren in Greece can also be seen in this graph. Immigrant children
and, to some extent, immigrant births in Greece have substantially




















































































ameliorated the severe demographic decline of the Greek population
(see Section 10.3.1 above). Data on immigrant children in Greek state
schools are poor, with the primary distinction being made between
children of ethnic Greeks and others [allogeneis], with no record of the
children’s actual nationalities (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a: 18-19). Recent
residence permit data show 108,000 children under fifteen with legal
status, as of 15 January 2006; however, it seems probable that there are
more without legal residence but who are able to attend state schools.
10.4 Critical outlook
The relationship between Greek immigration statistics and ‘reality’ can-
not be understood in a one-dimensional model of the sort that is impli-
cit in much contemporary western social science; owing to post-Otto-
man history and the recent development of the modern Greek nation
state, there is not merely one ‘reality’ which statistical data can be
thought to represent. One analytical mechanism that can be used to
throw light on the situation is a two-dimensional model of ‘alternative
realities’. Thus, we can evaluate existing statistical measures according
to two distinct questions for criteria:
1. How useful are the statistical instruments in describing an inde-
pendent, non-politicised ‘reality’?
2. How useful are the statistical instruments in permitting (or describ-
ing) a politically constructed ‘reality’?
The various types of statistical data are evaluated below, using this ana-
lytical framework.
10.4.1 Flow data
10.4.1.1 Illegal migration flows
By definition, illegal migration flows cannot be measured. What can be
measured with precision are two related categories: border apprehen-
sions and expulsions of detected illegal migrants. The former have con-
sistently been mixed up with the latter, while exaggerated data on bor-
der arrests have been provided by ministers in formal EU contexts.
The mass expulsions carried out before 2001 (see Table 10.9) did not
record the identities, ages, gender or anything other than (alleged) na-
tionalities of people expelled from Greece without legal process. It is
thought that many were repeat migrants; thus, the total figures for ex-
pulsions were related to cases rather than individuals, as well as exag-
gerated the apparent extent of illegal immigration.
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The lack of adequate data on border apprehensions, as well as the
merging of expulsion data with border arrests, have the effect of ob-
scuring the realities of immigration from public scrutiny. In the
1990s, this was used to some effect by linking the illegal expulsions
(skoupa or ‘broom’) of, in the main, Albanians, with Greek foreign pol-
icy. Thus, when Greek relations with Albania worsened, usually con-
cerning ethnic Greeks in southern Albania, the police would expel all
the undocumented Albanians they could find. This was presented as
an exercise in enforcing the law (the ‘broom’), but it was clear to all
that it was used as an expression of Greece’s regional hegemony and of
the primacy of Greek culture and ethnicity in the Balkan region. In re-
cent years, these low-quality data have permitted Greek politicians to
argue for fiscal transfers from Brussels, in order to deal with the ‘mas-
sive’ illegal immigration from which Greece suffers. This is a new poli-
tical construction, with a different target audience.
10.4.1.2 Legal migration flows
Legal migration flows comprise three types (Section 10.3.2.1): asylum
seekers, ethnic Greeks and seasonal workers.
Asylum seekers are subject to much regulation within the EU, so the
data should reflect European standards. In practice, there are substan-
tial deviations from lawful procedures, with the result that many asy-
lum seekers are denied the right to apply. It is possible that these data
are less accurate than elsewhere in the EU.
Ethnic Greeks’ inflows are completely unrecorded; other than in the
case of the granting of Special Visas to applicants in Pontos in the
1990s, these visa data were never published or made available. The dif-
fering treatment of ethnic Greeks from different countries, the conceal-
ment of their mass arrival, the linkage of Albanian ethnic Greeks with
foreign policy issues such that they could not until 2006 take Greek
nationality, along with the complete lack of transparency and public de-
bate about legislation on ethnic Greeks: all of these are symptoms of
extreme political constructivism. Neither the Treaty of Lausanne, nor
the Greek Constitution, gives any rights of residence for ethnic Greeks;
the legislation conferring these rights was enacted without public de-
bate and its motivation is open to question.
Seasonal workers, although small in number, are recruited from several
countries; no data are available on these inflows, although they can be
imputed from residence permit data. Given the massive structural need
for such workers in agriculture, it is remarkable that so few temporary
workers are recruited. Presumably, since these jobs are filled by illegal
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residents, the state prefers to avoid any public discussion about its lack
of immigration policy: the lack of data is of some benefit in this regard.
10.4.2 Stock data
10.4.2.1 Census data
Despite the presence of a significant immigrant population by 1990
(both legal and illegal), the 1991 Census made no attempt to capture
reality. It recorded almost exclusively Europeans, ethnic Greeks and le-
gal residents. By the late 1990s, there existed considerable political
pressure – both external and domestic – on the Greek Government to
quantify the extent of illegal immigration. Thus, a serious attempt was
made to modify the census procedures to this end (see Section 10.2).
However, the 2001 Census did not break with a tradition established in
the 1961 Census of not recording details relating to religion, ethnicity
or mother tongue. There are also many points of confusion in the data
as regards who is Greek or not; clear definitions of legal status (Greek
national, ethnic Greek of other nationality, etc.) are not used.
Nevertheless, the 2001 Census data constitute the most reliable in-
formation set currently available and represent a real challenge to the
political constructivist tendencies of the Greek state, despite the ab-
sence of any information at all concerning religion, native languages,
self-identified ethnicity, etc. Although the 2001 Census was relatively
successful in recording a depoliticised reality, access to the raw data is
prohibited.16 The National Statistical Service of Greece has decided that
all datasets are subject to the Data Protection Act (which Greece was
forced to pass in order to be admitted to Schengen). With this pretext,
the Statistical Service is able to control and ‘own’ the national datasets,
since independent analyses of the raw data are prevented. The benefit
of this policy is not so clear, but is in line with older approaches to
state information, along with a lack of public accountability.
10.4.2.2 Legalisation data
There have been five legalisation processes as of early 2008; from
1998, an initial ‘White Card’ lasting six months was followed by a
‘Green Card’. There was another large legalisation in 2001, attached to
the Immigration Law; yet another occurred in 2005, followed by one in
2007. From the 1998 procedures, some data were prepared from the
first phase; bureaucratic problems with the Green Card meant that the
state could not even declare the number of legal immigrants at any gi-
ven point in time. Although the 1998 data were the first to give any
real information about illegal immigrants in Greece, the Green Card
data were constructed post hoc. They failed to reveal the bureaucratic
disasters of the programme, including the cases of hundreds of thou-
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sands of people left in limbo for years and others who were unable to
renew their one-year or two-year cards. No data (other than total appli-
cations and awards) have ever been released of the legalisations in
2001, 2005 and 2007. Most of the data provided reveal little more than
the number of applicants and try to give the impression that the Greek
state is doing something about the problem of illegal immigration.
10.4.2.3 Residence permit data
This dataset, created by the Ministry of the Interior upon taking over
the policy area in 2001 (see Section 10.2), is slowly being improved
and proceeding toward a more European approach to data-collection.
Nevertheless, there are still many shortcomings, such as the inability
to extract age profiles (apparently recently remedied) and duration of
residence in Greece. These data, like those contained in the 2001 Cen-
sus, are part of a modernising trend which continues within the Minis-
try. At the ministerial level, however, there is some manipulation of
data going on, thus exaggerating the Ministry’s success in awarding re-
sidence permits. Different datasets are handed out to researchers and
journalists, when, in fact, they should contain exactly the same data
concerning valid permits on a specified date. This problem indicates
that political constructivism is alive and well, even when modernisation
trends are also flourishing.
10.4.2.4 Homogeneis permit data
No data have been published or communicated, except as ‘leaked’ infor-
mation in approximate form. The Ministry of Public Order considers
these data to be subject to issues of ‘national security’; there is a com-
plete lack of accountability or transparency as regards the policy and
data on ethnic Greeks, whose total number is thought to be in excess
of 400,000 since 1990. The existence and award of the permits for
Albanian homogeneis is pure political constructivism – an action appar-
ently taken without any political accountability. (There is a smaller
dataset on homogeneis in the Ministry of the Interior, which is also
unpublished.)
The reason given for secrecy – national security – is not entirely
baseless. This is because the purported number of permits handed out
was 200,000, whereas the total number of ethnic Greeks in southern
Albania had previously been estimated at 40,000 by the Albanian state
and 200,000-300,000 by the Greek state. Clearly, if all 200,000 reside
in Greece, then there should be almost no ethnic Greek population left
in Albania! There is no evidence to suggest that that has happened; in-
deed, something rather more complex has occurred. It has been sug-
gested that Albanians of Vlach ethnicity, seeing that their Vlach rela-
tives in Greece had become fully Greek, presented themselves to the
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Greek authorities as ethnic Greeks. There is also informal evidence to
suggest that the police authorities understood this and were complicit
in thus seeking to expand the recognised Greek community. All of this,
of course, is quite inconsistent with Greek foreign policy on Albania;
hence, we have an issue of national security.
10.4.2.5 Other stock data
These consist primarily of the births and deaths of foreign residents
and naturalisations.
Births and deaths data have only just been made available, though this
availability has not been made public by the authorities. The presence
in Greece of sizeable numbers of Albanian and other non-Greek chil-
dren is a matter of some contention, especially within the Greek school
system, with its declining population of Greek children. It is thought
that the appearance of this dataset is because of pressure from the Eur-
opean Commission; the fact that it has not been published on the in-
ternet – or even announced – suggests that these data are either of lit-
tle interest or are not welcomed by the state.
Naturalisation data are not available, since there are three discrete pro-
cedures – none of which publish any data at all. The sparse tables
which are available from the Ministry of Interior have little connection
with reality, and even these do not give former nationality, gender or
age of successful applicants. The transformation of large numbers of
aliens into Greek nationals is, therefore, unrecorded by statistics. Such
data would show how many Pontian Greeks have arrived since 1990 –
something toward which the Greek population is fairly hostile. The
data for allogeneis (non-Greeks) would show how few have been granted
Greek nationality, which is something Greece would prefer not to show
to the rest of Europe. Thus, all types of naturalisation data are unwel-
come for the Greek state.
10.4.2.6 Holistic data compilation
Given the multiplicity of categories of immigrant, along with the invol-
vement of different ministries as well as local authorities in handing
out permits, there is a need for central data collation for the publica-
tion of a statistical overview. In theory, the National Statistical Service
of Greece should be the responsible authority; in practice, it has been
provided with very little data. It seems that most official statistics sent
to Eurostat were, in effect, constructed from low-quality and incom-
plete information and are thus of little use for perceiving the realities
of immigration into Greece.
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10.5 Towards some conclusions
Overall, the balance between the evidence as evaluated with the two cri-
teria is heavily weighted toward the second – that is, the facilitation of
a politically-constructed reality. As we have attempted to show in the
introduction, this is part of modern Greek history and therefore an in-
tegral component of Greek institutional behaviour. Given such a con-
text, the 2001 Census and the Interior Ministry’s residence permit da-
tabase represent a significant shift away from traditional cultural
norms; the process is still in its early stages, though.
One might venture to suggest that many countries’ politicians would
dearly like to be in the Greek situation with respect to immigration
data, where they could adopt a certain position one day and the oppo-
site, the next. The downside is that compilation of reliable statistics is
seen as an attribute of a developed state, most certainly of one in the
European Union. Greek politicians appear not to be very troubled by
comments such as ‘worse population statistics than almost any African
country’, and rely upon the phenomenon of illegal immigration as a
defence. This is despite the (concealed) fact that Greece has effectively
no channels for legal immigration, whilst illegal immigrants seem to
find adequate employment quite easily.
Examining actual flows and trends, this last point continues to ring
true. Illegal immigration is set to continue, although male Albanians
now predominantly have legal status. The new immigrants are arriving
from Asia and the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, from Africa.
These will not be recorded, except in small numbers as intercepted ille-
gal migrants or asylum seekers; the great majority arrive legally, as in
most countries. The lack of data on arrivals and departures means that
the Greek state will not even be able to estimate migration flows; in-
stead, as previously, it will simply wait for large stocks of illegal immi-
grants to appear. The principal positive point is that the residence per-
mit database should improve and the Ministry has adopted many re-
commendations and made other improvements, such that it will be
able to provide limited data on employment and other characteristics
of legal immigrants. Slowly and reluctantly, the Greek state is being
dragged into the ambit of European practices and standards concern-
ing statistical data on migration.
Notes
1 Notably, the Jewish migration to Palestine after 1920; the Vlach emigration to Roma-
nia, from 1926; the Armenian emigration to the USSR, post-1945; the Jewish migra-
tion to Israel, from 1948, inter alii (Tsitselikis 2005: Fn. 2).
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2 See the discussion on the policy towards, and counting of, various nationalities of
homogeneis (ethnic Greeks), below. Also, the management of Greek censuses since
1951, alongside the inclusion of religion on national identity cards, are clear examples
of political constructivism.
3 E.g. ‘false tourists’ who entered Greece legally, but worked illegally, and either left
and returned every three months or paid a small penalty at the border for ‘overstay-
ing’, when they eventually did leave.
4 First published in Baldwin-Edwards (2004a: 3).
5 This legalisation programme was resisted by certain interests, especially over its in-
clusion of Albanians, and was reinstated at the last minute by the Prime Minister
himself. For a summary of different political positions by various institutional actors,
see Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild (1999: 215-217).
6 Personal interviews with Nikos Karavitis, the Secretary-General of the Statistical Ser-
vice of Greece, February-March 2002.
7 Art. 93 provides for an integrated information system to be established, by future
joint decision of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Public Order.
8 The NSSG refuses to supply LFS data on immigrant groups on the grounds of ‘priv-
acy protection’.
9 On the basis of Law 2130/1993, which required entry by special repatriation visa.
10 Later extended by Law 2790/2000, to grant Greek nationality regardless of the
means of entry into Greece.
11 The Kamenidis 2000 Study, carried out by the General Secretariat for Repatriated
Greeks, in the Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace; cited in Emmanouilidi (2003: 46-50).
12 Such an agreement has been denied by the Albanian government, and in the absence
of documentation constitutes a unilateral declaration by Greece.
13 Decision 4000/3/10-d (FEK 646, 13.05.2005): 9187-9189.
14 The reason for the inclusion of this provision is not given, is currently unknown, and
it is unclear which category of persons might benefit from it. On the face of it, it
would seem not to include the minority group known as Cham or Tsamides: these
were Greek nationals who were forced to flee across the border into Albania towards
the end of the Second World War, as some of them had collaborated with Axis forces.
Since 1991, they have made restitution claims for their properties in Greece.
15 Judging by the surprisingly large proportions of ‘illiterate’ Germans, British and
Americans – at approximately 6 per cent – these data seem unreliable. Possibly, the
question was misinterpreted by some census takers as meaning literacy in the Greek
language.
16 The datasets are handed in their entirety to international agencies such as OECD and
Eurostat: it is non-state agencies that are prohibited access.
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Migration to Portugal, in sizable numbers, is a very recent phenomen-
on. In fact, until the mid-1970s only a few thousand foreigners, mostly
from neighbouring Spain, were resident in the country.
The migratory situation of the country changed remarkably in the
aftermath of the 1974 Revolution and the subsequent independence of
the former colonies in Africa.1 During this period, close to half a mil-
lion Portuguese nationals returned to Portugal. To clarify their citizen-
ship status, Law 308 – A/75 (24 June 1975) established that only those
returnees (retornados) who were not of African ancestry were entitled to
Portuguese nationality.2 As a consequence, some of the returnees and
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Country (PALOP) lost their Portuguese nationality. These newly-made
foreign citizens constituted the first sizable ‘immigrant’ communities
in Portugal. Through family reunification and family formation, these
immigrant communities from the PALOP continued to grow. By 1985,
the country had 79,594 foreign legal residents, of whom 44 per cent
were from the PALOP (Baganha & Marques 2001: 93).
In 1986, Portugal joined the European Economic Community (EEC),
which attracted foreign investment and entailed the transfer of volumi-
nous structural funds. Over the following years, the overwhelming ma-
jority of these funds were invested in communication infrastructures
(bridges and highways) as well as in public buildings and urban renewal.
All these investments in the construction and building sector generated
plenty of new jobs at the bottom of the occupational ladder that immi-
grants from the PALOP, particularly from Cape Verde, were eager to fill.
This boom in construction and building, which essentially attracted
unskilled or low-skilled labour, coincided with a boom in tertiary activ-
ities, for which the native population was not prepared. These tertiary
activities, such as banking, finance, real estate, computer software and
marketing, attracted a substantial number of highly skilled immi-
grants, particularly from Western Europe and Brazil. In fact, the largest
rates of change in occupational groups, between 1983 and 1996, oc-
curred in two menial occupational groups: personal and domestic ser-
vices (428.9 per cent) and construction and industry (288.7 per cent);
and in two high-skilled occupational sectors – professionals and techni-
cians (403.9 per cent) and directors and managers (236.5 per cent) (Ba-
ganha, Ferrão & Malheiros 1998: 94).
Nevertheless, immigration to Portugal was a relatively minor phe-
nomenon at the end of the millennium. In 1999, 190,896 foreign le-
gal residents were living in the country, which at the time represented
less than 2 per cent of the total resident population. More than 90 per
cent of these were from the PALOP, Brazil or a Western European
country. Furthermore, incoming migration at the time could essentially
be attributed to the country’s colonial past and economic relations.
Without oversimplifying we can say that immigration to Portugal was
a bipolar movement, at one extreme constituted by unskilled or low-
skilled workers, overwhelmingly from the PALOP, and at the other by
highly skilled immigrants, mainly from Brazil and Western Europe. In
fact, between 1990 and 1998, the share of active immigrants from the
PALOP in unskilled or low-skilled occupations surpassed 90 per cent,
while the share of active immigrants from Western Europe and Brazil
in professional and managerial occupations represented 55 per cent
(Baganha & Marques 2001).
When in 1999 Portugal was selected to organise and host the 2004
European Football Championship, construction and building entered a
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new phase of growth. Labour shortages in this sector became particu-
larly intense in 2001 and 2002. This time, however, the labour needs
of the construction and building sector were not met by the traditional
suppliers – immigrants from the PALOP – but by entirely new sources,
namely immigrants from Eastern Europe, mainly from Ukraine. This
was a very new and puzzling situation since Portugal had no historical,
cultural or economic relations with these countries that could justify
the massive inflow of their nationals.
Official documents identify three main causes for this sudden and
massive inflow from Eastern Europe to Portugal: 1) uncontrolled grant-
ing of visas by other EU Member States; 2) the speed and ease of
movement within the Schengen area; and 3) the trafficking of human
beings, as organised in Eastern Europe under the disguise of ‘travel
agencies’ (High Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities,
Foreigners and Borders Bureau & General Labour Inspectorate 2002).
These factors are undoubtedly important. A sudden, massive legal
migratory flow can only occur if the migrants have easy access to trans-
portation and legal travel documents. However, these factors do not ex-
plain why people decide to leave their countries or why they decide to
come to Portugal in particular. The answers to these questions are to
be found elsewhere (see for the following Baganha, Marques & Góis
2004 and Baganha 2007).
That the people decided to leave can first and foremost be traced
back to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing transition of East-
ern European countries to market economies and to democracy. This
process considerably increased the propensity for migration because,
firstly, the restrictions to moving abroad were progressively dismantled
in all these countries so that it became possible for a large number of
people to emigrate; secondly, the huge differences in salaries and stan-
dards of living between Eastern European and EU countries became
publicly known; and, thirdly, these were regions where a strong migra-
tory culture could be reactivated.
Why some of these Eastern European emigrants decided to come to
Portugal can be attributed to the following reasons. Firstly, Eastern Eur-
opean travel agencies, particularly in the Ukraine, marketed Portugal
by offering very attractive packages, including travel documents, trans-
portation and job opportunities, that were affordable to a large segment
of the population. Secondly, salaries in Portugal were several times
higher than in the immigrants’ home country. For example, the salary
for the lowest non-skilled position in the construction sector (Servente
da Construção Civil), the main entry gate for newly arrived immi-
grants, was 458 euros in January 2001 and 474 euros in January 2002
(Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2002). Finally, the regularisa-
tion of immigrant workers which was in force from January to Novem-
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ber 2001 offered a real alternative to an illegal stay in any other EU
country. It is the combination of all these macro- and micro-level fac-
tors that explains the sudden and massive inflow from Eastern Europe
to Portugal that largely took place during 2001.3
The end result of all these movements was that by 2005, 460,000
legal residents plus 23,000 holders of work visas4 and 11,000 holders
of other types of long-term visas were residing in Portugal. These close
to half a million legal immigrants represented roughly 5 per cent of
the total population in Portugal at the time.
11.2 Stocks
11.2.1 Sources on stocks
In Portugal, there are two main sources of information on the foreign
population in the country. The first is the census, which registers the
resident population in the country on a given day and is carried out
every ten years by the National Statistical Bureau (Instituto Nacional de
Estatı́sitca, INE). The second is a continuous reporting system carried
out by the Foreigners and Borders Bureau (Serviço de Estrangeiros e
Fronteiras, SEF). This Bureau gathers data on all the foreigners who
have applied for or hold a residence permit and registers the withdra-
wal or expiry of such permits, which may occur for three reasons:
death, acquisition of nationality or voluntary departure. These data
have been published and updated annually since 1980.
Censuses have rarely been used to describe the foreign population
for three main reasons. Firstly, when compared to other sources, they
have been shown to cover the foreign population very poorly. Secondly,
the two most recent censuses, respectively carried out in 1991 and
2001, failed to register a large foreign population that illegally resided
in the country and that was brought to light by special regularisations
in 1992 and 2001. Thirdly, census data are static and do not capture
changes over time.
By contrast, the statistics of the SEF are frequently used to describe
the foreign population. However, this source does not cover the entire
foreign resident population. What the SEF database contains are data
on all holders of residence permits, all applicants for residence permits
and, since 2001, all holders of permits of stay.5 Other forms of legal sta-
tus, such as work or student visas, are not covered by this register.
There is no published information on the characteristics of the holders
of such visas, just on their volume and country of origin. Moreover,
there is, by the very nature of the phenomenon, no continuous monitor-
ing system that provides information on the illegal foreign population.
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These shortcomings are particularly relevant in the Portuguese case
because the overwhelming majority of the immigrants entered the
country on tourist visas and overstayed. This means that our knowl-
edge of the size and characteristics of the resident foreign population
is incomplete, except for the years when the state granted general am-
nesties and information on the formerly illegal population was pub-
lished.
11.2.2 Main characteristics of the resident foreign population
In 1960, the number of foreign residents in Portugal was insignificant.
29,428 foreign citizens were resident in the country at the time, which
represented 0.3 per cent of the country’s total resident population.
Furthermore, of these 29,428 foreign residents, 67 per cent were from
a Western European country, largely from neighbouring Spain.
This changed during the process of decolonisation in the aftermath
of the 1974 Revolution. By 1980 the number of foreign residents had
increased to 58,091 persons, representing approximately 0.6 per cent
of the resident population; what is perhaps more important, of these
58,091 foreigners 47 per cent originated from an African country,
mostly from a former Portuguese colony.
Table 11.1 presents the development of the resident foreign popula-
tion or, to be more precise, of holders of residence permits from 1980
to 2005. As we can see in Table 11.1, the number of foreign residents
increased continuously over the whole period, practically doubling
every decade. The annual average growth rates by decade indicate that
the inflow from Asia (mainly from China) grew faster than immigra-
tion from other countries, except during the 1990s when the fastest
growing population was from Africa (mainly from Cape Verde).
At the same time, the composition of the resident foreign population
did not change significantly between 1980 and 1999. During this peri-
od, the largest group of foreign residents was from Africa, accounting
consistently for more than 40 per cent of the total foreign population
(more than 95 per cent of these 40 per cent were from the PALOP,
mainly from Cape Verde). This group was followed by residents from
Western Europe and from Central and South America (in the latter
case, overwhelmingly from Brazil). The other origins were of far less
numerical significance.
However, over the last six years the composition of the resident for-
eign population has become more diversified, since the number of
foreign residents from Europe, Asia and Central and South America
has grown faster than that of foreign residents from Africa. While,
up to 2000, the foreign resident population accounted for a meagre 2
per cent of the resident population, with the vast majority of these
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foreigners being from two very specific origins, either the EU or one
of the Portuguese-speaking countries (Brazil and the former colonies
in Africa), this changed drastically in 2001 when the number of legal
residents rose markedly and the countries of origin became more di-
versified. Table 11.2, which summarises the numbers of valid resi-
dence permits and permits of stay between 2000 and 2005, shows
that the number of legal foreign residents rose by 68 per cent from
208,198 to 350,877 between 2000 and 2001 (mainly due to a special









1980 58,091 27,748 4,821 6,403 1,153 17,706 260
1981 62,692 27,948 6,018 8,123 1,394 18,931 278
1982 68,153 28,903 6,855 10,481 1,663 19,924 327
1983 79,015 32,481 8,520 13,351 2,219 22,053 391
1984 89,625 37,128 9,887 15,394 2,860 23,896 460
1985 79,594 34,978 7,987 11,567 2,564 22,060 438
1986 86,982 37,829 9,047 12,629 2,958 24,040 479
1987 89,778 38,838 8,623 13,009 3,124 25,676 508
1988 94,453 40,253 8,338 14,645 3,413 27,280 524
1989 101,011 42,789 8,737 15,938 3,741 29,247 559
1990 107,767 45,255 8,993 17,376 4,154 31,410 579
1991 113,978 47,998 9,236 18,666 4,458 33,011 609
19921 122,348 52,037 9,430 19,960 4,769 34,732 621
19931 136,932 55,786 10,513 21,924 5,520 37,154 696
19942 157,073 72,630 10,739 24,815 6,322 41,819 748
1995 168,316 79,231 10,853 25,867 6,730 44,867 768
1996 172,912 81,176 10,783 25,733 7,140 47,315 765
1997 175,263 81,717 10,573 25,274 7,192 49,747 760
1998 178,137 83,065 10,247 24,579 7,419 52,060 767
1999 191,143 89,797 10,169 25,767 7,935 56,689 786
20003 208,198 99,107 10,259 27,638 8,734 61,635 807
20013 223,976 107,273 10,187 28,856 9,721 67,121 818
20023 238,746 114,193 10,195 30,592 10,815 72,121 830
20033 250,231 118,012 10,119 32,458 11,584 77,216 842
20043 265,361 123,093 10,129 35,032 12,410 83,859 838
20053 276,460 127,001 10,138 37,420 12,841 88,217 843
1 The values for 1992 and 1993 vary from table to table in the statistics due to the special
regularisation process carried out in this period.
2 The statistics for 1994 include those foreigners legalised in 1992 and 1993.
3 Indicates provisional data.
4 Over 95 per cent of the foreign residents from Africa are from the former Portuguese co-
lonies, while 90 per cent of the European immigrants are from the EEC countries.
Sources: 1980-1999: INE, Demographic Statistics (Estatísticas Demográficas); SEF cited in
Baganha 2001; 1999-2005: SEF statistical report for the given year
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regularisation process). Furthermore, the stock of the foreign resident
population continued to grow, reaching 460,293 persons in 2005;
this constitutes roughly 5 per cent of the total resident population in
the country.
Table 11.3 illustrates the increased diversification of countries of ori-
gin of the foreign resident population in Portugal by comparing the
ten most important third countries of origin of the foreign population
in Portugal in 1999 and 2002.
Table 11.3 shows that the presence of nationals from countries with
which Portugal had no historical or commercial links became predomi-
nant in 2002. This was essentially due to a wave of Eastern European
migrants who entered the country in 2001 and 2002. Since then there
Table 11.2 Foreign legally resident population in Portugal, 2000-2005
Year Residence permits Permits of stay Total stock
2000 208,198 208,198
2001 223,976 126,901 350,877
2002 238,746 47,657 413,304
2003 250,231 9,097 433,886
2004 265,361 178 449,194
2005 276,460 460,293
Source: See Table 1, SEF
















Total from third countries 138,467 347,302*
Total from EU 52,429 66,602
Total foreign residents 190,896 238,746
* This total includes the permits of stay (see Note 5 at the end of this chapter) for 2001
and 2002.
Source: SEF, Statistics (Estatísticas) 1999, 2001, 2002
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have been no noticeable changes in the stock of the foreign resident
population.
11.2.3 General amnesties and special regularisations
As we have seen, some of the increases registered in the statistics of
the foreign population residing legally in Portugal are not the result of
new entries but of special legalisations of irregular immigrants already
in the country. In order to understand the numerical impact of these
processes on the evolution of the stock of the foreign legal population
and to grasp the size of the irregular population living in the country
at several points in time, we have to consider each of these processes
in more detail.
The irregular foreign population residing in Portugal grew consider-
ably over the 1980s when immigrants, particularly from the PALOP,
took to entering the country on short-term visas and to overstaying the
term of such visas.
Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986 and the country’s entry to
the Schengen zone in the early 1990s implied a revision of the prevail-
ing immigration law. Prior to this revision (Law 59/93 of 3 March
1993), the government launched a general amnesty for irregular immi-
grants already in the country to clear the migratory situation (Law 212/
92 of 12 October 1992). At the time, 39,166 irregular immigrants, 72
per cent of whom were from the PALOP and 14 per cent from Brazil,
applied for a residence permit. Nevertheless, a substantial number of
illegal immigrants either failed to resolve their situation or to secure
their legal status. That is why the government launched a second gen-
eral amnesty in 1996 (Law 17/96 of 24 May 1996). This time, 35,082
illegal immigrants applied for regularisation of their status. Again, the
overwhelming majority of these (73 per cent) were from a Portuguese-
speaking country.
In 2001, under the pressure of several lobbies (e.g. construction and
building, the tourism industry, pro-immigrant NGOs and the Catholic
Church), the government introduced a special regularisation period
(January to November 2001) for illegal immigrant workers who were
either already in the country or entered during that period and who
could prove that they held a legal work contract (Law 4/2001 of 10 Jan-
uary 2001). As a consequence of this selective regularisation 184,000
illegal immigrant workers received residence and work permits be-
tween 2001 and 2004.
In 2003, Portugal signed a bilateral agreement with Brazil, which in-
cluded the regularisation of illegal immigrant workers from Brazil who
entered Portugal prior to 11 July 2003. This special regularisation will
be in force until 11 July 2008. By the end of October 2004, 29,622 ille-
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gal immigrant workers from Brazil had applied for regularisation of
their status (SEF, unpublished data).
The most recent selective regularisation was launched on 26 April
2004. This time regularisation was open only to illegal immigrant
workers who had entered Portugal before 12 March 2003 and who had
paid their contributions to social security and the fiscal administration
for at least 90 days (Law 6/2004, art. 71). Under the provisions of this
new law, 53,196 illegal immigrant workers applied for regularisation of
their status in the country (SEF, unpublished data).
In total, the Portuguese government carried out two general amnes-
ties and three selective regularisations between 1992 and 2004. Since
the most recent of these are still under review, it is unclear how many
illegal immigrant workers will succeed in securing a permanent legal
status in the country under these provisions. What we know is that the
previous processes involved the regularisation of 257,903 immigrants,
which means that at the end of 2003 close to 59 per cent of the foreign
population legally residing in Portugal had entered and/or stayed in
the country illegally (Baganha 2005: 38). Moreover, the two last regular-
isations that are still in effect indicate that 83,000 illegal immigrant
workers currently reside in the country.
11.2.4 Demographic characteristics
There have traditionally been more men than women among the leg-
ally resident foreign population. In the early 1990s6 men accounted
for an average of 58 per cent of this group. However, between 1999
and 2005, the share of women grew continuously, increasing from 42
to 46 per cent, as shown in Table 11.4.
The feminisation of the stock of the resident foreign population is
linked to the origin of the migrants. Men still constitute the majority
in most groups with a remarkable exception: the population from
Table 11.4 Holders of residence permits in Portugal by sex, 1999-2005
Year Male Male in % Female Total
1999 109,965 58 80,931 190,896
2000 118,562 57 89,636 208,198
2001 125,941 56 98,035 223,976
2002 132,738 56 106,008 238,746
2003 137,695 55 112,536 250,231
2004 144,383 54 120,978 265,361
2005 149,203 54 127,257 276,460
Source: SEF, annual statistical report for the given year
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South and Central America or, to be more precise, from Brazil. In
2004, this was made up of 13,815 males and 15,141 females.
The majority of the resident foreign population is of working age, with
the largest group centred in the age range 25-44 years of age (46 per
cent). On the other hand, the share of foreign residents under 14 (13
per cent) and over 65 (7 per cent) is very low. Hence, in general, the
age structure is typical for economic migrants. However, the age struc-
ture differs significantly by region of origin.
On the one hand, Table 11.6 shows that the age structure of the resi-
dent foreign population from Europe and North America is biased to-
wards the age cohort 65 or over (13.1 and 13 per cent, respectively),
whereas the share of the working aged, particularly of those between
25 and 44 years of age (37.8 and 31.2 per cent, respectively), is signifi-
cantly smaller than the average. This is due to the fact that several mi-
grants from these regions are pensioners who move to Portugal after
retirement or have a second home there where they spend several
months each year.
Table 11.5 Holders of residence permits in Portugal by sex and region of origin in 2004
Total Male Female Male (%)
Total 265,361 144,383 120,978 54
Europe 83,859 44,016 39,843 52
Africa 123,093 70,259 52,834 57
North America 10,129 5,761 4,368 57
South and Central America 35,032 16,893 18,139 48
Asia 12,410 6,996 5,414 56
Other 838 458 380 55
Source: SEF, Annual Statistical Report 2004
Table 11.6 Holders of residence permits in Portugal by region, sex and age cohorts
in 2004
Total 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65 or over
Europe 83,859 11.7 11.2 37.8 26.3 13.1
Africa 123,093 13.6 17.0 48.7 16.4 4.2
North America 10,129 16.6 24.0 31.2 15.2 13.0
South & Central America 35,032 10.4 16.4 57.5 12.6 3.0
Asia 12,410 12.7 11.3 53.4 17.8 4.8
Other 838 7.5 10.7 50.6 24.6 6.6
Total 265,361 12.7 15.1 45.9 19.1 7.2
Source: SEF, Annual Statistical Report 2004
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On the other hand, the populations from South and Central America
(particularly from Brazil) and from Asia (predominantly from China)
have a higher concentration in the age cohort of 25-44 years of age, to-
talling 58 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively, while the average is 46
per cent. This is a clear indicator of the fact that migration from this
area is driven by economic motives, i.e. earning money and escaping
unemployment or relative deprivation in the home countries.
There is no information on the occupational structure of the resident
foreign population after 1998. Up to that date, the occupational struc-
ture of the resident foreign population was extremely polarised. Table
11.7 presents the relative distribution by occupation of the resident for-
eign population between 1990 and 1998.
Between 1990 and 1998, an average of 31 per cent of the foreign popu-
lation was concentrated at the top of the occupational structure and
held professional or executive occupations. At the other extreme, an
average of 49 per cent of the foreign population was concentrated at
the bottom of the occupational structure, holding manual occupations.
11.3 Acquisition of nationality
The first statistics on acquisition of nationality by foreign residents
were published by the National Statistical Bureau (Instituto Nacional
de Estatı́stica, INE) in 1994. The data published are difficult to analyse,
since for some years they do not cover all forms of acquisition of na-
tionality. Moreover, the Bureau does not explain what is subsumed un-
der the heading ‘other modes of acquisition’. Table 11.8 provides a
synthesis of these data, which differ considerably from both the data























1990 31.3 5.0 7.9 3.5 1.8 50.5
1991 32.3 4.9 7.8 3.9 1.6 49.4
1992 32.2 4.8 8.0 4.4 1.6 49.1
1993 32.5 4.7 8.2 5.0 1.5 48.1
1994 29.8 4.2 8.0 6.9 1.3 49.9
1995 29.1 4.0 8.0 8.0 1.3 49.6
1996 29.4 4.0 8.2 8.3 1.3 48.9
1997 30.1 3.9 8.2 8.4 1.2 48.2
1998 30.3 3.9 8.4 8.5 1.2 47.7
Source: SEF, annual report for the given year
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published by the SEF (Foreign and Borders Bureau) on acquisition of
nationality by naturalisation and the data provided by the Central Reg-
istry (Conservatória dos Registos Centrais).
According to Portuguese law, the acquisition of nationality only be-
comes effective after having been registered by the Central Registry.
This means that the Central Registry is the only reliable source for ac-
quisitions of Portuguese nationality by foreign residents. Unfortunately
the information available only covers the years 1999 to 2003.
Table 11.8 illustrates that only very few foreign residents acquire Portu-
guese nationality. As a consequence, the rate of acquisition of national-
ity, whether by naturalisation, marriage to a Portuguese citizen or an-
other mode of acquisition, is also very small and has been decreasing,
particularly in the years 2002 and 2003, mostly due to the fact that the
resident foreign population was growing at the time. Table 11.8 also re-
veals that most of the new Portuguese citizens were formerly citizens
of Venezuela and Brazil. This might be due to the large number of citi-
zens from these two countries who can claim Portuguese ancestry and,
as such, are entitled to Portuguese nationality.
Table 11.8 Acquisitions of Portuguese nationality after birth (including naturalisation
and other modes) by previous nationality, 1994-2003
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Angola 55 76 57 56 56 62 42 65 82 144
Cap Verde 129 169 80 93 159 117 69 228 271 370
Guinea Bissau 44 43 27 16 67 37 27 55 73 38
Mozambique 29 30 19 26 56 37 10 24 27 56
São Tomé & Principe 21 18 10 12 28 15 7 20 34 58
Total (ex-colonies
in Africa)
278 336 193 203 366 268 155 392 487 666
EU 27 45 44 47 13 42 25 27 45 62
Other Europe 19 24 19 18 6 11 7 14 16 30
Canada 39 76 69 92 4 70 55 54 65 68
US 67 164 120 203 7 91 64 90 108 94
Brazil 176 235 241 296 46 186 175 283 345 343
Venezuela 266 431 411 431 0 219 186 162 221 311
Other/stateless 99 102 57 74 77 69 54 60 82 173
INE 971 1,413 1,154 1,364 519 946 721 1,082 1,369 1,747
SEF 584 1,142 955 1,136 2,043
Central Registry 602 629 1,198 968 1,075
Sources: National Statistical Bureau (INE); Foreign and Borders Bureau (SEF), annual report
for the given year; Central Registry (Conservatória dos Registros Centrais), unpublished data
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11.4 Flows
There is no published information on arrivals and departures, either
for Portuguese nationals or for foreign citizens. The only data that pro-
vide information on migration flows in Portugal are visa statistics and
statistics on foreigners who applied for residence permits.
11.4.1 Residence and visa statistics
Residence and visa statistics are frequently confused with inflows of im-
migrants and are treated as such, though, in reality, only a part of these
data concern arrivals. In fact, this source registers the numbers of resi-
dence permits granted per year to the following categories of foreigners:
1. those who were residing in Portugal on a three-year visa to work
and applied for a residence permit;
2. those who entered the country with a visa for purposes of residence
and applied for a residence permit; and
3. those who, according to special regulations of the law, are exempt
from providing the documentation usually needed to apply for a re-
sidence permit.7
Another source for inflows are data on entries by type of visa issued
collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This database includes the
number of visas for residence, work, study and temporary stay granted
annually.8 Table 11.9 provides a synthesis of the information available
from this source.
Table 11.9 Inflow of immigrants to Portugal by type of visa, 1999-2005
Entry for the purpose of Total* Short-term
visas
Work* Studies* Residence* Temporary stay*
1999 1,931 3,487 1,890 1,281 8,589 99,664
2000 3,372 3,915 1,873 1,610 10,770 114,697
2001 3,024 4,392 1,547 2,896 11,859 108,761
2002 2,607 3,955 2,131 3,922 12,615 82,365
2003 2,762** 3,658 1,776 4,273 12,469 72,384
2004 2,770** 3,280 1,729 3,897 11,676 79,841
2005 3,742** 4,051 2,491 4,300 14,584 75,559
* visas granted for at least one year and that can be renewed
** Under the provisions of the 2003 Bilateral Agreement between Portugal and Brazil, 62
work visas were issued in 2003, 10,009 in 2004 and 3,995 in 2005. These visas were issued
to illegal immigrants already in the country and as such were deducted from the total num-
ber of work visas issued in the respective year.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unpublished data
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The Table illustrates that the number of incoming permanent immi-
grants is relatively low, with an average of 11,795 permanent immi-
grants per year. The number of temporary immigrants, business peo-
ple or visitors from countries that need entry visas is, however, quite re-
markable. On average 90,467 of these enter the country each year. It is
impossible to forecast what percentage of these short-term visa holders
will overstay the term of their visas and thus stay in the country illeg-
ally. However, this is frequent practice among immigrants from the
PALOP and Brazil, the two regions of origin of the overwhelming ma-
jority of holders of short-term visas. Finally, the above numbers also
confirm what has been stated above; the remarkable increase of the
stock of the resident foreign population in Portugal by 252,095 people
between 2000 and 2005 (see Table 11.2) was due less to legal entries
than to the special regularisation that took place in 2001. Through this
process, 183,833 illegal immigrant workers were granted permits of
stay, i.e. legal residence and permission to work.
11.4.2 Asylum seekers
In December 2004, 377 refugees recognised by the UNHCR were resi-
dent in Portugal. In the whole of Western and Southern Europe only
Slovenia and Albania recognise fewer refugees than Portugal (see the
statistics of the Portuguese Council for Refugees [Conselho Português
para os Refugiados, CPR], that are available online).
The reason for this low figure is not the number of asylum applica-
tions. As Table 11.10 shows, the number of applications is compara-
tively low, yet very much higher than the number of recognised refu-
Table 11.10 Asylum applications filed in Portugal, 1980-2004
Year Applicants Year Applicants
1980 1,638 1993 2,090
1981 600 1994 767
1982 1,115 1995 450
1983 609 1996 269
1984 378 1997 297
1985 70 1998 365
1986 275 1999 307
1987 442 2000 224
1988 326 2001 232
1989 156 2002 245
1990 75 2003 88
1991 255 2004 107
1992 690
Source: UNHCR, Population Data Unit
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gees. This is due to the rigidity of the process of evaluation of the appli-
cations. As a consequence, the overwhelming majority of applications
are turned down. However, as a rule, Portugal does not expel unsuc-
cessful applicants but either grants them residence permits on huma-
nitarian grounds or allows them to stay and to apply for a residence
permit or a permit of stay during one of the regularisation periods,
which took place in 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2003.
11.5 Conclusion
In 1999, the number of immigrants residing in Portugal represented
less than 2 per cent of the total resident population. Furthermore,
these were overwhelmingly from a Portuguese-speaking country, either
from Brazil or the PALOP. Brazilians and Western Europeans were
concentrated at the top of the occupational ladder, mainly in profes-
sional and executive occupations, while immigrants from the former
colonies in Africa were concentrated at the bottom, mainly in construc-
tion for males and domestic services for females.
This scenario changed drastically in 2001 with a sudden and intense
migratory wave from Eastern Europe, particularly from Ukraine. With-
in a few years (2000-2005), the foreign resident population rose from
208,198 to 460,293 persons, representing approximately 5 per cent of
total population in 2005. The same period saw a marked diversification
in countries of origin and a significant feminisation of migration. In
fact, the share of women in the stock of the foreign population in-
creased from 43 per cent in 2000 to 46 per cent in 2005.
The evolution of the immigrant population in Portugal can be de-
scribed from the 1980s to the present. Since that date, the SEF (For-
eigners and Borders Bureau) has published yearly information on the
main characteristics of residence permit holders – data usually treated
as describing the stock of the resident foreign population. Although
there are some gaps in this data set (e.g. information on the sex distri-
bution and on the age structure is only available for some years and
information on occupations and type of employment has not been pub-
lished since 1998), this is, nevertheless, the most reliable and consis-
tent source available with which to characterise the immigrant popula-
tion in Portugal.
By contrast, there are no published data on flows. Outflows are un-
known and information on inflows has only been collected over the last
few years. Furthermore, the data on inflows are relatively poor, register-
ing information only on two variables, inflows by type of visa and in-
flows by country of origin.
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The data on refugees are extremely poor. The only information avail-
able from the UNHCR is the annual number of applications and the
total number of refugees recognised.
Notes
1 The new countries were Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and São
Tome and Principe.
2 There were many exceptions to this rule, particularly for African residents who could
prove a special connection to Portugal and a clear desire to become Portuguese.
3 According to a national survey conducted in 2002, 57 per cent of the new immi-
grants arrived in 2001 (Baganha, Marques & Góis 2004: 32).
4 Work visas are valid for one year. After having held such a visa for three years, the
holders can apply for a residence permit. The 23,000 work visas are the sum of the
first visas issued between 2003 and 2005.
5 The permit of stay (autorização de permanência) was introduced during the regularisa-
tion process in 2001 and phased out in 2003. It was granted to immigrants who il-
legally resided and worked in Portugal in order to temporarily legalise their work and
stay. In contrast to a residence permit, the permit of stay is only valid for one year, re-
newable up to a maximum of five years, and conditional upon a valid work contract.
6 Information is available only for 1992, 1994 and 1995.
7 Thus article 88 of Law 244/98 allows illegal immigrants to apply for a residence per-
mit on humanitarian grounds.
8 Note that except for visas for short stays that are granted for periods of less than one
year, all other visas are granted for at least one year and are renewable. For this rea-
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evolução do fenómeno migratório. Lisbon: ACIME, SEF, IGT.
Baganha, M. (2005), ‘Polı́tica de Imigração: a Regulação dos Fluxos’, Revista Crı́tica de
Ciências Sociais 73: 29-44.
Baganha, M. (2007), ‘The Migration Industry: a Case Study’, in E. Berggren, B. Likic-Bro-
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Turkey has only recently come to be recognised as a country of immi-
gration and transit. In the past, Turkey was considered, and indeed re-
garded itself as, a country of emigration. Since the early 1960s it has
experienced an exceptionally high level of emigration of its own citi-
zens. It is estimated that in the last four decades more than four mil-
lion people have left the country, of whom some two million left after
1980 (Ayhan, Ergöçmen, Hancıoğlu, İçduygu, Koç, Toros, Türkyılmaz,
Ünalan, Üner & Yiğit 2000). More than four-fifths of the emigrants
left for Europe; in particular, more than two-thirds went to Germany.
The number of returnees amounted to more than half of the total
number of emigrants since the early 1960s. Today more than 2.5 mil-
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lion Turkish citizens reside in Europe, with some 100,000 Turkish
workers in the Arab countries, some 60,000 settlers in Australia and
over 75,000 workers in the CIS countries. In addition, more than a
quarter of a million Turkish migrants live in Canada and the United
States. Thus, at any one point in the last four decades, some 6 per cent
of the Turkish population was abroad (İçduygu 2004).
However, Turkish migration history was not exclusively characterised
by emigration. Immigration was an important element of the nation-
building process in Turkey in the early twentieth century. Naturally,
these inflows were limited to people of Turkish and Muslim origin
from the neighbouring regions. At the same time, and as part and par-
cel of the same process, Turkey also experienced the emigration of its
non-Muslims citizens. Only in the 1960s did Turkey become a well-
known country of emigration. Emigration slowed down but did not
cease in the 1970s, while immigration of non-Turkish persons re-
mained relatively insignificant. Turkey’s change from being a country
of emigration to one of immigration began in the 1980s and 1990s,
but until a few years ago the phenomenon and its consequences re-
mained a matter debated in relatively restricted circles. In the last few
years, as the arrivals of foreigners in the country increased, immigra-
tion has also come onto the political agenda, in particular within the
context of the country’s application for EU membership.
There are four main factors that seem to be shaping the migratory
movements to Turkey. Firstly, the long-established and ongoing political
turmoil and clashes occurring in neighbouring areas have pushed peo-
ple from their homelands in the hope of a better life, security and pro-
tection from persecution. Secondly, the collapse of communist regimes
reactivated the mobility of millions of people in the neighbouring areas.
As a consequence, Turkey has started receiving migrants from these
countries. Thirdly, Turkey’s geographical location between East and
West and between South and North has made the country a preferable
transit zone for those intending to reach western and northern coun-
tries. Fourthly, the policies and practices of ‘Fortress Europe’, with their
application of very restrictive admission procedures and increasing im-
migration controls, have diverted immigration flows targeting Europe
to peripheral zones around it, such as Turkey (İçduygu 2000).
Today there are four main types of migratory flows of foreign na-
tionals to Turkey: 1) irregular transit migrants; 2) irregular labour mi-
grants; 3) asylum seekers; and 4) regular migrants (for a detailed ela-
boration, see İçduygu 2005a). The first three types, which constitute
the larger portion of immigration flows to the country, often overlap
and fluctuate as migrants drift from one category to the other, depend-
ing on their circumstances and opportunities. Based on various official
sources (BFBA of DGS of MoI, 2001a,b), the stock of foreign nationals
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in Turkey in the early 2000s was estimated at more than 200,000, of
whom less than two-thirds (some 150,000) entered legally, while some
50,000 were irregular migrants. Asylum seekers only accounted for a
small proportion (2 per cent) of the foreigners residing in Turkey.
12.2 Overview of stock and flow data
International migration statistics in Turkey are constrained by the scar-
city and poor quality of the data. This becomes highly significant over
time concerning both outflows and inflows. As a result, it is almost im-
possible to specify who immigrated or emigrated over the years, from
or to which country and how they migrated. No precise data are avail-
able on the chronological course and directions of all relevant migra-
tion flows. Consequently, it is very difficult to obtain credible estimates
of migratory flows from and/or to Turkey. In the 1960s, the fundamen-
tal official data sources on emigration were the records of the Turkish
Employment Service (TES) and the Turkish Labour Ministry (TLM),
which reported the annual number of workers sent through official
state channels to various countries of destination. However, these data
covered only the period before 1980, were incomplete and did not re-
flect the real volume of emigration from Turkey at the time. They did
not even include all labour emigrants, let alone any other types of mi-
gratory flows.
Furthermore, there are no credible and reliable arrival and departure
statistics that provide information on immigration and emigration
flows to or from the country. While the available tourism statistics re-
port on all departures and arrivals, they fall short of producing reason-
able estimates of international migration, since they do not include any
information on the purpose and length of stay.
Censuses, which have been carried out in Turkey every five years be-
tween 1935 and 1990 and every ten years since then, are theoretically
and practically expected to collect some basic information on various
characteristics of people entering and leaving the country. Indeed, all
those censuses gathered information on the place of birth, residence
and citizenship of people residing in the country,1 which could nor-
mally be used (alone or in combination) to describe the countries of
origin of the immigrants residing in Turkey. However, the responsible
statistical institute, the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) renamed the
Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) in 2006, remained reluctant
to furnish any statistics on migration-related data, apart from simple
frequency tabulations of the total number of foreign-born persons liv-
ing in the country. On the other hand, the last three censuses (1985,
1990 and 2000) included both a question on the number of household
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members who were abroad on the day of the census and a question on
the number of household members who used to be abroad but had
meanwhile come back permanently. Unfortunately, TURKSTAT has
not disseminated any significant amount of this information. As a con-
sequence, we lack basic figures of emigration from Turkey even for
these years where data would be available. There are fairly similar pro-
blems within the context of immigration statistics. The main data
source of immigration to Turkey is held by the Bureau for Foreigners,
Borders and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Min-
istry of Interior (BFBA of DGS of MoI). These data are also far from
giving full and credible estimates of migratory flows to Turkey.
Data on legal immigration can be obtained from the Ministry of the
Interior, which collects information on work, study and residence per-
mit holders. But this information, which is based on a categorisation
of foreigners according to their citizenship, is static and not processa-
ble. It only reflects some aggregate figures. Based on the new Law on
Work Permits for Foreigners in 2003, the Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Security, as the main responsible official department, is supposed
to process all the work permits of foreigners and consequently is in
charge of producing relevant statistics on the foreigners working in the
country. However, until now this ministry has not made any attempt to
compile such statistics.
Information on asylum seekers and refugees is compiled by the
BFBA. Although the BFBA gathers very detailed personal background
information from each applicant, it only publishes statistics on annual
asylum applications broken down by nationality for security and confi-
dentiality reasons. However, the figures they do publish are fairly reli-
able and comprehensive. In addition, the BFBA has compiled some
statistics on apprehended irregular migrants. These include informa-
tion on the nationality and the year of apprehension of those who were
caught while crossing the borders illegally and those who were appre-
hended without a valid visa or were working on a visa which did not al-
low them to work.
Finally, the Bureau of Population and Citizenship of the Ministry of
the Interior publishes naturalisation statistics which include aggregate
figures on the previous citizenship of those who naturalised; unfortu-
nately, these are neither comprehensive nor complete. In fact, this is
due partly to the political sensitivity of the issue and partly to the lack
of an administrative tradition of compiling statistics in this field.
Overall, immigration-related statistics in Turkey are inadequate, in-
complete and often unreliable. However, in the period of the pre-EU
accession process, various government departments, including three
main agencies – the statistical institute, the State Planning Organisa-
tion (SPO), the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Labour
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and Social Security (MoLaSS) – have made some independent attempts
to improve the collection and compilation of data on international mi-
gration in Turkey. Conversely, there have also been discussions on the
integration of international migration statistics into the recently estab-
lished computer-based population registration system, the Central Po-
pulation Management System (MERNIS). For a long time, these at-
tempts have been insufficiently concrete to constitute any significant
progress in gathering data on international migration. However, in
2007 the Turkish Statistical Institute was able to set up a new Address
Based Population Registration System, which aims to improve existing
administrative records based on addresses. If this attempt is successful,
this new source will yield relatively good demographic data, including
information on international migration.
12.3 Description of the stock of foreign population
There are two main data sources that provide us with some informa-
tion on the stock of foreign population in Turkey: the first one is the
census that categorises the people in the country according to their
birthplace; the second is the database for residence permits, which ca-
tegorises immigrants according to their nationality.
12.3.1 Census
Information about the foreign-born population is available from the
1990 and 2000 Censuses. The 1990 Census recorded 56.5 million
people in Turkey. In the 2000 Census, the total population of the coun-
try amounted to 67.8 million. The population figure of 2000 repre-
sented a 1.8 per cent increase over the period since 1990, which is
mainly due to the fact that the population still has a considerably high
fertility rate. Although the foreign-born population grew from 1.1 mil-
lion in 1990 to 1.3 million in 2000, its share in total population in Tur-
key slightly fell from 2 per cent to less than 1.9 per cent (see Table 12.1
and 12.2).
In 1990, Bulgaria was the largest source of foreign-born residents,
with 462,767 people, or 41 per cent of the foreign-born, residing in the
country at the time. With a total population of 183,499, people from
former Yugoslavia constituted 16 per cent of the foreign-born in the
country. Another 16 per cent (176,820) were German-born foreign resi-
dents, almost all of whom most probably were the children of Turkish
migrants who had returned from Germany (see Table 12.1).
Nearly 70 per cent of the immigrants in Turkey were from one of
the top five source countries in 2000. Various Balkan countries were
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the leading countries of origin of migrants to Turkey. The 480,817 Bul-
garian-born migrants accounted for nearly 38 per cent of the foreign-
born in the country. Greece, the Republic of Macedonia and Romania
were the other Balkan countries that accounted for nearly 10 per cent
of immigrants. In addition to these, approximately 21 per cent of immi-
grants in Turkey (273,535 people) were born in Germany. Other sizable
foreign-born communities with a population of over 10,000 originated
from Azerbaijan (16,787), Austria (14,335), France (16,787), Iran
(12,957), the Netherlands (21,823), the Russian Federation (19,856),
Switzerland (10,369), Cyprus (10,391), the UK (18,914) and the US
(13,566). Again, those born in Austria, France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland are most likely children of Turkish emigrants who re-
turned home (see Table 12.2).
Table 12.1 Turkish-born and foreign-born population in Turkey, 1990






Born in Turkey 28,044,415 27,291,456 55,335,871 (980)
Born abroad 562,632 574,534 1,137,166 (20) (1000)
Afghanistan 3,626 3,594 7,220 0.13 6.35
US 7,695 5,173 12,868 0.23 11.32
Australia 1,404 1,506 2,910 0.05 2.56
Austria 3,440 3,539 6,979 0.12 6.14
Germany 88,533 88,287 176,820 3.13 155.49
Belgium 2,287 2,416 4,703 0.08 4.14
Bulgaria 224,879 237,888 462,767 8.19 406.95
France 5,235 5,045 10,280 0.18 9.04
The Netherlands 4,899 5,017 9,916 0.18 8.72
Iraq 14,652 12,651 27,303 0.48 24.01
England 3,140 3,343 6,483 0.12 5.70
Iran 6,527 3,936 10,463 0.19 9.20
Switzerland 4,018 4,091 8,109 0.14 7.13
Italy 1,079 879 1,958 0.04 1.72
Japan ,512 460 ,972 0.02 0.85
Cyprus 4,420 4,775 9,195 0.16 8.08
Egypt 1,314 1,004 2,318 0.04 2.03
Russian Federation 6,336 5,094 11,430 0.20 10.05
Syria 2,733 2,505 5,238 0.09 4.61
Saudi Arabia 1,762 1,582 3,344 0.06 2.94
Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
90,322 93,177 183,499 3.25 161.37
Greece 47,783 53,969 101,752 1.80 89.48
Others 33,712 32,913 66,625 1.18 58.59
Unknown 2,324 1,690 4,014 0.07 3.53
Total 28,607,047 27,865,988 56,473,035 20.00 1,000.00
Source: SIS 1995
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The female proportion of the foreign-born population was 51.5 per cent
in 1990 compared with 51.9 per cent in 2000, although the sex ratio
varies by origin. From 1990 to 2000, there was a slight trend towards
feminisation in the foreign-born population in Turkey; 52.4 per cent
were females from Bulgaria in 2000 compared with 51.4 per cent in
1990; similarly, 51.4 per cent were from Germany in 2000 compared
with 50.0 per cent in 1990.
12.3.2 Residence permit data
The number of residence permits issued by the BFBA is an indirect
measure of the stocks of regular migrants in Turkey. These permits are
issued for durations of residence of more than three months. Turkey
draws a significant number of immigrants from the Turkish-speaking
populations of neighbouring countries; in 2005, the total number of re-
sidence permits was around 132,000, with over 50,000 of the permit
Table 12.2 Turkish-born and foreign-born population in Turkey, 2000






Turkey 33,732,479 32,793,638 66,525,256 81.14
Total outside
Turkey
614,256 663,554 1,278,671 (18.86)
Azerbaijan 8,661 8,126 16,787 0.25 13.13
Austria 7,114 7,221 14,335 0.21 11.21
Bulgaria 228,363 252,454 480,817 7.09 376.03
France 7,815 8,161 16,787 0.25 13.13
Germany 132,937 140,598 273,535 4.03 213.92
Greece 26,967 32,250 59,217 0.87 46.31
Iran 8,076 4,881 12,957 0.19 10.13




16,625 14,890 31,515 0.46 24.65
Romania 8,330 12,356 20,736 0.31 16.22
Russian
Federation
7,764 12,092 19,856 0.29 15.53
Switzerland 4,937 5,432 10,369 0.15 8.11
Cyprus 4,799 5,592 10,391 0.15 8.13
UK 8,807 10,107 18,914 0.27 14.79
US 7,457 6,109 13,566 0.20 10.61
Others 115,941 123,795 239,736 3.54 187.49
Unknown 8,894 8,436 17,330 0.26 13.55
Total 34,346,735 33,457,192 67,803,927 1,000.00 1,000.00
Source: SIS 2003
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holders coming from Bulgaria, 7,500 from Azerbaijan, 6,700 from
Germany, another 5,000 from Iraq and 4,800 from the UK. According
to this dataset, there were also other sizable communities of foreigners
who have their residence in Turkey: Iranians (4,300), Russians
(4,200), US citizens (3,700), former Yugoslavians (3,500), Greeks
(3,400) and Afghans (2,800) (see Table 12.3).
Only 17 per cent of the residence permit holders in Turkey (over
22,000 persons) were people who work in the country and 19 per cent
were students, while the remaining 64 per cent were their dependants.
12.3.3 Acquisition of citizenship
Turkish citizenship can be acquired by birth, descent or naturalisation.
While legally Turkish nationality is open to non-Turkish people who are
willing to assimilate culturally and linguistically to Turkish culture,2 the
conditions and procedure for acquiring Turkish citizenship after birth,
regulated by Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship, favour the ius
sanguinus principle. Thus, the law offers facilitated access to citizenship
for those immigrants who can prove that they are of ‘Turkish descent
and culture’, which is the vast majority of those who are granted Turk-
ish citizenship after birth.




% Working % Student %
Afghanistan 2,833 2.2 104 0.5 627 2.5
Azerbaijan 7,486 5.7 821 3.7 2,170 8.6
Bulgaria 49,727 37.8 450 2.0 3,521 14.0
UK 4,809 3.6 1,493 6.8 142 0.6
France 1,626 1.2 1,286 5.8 91 0.4
Germany 6,677 5.1 1,508 6.8 240 1.0
Greece 3,417 2.6 307 1.4 2,178 8.6
Iran 4,260 3.2 921 4.2 833 3.3
Iraq 4,970 3.8 648 2.9 515 2.0
Kazakhistan 2,613 2.0 168 0.8 1,115 4.4
Kyrgyzstan 1,458 1.1 128 0.6 1,439 5.7
Moldova 2,618 2.0 216 1.0 231 0.9
Russian Federation 4,212 3.2 1,308 5.9 924 3.7
Ukraine 2,299 1.8 715 3.2 408 1.6
US 3,726 2.8 2,062 9.3 331 1.3
Former Yugoslavia 3,467 2.6 286 1.3 766 3.0
Subtotal 106,198 (80.7) 12,421 (56.1) 15,531 (61.5)
Others 25,396 19.3 9,709 43.9 9,709 38.5
Total 131,594 100.0 22,130 100.0 25,240 100.0
Source: Bureau for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum of the Directorate of General Security of
the Ministry of Interior
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Most of these entered the country based on the 1934 Law of Settle-
ment that differentiates between those settled by the state (assisted/
settled immigrants) and those who settle themselves (free immigrants). In
the period between 1995 and 2000, 56,449 free immigrants acquired
Turkish citizenship. While 43 per cent of these acquisitions were based
on marriages with Turkish citizens, the remaining 57 per cent were ac-
quisitions by naturalisation. As to the previous nationality of the people
who obtained Turkish citizenship, countries with the largest numbers
were Bulgaria (23,634 or 42 per cent), Azerbaijan (3,876 or 7 per cent),
Romania (2,894 or 5 per cent), the Russian Federation (2,193 or 4 per
cent), Iraq (1,635 or 3 per cent), Iran (1,337 or 3 per cent) and Moldavia
(1,292 or 2 per cent) (see Table 12.4).
In addition, 900 immigrants settled by the state naturalised between
2001 and 2005. Various Balkan countries were the major source coun-
tries of these new Turkish citizens: Bulgaria (68), Macedonia (432),
Serbia and Montenegro (285), Romania (3) and former Yugoslavia (52)
(see Table 12.5).
Table 12.4 Free immigrants who acquired Turkish citizenship, 1995-2001
Previous nationality Naturalisation Marriage Total %
Bulgaria 19,998 3,636 23,634
Iraq 1,384 251 1,635
Iran 1,080 257 1,337
Azerbaijan - 3,876 3,876
Romania - 2,894 2,894
Russia - 2,193 2,193
Moldovia - 1,292 1,292
Subtotal 22,462 14,399 36,861 65.3
Other countries 9,687 9,901 19,588 34.7
Total 32,149 24,300 56,449 100.0
Total in % 57.0 43.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Bureau of Population and Citizenship
Table 12.5 Number of settled immigrants who naturalised in Turkey by country of
origin, 2001-2005
Previous nationality 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Bulgaria 38 20 3 1 6 68
The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
107 97 73 119 76 432
Serbia & Montenegro - - 126 107 72 285
Romania 1 - 1 - 1 3
Former Yugoslavia 23 29 - - - 52
Total 169 146 203 227 155 900
Source: Official Gazette of Turkey 2001-2005; author’s calculation
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12.4 Description of flows
As noted earlier, data on flows to and from Turkey are scarce and not
very reliable. Nevertheless, the following sections will try to provide es-
timates of inflows and outflows of Turkish and foreign citizens.
12.4.1 Emigration and return migration of Turkish citizens
In recent decades there have been five main types of outflow of Turkish
citizens (İçduygu 2005b): family-related emigration; asylum-seeking; ir-
regular (undocumented or clandestine) labour emigration; contract-re-
lated (low-skilled) labour emigration; and international professional
emigration.
Family-related migration is mainly due to the presence of sizable
Turkish migrant communities in the migrant-receiving countries, in
which networks keep the migratory flows continuously active. Long
and short-term family related visits, family reunification and marriage-
related migration where brides and grooms from Turkey join spouses
living abroad, account for a significant part of Turkish emigration.
These movements are primarily directed towards Western European
countries and, to a certain extent, towards Australia and North Ameri-
ca. From numbers of arrivals of Turkish citizens in several migrant-re-
ceiving countries, we can estimate that by the mid-1990s nearly
100,000 emigrants would leave Turkey annually, a vast majority of
them directed to Europe and nearly half of them due to family ties with
those already living abroad. These ranged from long-term visits for at
least three months to long-term residence permits for a year as well as
family reunification schemes. Overall, in the second half of the 1990s,
there was a considerable decline in the family-related movement. It is
estimated that the total number of Turkish emigrants to Europe fell to
the level of 50,000 per year in the early 2000s and nearly one third of
these are those who moved in the family-related flows.
Asylum-seeking contributed considerably to the overall level of emi-
gration in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Data from the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that almost
39,000 people from Turkey filed asylum claims in 1996 (a large major-
ity of these in Germany). This number fell to about 20,000 in 1999, in-
creased again to almost 33,000 in 2001 and decreased continuously to
about 12,000 in 2005. Claims filed in Germany have fallen from almost
32,000 in 1996 to only about 3,000 in 2005 (UNHCR 2007: 525).
It is extremely difficult to provide accurate estimates of the numbers
of irregular labour migrants, due not only to the very nature of this form
of migration but also to the diversity of groups included in this category,
such as ‘illegal entrants’, ‘overstayers’ and ‘rejected asylum seekers’. In
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addition, those who enter as family members or asylum seekers may at
some stage also become ‘overstayers’ and ‘rejected asylum seekers’. In a
study conducted in the late 1990s in Turkey, nearly one-quarter of all
the interviewed international migrants stated that they had tried to enter
a country without the required papers (11 per cent) or attempted to over-
stay their visa or permit (11 per cent) (İçduygu & Ünalan 2002). Anecdo-
tal evidence of irregular migration in Turkey and Europe indicates that
although there were still ongoing flows of irregular migration, the trend
was on the decline. For instance, while 2,350 Turkish citizens were ap-
prehended in Central and Eastern Europe as irregular migrants in
2004, this figure dropped to 2,124 in 2005 (Futo & Jandl 2006).
In recent years contract-dependent labour migration has constituted
a large part of Turkish emigration. In 2000, 13,645 workers obtained
employment abroad through the Turkish Employment Office (TEO).
This figure leapt to over 20,000 in 2001, to 27,000 in 2002, to
34,000 in 2003, to 40,000 in 2004 and to over 60,000 in 2005.
These workers were hired for a period of three to 24 months by Turk-
ish or foreign contracting firms operating mainly in the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) and in Arab countries. In 2005, the
top three destination countries were the Russian Federation (32 per
cent), Iraq (12 per cent) and Kazakhstan (9 per cent). This type of mi-
gration to EU countries was almost entirely directed to Germany, based
on a bilateral agreement of 1991, which allowed German firms co-oper-
ating with Turkish partners to hire Turkish workers. 2,100 Turkish
workers found employment in Germany in this framework in 2000,
accounting for over 90 per cent of the total workers sent to Europe by
the Turkish Employment Office (TEO). This figure was 82 per cent in
2001, 85 per cent in 2002, 78 per cent in 2003 and 71 per cent in
2004. In 2005, there were over 1,000 contract-based Turkish workers
sent to Germany, accounting for 63 per cent of the workers sent by
TEO to the EU countries in the context of the same migration scheme.
Although there are no adequate data on the outflow of university
graduates and skilled workers, it is estimated that about 2,000 to 3,000
individuals, mostly specialising in the areas of computer sciences, fi-
nance and management, leave Turkey to work abroad annually. The
main destinations are the traditional migrant-receiving countries, such
as Australia, Canada, the US and some European countries.
In addition to these outflows, there is no doubt that there is a return
migration of Turkish emigrants. However, the extent of our knowledge
of this return migration is, for the most part, very limited. The reason
for this is again the lack of data. The estimated annual number of re-
turnees was around 100,000 in the 1980s; this stabilised at around
50,000 in the 1990s and currently lies below 50,000.
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12.4.2 Immigration of foreign citizens to Turkey
The inflow of foreign nationals to Turkey has become increasingly sig-
nificant in the last decade. Besides the flows of regular migrants that
are mostly unknown due to the lack of adequate data (see Section
12.2), there are two main types of inflows: that of asylum seekers and
of irregular migrants.
12.4.2.1 Asylum flows
Since the early 1980s, Turkey has become a major country of asylum.
The change of the political regime in 1979 in Iran and then the Iran-
Iraq War, the Gulf War of 1990/91 and recent political turmoil in Iraq
contributed to the asylum flows from these two neighbouring countries
to Turkey. Although de iure Turkey does not accept non-European refu-
gees based on its ‘geographical reservation’ in the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion, de facto almost all asylum applications in the country are filed by
non-Europeans. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Turkey was re-
ceiving approximately 4,000-5,000 asylum applications a year. As a
pragmatic solution, the Turkish authorities agreed to handle all applica-
tions in conjunction with the UNHCR Office in Ankara. Subsequently,
the UNHCR would try to find a re-settlement country outside Turkey
for the accepted non-European refugees. In the last decade, asylum ap-
plications in Turkey have come from over 30 different countries,
mainly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Iran and Iraq are the two
main source countries of asylum seekers. For instance, in 1997, 1,400
Iranians and 3,000 Iraqis sought asylum in Turkey. The respective fig-
ures in 2000 were 3,900 and 1,700. In 2005, 1,700 people from Iran
and 1,000 from Iraq claimed asylum in Turkey (see Table 12.6).
Table 12.6 Number of asylum applications and asylum seekers in Turkey, 1997-2005
Year Iranians Iraqis Others Total
Cases* Persons** Cases Persons Cases Persons Cases Persons
1997 746 1,392 1,275 2,939 83 117 2,104 4,448
1998 1,169 1,979 2,350 4,672 124 187 3,643 6,838
1999 2,069 3,843 1,148 2,472 184 290 3,401 6,605
2000 2,125 3,926 791 1,671 108 180 3,024 5,777
2001 1,841 3,485 497 998 372 709 2,710 5,177
2002 1,456 2,505 402 974 219 315 2,077 3,794
2003 1,715 3,092 159 342 373 514 2,247 3,948
2004 1,225 2,030 472 956 540 912 2,237 3,898
2005 1,021 1,716 490 1,047 753 1,151 2,264 3,914
* refers to number of applications filed
** indicates total number of asylum seekers, including applicants and their dependants
Source: UNHCR Office, Ankara; author’s tabulation
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12.4.2.2 Flows of irregular migrants
There are two main types of irregular migration flows into Turkey:
from north to south – immigration of labourers from the Eastern Eur-
opean and former-Soviet Union countries – and from east to west –
transit migration of people from various Middle Eastern, Asian and
African countries.
The first group of irregular immigrants are migrant workers from
countries such as Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and the Russian Federa-
tion, who are in search of employment in Turkey. Various sectors of
the Turkish economy, in particular domestic work, sex and entertain-
ment, textile, construction and some service sectors, absorb these as
temporary workers. Many of them enter Turkey legally in accordance
with Turkish visa requirements but overstay their visas and subse-
quently become illegal while in the country. The second form of irregu-
lar migration involves transit migrants who come to Turkey mainly from
the Middle East (Iran and Iraq) and from Asia and Africa (Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Somalia). These migrants intend to en-
ter Turkey for a temporary stay and to find their way to the developed
countries in the West and North. Most of these migrants are smuggled
into Turkey, while some arrive legally with tourist visas, but often drift
into illegality as they overstay their right of entry or try to enter a third
country without proper travel documents.
There are no direct data on these irregular migration flows; however,
some indicative figures are available. The BFBA reports that there were
nearly 95,000 apprehended cases of irregular migrants in 2000, but
this figure dropped to 56,000 in 2003 and to 43,000 in 2005. From
2001 to 2005, the first ten source countries were Iraq (19 per cent),
Moldova (9 per cent), Pakistan (8 per cent), Afghanistan (6 per cent),
Iran (4 per cent), Romania (4 per cent), the Russian Federation (3 per
cent), Ukraine (3 per cent), Georgia (3 per cent) and Bangladesh (3 per
cent). In the same period, 56 per cent of these migrants were caught
when they were entering or departing illegally, while the remaining 44
were apprehended while they were overstaying the term of their visa
(Table 12.7).
12.5 Conclusions
In the last two decades Turkey has fundamentally changed, from being
an emigration country to a country attracting migrants of different
kinds. Nevertheless, the country has failed to produce adequate statis-
tics that provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the migration
flows into the country. It appears that the lack of a reliable body of in-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fairly balanced and established system of collection and dissemination
of data and partly to the irregular nature of the flows into the country.
It also appears that now that, while Turkey is in accession negotia-
tions with the European Union, it does not only try to harmonise its
migratory regime with the one in the EU, but also attempts to establish
a statistical system compatible with that of the EU countries. Turkey’s
EU candidature certainly plays a key role in the country’s state appara-
tus’ concerns regarding harmonisation and subsequent efforts to im-
prove and develop the data collection on the stocks of immigrants re-
siding in the country and on the flows of people entering and leaving
the country. Some of the initiatives focus directly on the improvement
of the population registration system and the census, while others deal
with the arrival and departure statistics. In fact, international migration
statistics are central to the re-structuring of the national statistics in
Turkey. Essential for this re-structuring is an adequate administrative
and institutional capacity which can guarantee the efficient collection,
processing and dissemination of international migration data.
Notes
1 No data are available on the length or the purpose of stay, which naturally limits any
detailed structural analysis of international migrants and migration.
2 Those applying for naturalisation have to be adults (eighteen years or older) and they
have to prove that they: a) have been residing in Turkey for at least five years, b) have
decided to settle in Turkey, c) have good moral conduct, d) have no threatening ill-
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Statistics and migration: Past, present and future
Ursula Reeger and Wiebke Sievers
In his book The Politics of Large Numbers, Alain Desrosières shows that
the developments in statistical institutes were particularly dynamic
when their surveys were closely linked to contemporary issues. To
prove his point, Desrosières cites the Public Health Movement in
1840s England, Engel’s Verein der Socialpolitik in 1860s Prussia, the
economic crisis and the resulting unemployment in the United States
of the 1930s and economic planning and growth in 1950s and 1960s
France (see Desrosières 2005: 276 and chapters 5 and 6). The present
publication shows that in many European countries statistical dyna-
mism in recent decades has been closely linked to the topics of migra-
tion and integration. How to define and measure changing migration
patterns and the integration of immigrants and their descendants and
how to harmonise the gathered data have been topics discussed in
many European countries.
That these issues are not easy to solve is also linked to the fact that
the statistical tools used today were mainly invented to measure the
growth of nation states in the nineteenth century, as will be explained
in the first part of this summary, whereas the statistical measurement
of migration is a more recent interest, as Heinz Fassmann shows in
his introductory chapter to this book. After a short insight into the his-
tory of statistics that serves to put the following into perspective, we
will summarise the findings of this volume.
1 Statistics and migration: A historical paradox?
The emergence of statistics, as we understand the concept today, is clo-
sely linked to the establishment of the nation state in the nineteenth
century. Of course, some of the tools used in statistics today were intro-
duced long before the nation state came into existence. It is well-
known that ancient Babylonia, Palestine, China, Egypt and Rome con-
ducted censuses. In addition, the Greek and Roman empires had birth
registers and later also death registers. However, unlike their modern
counterparts, these did not aim at providing a complete inventory of a
specific society but at identifying those who were allowed to vote or
could be taxed. Hence, the Roman censuses, for example, did not count
all residents but only male citizens, thus excluding women, slaves and
children (see Beloch 1979).
First attempts to understand states as a whole were made in Göttin-
gen in the eighteenth century. These became known as statistics but
are only vaguely related to statistics as we know them today, mainly be-
cause they did not draw on exact survey data (see Desrosières 2005:
22). At the same time, the gathering of such data was still very much
driven by specific aims rather than by describing states as a whole.
Thus the US census, which was to become the first regular census in
the modern world, was designed to apportion both representation and
taxation to the states based on their population and wealth. Hence, the
1790 Census was a full count of the population, albeit gathering only
the basic information necessary for the apportionment. The inclusion
of further details, such as occupation, was discussed yet dismissed by
the Senate, on the grounds that it was ‘a waste of trouble and supply-
ing material for idle people to make a book’ (James Madison in a letter
to Thomas Jefferson, cited in Anderson 1988: 14).
Only in the course of the nineteenth century, when the population
became the most important element for legitimising the existence of a
state, did censuses become more exhaustive. They came to include
more details not only on the population, but also on other topics, such
as manufacturing, that would be relevant for the development of the
people. As the growth of the population became equated with the
growth of the nation, it became a source of pride both in the United
States and in the evolving European nation states (see Anderson 1988:
21; Desrosières 2000: 125). Hence, the census, in particular, and statis-
tics, more generally, became tools not only for measuring but also for
securing national growth, for instance, by using such data to fight epi-
demics and child mortality (see Desrosières 2005: 93-98, 186-189). So,
to put it in Foucauldian terms, in the course of the nineteenth century,
statistics became a powerful mechanism for regulating and thereby in-
creasing national populations, which in turn confirmed the importance
of the respective nation state (see Foucault 1999).
This intricate relationship between statistics and the nation state has
two major implications for the topic discussed in this volume, namely
European migration statistics. Firstly, as the term implies, statistics
were implemented on the state level. This was not at all an easy pro-
cess as the natural link between statistics and states today might sug-
gest. On the one hand, when statistics were introduced, states were
only just becoming the ‘common cognitive spaces’, to use Desrosières’
term, which they are today. In other words, the coherent grid that al-
lows us to observe and describe them was only just emerging (Desro-
sières 2000: 125). This becomes immediately obvious when we look at
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the first national survey conducted in post-revolutionary France. While
the results of this survey are useless for historians searching for exact
and comparable data, they aptly illustrate how diverse the country was
at the time and how little agreement there was on seemingly obvious
definitions, such as categorisation of people by their property and in-
come (see Desrosières 2005: 46-50). The reduction of this diversity
within the states by way of introducing a common legal framework, for
instance, automatically implied their differentiation from other states –
which explains the incomparability of national statistics today. Another
reason that the statistical tools that are, in principle, universal had to
be reinterpreted was the existence of particular ideological traditions.
Thus, the liberalist tradition in Britain made it very difficult to intro-
duce a census, which explains why the first mathematical tools for po-
pulation estimates were developed here (see Desrosières 2005: 28).
This same tradition also explains why Britain, unlike most other Eur-
opean countries, has no population register, though uses a sample sur-
vey to measure immigration and emigration flows. Similarly, the late
unification of German states into a federalist nation state explains why
there are still differences between the measurements of migration in
the individual Länder.
Secondly, the ‘discovery of the population’ and the goal of optimising
the life of a specific people automatically implied a racist attitude to
those not included, as Foucault rightly pointed out. This does not mean
that racism did not exist before the nineteenth century. The novelty
was that racism became an inherent element of state mechanisms, in-
cluding statistics (Foucault 1999: 294-295). Again, this process of sta-
tistical inclusion and exclusion was handled differently in the different
countries. Thus, from the start, American censuses made strict racial
distinctions among whites, blacks/slaves and Indians, but did not
clearly differentiate between original English settlers and the European
newcomers, who were regarded as contributing to the growth and im-
portance of the new state. Only when this ideological stance was ques-
tioned in the mid-nineteenth century did census takers include a ques-
tion on place of birth in the census (see Thernstrom 1992: 83-86). The
statistical exclusion of others was introduced at the same time in
France, but in a different form. Firstly, differentiation by ethnicity has
always been prohibited in France; secondly, French statistics did not ex-
clude by origin but by citizenship, which was the decisive factor in
French statistics between the 1850s and the 1990s, when the category
‘immigrant’ was introduced (see Simon 1999: 197-198). Citizenship is
still the decisive factor for statistical differentiation in many European
countries. However, as the following will show, this does not necessa-
rily mean that the data are comparable, since nationality laws differ
massively between the countries.
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All of these differences between states are still of major importance.
Nevertheless, as the following summary of our findings will show, si-
milar migration regimes and histories have implied similar trends in
the statistical description of immigration. Moreover, some findings are
valid for almost all the countries in our sample:
1. data gathered in the individual countries are hardly comparable;
2. migration statistics in each country only ever reflect part of the
truth, be it for historical and/or political reasons;
3. we have little or sometimes no knowledge about emigration, which
also implies that the calculated migration balance tends to be too
high in most countries;
4. we have little or no knowledge about illegal immigration, due to its
very nature (exceptions to this rule can be found in countries that
have carried out legalisation programmes, but the resulting data
again only offer snapshots of a resident population and no informa-
tion on flows).
The following sections not only provide a more detailed insight into re-
cent debates on migration statistics per group of countries, but also
point out the idiosyncrasies in each of these countries.
2 Statistics and migration: Current debates
2.1 Post-colonial countries
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom share long traditions of la-
bour immigration, with a significant share of these immigrants origi-
nating from their (former) colonies, which implies that many of those
who arrived were already citizens of the receiving country. In addition,
all three countries have provided relatively broad access to their nation-
alities in order to facilitate the integration of their immigrants, a stance
which has a long tradition in France and represents a more recent ap-
proach in Belgium (see Foblets & Loones 2006, Weil & Spire 2006
and Dummett 2006). Both of these factors imply that citizenship is
not a sufficient indicator for measuring international migration in
these three countries.
However, these similar points of departure do not mean that the
countries have reached the same conclusions on who should be consid-
ered an immigrant, statistically speaking. While the UK describes all of
its residents born abroad as immigrants (i.e. including British people
born abroad, as well as naturalised citizens and aliens), France only in-
cludes those who were born abroad as foreigners and reside in France
(i.e. excluding immigrants from French territories abroad such as Gua-
deloupe and Martinique), a decision which might be explained by its
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strong Republican tradition. Belgian statistics on immigration, on the
other hand, simply count the number of foreign nationals residing in
the country. Hence, they exclude all immigrants who have been natura-
lised since their arrival, who make up 45 per cent of the immigrants re-
siding in the country, as a recent study has shown (see Eggerickx, Bahri
& Perrin 2006). However, the demand for more detailed information
on the foreign-born population residing in Belgium has grown among
both researchers and policymakers. In response, researchers have tried
to provide more detailed data on immigration to Belgium within the
framework of the ‘Charles Ullens Initiative’, an inter-university survey,
coordinated by the King Baudouin Foundation, which aims to provide
comprehensive quantitative and qualitative data on immigration to Bel-
gium. It remains to be seen whether this will also bring about a change
in the conceptualisation of immigration in official Belgian statistics.
While this more recent demand for information on the foreign-born
is a factor that Belgium shares with the other guestworker receiving
countries in our sample (i.e. Austria, Germany and Switzerland), the
Belgian interest in collecting detailed data on the ethnic minorities re-
siding in the country (see Hanquinet, Vandezande, Jacobs & Swynge-
douw 2006) justifies its classification in a group with Britain and
France. As Kertzer and Arel (2002: 8-13) explain, data on ethnicity have
been collected since the rise of cultural nationalism in the nineteenth
century. At the time, Germany and Austria-Hungary gathered such
data in order to justify their political and territorial demands based on
cultural categorisations, whereas France, Britain and Belgium only dis-
tinguished between citizens and non-citizens in their territories, while
gathering detailed information on imposed racial categorisations in
their colonies. As racial categorisations were misused by the National
Socialists, many countries abandoned gathering any data on such racial
categories after the Second World War.
However, questions on race/ethnicity re-entered the census in Brit-
ain when the government prohibited discrimination based on ‘colour,
race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origin’ in
1976 and, for this purpose, needed detailed data on those targeted by
such discrimination. The first attempt of the statistical institute to
gather such data failed, due to strong objections against the suggested
categorisations. Yet, since 1991 Britain has gathered data in the census
on ethnic minorities based on racial categories, such as black, and on
ethnic categories, such as Pakistani and Bangladeshi (see Kertzer &
Arel 2002: 13-14). As a consequence, the debates on immigration fo-
cussed further on the black minority. This tension between the need
for data that makes it possible to describe and subsequently fight exist-
ing discrimination and the fact that such data codifies these same dis-
criminatory categories also characterised a fierce debate in France,
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which was triggered by a report in 1995 that pleaded for lifting the ban
on the publication of data related to ethnicity (see Blum 2002). Here,
the Republican position and the fear that such data would be abused
by the extreme right prevailed. As of yet, official French statistics do
not gather such data.1
Neither Britain nor France has a population register, which makes it
difficult to gather data on migration flows. While Britain tries to make
up for this lack by asking a sample of passengers entering and leaving
the country by ship or plane for their intended stay abroad or in Brit-
ain, France only reports on inflows of foreigners based on residence
permit data. France does not collect any data on the immigration of
French citizens. Nor does it collate information on the emigration of
either French or foreign citizens. The practice differs vastly in Belgium,
which records inflows and outflows of both Belgian and foreign citi-
zens in the National Register, which is divided into a population regis-
ter for Belgians and those aliens who hold a settlement permit and an
aliens register for all other foreigners staying in the country for an in-
tended period exceeding three months, i.e. a shorter period than re-
commended by the UN. This is normal practice in many countries,
since otherwise the published data would be outdated at the time of
publication (see Fassmann in this publication).
2.2 Guestworker receiving countries
The concepts and tools used to measure immigration and emigration
in Belgium bear close resemblances with those in the guestworker re-
ceiving countries of Austria, Germany and Switzerland, which share
with Belgium a history of active labour recruitment in Southern Eur-
ope. Like Belgium, Austria, Germany and Switzerland currently identi-
fy their immigrant population by citizenship. However, this choice re-
flects less a Republican tradition, as in France, than a long history of
not perceiving themselves as countries of immigration. All three based
their recruitment on a rotation policy, which means that the workers
received short-term contracts, after which they were expected to return
to their countries of origin. As a consequence, the arriving workers
were not perceived as immigrants, let alone as possible future citizens,
but as foreigners who were therefore also registered in specific data-
bases at the time. While Switzerland used to gather data on these
workers in permit databases and Austria had a special guestworker reg-
ister, Germany established an aliens register in 1953, i.e. before the for-
eign workers arrived, which is still the main source for information on
the resident foreign population and has recently also been used to de-
scribe the inflows and outflows of foreigners. Switzerland later fol-
lowed the German example. The German aliens register contains data
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on all foreigners legally residing in Germany for a minimum of three
months. So, in this respect, the data are comparable to those gathered
in Belgium. However, unlike in Belgium, the German and Swiss regis-
ters do not distinguish between the resident population (registered in
the population register) and the other foreign population (registered in
the aliens register) but still neatly distinguish between foreigners and
citizens. Austria, by contrast, only recently introduced a population reg-
ister that also includes data on all foreigners legally residing in the
country for a minimum period of three months.
The long histories of exclusion in Austria, Germany and Switzerland
are also inscribed in their respective citizenship legislations. All three
countries regard the acquisition of their citizenships as the final step
in the integration process rather than as an instrument facilitating this
process, which means in practice that immigrants to Austria have to
wait for at least ten years rather than three years, as in Belgium, before
they can acquire the citizenship of their country of residence. More-
over, their long-established ius sanguinis traditions have even made
and, in the case of Austria and Switzerland, still make it difficult for
children born in these countries to foreign parents to acquire the na-
tionality of their country of birth – in Germany this only changed in
2000 (Hailbronner 2006).2 As a consequence of these different legisla-
tions, the number of foreign citizens residing in Austria, Germany and
Switzerland is automatically higher than in Belgium. The effect of
these differences should not be underestimated. About 16 per cent of
the foreigners residing in Austria, 21 per cent of the foreigners residing
in Germany and 23 per cent of the foreigners residing in Switzerland
were born in these countries.
On the other hand, statistics based on citizenship exclude all immi-
grants who have naturalised since their arrival and whose success in
education and the labour market might differ from those who have
chosen not to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence. In
Austria, these are 40.7 per cent of all those born abroad. More specifi-
cally, a definition of immigration by citizenship also excludes all those
immigrants to Germany who are ethnic Germans and are counted as
German citizens when they enter the country. Between 1991 and 2005,
these were more than two million people usually not included in data
on immigration to Germany. Consequently, the information available
on immigration in Austria, Germany and Switzerland is biased. Not
only are all naturalised immigrants excluded but the category ‘foreign-
ers’ also includes two categories of people who differ in many respects:
immigrants and foreigners born in these countries. As a consequence,
the demand for data that include information on the place of birth of
the resident population has grown both among researchers and policy-
makers in all three countries. Recent survey data gathered in Austria
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(2001 Census), Germany (2005 Microcensus) and Switzerland (1990
and 2000 Censuses) include this variable; however, the next census to
be held in Switzerland will not contain data on the place of birth.
Moreover, the place of birth is not included in statistics produced on
the basis of the population and aliens registers.3
2.3 Post-communist countries
In the three post-communist countries included in this volume – Hun-
gary, Poland and Romania – both immigration and emigration were
strictly controlled and therefore also limited in the communist period.
Yet, recent studies in Poland show that the low figures can to some ex-
tent also be explained by the ways in which international migration
was measured, since those who left the country were still counted as
resident population, irrespective of their length of stay abroad. This
was slightly different in Romania, where at least ethnic emigration was
recorded meticulously, probably due to the fact that the Romanian gov-
ernment received a lump sum of money for each ethnic German and
Jew who was allowed to leave. Despite these problems in measuring
migration, there is no doubt that both emigration and immigration
grew in importance in all three countries after the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain. Large numbers of Poles and Romanians left for Western Europe
but only a minority stayed, whereas the majority have become circular
migrants, often working on an irregular basis. At the same time, all
three countries also began to receive immigrants. While these were
mostly short-term traders and irregular immigrants in the early 1990s,
regular immigration has grown in significance since the beginning of
the 21st century.
Unfortunately, the statistics in the three countries have not yet
caught up with these new developments. To some extent this is due to
the fact that these movements are, by nature, difficult to capture. This
holds particularly true for any form of irregular migration that de-
mands new forms of measuring migration, as described in the Hun-
garian chapter in this volume. However, measuring emigration, even if
it is legal, is also a problem in many of the other countries described
here. As explained above, France does not measure emigration at all
but relies on estimates. Moreover, even if the countries have installed
instruments to measure emigration, usually by deregistration from a
population register, there are usually no incentives for deregistering,
which means that emigration is underestimated and, in turn, that the
migration balance is overestimated. Both the Polish and the Romanian
chapters show how large the gap is between the numbers of emigrants
registered in their countries and the numbers of immigrants from
their countries registered abroad; in 2002 only 17.6 per cent of the Po-
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lish immigrants and 5.4 per cent of the Romanian immigrants regis-
tered in Germany had previously deregistered in Poland and Romania.
However, this massive gap between the registration of emigration and
immigration can also be explained by the conceptualisations underly-
ing these two systems. While in Romania a person is counted as an
emigrant if he or she goes to the police to permanently change the ad-
dress in his or her passport, in Germany a person is counted as an im-
migrant if he or she stays for a period exceeding one to three months,
depending on the federal state. Since many of the Romanian emigrants
only go abroad for a limited period of time, they do not deregister in
Romania but have to register in Germany, often more than once a year.
Thus, neither the small numbers of emigrants from Romania and Po-
land nor the large numbers of immigrants from these countries regis-
tered in Germany depict reality, but, rather, reflect these operative con-
ceptualisations.
This also holds true for the post-communist statistics on immigra-
tion. As in the guestworker receiving countries, these statistics are
based on the concept of citizenship. However, since immigration is a
more recent phenomenon in these countries, citizenship is still a rela-
tively good indicator of immigration – with some exceptions. Thus,
Hungarian statistics on the stocks of foreigners residing in the country
include all dual citizens, although only slightly more than half of these
were born abroad. And the Polish practice regarding this particular is-
sue is even stranger; here it is only the Opolskie voivodship that counts
all those who hold dual German and Polish citizenship as Germans,
most probably for historical reasons. On the other hand, the country of
birth of the resident population is often not a sufficient indicator of mi-
gration in these countries, due to the border changes in their recent
histories. Moreover, like emigration, immigration is still conceived as a
one-time event aimed at staying in the receiving society for good. This
implies that Polish statistics on immigration only include those immi-
grants who hold a settlement permit for which they can apply after at
least three years of residence in the country on the basis of a residence
permit. This explains why even the statistics on immigration published
in Poland only capture 3 per cent of the German immigrants recorded
as having left Germany for Poland in the year in question. Further-
more, not only the Polish statistics but also those published in Hun-
gary and Romania focus on nationals and co-ethnics. Both Poland and
Hungary gather data on returnees. In addition, Hungary gathers elabo-
rate statistics on the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship, access to
which was facilitated for the Hungarian diaspora. Finally, Romanian
statistics on immigration only contain data on those immigrants who
were able to change their address in their passport at a Romanian po-
lice station; these were, in the majority, repatriates. Again, these figures
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only capture a tiny minority of the immigrants moving to and residing
in these countries.
2.4 New immigration countries
Ethnic/postcolonial links also influence the respective statistics on in-
ternational migration gathered and published in Greece, Turkey and
Portugal. These three countries are major countries of origin of the for-
eign-born populations residing in Central, Western and Northern Eur-
ope. However, like many other countries, Greece, Portugal and Turkey
did not properly count these emigrants. Hence, all figures cited are es-
timates. More recently, all three countries have also begun to receive
immigrants. While this development goes back to the 1970s in Greece
and Portugal, with significant increases since 1990 and 2000, respec-
tively, immigration to Turkey began in the late 1980s. However, as in
the Eastern European countries, the instruments used to measure the
resident population in these countries have only slowly been catching
up with these new developments and still only cover a part of the im-
migrant population, for various reasons.
Firstly, an unknown proportion of the immigrants who reside in the
country have either entered or have been staying in the country illeg-
ally, which implies that they are usually not covered by any statistics.
However, several legalisation programmes in both Greece and Portugal
have not only served to improve the status of these immigrants in their
countries of residence but have also yielded some data on those arriv-
ing or staying illegally. Sometimes these data are very limited, provid-
ing us only with the total numbers of those who have attained legal sta-
tus; sometimes we also have figures on their nationalities and/or coun-
tries of origin. Moreover, prior to the 2001 Census, the Greek
government made major efforts to convince immigrant populations to
register, which has resulted in more reliable census data than those
available in Portugal. However, as in Turkey, the data have not been
made available to researchers or the general public.
Secondly, both Greece and Turkey facilitate immigration of their co-
ethnics. As is the case in many other countries, these are not counted
towards the immigrant population. However, in Greece matters are
more complicated. While there are apparently no figures on those eth-
nic Greeks who arrived from the former Soviet Union, those arriving
from Albania were regarded as illegal immigrants in the 1990s but
have been issued special identity cards since 2000. Again, information
on the number of cards issued was not published. Data on immigra-
tion and emigration flows to all three countries are similarly unreliable
since there are no registers on emigration in these countries and only
limited registration systems for measuring immigration flows.
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The above discussion shows that the migration statistics of indivi-
dual countries only ever reflect part of the truth, be that for historical
and/or political reasons. This becomes particularly obvious when we
look at the measurement of co-ethnic migration to many of the above
countries. Usually, researchers are aware of such deficits in their re-
spective data and may attempt to supplement these in surveys which
supply them with the missing data. Other shortcomings, however, only
become apparent in international comparison. This holds particularly
true for concepts and definitions. While these are often accepted as
natural in the individual countries, international comparison shows
their contingency.
That data are dependent on their respective setting also becomes ob-
vious in the second part of our joint exercise, which served to test the
data in the respective countries by looking at two recently observed
trends in international migration: the feminisation of migration and
the diversification of the migrants’ countries of origin. Before going
into detail, we should mention that the results of this exercise are not
comparable, since some authors based their observations on flow statis-
tics whereas others looked at stocks, where such changes have less of
an impact and appear later. Notwithstanding these differences, almost
all authors observed varying patterns regarding the feminisation of mi-
gration for different countries of origin. Moreover, while the data in
those countries with a long migration history confirmed a diversifica-
tion of origins in recent years, they also showed that it did not have a
significant quantitative impact, since the traditional sending countries
still dominated the stocks.
2.5 Feminisation of migration
In 1998, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller claimed that one of the five
main trends in recent international migration was that migration was
becoming more female. True, more and more women migrate. How-
ever, female migration did not appear out of the blue. Women had al-
ways migrated, but this fact was not really acknowledged in statistics
and research. Research on female participation in international migra-
tion only goes back some 30 years. Until then, migration had been per-
ceived as a purely male domain. If women were included in the discus-
sion at all, then they were usually regarded as dependent on their hus-
bands. Statistics contributed to this perception, as they were often not
broken down by gender. Moreover, if they were, they frequently under-
estimated the number of women, as these tended to work in the infor-
mal economy (see Oso Casas & Garson 2005: 2).
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So what do the most recent statistics in the countries under discus-
sion in this volume tell us with regard to this trend? Do our authors
observe a feminisation of migration?
The three post-colonial countries (Belgium, France and the UK)
based their observations on the stock of the foreign-born population.
All authors found a (sometimes only slight) trend towards feminisa-
tion, varying according both to country of origin (namely, more females
from Eastern Europe) and age, the latter for two reasons. On the one
hand, the female population is younger than the male population, since
they arrived more recently. On the other hand, women have a longer
life expectancy, which also influences the sex ratio in stock statistics.
The results vary more in the guestworker receiving countries (Austria,
Germany and Switzerland). What they have in common is that early im-
migration in the 1960s and 1970s was clearly dominated by men. This
changed dramatically with family reunification, which was almost com-
pleted at the beginning of the new millennium, when the stocks of im-
migrants from the most important labour-sending countries was made
up of more or less equal shares of men and women. Both the Austrian
and the Swiss data confirm the trend towards the feminisation of migra-
tion. However, the Austrian results, which are based on the stocks of for-
eign nationals, also show clear differences between the countries of ori-
gin (more females than males from Germany, India or the Philippines).
Unlike the Austrian data, the German and Swiss observations draw on
flow statistics. As mentioned above, these confirm the trend towards
feminisation in Switzerland, which the authors put down to the ‘devel-
opment of migration opportunities for more qualified women and to fa-
mily reunification’. The German chapter, on the other hand, reports the
opposite; less women than men immigrate to Germany per year, with
the respective shares remaining stable.
The three post-communist countries (Hungary, Poland and Roma-
nia) have only just begun to receive immigrants. While the authors of
the Hungarian chapter cannot observe a feminisation of immigration
flows, they state that more and more women tend to leave the country.
This also holds true for Poland and Romania. Yet, the Polish data also
seem to show a growing inflow of women, taking over the domestic
duties of Polish emigrant women, albeit only from the former Soviet
Republics, while from all other continents immigration to Poland is
predominantly male.
Finally, the data for the three new receiving countries – Greece, Por-
tugal and Turkey – also show that feminisation is not a general but a
country-specific trend, with Greece receiving more women from East-
ern Europe, Portugal from Brazil and Turkey from Bulgaria and Ger-
many. Moreover, Greece seems to be the only country in our sample
where the gender imbalance has increased since 2001.
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2.6 Diversification of origins
Over the past twenty years, international migration to and in Europe
has changed enormously. The major event was the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain and the ensuing freedom of movement for people from post-com-
munist countries, although, contrary to expectations, this did not initi-
ate mass migration movements. With the EU accession of many East-
ern European countries, their inhabitants are now entitled to free
movement within the European Union. Furthermore, globalised trans-
port and communication offer cheaper and easier possibilities to move
around. Supposedly, all of these changes have led to a diversification of
migrants’ origins in the countries under discussion in this volume. At
the same time, many EU countries have imposed new restrictions on
immigration from third countries, which might be expected to have
the opposite effect.
The findings are similar for most of the countries in our sample;
although there has been a diversification of origins, the great majority
of all immigrants still come from the traditional countries of origin.
Thus, the stock statistics in Belgium show that the pattern for the ten
most important countries of origin has not changed over the past ten
years, whereas the smaller groups from farther origins tend to diversi-
fy. Similar observations were made for Austria, Greece, the UK and
France, mostly due to an increase of immigration from Africa and
Asia. However, flow statistics in France seem to imply that the diversifi-
cation of origins has come to a stop more recently.
Two countries report a more drastic change: Switzerland and Portu-
gal. The data for Switzerland show not only a more rapid diversifica-
tion of origins but also a clear decrease in immigrants from traditional
countries of origin, namely Italy and Spain. While the decrease in Ita-
lians between 1970 and 1980 can mainly be traced back to the fact that
following the oil crisis annual permits were not renewed, the decreas-
ing number of Spanish nationals can be explained by growing return
migration. When Switzerland recovered from the economic crisis, la-
bour supply from the two traditional countries of origin was no longer
available, so that workers were recruited in Portugal, Turkey and for-
mer Yugoslavia after 1980. At the same time, there has been an in-
crease in asylum inflows, particularly from Sri Lanka and in students
coming from China. Portugal has a completely different story to tell,
with a drastic change in 2001 when an intense migratory wave from
Eastern Europe was observed, resulting in a marked diversification of
countries of origin.
Hungary is the only country in our sample where the data do not
confirm the thesis of a diversification of origins. The majority of immi-
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grants to Hungary still originate from Europe or, to be more precise,
from the neighbouring countries with large Hungarian minorities.
Finally, the authors of the chapters on Poland, Romania and Turkey
did not supply an answer to our question on the diversification of ori-
gins, as immigration is a rather new phenomenon and many of the
newcomers are not included in migration statistics.
3 The future of European migration statistics?
The present publication clearly shows that concepts and measurements
of migration in Europe still differ massively, in spite of all the time
and money that has been invested in harmonising them. There is no
agreement on either what should be counted or on how this should be
technically achieved. In fact, recent decisions on these issues have to
some extent increased diversity among the countries under discussion
here. Thus, France decided to introduce a continuous annual census,
which again makes comparison with other countries more difficult.
Serious efforts are still necessary both on the state and on the EU level
for the project of harmonising statistics to succeed.
However, the future of statistics on migration also raises more gener-
al issues, which have rarely been raised in recent discussions, either in
the individual states or on the European level. Firstly, there has been a
tendency towards further differentiation with regard to immigration.
Thus, the UK introduced ethnic categorisations and France defined the
new category of immigrant in the 1990s. Similar moves are currently
being discussed and slowly being introduced in Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many and Switzerland. This current interest in more and more data,
not only on immigrants who have acquired the nationality of their
country of residence but also on their children and grandchildren
raises the question as to when differentiations (both of origin and of
ethnicity) should be dropped. Or, to phrase it differently, when do these
constructed boundaries become irrelevant?
Secondly, there has been a distinct trend towards harmonising the
data gathered in the individual countries, but no discussion about the
question as to whether the data should actually be gathered by the
states. However, not only do states have their own specific agenda
when gathering such data, as the previous discussion should have
shown, but they also only gather data that are relevant from their per-
spective. This has resulted in a form of methodological nationalism in
migration studies that posits the nation state as the natural unit of ana-
lysis and rarely looks at subnational, supranational or transnational as-
pects of migration (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller 2002: 306). Conse-
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quently, either states include these dimensions or other bodies will
have to gather data that go beyond the state perspective.
Notes
1 Roxane Silberman (1992: 121) points out that such data was gathered on specific
groups, such as Muslims of Algerian origin or on French immigrants from overseas
territories in the 1954 census, which, according to her, shows that ‘there exists a tra-
dition of ethnic categories in France with a strong racist and colonial character’.
2 The most recent changes in the Austrian Citizenship Law that came into force in
2006 could be interpreted as a move towards ius soli as they entitle foreign citizens
born in Austria to citizenship after six years. However, the children still have to fulfil
the general naturalisation requirements that were increased by the same law (see Çı-
nar & Waldrauch 2006: 53).
3 The Austrian population register includes data on the place of birth since 2006.
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